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Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) has been a common feature of war, in armed conflict 
situations. This is particularly so on the African continent where sexual and gender-based crimes 
(SGBCs) are prevalent. Previously thought of as an unavoidable feature of war, it is now realised 
that SGBV is used as a weapon of war by perpetrators of these crimes. For years, SGBCs were 
marginalised and overlooked as they were not prosecuted as crimes in their own right. It was 
through the work of many feminists’ striving to have these crimes recognised and prosecuted in 
their own right, that these crimes were included as crimes in their own right in statues such as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rome Statute.  
Though SGBCs were included as crimes in their own right in the Rome Statute, this did not 
necessarily mean that these crimes were tried and when tried, there is no assurance that they 
would be successful prosecuted. As a result, it is necessary that SGBCs committed during armed 
conflicts are prosecuted at the international, regional and domestic levels so that the impunity 
gap for these crimes is closed. This thesis therefore considers the prosecution of SGBV 
committed during armed conflicts in Africa at the International Criminal Court (ICC), regional 
(proposed African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights) and domestic level (using 
the Democratic Republic of Congo as the case study). This is with a view to assessing whether 
these three forms of justice will bridge the impunity gap in bringing prosecutors to account 
and/or complement each other. The end result of this is to deter the occurrence of the above 
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BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF STUDY 
1.1    BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY – INTRODUCTION 
Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) has been a common feature in armed conflict 
situations. Askin, a feminist scholar, in referring to impunity relating to rape and other sexual 
and gender-based crimes (SGBCs), notes how exceptional it is ‘to read in detail about one (war) 
without reading about the other (rape)’.1 SGBV involves premeditated crimes committed by 
rebel forces and dissidents, as well as government agents, such as the local police, members of 
the victims’ community and peacekeeping forces,2 regardless of their victim’s age, ethnic group 
or political affiliation. Civilian women and children in particular are intentionally targeted for 
SGBCs.3 Although in recent years, scholars such as Sivakumaran have drawn attention to the 
fact that men and boys also experience SGBV during armed conflicts,4 the crimes are generally 
viewed as crimes primarily committed against women and girls. Examples of SGBV committed 
against women and girls in armed conflicts include rape, sexual slavery and mutilation, forced 
nudity, enforced prostitution and causing unwanted pregnancies.5 Previously thought of as an 
inevitable by-product of war or collateral damage to be tolerated, it is now realised that SGBV is 
used as a weapon of war by perpetrators of these crimes. It is used to instil fear in and humiliate 
                                                            
1 Kelly Dawn Askin, ‘Holding leaders accountable in the International Criminal Court for gender crimes committed 
in Darfur’ (2006) 1 Genocide Studies and Prevention 13 at 14. 
2 Rashida Manjoo & Calleigh McRaith ‘Gender-based violence and justice in conflict and post-conflict areas’ 
(2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal 11. Catherine N Niarchos ‘Women, war and rape: Challenges facing 
the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 649 at 655. 
Women have also been known to incite troops to commit acts of gender-based violence on victims. For example, in 
the Rwanda genocide, the former Minister for Family Welfare and the Advancement of Women, Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko, incited troops and the militia to carry out rape against the Tutsi women. She was the first woman to 
be convicted for genocide and genocidal rape before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Kelly 
D Askin, ‘The quest for post-conflict gender justice’ (2002 – 2003) 41 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 509 
at 513. 
3 Though female combatants are also victims of SGBV, it is civilians who are mainly targets of SGBV. 
4 Sandesh Sivakumaran ‘Sexual violence against men in armed conflict’ (2007) 18 European Journal of 
International Law 253-276. Valerie Amos, former under-secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief 
Coordinator ‘Remarks to the global summit to end sexual violence in conflict – ministerial dialogue on the hidden 
victims of sexual violence’ (12 June 2014) available at http://reliefweb.int/report/world/under-secretary-general-
humanitarian-affairs-and-emergency-relief-coordinator-valerie-5 (accessed 2 January 2015) (pointing out that 
though sexual violence against men and boys is not a new phenomenon, it was only documented in 25 conflicts 
between 2000 to 2010). 
5 Men and boys also experience rape during armed conflicts. Other forms of SGBV which men and boys experience 
are castration, being forcibly stripped naked during detention, torture of their genital areas, forced to rape others 




the enemy, bring shame and destruction to a community as an instrument of ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
and as a form of punishment.6 SGBV is also used as a means of demonstrating power and control 
over victims and targeted communities.7 As stated by Zaniab-Bangura, a former Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, sexual violence in armed conflict 
had become ‘cost-free’ for perpetrators to rape their victims during armed conflicts.8  
It is the victim’s gender that makes her especially vulnerable to those perpetrating these 
gender-specific crimes. Campanaro makes this point that ‘[i]n times of war, women and girls are 
targeted for sexual abuse on the basis of their gender, irrespective of their age, ethnicity or 
political affliction. By virtue of their gender, women become the target of one of the most serious 
violations that occur during war’.9 In expressing his opinion on the violent nature of sexual 
violence committed against civilian women during armed conflict, Major-General Patrick 
Cammaert, a former peacekeeping commander of the United Nations (UN) in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), stated that ‘[i]t has probably become more dangerous to be a woman 
than a soldier in an armed conflict’.10 
SGBV has long-term effects on victims of these crimes, resulting in their needing 
medical and psychological help. The Chibok girls from north-eastern Nigeria, who were released 
from captivity by the terrorist group known as Boko Haram, are a recent example of victims of 
SGBV needing medical and psychosocial therapy. The psychosocial team comprises a 
                                                            
6 Manjoo & McRaith ‘Gender-based violence and justice’ Cornell Law School at 14 Resolution 1820 (2008) (19 
June 2008) S/RES/1820 (2008) available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/485bbca72.html (accessed on 12 January 
2015). 
7 Interview with Margot Wallstrom, former Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in 
Conflict (11 Nov 2010) available at www.un.org/apps/news/newsmakers.asp?NewsID=26 (accessed 12 January 
2015). 
8 UNSC ‘Security Council adopts text urging targeted sanctions against perpetrators of sexual violence during armed 
conflict’ (June 2013) available at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc/1043.doc.htm.sc/1043 (accessed 14 January 
2015). 
9 Jocelyn Campanaro ‘Women, war and international law: The historical treatment of gender-based war crimes’ 
(2000 -2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal at 2557 - 2558. In the Rwandan genocide for example, Mullins writes 
that ‘[g]ender also (laid) at the core of why sexual violence was embraced as part of the genocide event.’ 
Christopher W. Mullins: ‘He would kill me with his penis, genocidal rape in Rwanda as a state crime’ (2009) 17 
Critical Criminology 15 at 28. Sivakumaran ‘Sexual violence against men in armed conflict’ The European Journal 
of International Law at 253-276 (also arguing that men committed sexual violence against men because of their 
gender and also maintains that such violence committed against men is under-reported.). 
10OHCHR ‘Rape as a weapon of war’ available at 
 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/RapeWeaponWar.aspx (accessed 6 January 2015).  
Beth Van Schaack ‘Obstacles on the road to gender justice: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as 




psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker and doctor.11 Some of the well-known medical 
problems which victims of SGBV may suffer include post-traumatic stress disorder, insomnia, 
HIV/AIDS, gonorrhoea, traumatic fistulas and injury to their reproductive organs or infertility as 
a result of being raped repeatedly.12 Women and girls may also experience unwanted 
pregnancies or medical complications when attempting to abort unwanted pregnancies.13 Victims 
of SGBV are normally traumatised twice. First, from the violence suffered in the hands of their 
perpetrators, and then from the reactions of society and state, towards them.14 For example, there 
is the shame and stigma which women suffer when rejected by their family members and 
communities or divorced by their husbands.15 In the case of men known to have been raped, they 
are considered homosexuals and treated ‘like a wife’.16 SGBV in armed conflict situations has 
been prevalent on the African continent. The genocidal conflict in Rwanda in 1994 and the 11-
year civil war in Sierra-Leone which began in 1991 highlighted the effects SGBV had on 
civilians.  
1.2   STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
To curtail violence committed against combatants and non-combatants in times of war, 
international humanitarian law (IHL) provides a set of rules which combatants should adhere 
to.17 Though rape has historically been considered a criminal offence in national and 
                                                            
11 Of the 276 Chibok girls who were abducted, three were found or had escaped, 21 were freed in October 2016 and 
83 in May 2016. News 24 ‘Chibok girl refused to be part of release deal: Nigeria’ (May 2017) available at 
http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/chibok-girl-refused-to-be-part-of-release-deal-nigeria-20170509 (accessed 12 
May 2017). CNN ‘A rare inside look at the Chibok girls’ road to recovery’ (May 2017) available at 
www.cnn.com/2017/05/11/africa/nigeria-chibok-girls-release-boko-haram/ (accessed 12 May 2017). 
12 Manjoo & McRaith ‘Gender-based violence and justice’ at 16. Human Rights Watch ‘Seeking justice: The 
prosecution of sexual violence in the Congo war’ (March 2005) at 45 available at 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0305.pdf (accessed 6 January 2015). 
13 Ibid. 
14 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on conflict related sexual violence’ para 10 (S/2017/249, 15 April 2017). 
15 Manjoo & McRaith ‘Gender-based violence and justice’ at 16. 
16 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on conflict related sexual violence’ para 8 (S/2016/361, 20 April 2016). 
OHCHR ‘Report of the panel on remedies and reparations for victims of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo to the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ at 50 (2011). 





international laws relating to armed conflicts and it is not condoned by IHL, gender-specific 
violence remains rife in armed conflict situations.18 
Despite SGBCs occurring in armed conflict situations, these crimes were often passed over for 
prosecution by tribunals such as the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg, which 
elected to prosecute the perpetrators for generalised war crimes such as murder and torture. 
Gender-specific crimes instead were subsumed under the category of ‘other inhumane acts’.19 
Scholars such as Pillay put this down to the fact that such instruments were drafted by men who 
considered rape and gender-related crimes as an inevitable by-product of war or collateral 
damage to be tolerated and ignored.20 Feminist scholars such as Copelon, on the other hand, have 
argued that for the most part, gender-based crimes are invisible and only become public when 
they form ‘part of the competing diplomacies of war’.21 
As a result of the invisibility of SGBCs to the international community and courts, 
feminist scholars and activists, and various non-governmental organisations (NGOs), have 
actively sought to have gender-specific crimes such as rape, forced marriage, forced pregnancy 
and sexual slavery perpetrated against civilian women and girls recognised in international 
instruments and prosecuted as distinct or different crimes in their own right when perpetrated in 
armed conflicts. There has been progress in the body of international law relating to SGBV 
crimes committed in armed conflict situations: various UN reports,22 human rights law, such as, 
                                                            
18 Rhonda Copelon ‘Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes against Women in Humanitarian Law’ (1994) 5 
Hastings Women’s Law Journal 243 at 248. Patricia Viseur Sellers ‘The cultural value of sexual violence’ (1999) 93 
American Society of International Law Proceedings 312 (where the writer outlines the development of the 
prohibitions of sexual violence). See also chapter 2 regarding the Lieber Code of 1863 which condemned rape as a 
capital offence and was adopted by states such as the United States. Hague Conventions and Regulations, art 46 
where sexual violence is indirectly prohibited as a violation of ‘family honour’. Articles 27, 76 and 97 of the Four 
Geneva Conventions, art 78 of Protocol I, art 4 Protocol II prohibit rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of 
indecent assault, also calls for the special protection of women. However these crimes are couched as crimes against 
women’s honour or an outrage upon their personal dignity.  
19 See, for example, the Statute for the International Military Tribunal for Nuremberg. 
20 Navanethem Pillay ‘Sexual Violence: Standing by the victim’ (2009 -2010) 42 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 459 at 460 and 465. 
21 Copelon ‘Surfacing Gender: Re-engraving Crimes against Women in Humanitarian Law’ Hastings Women’s Law 
Journal at 243. 
22 See for example, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms 
Radhika Coomaraswamy, submitted in accordance with commission resolution 1997/444 (26 January 1998) UN 





the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (UDHR),23 human right instruments, such as, the 
Vienna Declaration on Violence against Women 1993,24 the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),25 the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence against Women,26 and UN resolutions such as 1325(2000),27 1888(2000)28 and 
1820(2008)29 have been instituted to address such violent attacks. The UDHR, for instance, in its 
article 4 condemns slavery, whilst article 5 condemns ‘torture. . . cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’.30 These are sexual and gender-based acts which occur during armed 
conflicts. CEDAW, also known as the ‘Women’s Convention’, prohibits discrimination against 
women. Article 2 of CEDAW, for example, commits ‘state parties to pursue a policy of 
eliminating discrimination against women and to adopt legislative and other measures 
prohibiting all discrimination against women’. In its General Recommendation No. 19 given in 
1992, CEDAW’s Committee defined gender-based violence in article 1 as ‘a form of 
discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of 
equality with men’.31 Its Recommendation further provides that discrimination against women 
‘includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a woman because she is 
a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or 
sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty’.32 
Article 7(c) of the committee’s Recommendation recognises that ‘[g]ender-based violence, 
which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
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http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ac9aa152.html (accessed 12 January 2015). 
29 Resolution 1820 (2008). The UN in 2008 unanimously adopted resolution 1820(2008) recognising that ‘rape and 
other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity or constitutive act with respect 
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30 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html (accessed 10 June 2018). Article 4 provides that ‘no one shall be 
held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms’. Article 5 provides that 
‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. 
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U.N. Doc A/47/38 1993, (adopted on January 29, 1992), art 1. 




under general international law or under human rights conventions, is discrimination within the 
meaning of article 1 of the Convention. These rights and freedoms include. . . the right to equal 
protection according to humanitarian norms in time of international or internal armed conflict’.33 
As Sellers notes, since General Recommendation No. 19 is considered as an ‘authoritative legal 
interpretation of CEDAW’, it thereby, recognises that CEDAW grants ‘women and girls the right 
to equal protection or non-discriminatory application of humanitarian norms in times of 
international or internal armed conflict and reaffirms the redress of war-related gender-based 
violence, such as rape, has a human rights dimension’.34 With regard to resolutions of the United 
Nations, Resolution 1325(2000), for example, summarises principles protecting women’s basic 
rights by using ‘international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international 
criminal law’.35 It acknowledges, ‘the need to implement fully international humanitarian and 
human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts’.36 
Resolution 1325(2000) ‘calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect 
women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, 
and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict’.37 It also ‘emphasises the 
responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other 
violence against women and girls’, and in this regard ‘stresses the need to exclude these crimes, 
where feasible from amnesty provisions’. Resolution 1820(2008) expands on the scope of 
Resolution 1325,38 by declaring ‘that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of 
war in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict and may 
impede the restoration of international peace and security . . . ’39 The resolution also notes ‘that 
rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or 
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a constitutive act with respect to genocide’.40 As with Resolution 1325, Resolution 1820 
‘stresses the need for the exclusion of sexual violence crimes from amnesty provisions in the 
context of conflict resolution processes’.41 Member states are called upon ‘to comply with their 
obligations for prosecuting persons responsible for such acts, to ensure that all victims of sexual 
violence, particularly women and girls, have equal protection under the law and equal access to 
justice’.42 However, Scully in referring to Resolution 1820 (which would also apply to modern-
day documents) points out that men and boys are not included in the provisions of Resolution 
1820 as potential victims of SGBV.43 She points out the necessity of including men (which 
would include boys) as victims of SGBV committed in armed conflicts, by stating that the 
omission would exclude the ‘opportunity to develop more subtle understanding of why certain 
forms of violence are visited on certain individuals during wartime’.44  
Also, the establishment of two ad hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) by the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC)45 in the early 1990s, and the creation of the ICC in 2002,46 
saw rape recognised for the first time as a distinct war crime in its own right. The jurisprudence 
coming out of these tribunals has seen rape and other gender-related crimes recognised as 
distinct manifestations of some crimes against humanity and violations of article 3 in line with 
the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II and instruments dealing with genocide. Since 
then, subsequent hybrid courts (including the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)47 and the 
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Extraordinary Court Chambers for Cambodia (ECCC)),48 also specifically list rape in their 
statute and have prosecuted perpetrators for other SGBCs. It has also emerged from the 
jurisprudence of these more recent tribunals that men and boys were sexually assaulted in the 
context of detention or interrogation, and could also be classed victims of SGBCs, previously 
believed to only affect women and the girl child.49 
Sadly, despite these positive steps towards direct prosecution of those committing acts of 
SGBV, the persistence of such crimes remains a troubling reality in conflicts in Africa. This is 
particularly so in states such as South Sudan, Darfur (Sudan),50 the DRC and Nigeria. In 2013, 
for example, 15 352 incidences of SGBV were recorded by the government of the DRC, of 
which 860 cases were verified by the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the 
DRC (MONUSCO).51 The Secretary-General for the UN stated that this was a 13% increase on 
his previous report of sexual violence.52 Margot Wallstrom, a former UN special representative 
on sexual violence in conflict, has dubbed the DRC ‘the rape capital of the world’.53 Notably, by 
2015, although MONUSCO and other organisations reported a decline in conflict-related cases, 
this was attributed to underreporting of cases and limited access to conflict affected areas.54 In 
Nigeria, where SGBV has played an important part in the fight against terrorism between the 
government forces and the terrorist group known as Boko Haram, women and children have 
been the main targets. Testimonies from the Chibok girls freed from their abductors reveal that 
many of them were forced into marriage, raped randomly, forced to work as domestic slaves and 
used to carry ammunition in the front line.55 Out of the 83 Chibok girls who ought to have been 
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released in May 2017, one of them refused to return as she was avowedly happily married with 
one of her abductors.56 Her refusal to return is an example of the psychological effect of long-
term captivity can have on a victim in which she might tend to develop sympathy for her 
kidnappers.57  
Though tribunals like the ICC have jurisdiction to try perpetrators of such crimes, the 
ICC, a court of last resort, is limited to trying only the ‘most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community’.58 Prosecuting SGBCs has been fraught with difficulties. First is the 
fact that the ICC can only prosecute a minute number of perpetrators alleged to have committed 
crimes within its jurisdiction. Two reasons given by Burke-White on the failure of ICC to 
provide worldwide accountability as expected are the unrealistic goals set by the court, and the 
limited funding provided by the Assembly of States, enabling only a maximum of two or three 
cases to be tried each year.59 The limited capacity has had the obvious result that perpetrators of 
SGBCs in armed conflict are not deterred from committing these crimes, believing that they 
would be unlikely to be tried by the ICC60 unless the crimes fell to be tried with other serious 
crimes like genocide. This could relegate SGBCs to a hierarchy of less serious crimes, making 
them, once again, invisible. The second reason was that, where states (non-state parties and state 
parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC) were not in agreement with the ICC as to the legality of 
the issue before the court, lack of cooperation from such states could prevent the ICC from 
bringing perpetrators of SGBCs to account for crimes committed. The dispute between the 
African Union (AU), which comprises a number of ICC member states,61 and the ICC is an 
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example of how this could happen. The AU has accused the ICC of selectively or impartially 
targeting African states in prosecutions.62 This accusation is ongoing, although a number of the 
situations from Africa have been referred or reported to the ICC at the instance of or by the state 
in which the crime occurred.63 The dispute between the two organisations came to a head with 
the indictment by the ICC Prosecutor of President Omar Al-Bashir, a sitting head of state from 
Sudan, charged with crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in 
Darfur.64 Rape, as a crime against humanity, was a SGBC with which Al-Bashir was charged. 
Given that Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute, the situation in this state was referred to the 
ICC Prosecutor by the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of its Charter,65 based on the report of 
the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Darfur.66 Accepting the referral based on the 
information before him, the prosecutor subsequently filed an application for Al-Bashir’s arrest 
on July 14, 2008.67 On March 4, 2009 an arrest warrant was issued by Pre-Trial Chamber 1.68 
The AU requested the UNSC to defer the proceedings brought against President Al-Bashir, in 
accordance with article 16 of the Rome Statute, due to the delicate peace processes that were 
ongoing in Sudan.69 This request was ignored. The AU retaliated by instructing its member states 
at its 13th Ordinary Session held in Libya in July 2009 not to cooperate with the prosecutor’s 
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order for the arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir.70 It has continued to urge its member states to 
ignore the arrest warrant, and also urged them to consider withdrawing as members of the Rome 
Statute.71 Since the arrest warrant against Al-Bashir was issued, he has visited non-member and 
member states which have elected not to arrest and surrender him to face trial at The Hague.72 
Under the Rome Statute, member states have a duty to cooperate with the ICC in the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes within its jurisdiction.73 Thus, member states are bound 
to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir to The Hague. A letter written by Human Rights and Civil 
Organisations supports the fact that refusal by states to cooperate with the ICC on the arrest 
warrant not only cultivates impunity but also promotes the continuation of SGBV. It also sends 
the wrong message to perpetrators. This suggests that there will always be an impunity gap at the 
ICC level in prosecuting perpetrators of SGBV committed in armed conflicts, where, in 
particular, state parties to the Rome Statute refuse to cooperate with the ICC in bringing 
perpetrators to justice. In summary, that ICC’s success is dependent on the level of cooperation 
from states.74 
In addition, states which have referred situations to the court have been accused of 
cooperating with the court for political reasons. For example, scholars such as Burke-White have 
suggested that the cases in the DRC were only referred to the ICC by its President Kabila for 
political gain.75 A referral on the grounds of political gains is an abuse of the concept of 
complementarity as provided in the Rome Statute, as the ICC is intended to be a court of last 
resort when a state is unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute a SGBV case 
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occasioned by armed conflict.76 Equally, the ICC has been accused of not encouraging states to 
fulfil their obligation of investigating and prosecuting crimes, but has rather used various other 
means to attract cases for prosecution before the court.77 As Burke-White suggests, this could 
undermine the purpose for which the court was established and undermine accountability.78 
Taking Burke-White’s views further, although the purpose of the ICC is to bring perpetrators of 
international crimes to account, its credibility would always be questioned once it is considered 
to be a court which engages in political issues. This could affect the credibility of its evidence 
and judgments, despite having achieved its aim of bringing perpetrators to account.  
Apart from the above reasons, though the ICC was successful in prosecuting one case 
relating to SGBV committed in armed conflict since it started operating,79 this case has been 
overturned by the Appeals Chamber. With its Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-based Crimes, 
the ICC has however, tried to avoid repeating its past mistakes.80 The ICC finds it difficult on its 
own to bring perpetrators of SGBV committed in armed conflict situations to justice. It is, 
therefore imperative to bridge this impunity gap at the prosecutorial level by also exploring 
prosecutions at the regional and domestic levels, to combat impunity of SGBV committed in 
armed conflicts in Africa.  
1.3     REASONS FOR CHOOSING THIS TOPIC AND AIMS OF THE STUDY 
It has taken feminist scholars and activists, as well as NGOs over 40 years to get international 
law to recognise and prosecute SGBCs committed against women under the banner of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. This breakthrough arose in response to the 
atrocious crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which caught the media’s 
attention and thus, prompted the Security Council to act in exercising its powers under Chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter. The International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and the ICTR) were established in 1993 and 1994 respectively to 
try perpetrators for crimes considered to be the most serious crimes of international concern and 
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constituting a threat to international peace and security.81 These two ad hoc tribunals paved the 
way for the drafting of the Rome Statute,82 which also provides for the prosecution of additional 
gender-focused crimes such as sexual slavery and forced pregnancy.83 Previous tribunals, such as 
the IMT, failed to specifically list sexual assault crimes within their charters, and consequently, 
were unable to prosecute them on their own, despite evidence that these crimes had been 
committed. In commenting on this failure, Campanaro notes that this reduced rape to a minor 
crime and reinforced the fact that historically it has been considered to be insignificant in 
theatres of armed conflicts.84 
Although there has been success in getting rape and gender-based crimes against women 
and girls recognised and prosecuted under international law as war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide, the international community has much to do to end the culture of 
impunity relating to these crimes and to bring perpetrators to justice. As one scholar notes, 
although International Humanitarian Law (IHL) ‘has come a long way in acknowledging the 
gendered components of violence during war . . . they are more symbolic than revolutionary in 
nature’.85 International criminal institutions have only been able to prosecute a handful of 
perpetrators, as their jurisdiction is limited to prosecuting major perpetrators for the most serious 
crimes of international concern committed in the states for which they were created.86 Even 
bringing these major perpetrators to justice has been fraught with difficulties. Nowrojee, though 
applauding the ICTR in producing its first landmark judgment which expanded the meaning of 
rape in international law, refers to this as being an exception.87 The ICC has yet to obtain a 
successful prosecution in cases relating to SGBV committed in an armed conflict situation.88 In 
trying to combat the deficit, the international community has repeatedly called on states to take 
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responsibility for putting an end to impunity and prosecuting perpetrators who commit such 
crimes, stressing that their role is complementary.89 The Rome Statute of the ICC also recognises 
the concept of complementarity. In paragraph 6 of its preamble, the Rome Statute recalls ‘that it 
is the duty of every state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for 
international crimes’.90 It then goes on to emphasise in paragraph 10 of its preamble and article 1 
of the charter that the ICC ‘shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions’.91 In other 
words, the Rome Statute only provides for a court of last resort by recognising that it is the 
primary duty of states to exercise jurisdiction over atrocities. Though article 17 of the Rome 
Statute does not mention the word complementarity, it incorporates the principle. Thus, as long 
as a state is investigating or prosecuting a case over which it has jurisdiction, the ICC will not 
have jurisdiction over that matter.92 This concept of inspiring and moving states to be 
responsible for making perpetrators accountable has been coined by Burke-White as ‘proactive 
complementarity’.93 Thus, a case will only be admissible before the court where ‘the state is 
unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution.’94  
Scholars such as Du Plessis, Louw and Maunganidze have suggested a broader approach 
of complementarity for African member states to that provided in the Rome Statute95 in the form 
of a horizontal relationship (as opposed to the vertical complementary relationship in the Rome 
Statute) between the ICC and the state, whereby the state seeks to reduce the impunity gap 
contained in the Rome Statute.96 The ICC has however, taken what it calls a ‘positive 
complementarity’ approach, by which it encourages states to bring prosecutions for crimes 
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within the ICC’s jurisdiction, in their domestic courts.97 For an African state to fulfil such a 
complementary role with regard to crimes of SGBV that occur in armed conflict situations, it 
would need to ensure that the gender-specific crimes set out in the Rome Statute are included as 
part of its domestic law. This would enable states strengthen their domestic jurisdiction in 
SGBCs, and also properly investigate and prosecute such crimes. Only a few African states, such 
as, South Africa, Uganda and Kenya, have included the international crimes provided for in the 
Rome Statute in their domestic law.98 In the DRC, where SGBV committed in armed conflict 
was prevalent, the president of the DRC only promulgated the law implementing the Rome 
Statute on 31 December, 2015.99 It is with this in mind, that this thesis considered the application 
of the Rome Statute in states’ domestic law, by selecting the DRC as a case study, given that it 
has been the state most affected by SGBV in armed conflict in Africa, and one of the first states 
in Africa to refer situations to the ICC. With its recent implementation of the Rome Statute in its 
domestic laws, it would be necessary to consider whether states in Africa, such as the DRC –
seriously affected by SGBCs committed in armed conflict – can successfully bridge the impunity 
gap for these crimes. Although, states such as Rwanda have used the ‘gacaca’ means of 
prosecuting SGBCs, this thesis did not consider such other forms of prosecuting SGBCs in the 
DRC. As already stated above, the thesis focuses on the prosecution of SGBCs in the DRC, by 
considering the Rome Statute which was implemented in its domestic laws.  
At the regional level, the AU is expanding the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights by conferring on it international criminal jurisdiction.100 Thus, it is hoped that 
at the international, regional and domestic levels the impunity gaps for SGBV at these 
prosecutorial levels will be bridged. Bridging these impunity gaps not only restores victims’ 
rights and dignity, but also sends a strong warning signal to perpetrators of these crimes that they 
                                                            
97 ICC-ASP Report of the Bureau on stocktaking: Complementarity. Taking stock of the principle of 
complementarity: bridging the impunity gap. (18 March 2010) at 4 available at https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/complementarity/.../ICC-ASP-8-51-ENG.pdf (accessed 11 November 2016). 
98 Other African States which have implemented the Rome Statue into their domestic laws are Burkina Faso and the 
Central African Republic, Mauritius and Senegal. Implementation of the Rome Statute available at 
www.iccnow.org>...>Ratification and Implementation  (accessed 4 February 2015). 
99 This law which was published in its Official Journal on 29 February 2016, came into force 30 days after its 
publication. Office Journal of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Office of the President of the Republic, 29 
February 2016. 
100 The Protocol on amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Malabo Protocol), establishes the new court which will be known as African Court of Justice and Human and 





will be prosecuted. By considering these various methods of bridging the impunity gap for 
SCBV, this thesis aims to contribute to the legal and scholarly discussion on the bringing of 
perpetrators of SGBV committed in armed conflict situations in Africa to account, by 
considering whether the international community has finally been able to find a solution to this 
problem. This was carried out by examining whether all these methods complemented each other 
or whether one particular method was a better option or proved to be more successful. 
To this extent, this thesis thus goes further than the current literature by examining at the 
international, regional and domestic levels in Africa, whether all forms of justice complemented 
each other in closing the impunity gap in relation to SGBV in armed conflict situations in Africa, 
or if one approach was likely to be more successful than others, and what might be learnt from 
the failings or successes of these various approaches. This thesis therefore proceeded on the 
assumption that states in Africa which ratify the Rome Statute and the proposed Protocol on 
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (Malabo Protocol) into their domestic laws are willing to bring an end to SGBV 
committed in armed conflict situations. A limitation to this research is that as the DRC is a 
French-speaking state, and obtaining accurate translations in English of it laws, such as the 
Journal Officiel de la Republique Democratique du Congo, was difficult. As official translations 
of these documents were not available, reliance was placed on a language translator to assist with 
their translations. Analysis at the regional level was also based on the context of the Malabo 
Protocol in relation to SGBV in armed conflict situations. At the domestic level, the Journal 
Officiel de la Republique Democratique du Congo, the document implementing the Rome 
Statute into the DRCs domestic laws was analysed. From this analysis, consideration was given 
to the relationship between the ICC and the DRC on matters such as head of state immunity, 
cooperation and competing obligations. An analysis was also made of the steps the DRC needs to 
take for the effective investigation and prosecution of SGBCs, to avoid making the same 
mistakes as the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).  
This thesis does not consider prosecution of SGBV committed in armed conflicts by way 
of traditional mechanisms. Consideration was only given to the hybrid courts of the ICTY and 
ICTR jurisdiction which dealt with case law of SGBV committed during armed conflicts, as this 




does this thesis consider SGBV committed against refugees of armed conflicts. Though 
discussion on immunity of heads of state and state officials has been well canvassed by various 
scholars,101 consideration was given to this topic in relation to immunity under articles 27 and 98 
of the Rome Statute, as the dispute on the issue between the ICC and the AU is relevant in 
assessing the effect this has on SGBC in armed conflict situations in Africa, at the international 
and regional level. In particular, consideration was given to the effect of a referral of a non-state 
party to the ICC by the UNSC acting under article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.  
As mentioned above, my intention was to position this thesis amongst existing literature, 
and add to it legal analysis of the historic development around the prosecution of SGBV in 
armed conflicts. By comparing the three methods of prosecuting SGBV during armed conflicts at 
the international, regional and domestic levels a conclusion was made as to whether all forms 
could be found to bridge the impunity gap of bringing perpetrators to book for SGBV in armed 
conflict situations. This is with the view that by prosecution, SGBV in the long run will be 
prevented, thereby relieving the victims of SGBV the stigma of having suffered the crimes.  
1.4      DEFINING TERMS RELEVANT TO THE STUDY 
It is important to define two terms used throughout this thesis to clarify the context of usage in 
this thesis and the ambit of this thesis.   
1.4.1   Definition of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 
In defining what SGBV means, it is necessary to first define the term sexual violence, as this 
definition is incorporated in the definition of gender-based violence. The definition of sexual 
violence is taken from the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 
(UNHROHC) which describes sexual violence as: 
[A] form of gender-based violence and encompasses any sexual act, attempt to obtain a 
sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, or acts to traffic, or otherwise directed 
                                                            
101 See for example articles by Paola Gaeta and Dapo Akande, two of the leading authorities on this topic. Paola 
Gaeta ‘Does President Al-Bashir enjoy immunity from arrest?’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
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against a person’s sexuality, using coercion, by any person regardless of their relationship 
to the victim, in any setting.102 
 
Thus, sexual violence includes crimes such as rape, forced pregnancy and sexual mutilation. A 
necessary staring point is the definition of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), General Recommendation 19 in 1992 and that of the 
United Nations General Assembly in 1993, as their definitions point to violence committed 
against women because of their gender. CEDAWs General Recommendation 19 refers to gender-
based violence as ‘violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that 
affects women disproportionately’.103 It goes on to state that gender-based violence ‘includes 
acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and 
other deprivations of liberty’.104 In defining ‘violence against women’, the United Nations 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women states that this term means ‘any act 
of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological 
harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life’.105 
The meaning of the term ‘gender-based violence’ is still evolving, and has yet to be 
developed.106 Scholars have pointed to the fact that most definitions of gender-based violence 
exclude males and boys who are now also recognised as victims of this kind of violence,107 
although not to the same extent as women and children. Jeanne Ward’s definition of gender-
based violence, which has been adopted by The Reproductive Health for Refugees Consortium, 
includes men and boys as victims of violence as a result of their gender. She defines gender-
based violence as:  
                                                            
102 OHCHR Sexual and gender-based violence in the context of transnational justice (October 2014) available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/OnePagers/Sexual_and_gender-based_violence.pdf 
(accessed 2 February 2015). 
103 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation 19, Violence against 
Women (Eleventh Session, 1992), U. N. Doc. A/47/38 at 1 (1993). 
104 Ibid. 
105 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, art 1. See also The Fourth 
World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 1995 at para 113 which adopts the same 
definition. 
106‘Gender-based violence in the world of work: Overview and selected annotated bibliography’ available at 
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-.../.../wcms_155763.pdf  (accessed 2 February 2015). 
107 Gabrielle Ferrales and Suzy Maves McElrath (2014) ‘Beyond rape, reconceptualising gender-based violence 
during warfare’ in Rosemary Gartner and Bill McCarthy (eds) in The Oxford Handbook of Gender, Sex and Crime, 




[a]n umbrella term for any harm that is perpetrated against a person’s will, that has a 
negative impact on the physical or psychological health, development and identity of the 
person, and that is the result of gendered power inequities that exploit distinctions between 
males and females, among males and among females. Although not exclusive to women 
and girls, gender-based violence principally affects them across all cultures. Violence may 
be physical, sexual, psychological, economic, or socio-cultural.108 
 
This thesis will thus adopt the typology of gender-based violence proffered by Jeanne Ward, as 
her definition not only includes violence committed against civilian women and girls but also 
civilian men and boys who are targeted because of their gender. As already explained, feminist 
scholars endeavoured to have gender-based violence committed against women and girls 
recognised as a crime in its own right in order to reverse its invisibility and spotlight the special 
vulnerability that civilian women and girls suffer in conflict situations because of their gender. It 
is only in recent years that it has come to light that men and boys can also be victims of gender-
focused crimes. Although the number of male victims is infinitesimal when compared with 
women and girls, they should not be ignored as they also have had their human rights violated 
and might need medical as well as psychological help. The international community recognised 
this fact, in the Rome Statute of the ICC, in reports by the Secretary-General and also in various 
resolutions.109 
1.4.2     Armed Conflicts 
This thesis concentrates on SGBV committed in the course of international and/or non-
international armed conflicts. It is important to draw attention to this fact as SGBV can also be 
committed in the course of internal disturbances and tensions, for example, during riots, such as 
in the case brought against Uhuru Kenyatta by the ICC.110  
In addition, reports from the United Nations Secretary-General referring to SGBCs do not 
distinguish between SGBCs which occur during an armed conflict and those which occur during 
an internal disturbance or tension. The reports encompass both situations by referring to ‘conflict 
related sexual violence’, which states that the: 
                                                            
108 Jeanne Ward ‘If not now, when? Addressing gender-based violence in refugee, internally displaced, and post-
conflict settings’ (2002) available at www.thrc.org/resources/ifnotnow.pdf (accessed 4 February 2015). 
109 Under article 7(3) of the Rome Statute the term ‘gender’refers to both male and female. UNSC ‘Report of the 
Secretary-General on conflict related sexual violence’  at para 7 (stating that the Security Council notes ‘that sexual 
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110 Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02/11. One of the charges brought against Kenyatta by the ICC, 




. . . term ‘conflict-related sexual violence’ refers to rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage and any other 
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against, women, men, girls or 
boys that is directly or indirectly linked (temporarily, geographically or causally) to a 
conflict.111 
With regard to an armed conflict, the Appeals Chamber in The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic stated:  
An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between states or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups 
or between such groups within a state.112 
There are two types of armed conflict in International Humanitarian Law (IHL), international 
and non-international armed conflicts. Common Article 2 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
provides that: 
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which 
may arise between two or more of the High Combating Parties, even if the state of war is 
not recognised by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or 
total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation 
meets with no armed resistance.113 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber states that an armed conflict is considered as being international 
. . . if it takes place between two or more states. In addition, in case of an internal armed 
conflict breaking out on the territory of a state, it may become international (or, depending 
upon the circumstances, be international in character alongside an internal armed conflict) 
if (i) another state intervenes in the conflict through his troops, or alternatively if (ii) some 
of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other state.114 
 
In the case of non-international armed conflicts, Protocol Additional II to the Geneva 
Conventions of 8 June 1977 provides:  
. . . that these types of armed conflict take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party 
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups 
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to 
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
Protocol.115 
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‘Report of the Secretary-General on conflict related sexual violence’ para 2 (20 April 2016). 
112Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic ‘Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction’ (Appeals 
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Lubanga Dyilo ‘Decision on the confirmation of charges’ para 209. 
115 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
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The Protocol makes it clear that it does ‘not apply to situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as 
not being armed conflicts’.116   
1.5       OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY AND KEY QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED 
1.5.1 The objectives of the study flow from the problem statement. Consequently, the specific 
objectives of the study are to: 
a) Examine the evolutionary response of international law to SGBV in armed conflict 
situations in order to provide an understanding of the problem(s) relating to the 
invisibility of SGBV in armed conflict situations. 
b) Examine the existing legal frameworks together with relevant reported cases of the 
ICTY, ICTR, and ICC, to identify the basis of these decisions aimed at addressing the 
problem(s) of overcoming the invisibility of SGBV in armed conflict situations. 
c) Identify the challenges and problems faced by the ICC in prosecuting SGBV in armed 
conflict situations. 
d) Examine whether the DRC by implementing the Rome Statute into its domestic laws, 
and the proposed African Court of Justice as well as Human and Peoples’ Rights, will 
concomitantly with the ICC complement each other in the fight against impunity with 
regard to SGBV in armed conflict situations. 
1.5.2 Research questions 
a) What is the historical framework relating to criminalisation and prosecution of SGBV 
in armed conflict situations under international law? 
b) Have the conflicting views of the definition of rape at the ICTY and ICTR helped 
strengthen the prosecution of SGBV in armed conflict situations before the ICC?  
c) In what ways has the ICC failed to bring perpetrators of SGBV in armed conflict 
situations to justice? 
d) Will the proposed prosecution of international law crimes in the African Court of 
Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACJHPR) be a viable alternative in 
prosecuting SGBV in armed conflict situations at the regional level? In answering this 
question, the thesis will briefly address complementarity under the ACJHPR and 
preferred institutional affiliation for African states (ICC or the proposed ACJHPR) in 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
control.’ As a result of this the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that ‘the involvement of armed groups with some degree of 
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on the confirmation of charges’ paras 209 and 233. 
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the light of recent controversies surrounding Head of State immunity. The final 
analysis will revolve around whether the ACJHPR will be better equipped than the ICC 
in understanding and prosecuting SGBV committed in armed conflict situations? 
e) Can the promulgation of the Rome Statute in the DRC’s domestic laws help bridge the 
impunity gap in the fight against SGBV committed in armed conflicts in Africa? 
1.6         RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
1.6.1     Research Design 
The invisibility of SGBV in armed conflict situations is a concept which evolved from feminist 
jurisprudence and activists such as Askin, Copelon and Charlesworth. It is necessary for this 
thesis to commence by considering such jurisprudence for an understanding and appreciation of 
SGBV in armed conflict, and to appreciate why so much effort was put in by these feminist 
scholars and activists to have such crime considered a crime in its own right. Evidence of the 
feminist jurisprudence approach is found in the case law of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, 
which speaks to the fact that most of the influential academic writings have emerged from the 
feminist school. More recently, it has been acknowledged that men and boys can also suffer 
sexual assault as a result of their gender. 
This thesis also takes a critical legal approach to the prosecution of SGBV in armed 
conflicts at the domestic and regional levels in Africa, to determine whether prosecution of these 
crimes at these domestic and regional levels will complement the work of the ICC, and thus help 
in bridging the impunity gap. In this analysis, much was drawn from a critical legal approach of 
studies by scholars such as Burke-White, Du Plessis, Murungu and Abassare. At the regional 
level, the plans for the proposed ACJHPR to take up the prosecution of international crimes, in 
so far as they relate to SGBV committed in armed conflict situations, were considered. Such 
theories as the complementarity principle by the court, immunity of heads of state from 
prosecution of SGBV and whether the court will have advantage over the ICC in prosecution of 
such crimes where member states are concerned were considered. 
1.6.2    Research Methodology 
This research does not involve interviews, but uses a purely text-based approach, analysing 
relevant legislation, treaties, protocols, case laws, policy papers and scholastic works and articles 




Primary and secondary sources are relied on. Primary sources include materials such as 
the Rome Statute of the ICC, the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol of the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Malabo Protocol), the DRC’s Constitution, Journal 
Officiel de la Republique Democratique du Congo, ICC Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
based Crimes and other ICC documents. Other primary sources include statutes of the ICTY and 
ICTR, which paved the way for the creation of the ICC and the subsequent judgments of these 
tribunals. 
Secondary sources of information include, in particular, monograms relating to this area 
of law mapping out how feminists strove to include crimes of SGBV as crimes in their own right 
for classification as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and the judicial approach 
of prosecuting such crimes. Textbooks, journal articles, internet materials, reports of NGOs such 
as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, Security Council press releases and 
newspaper articles were also studied. Relevant cases and laws relating to how judges have 
interpreted sexual and gender-based cases were also considered, along with articles relevant to 
this topic. Determining the accuracy of each secondary source was considered by cross-
referencing it with other secondary and primary sources. 
1.7    STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis contains seven chapters in all. 
 
Chapter 1 deals with introductory matters such as the background to the study, statement of the 
problem, reasons for choosing the topic and aims of the study, defining terms relevant to this 
thesis, objectives of the study and research questions, research methodology and structure of the 
thesis. 
Chapter 2 focuses primarily on the literature review relating to SGBV in armed conflict 
situations in the IMT, IMTFE, ICTY, ICTR and ICC. 
Chapter 3 applies a doctrinal approach in considering the Prosecutor’s discretionary powers in 
the selection of situations and cases at the ICC. In particular, chapter three considers the nature 
of the Prosecutor’s powers in the selection of situations and cases under the ICC’s Rome Statute, 




conflicts has occurred; and how the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has rectified mistakes made 
in the selection of these situations and cases. 
Chapter 4 critically examines cases relating to SGBV committed in armed conflicts before the 
ICC. The Prosecutor’s weaknesses in being able to obtain successful prosecutions before the 
ICC, and judges’ interpretation of facts relating to cases before the ICC are examined. The 
chapter reveals the problem in securing convictions for such crimes despite feminist scholars 
having succeeded in getting SGBCs committed in armed conflict situations recognised as crimes 
in their own right. This examination was necessary to enable other courts to recognise that 
drafting and implementing laws requires practical understanding and recognition of the need to 
bring successful convictions of SGBV in armed conflict situations. 
In chapter 5, the prosecution of SGBV in armed conflicts at the regional level and at the state 
and individual levels is examined using the provisions in the Malabo Protocol. The chapter 
provides a brief review of the Constitutive Act (CA) of the African Union and the legal basis for 
the creation of the ACJHPR. The chapter reveals the weaknesses in the Malabo Protocol relating 
to SGBCs, and the need to redraft it with suggestions from NGOs and other bodies. Chapter five 
also explores the reality that the AU prefers negotiating with states regarding bringing impunity 
of SGBCs to an end, rather than prosecuting perpetrators of these crimes.  
Chapter 6 considers the prosecution of SGBV during armed conflict at the domestic level by 
examining the DRC’s Journal Officiel de la Republique Democratique du Congo which 
implemented the Rome Statute into its domestic laws. A brief resumé of the occurrence of SGBV 
in armed conflicts in the DRC is considered and how the DRC has tried to combat impunity for 
SGBV before implementing the Rome Statute in its domestic law. The chapter also examines 
how the implementation of the Rome Statute in the DRC’s domestic laws has strengthened the 
relationship between the ICC and the DRC on such issues as head of state immunity, competing 
obligations and cooperation. Suggestions were also made on steps the DRC should take in its 
investigation and prosecution of SGBCs to avoid making the same mistakes which the ICC has 
made. 





ENGRAFTING GENDER CRIMES INTO INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Though rape and other sexual and gender-based crimes (SGBCs) committed during an armed 
conflict have happened throughout history, the international community still faces the problem of 
how best these crimes can be prevented. Many feminist scholars believe that this can be achieved 
by effectively prosecuting rape and other SGBCs as crimes premised on the recognition that they 
are distinct war crimes in their own right, so that they may be considered on the same level as 
other grave crimes, such as murder.117 It is acknowledged that the prosecution of crimes in 
criminal tribunals at the international level will not necessarily deter their complete reoccurrence, 
but at least it would hold perpetrators accountable, and bring some relief to victims.118   
SGBCs against women have been largely ‘invisible’, and despite being prohibited, have 
not been accorded the same status as other grave crimes. Besides, women were not duly 
recognised as being wronged or abused. In ancient times, for example, raping a woman was 
considered an offence against those who owned her, such as her father or husband, rather than an 
offence against her person.119 During the Middle Ages there were medieval edicts relating to 
humanitarian law which prohibited the rape of women during war carrying the penalty of a 
death. Examples of these edicts were the Ordinances of War enacted in Durham by Richard II in 
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1385 and those attributed to Henry V in 1419 at Mantes.120 Though these ordinances offered 
women some legal protection because of their economic value to the ‘owner’,121 they were 
usually ignored. In the event of a ‘just war’, the prohibition of rape did not apply as medieval 
laws permitted rape in order to force a city under siege to surrender.122 The first recorded 
international criminal trial, which took place in 1474, illustrates this point, when Sir Peter 
Hagenbach was convicted for violating the rules or customs of war when his troops raped and 
murdered innocent civilians, along with other crimes, without first declaring war.123 The acts 
committed by Sir Hagenbach’s troops were only considered illegal because he had not declared 
war.124 Even in an internal armed conflict, rape committed by state actors could be permitted by 
a ruler as a means of showing sovereignty and in order to defend his kingdom125 Thus, the rape 
of women could be said to have evolved from unequal power relations between men and women 
historically, and still manifests in today’s societies.126 The later part of the 19th century and early 
20th century is considered the ‘initial modern period of international humanitarian law’ (IHL).127 
SGBCs, including rape which occurred in times of war were codified in treaties and war codes. 
For example, the United States and its allies entered into treaties which not only regulated 
commerce but also expressed their customary law expectations in the event of war.128 Although 
these treaties prohibited sexual violence, their purpose was to minimise economic disruption 
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caused by sexual violence in war.129 Article 23 of the 1785 Treaty of Amity and Commerce 
between the United States and Prussia, for example, provided that ‘women and children. . . shall 
not be molested in their persons’ where a war ensued between two contracting parties.130 The 
Lieber Code 1863,131 the first attempt to codify the laws of war, portrays the changing view of 
rape during military sieges when compared to the medieval era (where rape was permitted to 
confirm victory over the enemy).132 The Lieber Code provided protection during war to those 
captured by the enemy, regardless of that person’s sex, religious affiliation, status or 
occupation.133 It criminalised rape as an offence punishable by death, thus, signifying the 
position taken under customary humanitarian law that rape was prohibited.134 Later, other 
codifications of the laws of war implicitly or explicitly prohibited sexual violence by considering 
it either as a violation against women’s honour or dignity − instead of an offence against women. 
Such an example is found in article 46 of The Hague Conventions and Regulations, which has 
been construed as prohibiting sexual violence and wartime rape, even though this provision does 
not specifically mention sexual violence or rape. Article 46 provides that ‘family honour and 
rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, 
must be respected’.135 Sellers, in referring to the article, states that rape was prohibited to 
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Investigating and Prosecuting Sexual Violence as an International Crime eds Anne-Marie de Brouwer et al(2013) at 
23. 
131 Also known as the ‘Lieber Instructions.’ Though the ‘Lieber Instructions’ were binding on the United States 
forces during the American Civil War, they influenced the codification of other laws of war such as the Hague 
Conventions, and also similar regulations which were adopted by other states. Instructions for the Government of 
Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code) (24 April 1863) available at 
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/110?OpenDocument (accessed 10 January 2015).  
132 Sellers ‘The cultural value of sexual violence’ at 317. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Kelly Askin ‘Treatment of Sexual Violence in armed conflicts’ at 23. Section II of the ‘Lieber Instructions’ under 
which articles 44 and 47 are, is titled in part ‘Protection of persons, and especially women, of religion, the arts and 
science.’  
Article 44 provides: All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all destruction of 
property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking place by 
main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited in the penalty of death and 
such other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense.’ 
Article 47 provides: ‘Crimes punishable by all penal codes, such as . . .  rape, if committed by an American soldier 
in a hostile country against its inhabitants, are not only punishable as at home, but in all cases in which death is not 
inflicted, the severe punishment shall be preferred.’   
135 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations Concerning the 
Laws and Custom of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1822, 1 Bevans 247, 260, art 46. 
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and 
Custom of War on Land, The Hague, 18 Oct. 1907, 36 Stat.  2277, 2306-07, 1 Bevans 631, 651, art 46. The 1899 




promote pacification during occupation and also because it inhibited the restoration of civil 
society.136 Thus by recognising rape as an illegal act, article 46 supports the humanitarian law 
theory that sexual offences, including rape, lead to the breakdown of civil society137 − even 
though it is the only reference in The Hague Conventions and Regulations to sexual violence and 
rape. With regard to the application of international human rights law in armed conflict 
situations, the Martens Clause which is contained in The Hague Conventions, supports the 
principle that human rights norms continue to apply in armed conflict situations.138 Thus, as 
international human rights norms reinforce and supplement international humanitarian law, they 
are applicable in situations covered by an article 46.139 Although the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and the Additional Protocols of 1977 recognised that women were vulnerable to SGBCs during 
armed conflict, these crimes were categorised as matters relating to women’s honour and dignity, 
which will be discussed further in this chapter.  
As discussed above, the first international criminal court designed to try any commander 
for allowing his troops to rape and kill civilians was established in 1474.140 Thereafter, other 
important tribunals created were the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg and the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). These tribunals did not do justice to the 
victims of SGBCs. It was the genocide and ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
which spurred the Security Council to set up tribunals to prosecute the atrocious crimes 
committed in these countries, following upon outcries by the international community.141 These 
two conflicts opened an avenue for feminist scholars and activists to employ the use of 
international humanitarian law to address SGBCs, and also to implement laws relating to these 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
violation of one’s family honour now understood in the 20th century to include sexual assault, such as rape. See also 
Kelly D Askin ‘Prosecuting wartime rape and other gender-related crimes under international law: Extraordinary 
advance, enduring obstacles, (2003) 21 Berkeley Journal of International Law 288 at 300. Though Article 46 is said 
to cover sexual violence, in practice it has rarely been interpreted as covering sexual violence. Meron ‘Editorial 
comment’ at 425. 
136 Sellers ‘The cultural value of sexual violence’ at 318. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Askin ‘Prosecuting wartime rape’ at 293. 
139 Ibid.  
140 Susana SaCouto and Katherine Cleary ‘The Women’s Protocol to the African Charter and Sexual Violence in the 
context of armed conflict or other mass atrocity’ (2009) 16 Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice 173 at 175 referring to Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni ‘The time has come for an International Criminal Court’ 
(1991) 1 Indiana International & Comparative Law Review. Dianne Luping ‘Investigation and prosecution of sexual 
and gender-based crimes before the International Criminal Court’ (2009) 17 American University Journal of Gender 
Social Policy & Law 431 at 436-7. (Luping points out that even though the crime of rape was tried, it was 
considered illegal because the war was ‘undeclared’ thus making it unjust and illegal. 




crimes.142 Thereafter, in 2002, the long talked-about ICC came into force after 60 countries 
ratified its statute. One of the major achievements made by the feminist scholars and activists 
was the inclusion of SGBCs as distinct crimes duly recognised in their own right in the Rome 
Statute. 
In this regard, this chapter will consider SGBCs committed in armed conflicts from four 
different perspectives to show how SGBCs have moved from been invisible to being recognised 
as violent crimes in their own right, prompted by the struggle of feminist scholars and human 
rights women’s organisations to have these crimes accorded the same status as other grave 
crimes by having them investigated and prosecuted as crimes in their own right in international 
criminal treaties. The chapter will also consider the articles prohibiting sexual violence under the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. Although provision was made to protect women 
from sexually violent crimes such as rape during wartime, rape was not included as a grave 
breach. The first perspective will consider how the IMT and IMTFE handled SGBCs. Most 
feminist scholars believe that the prosecution of SGBCs by these tribunals was glossed over. 
Secondly, the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols in relation to the protection given 
victims of sexual crimes is considered. Consideration is given in the third section to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, (ICTR), in which wartime SGBCs were reconceptualised. The concluding 
(fourth) section will consider the inclusion of SGBCs in the ICC’s Rome Statute.     
2.2 THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNALS AT NUREMBERG AND IN 
THE FAR EAST 
The IMT and IMTFE were established after World War II to try German and Japanese war 
criminals, respectively for war crimes committed in the war. The IMT was situated in 
Nuremberg, Germany, and the IMTFE was located in Tokyo, Japan. The IMT has been described 
as marking ‘the creation of the first such tribunal to evaluate war crimes and crimes against 
humanity’.143 Despite criticisms that the IMT was a ‘victor’s justice’ tribunal, together with the 
                                                            
142 Janet Halley ‘Rape at Rome: Feminist interventions in the criminalisation of sex-related violence in positive 
international criminal law’ (2008) 30 Michigan Journal of International Law 1 at 8. 
143 Christopher K Hale ‘Does the evolution of international criminal law end with the ICC? The “Roaming ICC”: A 
model International Criminal Court for a state-centric world of international law’ (2006-2007) 35 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 429 at 442 (quoting Laurie A Cohen ‘Comment, application of the realists and liberal 




12 subsequent trials,144 it was recognised as having laid the basic foundations for developing 
international criminal law and also establishing international criminal tribunals.145 The IMTFE 
trials, on the other hand, did not carry the same historical and legal weight as they were 
considered unfair to defendants.146 The IMT commenced in November 1945 ended in October 
1946. The IMTFE commenced in May 1946, and ended in November 1948, two years after the 
IMT trial had been concluded.147 
2.2.1  The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg  
The IMT was founded after the four Allied governments signed the London Agreement 148 on 
August 8 1945, for the ‘just and prompt trial and punishment of major war criminals of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 113 at 143). Hale however refers to Leila N Sadat (2002) The 
International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: Justice for the New Millennium (2002) 
Martinus Nijhoff 27, where Sadat points out that though international criminal tribunals existed before the 
Nuremberg Tribunals, none of them possessed the same legal significance. Hale also refers to William A Schabas 
(2006) ‘The United Nations International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra-Leone’ 
Cambridge University Press 7 where he points out that Bert V A Röling, a jurist and judge maintained that the 
Tokyo and Nuremberg Tribunals were not ‘international tribunals in the strict sense’ but were more aptly described 
as ‘multinational tribunals’.  
144 The 12 subsequent trials were trials conducted by the United States in Nuremberg after the end of the initial 
Nuremberg Trial. Each Allied government conducted subsequent trials to try a larger segment of Germans, such as, 
diplomats, politicians and physicians accused of committing Nazi crimes, as the four Allied governments, could not 
agree to a joint subsequent trial after the IMT. The Allied Control Council for Germany enacted the Control Council 
Law No. 10 on 20 December 1945. Law No. 10 to establish ‘a uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution of 
war criminals and other similar offenders, other than those dealt with by the International Military Tribunal.’ 
Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against 
Humanity, December 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50-55 (1946) available at 
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ccno10.htm (accessed 14 January 2015). Trials of War Criminals before the 
Nuerngerg Military Tribunals, Volume II, ‘The Medical Case’ ‘The Milch Case available at 
www.ioc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals-Vol-II.pdf  (accessed 12 January 2015). Some scholars 
have argued that the IMT at Nuremberg and the IMT for the Far East are not truly international tribunals ‘as they 
were concluded by agreement between the Allied powers in Europe and not by the international community as 
such.’ Phillip Wardle ‘The survival of Head of State immunity at the International Criminal Court’ (2011) 18 
Australian International Law Journal 181 at 190 referring to Madeline Morris, ‘High Crimes and Misconceptions: 
The ICC and Non-Party States’ (2001) 64 Law and Contemporary Problems 13. See also Benjamin B Ferencz 
‘International Criminal Courts: The legacy of Nuremberg’ (1998) 10 Pace International Law Review 203 at 213.   
145 Hale ‘Does the evolution of international criminal law end with the ICC?’ at 444. Ferencz ‘International criminal 
courts’ at 215. Jocelyn Campanaro ‘Women, war and international law: The historical treatment of gender-based 
war crimes’ (2000-2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2557, 2560 (stating that many of the principles which 
emerged from the IMT and IMTE Charters formed the basis of the United Nations). 
146 Ibid. 
147 U S Department of State Office of the Historian, The Nuremberg Trial and the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1945-
1948) available at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nuremberg (accessed 14 January 2015). Allan A 
Ryan ‘Nuremberg’s Contribution to International Law’ (2007) 30 Boston College International and Comparative 
Law Review 55, 55 
148 The four Allied governments were of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Provisional Government of the 
French Republic and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. United Nations, Agreement for the prosecution 
‘and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis, (‘London Agreement’), 8 August 1945, 82 




European Axis.’149 The agreement which had the Charter of the IMT appended to it, defined the 
tribunal’s constitution, jurisdiction and function.150 Nineteen other United Nations states 
subsequently adopted the London Agreement and its Charter, in accordance with the procedure 
premised on its article 5.151 When the trial began in November 1945, 22 of the 24 indicted 
defendants were prosecuted.152 The defendants represented a cross-section of leaders of the Nazi 
Party and German Reich who were responsible for not only organising but also carrying out a 
systematic and planned reign of terror in Germany, the satellite Axis states and a number of 
occupied countries in Europe.153 Six Nazi organisations were also charged,154 but the tribunal 
found only four of these organisations criminally liable.155  
                                                            
149 Ibid.  Also at United Nations Charter of the International Military Tribunal – Annex to the Agreement for the 
prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis (‘London Agreement’) 8 August 1945, 
82 UNTS 279, 59 Stat., art 1 available at  http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39614.html (accessed 14 January 
2015).   
150 Ibid.  
151 The 19 United Nations states were Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Uruguay, 
Venezuela and Yugoslavia. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment of 1 October 1946 available at 
http://www.crimeofaggression.info/documents/6/1946_Nuremberg_Judgment.odf (accessed 15 January 2015). See 
also ‘Preface to Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on 
Military Trials, London, 1945’ available at  http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/military_Law/pdf/jackson-rpt-military-
trials.pdf.(accessed 15 January 2015). The United Nations General Assembly on 11 December, 1946 affirmed the 
principles of international law recognised by the IMT Charter and also the Tribunal’s judgment. General Assembly 
Resolutions 1st Sessions available at www.un.org/documents/ga/res/1/ares1.htm (accessed 15 January 2015). 
Matthew Lippman ‘Nuremberg: Forty Five Years Later’ (1991-1992) 7 Connecticut Journal of International Law 1. 
United Nations ‘Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals’ art 5 which provides 
that ‘[a]ny Government of the United Nations may adhere to this Agreement by notice given through the diplomatic 
channel to the Government of the United Kingdom, who shall inform the other signatories and adhering 
Governments of each such adherence.’       
152 Though 22 men were prosecuted, three of them were acquitted. One committed suicide whilst in prison; another 
could not be tried because of his physical and mental condition, whilst the third individual was tried in his absence. 
Of the 19 men convicted, 12 were sentenced to death by hanging, three to life imprisonment and the remaining four 
to prison terms ranging from 10 to 20 years. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment of 1 
October 1946. 
153 ‘Memorandum to President Roosevelt from the Secretaries of State and War and the Attorney General, January 
22, 1945 in Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military 
Trials, London, 1945’ available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/military_Law/pdf/jackson-rpt-military-trials.pdf 
(accessed 15 January 2015). 
154 United Nations Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art 9 which provides in part that ‘[a]t the trial of 
any individual member of any group or organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of which 
the individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a 
criminal organization’.   
155 The six organisations which were indicted were The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party; Die Schutzstaffein (also 
known as the SS); Die Sicherheitedienst (also known as the SD); Die GeheimstaatsPolizie (also known as the 
Gestapo or Secret State Police); Die Sturmabteilungen (also known as the SA); the Reichscabinet, and the General 
Staff and High Command. The first four organisations were found to be criminally liable. (LXIII, ‘Report to the 




The Charter provided the IMT with jurisdiction to prosecute defendants charged with 
crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of a common plan or 
conspiracy. These crimes were defined in article 6 of the IMT Charter as: 
Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, 
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;156  
War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but 
not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of 
civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or 
persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction 
of cities, towns or villages, or destruction not justified by military necessity.157 
 
Crimes against humanity were also defined in the London Charter as: 
Crimes against humanity: namely murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of 
the country where perpetrated.158   
For each of these offences ‘[l]eaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices participating in the 
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes 
were (sic) responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan’159 
according to the article. In addition to providing the IMT jurisdiction over the above-mentioned 
crimes, the Charter also provided that individuals, rather than states, could be made liable for 
these international crimes, regardless of their official position. Thus, it curtailed the concept of 
national sovereignty, in that a head of state or responsible government officials could be 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945’ available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/military_Law/pdf/jackson-rpt-military-trials.pdf (accessed 15 January 2015). 
156 United Nations Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art 6(a). 
157 Idem art 6(b).   
158 Idem art 6(c). This is the first time that crimes against humanity were defined. The origin of this crime can be 
traced as far back to 1915, when three of the Allied governments, France, Great Britain and Russia criticised the 
massacre of Armenians by the Ottoman government as constituting ‘ crimes against civilization and humanity’. See 
Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law 2 revised ed (1999) Kluwer 
Law International at 61. See page 34 for further explantion of ‘crimes against humanity.’ 
159 In addition to crimes against humanity being introduced into international law by the Charter, crimes against 
peace, conspiracy to commit a war crime or a crime against peace or humanity and the recognition of criminal 




prosecuted under the London Charter.160 This provision, as described by Hale, ‘established the 
foundational principles of international criminal law’ and also ‘the principle that international 
law pre-empts national law’.161 Another significant aspect of the London Charter is that a 
defendant acting under government’s authority or that of a superior would not be absolved from 
his/her actions, although it might be a factor in the mitigation of sentence.162  
Although the work of the IMT has been highly praised by scholars in its development of 
modern international law,163 one aspect lacking in the jurisprudence was the failure to include 
gender specific atrocities (such as rape committed against women and children) in the crimes 
listed under the tribunal’s jurisdiction. This omission lent credence to the notion that rape and 
sexually-related assaults committed during armed conflicts were not viewed with the same level 
of concern as traditionally committed grave crimes.164 The evidence on war crimes and crimes 
against humanity which was presented before the IMT by the French and Soviet prosecutors165 
revealed that rape and various forms of sexual assaults such as forced prostitution, forced 
abortion and sexual mutilation had been committed, not only by the Germans but also by the 
Allied forces.166 According to Copelon, concentration camp brothels set up for raping Jewish and 
                                                            
160 United Nations Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art 7 which provides that ‘[t]he official position of 
defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered 
as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.’  
161 Hale ‘Does the evolution of international criminal law end with the ICC?’ (2008) 35 Denver Journal of 
International law and Policy at 444. Ryan ‘Nuremberg’s contribution to international law’ describing the IMT as 
having changed ‘forever the presumptions of national sovereignty, individual responsibility, and personal 
accountability that had underlain international law since the rise of nation states three centuries before.’  
162 United Nations Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art 8.   
163 Campanaro ‘Women, war and international law’ at 2560. Hale ‘Does the evolution of international criminal law 
end with the ICC?’ at 444. Ryan ‘Nuremberg’s contribution to international law’ at 55 (describing the IMT as ‘the 
most significant development in human rights law in the twentieth century’ and also as ‘the first trial for violations 
of human rights’ yet gender specific crimes which were committed were not prosecuted.) See also The influence of 
the Nuremberg Trial on international criminal law, available at 
www.robertjackson.org>...>Speeches Related To Robert H. Jackson (accessed 14 January 2015).  
P D Marquardt ‘Law without borders: The constitutionality of the International Criminal Court’ (1995) 33 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 73, 82.  
164 Idem at 2561. 
165 The indictment contained four counts. The United States was responsible for trying the conspiracy count whilst 
the United Kingdom was responsible for trying crimes against peace. 
166 Niarchos ‘Women, war and rape’ at 665– 666 (stating that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic soldiers 
committed rape, when they captured Berlin in 1945. Between 110 000 and 800 000 women are reported to have 
been raped).  Kelly D Askin ‘A decade of the development of gender crimes in international courts and tribunals: 
1993 to 2003’ (2004) 11 Human Rights Brief at 16 (noting that evidence of ‘rape of medical and first-aid nurses’ and 
various forms of sexual assault were submitted to the IMT). Kelly D Askin ‘Sexual violence in decisions and 
indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current status’ (1999) 93 The American Journal of 
International Law 97 at 99 (stating that the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals largely ignored gender-based crimes). 




Aryan women were not included in the IMT proceedings. She also states that the rapes 
committed by the Allied forces on German women were also not included.167 This is not 
surprising as the IMT was established after World War II to try German war criminals for war 
crimes committed, thus the crimes committed by the Allied forces did not fall to be mentioned in 
the jurisprudence emanating from the IMT.168 Also as pointed out by Askin, the Allied 
governments would not have wanted to prosecute gender specific crimes as they were also guilty 
of committing these offences.169 
Scholars have criticised the IMT for failing to prosecute rape and other SGBCs despite 
the wealth of evidence that these crimes took place. They argue that these crimes could still have 
been prosecuted as war crimes and/or crimes against humanity, given that the Charter is flexible. 
The crimes listed under the war crimes provision in article 6(b) of the Charter, are crimes which 
international law recognised as such. As stated in the IMT judgment, these crimes were covered 
by certain articles in the 1907 Hague Convention and 1929 Geneva Convention.170 In support of 
the argument that rape and other SGBCs could have been prosecuted as war crimes, Askin 
argues that under article 6(b) of the Charter, the words ‘but not be limited to’, ‘expressly allowed 
for other violations of laws or customs of war which were not already enumerated’.171 Thus, in 
her opinion, two of the charges in count three of the indictment relating to war crimes, namely 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
been be sufficient to encompass rape and other sexual forms of violence. She gives various examples, such as the 
fact that one of the defendants’ had ‘knowledge of the brutal treatment and terror to which the Eastern people were 
subjected’. Another instance mentioned by her is of a defendant who was found to be a ‘willing and knowing 
participant in the use of terrorism in Poland …’ Luping ‘Investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based 
crimes’ (2009) 17 Journal Of Gender, Social Policy And The Law at 442. 
167 Rhonda Copelon ‘Surfacing gender: Re-engraving crimes against women in humanitarian law’ (1994) 5 Hastings 
Women’s Law Journal 243 at 243. 
168 Idem at 665 (stating that ‘rape’ does not appear in the judgment of the IMT which consisted of 179 pages. and 
that rape was ‘folded into the general category of ‘ill-treatment of the civilian population.’). But compare Askin ‘A 
decade of the development of gender crimes’ at 16 (stating that though a notable amount of evidence relating to sex 
crimes had been recorded by the IMT and IMTFE, not much reference was made to gender crimes in judgments.) 
See also Kelly D Askin ‘Prosecuting wartime rape and other gender-related crimes under international law: 
Extraordinary advances, enduring obstacles’ (2003) 21 Berkeley Journal of International Law 288 at 301 (where 
Askin states that even though there was a lot of documentation relating to sexual violence in World War II and the 
occupation of Germany, the prosecutors did not expressly prosecute these crimes. She states however, that much 
evidence relating to sexual violence was contained in the trial records). See pages 34 and 35 relating to this. See 
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment of 1 October 1946. 
169 See page 35 below.  Askin ‘Prosecuting wartime rape and other gender-related crimes’ at 301. Also Judith 
Gardam and Michelle Jarvis Women, armed conflict and international law (2001) Springer Netherlands at 227. 
170 The articles referred to in the 1907 Hague Convention are Articles 46, 50, 52 and 56. Under the 1929 Geneva 
Convention they are Articles 2, 3, 4, 46 and 51. International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Trial of The Major War 
Criminals, Judgment of 1 October 1946 (22 August 1946 to 1 October 1946) at 79, available at 
https://crimeofaggression.info/documents/6/1946_Nuremberg_Judgement.pdf (accessed 25 June 2018). 




‘[a]bduction of the civilian population of occupied territories into slavery and for other purposes’ 
and ‘. . . devastation unjustified by military necessity’, could have embodied sexual assault.172 
This would have come within the term ‘ill-treatment’ in the article.173 Askin, however, does not 
dispute the IMT’s conviction of persons who committed war crimes against prisoners of war who 
were maltreated.174 Like Askin, Bassiouni is of the opinion that rape and other sexual assault 
crimes constitute war crimes under article 6(b) of the Charter, as they are implicitly covered by 
this term.175  
The ‘first concrete formulation’ of the term ‘crimes against humanity’ is found in article 
6(c) of the Charter.176 The drafters thought it was necessary to include this crime in the Charter 
to cover crimes committed by the Germans which could not be prosecuted as war crimes.177 The 
crimes which were prosecuted as crimes against humanity were crimes which the German 
perpetrators committed against German victims of ‘the same nationality as their oppressors or 
against citizens of a state allied with Germany’178 With regard to the charge of crimes against 
humanity provided for in article 6(c) of the Charter, Askin and Bassiouni are of the same opinion 
that rape could have been covered under the words ‘other inhumane acts’.179 Before World War 
II, crimes listed in article 6(c) of the Charter, excluding ‘persecution per se’, were acknowledged 
as crimes within the criminal legal systems of major states of the world. Such crimes, for 
example, were classified as murder, manslaughter and rape. 180 It therefore follows that since 
rape was prohibited by the general principles of law of these systems, it could come under the 
term ‘other inhumane acts’.181 Askin, however, concludes that sexual violence was implicitly 
recognised as torture by the IMT when it referred in its judgment to crimes which had been 
                                                            
172 Idem at 138. 
173 See also Niarchos ‘Women, war and rape’ at 665 citing United States v Göring, 22 Trial of the Major War 
Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, 411, 491 (1948) 
174 Askin ‘War crimes against women’ at 139. 
175 Bassiouni is of the same opinion with regard to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), that 
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committed by the Germans. In support of this argument she cites, as example, the IMT judgment 
stating that: 
Many women and girls in their teens were separated from the rest of the internees . . . and locked 
in separate cells, where the unfortunate creatures were subjected to particularly outrageous forms 
of torture. They were raped, their breasts cut off . . . ’ 
[W]omen were subjected to the same treatment as men. To the physical pain, the sadism of the 
torturers added the moral anguish, especially mortifying for a woman or a young girl, of being 
stripped nude by her torturers. Pregnancy did not save them from lashes. When brutality brought 
about a miscarriage, they were left without any care, exposed to all the hazards and complications 
of these criminal abortions.182  
Despite the wealth of evidence before the IMT of rape and sexual assault, the tribunal’s failure to 
prosecute these gender-specific crimes was glaring. Askin offers two explanations for this: first, 
that the tribunal may have thought it unnecessary to prosecute ‘specific instances of individual 
acts against named individuals’ due to the wealth of evidence proving crimes on a massive scale 
which was ample to convict the defendants.183 Moreover Askin argues that the IMT seemed 
more comfortable prosecuting crimes against peace, rather than war crimes or crimes against 
humanity, as the tribunal considered waging aggressive war to be the ‘supreme crime,’ and 
appeared to be less concerned with prosecuting gender specific crimes.184 Askin’s second 
argument for not focusing on prosecuting gender specific crimes was that it would have 
forestalled prosecuting the defendants for the same offences which members of the Allied 
governments were guilty of committing.185 Bassiouni, on the other hand, based his theory on the 
fact that prejudice and poor understanding of sexual violence prevented the prosecution of this 
crime and its inclusion in international treaties − although this was slowly changing.186 This 
                                                            
182 Askin ‘Prosecuting wartime rape and other gender-related crimes’ at 301, referring to the IMT’s judgment. 
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violence are normally considered abnormal acts which normally occur in private. This may be the reason why, when 
the French prosecutor was presenting his evidence on rape, that Brownmiller describes how uncomfortable he was 
by stating that when he ‘shifted through his documents’, he adopted ‘the standing censoring mechanism that men 
employ when dealing with the rape of women. . . “The Tribunal will forgive me if I avoid citing the atrocious 
details,” he said with gallantry. “A medical certificate from Doctor Nicolaides who examined the women who were 




reasoning may be supported by the fact that the prosecuting lawyers came from different legal 
jurisdictions, and the trial was conducted in four different languages; English, Russian, French, 
and German. 
Sellers’ report disagrees with other scholars on the exclusion of evidence of sexual 
violence before the IMT. From the final decisions of the tribunal, she states that it was clear that 
the judges ‘deliberated upon evidence of sex-based crimes and that such evidence indeed shaped 
the judgment’.187 She goes on to state that the IMT indictments and its decisions ‘are complete 
with proscriptions that capture mid-twentieth-century legal culture as applied to sexual 
violence’.188 Sellers cites article 3 of the Geneva Convention 1929189 as an example of the legal 
basis on which the IMT secured convictions in cases of rapes against military nurses and 
personnel who were imprisoned and ill-treated.190  
In contrast to the IMT, national military courts were established to prosecute war 
criminals from Germany who had committed crimes of a lesser degree, compared to those 
prosecuted at the IMT.191 The authority for these prosecutions arose from the Allies 
promulgating Allied Control Council Law 10 (CCL 10)192 in exercise of their sovereignty over 
Germany.193 German war criminals were to be prosecuted in the courts of the territories where 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and Schuster at 56. After referring to Brownmiller’s description of the French prosecutor, Niarchos, points out that 
the Soviet Union’s prosecutor was bolder in presenting his evidence. Niarchos ‘Women, war and rape’ at 664. 
187 Sellers ‘The cultural value of sexual violence’ at 319. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (hereinafter the 
Third Geneva Convention), art 3 which provides that ‘[p]risoners of war are entitled to respect for their persons and 
honour. Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their sex. Prisoners retain their full civil capacity.’  
190 Sellers ‘The cultural value of sexual violence’ at 319. See also Sellers ‘The prosecution of sexual violence in 
conflict’ at 7 (stating that the IMT and the Tokyo Tribunal admitted and ruled upon evidence of rapes, even though 
the lingering legacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal remains one of inattention to sex based crimes.’ She states that the 
forced deportation of 500 000 females, in the IMT’s judgment, should have been ‘examined as a gender-based crime 
of massive female enslavement. Luping concurs, by stating that though rape was not explicitly referred to in the 
IMTs indictment, its transcripts show that rape was prosecuted. Luping ‘Investigation and prosecution of sexual and 
gender-based crimes’ at 441. 
191 Although these criminals committed heinous crimes they did not instigate the war like those who were tried at the 
IMT. Campanaro ‘Women, war and international law’ at 2565. Those indicted ‘were Nazi leaders who ‘played 
central roles in the crimes perpetrated, including doctors, judges, industrialists and government and military leaders. 
Theodor Meron ‘Reflections on the prosecution of war crimes by international tribunals’ (2006) 100 American 
Journal of International Law 551 at 562. 
192 Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and Against 
Humanity.    
193 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni ‘From Versailles to Rwanda in seventy-five years: The need to establish a Permanent 




they committed the crimes.194 Though CCL 10 was modelled on the IMT Charter,195 with regard 
to sexual offences, rape was included as a crime against humanity.196 Copelon states that rape 
was not prosecuted although it was listed as a crime against humanity. She believes that this 
could have been because the Allied forces were also guilty of this crime.197 Askin on the other 
hand, states that gender crimes were casually treated in these trials. Crimes such as unethical 
experiments performed by medical doctors, and forced sterilisation and abortion by the guards of 
the concentration camps, were mentioned at these trials.198 Although Sellers points out that 
hardly any cases of rape, if any, were prosecuted as a crime against humanity by these military 
courts, she adds that most of the concentration camp cases ‘confirmed  . . . the gender-based 
violence aspect of forced sterilization, castrations and fertility experiments’ that were carried out 
on men and women in most of the camps by the Germans.199  
2.2.2 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) 
The IMTFE, also known as the Tokyo Trial, was established to try war criminals, either 
individually or those who were members of organisations or in both capacities, with offences 
which included crimes against peace.200 Whilst the war criminals prosecuted at the IMT were 
from Europe, those prosecuted at IMTFE were Japanese top military, political and diplomatic 
leaders.201 Its establishment flowed from the implementation of the Cairo Declaration of 
                                                            
194 Jackson Moogato ‘The work of national military tribunals under Control Council Law 10’ in Jose Doria et al 
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December 1, 1943,202 the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945,203 the Instrument of Surrender 
of September 2, 1945,204 and the Moscow Conference of December 26, 1945.205 At the Moscow 
Conference, held between 16 and 26 of December, 1945 the governments of the United States, 
Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) agreed inter alia, with 
the concurrence of China, that the orders for implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the 
occupation and control of Japan and directives relating thereto should be issued by the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers.206 Based on this power, General Douglas MacArthur by 
Special Proclamation established the IMTFE, on January 19 1946. 
The IMTFE Charter (modelled after the IMT Charter) was issued on the same day as the 
Proclamation. It was amended on 26 April, 1946 to include the addition of two judges, from 
India and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, to the nine originally chosen.207 The provision 
for two judges from Asia was to give that region the opportunity to judge the Japanese for the 
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the same nine Allied Powers. International Military Judgment of 4 November, 1948. First Instrument of Surrender, 2 
September 1945 
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206 Ibid. Communique on the Moscow Conference of the three foreign ministers, signed at Moscow on 27 December 
1945, and report of the meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
United States and the United Kingdom, dated 26 December 1945, together constituting an agreement relating to the 
preparation of Peace Treaties and to certain other problems available at www.ungarisches-
institut.de/dokumente/pdf/19451227-1.pdf (accessed 14 January 2015). 
207 The nine judges came from those countries which were the signatory powers that signed the Instrument of 





brutal atrocities it suffered under them.208 Critics of the IMTFE have noted America’s 
domination over the trial and other aspects relating to the IMTFE.209 Also, it was considered to 
be out of place for colonial nations such as France, Britain and the Netherlands to judge Japan 
for its colonial ambitions.210 In their opinion, there should have been more judges from Asia, 
including Korea, which had been ‘brutally’ colonised by Japan for over 30 years.211 In his 
judgment and subsequent article, Justice Bert Röling, one of the judges who presided over the 
trial, said the judges should have come from neutral countries and from Japan, as their presence 
‘would have had a favourable influence’.212  
The crimes within the jurisdiction of the IMTFE; that is, crimes against peace, crimes 
against humanity and conventional war crimes, though similarly titled to those contained within 
the IMT Charter, are worded differently in some respects. 213 The 28 selected Class A war 
criminals214 were indicted on 55 separate counts (as opposed to the IMT which had four counts), 
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213 Under article 5(a), crimes against peace is defined as ‘the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a declared 
or undeclared war or aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances, or 
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War crimes against women at 166. 
214 Selected from 80 war criminal suspects, including nine civilians and 19 soldiers. Askin quotes Minear on the 
criteria for selecting the defendants, that the group of accused represent branches of the Japanese Government and 
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between the periods of 1 January 1928 and 2 September 1945.215 Due to the complexity of these 
counts they were grouped into three: crimes against peace (Group I: counts 1–36); murder Group 
II: counts 37–52) and conventional war crimes or crimes against humanity (Group III: counts 
53–55).216 The trial which commenced on 3 May 1946 was factually gruesome and finally ended 
on November 4, 1948, taking two and a half years to complete.217 At the end of the trial 25 of the 
28 war criminals were convicted and sentenced.218 Seven of them were sentenced to death by 
hanging, 16 to life imprisonment, and a number of others were imprisoned for 20 years. The last 
category of those tried was sentenced to seven years imprisonment.219  
Gender specific sex crimes were committed by the Japanese during World War II. 
Although the Charter did not specifically list rape as a crime, some of the defendants were 
charged with other crimes along with rape under the category of war crime.220 Yet, scholars have 
pointed to the fact that, like its counterpart, the IMT, the IMTFE ‘largely neglected sexual 
violence’,221 or failed to adequately prosecute it and other sexual violence crimes.222 In 
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216 International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Dissentient Judgment of Justice Pal, Kokusho – Kankokai, Inc., 
Tokyo, 1999 available at www.cwporter.com/pal1.htm (accessed 15 January 2015). Caroline J K S Picart 
‘Attempting to go beyond forgetting: The legacy of the Tokyo International Military Tribunal and crimes of 
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[emphasis added] International Military Tribunal judgment of 4 November, 1948.  
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U S Department of State Office of the Historian, The Nuremberg Trial and the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1945-
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220 Askin ‘Prosecuting wartime rape and other gender-related crimes’ at 302. Meron ‘Rape as a crime under 
international humanitarian law’ at 87 (stating that those defendants who were prosecuted for war crimes which 
included rape were found guilty because they failed to ensure that their subordinates did not contravene international 
law. By including rape with other crimes in the indictment, the indictment contemplated acts ‘carried out in violation 
of recognised customs and conventions of war . . .  murdering, maiming and ill-treating prisoners of war (and) 
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Campanaro’s view the failure to specifically list sexual assault crimes within the tribunal’s 
Charter reduced rape to a minor crime, and reinforced the fact that historically rape had been 
considered to be an insignificant crime.223 Sexual assault crimes were only considered by the 
prosecution after a defendant had been charged with other crimes.224 The particulars of breaches 
in the indictment relating to rape were drafted as follows: 
SECTION ONE 
Inhumane treatment, contrary in each case to Article 4 of the said Annex to the said Hague 
Convention and the whole of the said Geneva Convention and to the said assurances. In addition 
to the inhumane treatment alleged in Sections Two to Six hereof inclusive, which are 
incorporated in this Section, prisoners of war and civilian internees were murdered, beaten, 




Mistreatment of the sick and wounded, medical personnel and female nurses, contrary to Articles 
3, 14, 15 and 25 of the said Geneva Convention and Articles 1, 9, 10 and 12 of the said Red Cross 
Convention, and to the said assurances:  
………………………………………………………………………………… 
(c) Female nurses were raped, murdered and ill-treated, 
 
Failure to respect family honour and rights, individual life, private property and religious 
convictions and worship in occupied territories and deportation and enslavement of the 
inhabitants thereof, contrary to Articles 46 of the said Annex to the said Hague Convention and to 
the Laws and Customs of War: Large numbers of the inhabitants of such territories were 
murdered, tortured, raped and otherwise ill-treated, arrested and interned without justification, 
sent to forced labour, and their property destroyed or confiscated.225 
 
Thus rape and other crimes were classified as ‘inhuman treatment,’ ill-treatment’ and ‘failure to 
respect family honour and rights’. The crime of rape which the Allied prosecutors successfully 
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prosecuted related to atrocities committed in the Chinese capital city of Nanking in December 
1937226. Before its invasion by the Japanese Imperial Army, the Chinese nationalist forces had 
pulled out of Nanking, moving westward, thus, making Hankow its new capital.227 Those who 
had the means to leave also left, ‘leaving the poorer classes and a small number of foreign 
missionaries defenceless’.228 Brownmiller, describes the ‘Rape of Nanking’ as it is popularly 
referred to, as an ‘orgy of wholesale assault against the. . . civilian population.’229 Iris Chang, in 
giving an account of the heinous crimes committed during the six weeks of the raping in 
Nanking states that: 
Chinese men were used for bayonet practice and in decapitation contests. An estimated 20 000-
80 000 Chinese women were raped. Many soldiers went beyond rape to disembowel women, slice 
off their breasts, nail them alive to walls. Fathers were forced to rape their daughters, and sons, 
their mothers, as other family members watched. Not only did live burials, castration, the carving 
of organs and the roasting of people become routine, but more diabolical tortures were practiced, 
such as hanging people by their tongues on iron hooks or burying people to their waists and 
watching them get torn apart by German shepherds.”230   
 
In drawing attention to the high number of those who were raped, Wood makes reference to 
Chang’s calculations. Chang, she states, calculated that the 20 000-80 000 thousand women (and 
girls) who were raped were 8-32% of the 250 000 female civilians in Nanking at that time.231 
However, Wood, points out that it is not clear how Chang arrived at this figure.232 In its 
judgment, the Tribunal referred to the rape of Nanking by concluding that ‘[i]ndividual soldiers 
and small groups of two or three roamed over the city murdering, raping, looting and burning.’233 
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The Tribunal further stated, in one paragraph when referring to the gender crimes which 
occurred in Nanking that234  
. . . many cases of rape occurred. Death was a frequent penalty for the slightest resistance on the 
part of a victim or the members of her family who sought to protect her. Even girls of tender 
years and old women were raped in large numbers throughout the city, and many cases of 
abnormal and sadistic behaviour in connection with these raping’s occurred. Many women were 
killed after the act and their bodies mutilated. . . . Approximately 20 000 cases of rape occurred 
within the city during the first month of the occupation.235 
Torture by way of burning victims or electric shocks was also used as a means of sexual violence 
on the prisoners of war and civilian internees. The application of electric current on a sensitive 
part of the body such as the nose, ears, sexual organs or breasts, was carried out.236 In later years 
the two ad hoc tribunals and the ICC acknowledged that rape by torture could be a form of 
sexual violence.237 
Justice Pal’s dissenting judgment also gave an account of the rape which occurred at 
Nanking. His judgment and Chang’s research not only cited gender-based crimes committed 
against the Chinese female population, but also those against men who were forced to rape 
members of their families, which the prosecutor at the IMTFE did not consider prosecuting. This 
is not surprising, considering the fact that the charges brought against the defendants for rape 
committed against the women and girls were only brought when they had been charged with 
other crimes.238 Justice Pal’s dissenting judgment suggested that rapes alleged to have been 
committed by the Japanese had been exaggerated.239 Sellers used the same arguments as that put 
forward for the IMT, that the judges considered the evidence of sex-based crimes, which shaped 
the IMTFE judgment. She was of the opinion that the fact the Tribunal disregarded Justice Pal’s 
dissenting judgment implied that the Japanese misconduct in respect of the rapes committed in 
Nanking had been exaggerated was proof of the studied consideration given to sex-based 
crimes.240 However, the Tribunal, subsumed the rape crimes under the command responsibility 
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charges. In applying the command responsibility principle for crimes which included rape, the 
Tribunal prosecuted and convicted General Iwane Matusi, Commander Shunroku Hata and Koki 
Hirota, who was the Japanese Foreign Minister from 1933 to 1938. Hirota was the first civilian 
person convicted under this regime for crimes committed by soldiers who were under his 
authority. With regard to the rapes of Nanking, the Tribunal found that the War Ministry of 
which Hirota was in charge gave assurances that the atrocities occurring in Nanking would stop. 
However, the atrocities continued and the Tribunal found that Hirota 
 . . . was derelict in his duty in not insisting before the Cabinet that immediate action be taken to 
put an end to the atrocities, failing any other action open to him to bring about the same result. He 
was content to rely on assurances which he knew were not being implemented while hundreds of 
murders, violations of women, and other atrocities were being committed daily. His inaction 
amounted to criminal negligence.241  
Thus, instead of preferring charges rape and other sexual atrocities in their own right, the Tokyo 
Tribunal used the evidence which it had of these crimes to support the charges of crimes against 
humanity.242  
Although the IMTFE applied the command responsibility theory to adjudicate the crime 
of rape and other crimes which occurred in Nanking, the Tribunal did not convict defendants on 
evidence of sexual slavery committed by the Japanese Imperial Army.243 Goldstone, in 
expressing his disappointment at the non-prosecution of these crimes, states that the Tribunal 
‘completely ignored the equally notorious forcing of thousands of comfort women into 
prostitution in Japanese military motels’.244 Two hundred thousand women and girls 
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(euphemistically referred to as comfort women),245 mostly from Korea, as well as from other 
Asian countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, China and Japan were lured, abducted or 
forced to become sexual slaves.246 Refusal to comply with the soldiers’ demands, resulted in 
their being beaten or murdered in a gender specific way, such as, being raped with broken glass 
or with a crude weapon or having their sexual organs or bodies maimed.247 The comfort stations 
devised by the Japanese, which in reality were military brothels, were intended to prevent reports 
of rapes committed by them in their occupied territories from spreading internationally.248 They 
were also established to prevent the spread of venereal diseases, to provide comfort for the 
soldiers, to forestall the soldiers from committing rape outside these stations and also to prevent 
espionage.249 This, however, did not prevent them from carrying out widespread rapes in their 
occupied territories.250 
The sexual crimes committed by the Japanese Imperial Army could have been prosecuted 
by the IMTFE, under article 5(c) of the Charter as crimes against humanity. Instead, the IMTFE 
                                                            
245 Idem at 14-15 and 20 (Askin asserts that the word ‘comfort’ gives the wrong impression of ‘solace and care’ 
when in actual fact the women were tortured and beaten if they refused to submit to the soldiers demands for sex. 
She also points out that in such situations prostitutes can be raped and thus should not be treated differently from 
rape victims). It is estimated that 80% of those from Korea were between 14 to 18 years of age. Picart ‘Attempting 
to go beyond forgetting’ at 29. Wood ‘Variation in sexual violence during war’ at 311.  Apart from being repeatedly 
raped, up to 40 times a day, these women were also expected to provide domestic services to the Japanese soldiers. 
Copelon ‘Gender Crimes as War Crimes’ at 222.    
246Idem at 30. Based on research carried out mostly on Korean comfort women and their Japanese counterparts, Soh 
claims that their ‘victimisation was partly a result of ‘institutionalized . . .gender violence tolerated in patriarchal 
homes and enacted in public sphere’ which was imbued in what she calls ‘masculinist sexual culture.’ C Sarah Soh 
The Comfort Women: Sexual violence and Postcolonial memory in Korea and Japan (2008) University of Chicago, 
Press, Chicago, at xii, 3. 
247 Idem at  20-21 
248 Idem at 12. Carmen M Argibay ‘Sexual Slavery and the “Comfort Women” of World War II’ (2003) 21 Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 375 at 376-377. The first comfort station was established in 1932, in Shanghai. 
Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal 2000 for the Trial of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery, In the matter of 
The Prosecutors and the Peoples of the Asia-Pacific Region v Emperor Hirohito et al. and the Government of 
Japan, Summary of findings, 12 December 2000 para 20 available at  
http://www.alpha-canada.org/.../themes/.../theme/.../WomenTribunal_Summary … (accessed 20 January 2015). Lee 
‘Comforting the comfort women’ at 509. Copelon is convinced the Allies were aware of the ‘comfort women’ but 
chose to turn a blind eye to it, based on discussions with a relative who was part of the Allied forces and 
documented writings from the military archive in Australia, in particular that of Ustina Dolgopol.  
Copelon ‘Gender Crimes as War Crimes’ at 222. Picart ‘Attempting to go beyond forgetting’ at 37 (Picart also tends 
states that the international community should have condemned the establishment of comfort stations. Their 
establishment and the crimes which arose from them should have been prosecuted by the IMTFE as crimes against 
humanity).  
249 Idem at 13. Picart ‘Attempting to go beyond forgetting’ at 30-31 and 38. Copelon ‘Gender crimes as war crimes’ 
at 222.  




focused more on prosecuting the defendants for crimes against the peace251 and not prosecuting 
any of the defendants for crimes against humanity. Certain scholars have criticised the tribunal 
for not giving much attention to the various crimes committed against humanity,252 citing 
‘gender prejudice,’253 and racism,254 as the tribunal preferred to prosecute those crimes which 
favoured them. Expatiating on the scholars’ reasoning, they cited various examples, such as the 
experiences of the whites being more important to the tribunal than those of the Asians, whom 
the tribunal deliberately ignored as victims of crimes such as the atomic bombing of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki by the Americans.255 Totani differs from these views of ‘gender prejudice’ or 
racism, arguing that the prosecutors did provide evidence of sexual violence committed against 
Asian women, especially in China and Dutch East Indies,256 but were not able to convince the 
judges that the crimes committed were the result of superior orders.257 Totani’s argument, 
however, is found wanting in that she proceeds to admit that the Tokyo trial was a means to 
strengthen America’s interests and that of the colonial powers in Asia.258  
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Copelon reasons that the tribunal did not try the defendants for the crime of sexual slavery 
because women were seen as spoils of war.259 It was easier for the tribunal to consider the 
‘comfort stations’ as brothels, rather than rape camps and also deny the fact that the women were 
treated as sex slaves.260 Moreover, the allies were just as guilty as Japanese soldiers.261 She gives 
the example of the US military organising and directing their men to brothels.262 Similarly, 
Argibay concurs that the words prostitute and/or prostitution derogatorily described the comfort 
women’s situation and recommended the term sexual slavery.263  
Right from the start, the IMTFE was what Chang and Barker refer to as a ‘creature of 
political decision-making’.264 Politics, therefore, would have played a part in how the tribunal 
decided which defendants to try and also the crimes to be tried. Many scholars have said that the 
Japanese Emperor Hirohito ought to have been tried.265 As the supreme leader and commander 
of the Japanese Imperial Army, World War II was fought in his name and he would have been 
aware of the heinous crimes which the Japanese army was committing.266 Unfortunately, Cold 
War politics overtook the politics of the IMTFE, as the allies were more concerned in getting the 
Japanese on their side.267 Picart recounts Chang’s view on this point:  
After the 1949 Communist revolt in China, neither the People’s Republic of China nor the 
Republic of China demanded wartime reparations from Japan (as Israel had from Germany) 
because the two governments were competing for Japanese trade and political recognition. And 
even the United States, faced with the threat of communism in the Soviet Union and mainland 
China, sought to ensure the friendship and loyalty of its former enemy, Japan. In this manner, 
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cold war tensions permitted Japan to escape much of the intense critical examination that its 
wartime ally [Germany] was forced to undergo.268  
Thus, those crimes which the Japanese had committed were glossed over, particularly gender-
violence crimes269 which ought to have been punished as crimes against humanity. Picart 
describes the military pensions awarded − the Japanese government’s benefits to its soldiers − 
and non-compensation to the comfort women as a ‘second rape’ by the Allies.270 Unlike 
Germany, which had acknowledged the crimes it committed during World War II and apologised 
for them, the Japanese government for many years continued to deny the crimes committed 
against these comfort women271 It was only when the surviving comfort women started to speak 
out in the 1990s, and evidence of the crimes committed against them started to emerge, that the 
Japanese government finally admitted its moral responsibility relating to sexual slavery 
committed during World War II.272 The government of Japan, nonetheless, continues to refuse its 
legal responsibility towards the comfort women, claiming that issues of wartime compensation 
had been settled with their respective countries and also that individuals have no right to claim 
reparations under international law.273 The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal 2000 
for the Trial of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery (Women’s Tribunal) was a people’s tribunal, 
based in Tokyo, Japan, from early December 2000.274 It was established as an addendum to the 
IMTFE, to fill the gap which the Allies created, when they failed to try the defendants at the 
IMTFE for rape and sexual crimes committed against the comfort women by the Japanese 
army.275 Thus, the Women’s Tribunal was established to clarify and assess Japan’s criminal 
liability towards the comfort women for sexual war crimes committed against them in the 1930s 
and 1940s and also to ‘end the cycle of impunity for wartime sexual violence and . . . prevent its 
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reoccurrence’.276 As the Supreme Commander of the Japanese Army and Navy, Emperor 
Hirohito was found guilty of responsibility for sexual slavery and rape as a crime against 
humanity by the tribunal.277 Nine top military officials including government officials were also 
found guilty of the same crime.278 The Japanese government was also found guilty of 
committing rape and sexual slavery against the comfort women.279 As the tribunal was a 
peoples’ own creation, not that of a national state or international body, its decision cannot be 
legally enforced. It is therefore, not in a position to impose sentences or order reparations.280 
Although, Phelps refers to this as a ‘hollow victory’, she goes on to state, however, that the 
tribunal’s decision provided a moral victory for the comfort women.281 She also points to the fact 
that the Women’s Tribunal was the first war crimes tribunal which focused solely on gender-
specific crimes committed during armed conflict situations.282 Matsui also draws attention to the 
fact that the Women’s Tribunal influenced the re-examination of international law in the area of 
gender crimes283, pointing to the need for the sexual slavery to be recognised as a crime to 
restore the honour and dignity of the comfort women, as achieved by the tribunal.284 Other war 
crimes trials were held in Asia, such as that by the United States military commission. The 
commission convicted General Tomoyuki Yamashita, who commanded the 14th Area Army of 
Japan, for failing in his command responsibility. He was charged with ‘failing to exercise 
adequate control over his troops, who had committed widespread rape, murder and pillage in 
Manila.’285   
2.3 THE FOUR GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 AND 1977 ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS 
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The massive destruction and atrocious acts committed during World War II against civilians, 
emphasised the necessity to have international instruments to protect them during wars. 
Instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention and 
the Fourth Geneva Convention for the protection of civilians286 were drafted to deter bloodbaths 
and brutality of the kind which occurred in World War II.287 The four Geneva Conventions of 
1949 revised the Geneva Conventions288 which were in existence. These four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, together with the 1977 Additional Protocols, constitute the customary rules 
of international humanitarian law.289 Common Article 2 sets out the circumstances together with 
the conditions in which these Conventions apply, thus filling a gap which other instruments of 
international humanitarian law did not provide.290 Common article 2 provides in part that:   
(1) In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may 
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not 
recognized by one of them. 
(2) The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a 
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance 
Although the Geneva Conventions apply during armed conflict situations, the phrase ‘[i]n 
addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime’ in article 2(1) indicates that 
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human rights norms continue to apply even during armed conflict situations.291 As a result, the 
provisions in international human rights treaties, such as, the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination (CEDAW)292 and the Convention against Torture apply during 
armed conflicts.293 Thus, states cannot derogate from their obligations owed to their citizens.  
Regarding the protection of women who are wounded, shipwrecked or prisoners of war, 
the First, Second and Third Geneva Conventions contain provisions which are similar to article 3 
of the 1929 Geneva Convention, in that ‘[w]omen shall be treated with all consideration due to 
their sex’.294 Under article 27(2) of the Fourth Convention, which provides for the protection of 
civilians during war, rape is explicitly prohibited. The article protects female civilians from ‘any 
attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent 
assault’.295 However, female civilians are only protected where ‘they find themselves, in the case 
of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or occupying powers which 
they are not nationals’.296 Thus, article 27(2)’s application is limited, in that female citizens are 
not protected from the activities of the state to which they belong.297  
Articles 75 and 76 of Additional Protocol I which relate to international armed conflicts, 
extend the ‘humanitarian protection ‘contained in the Fourth Convention to ‘civilians. . . in the 
power of a Party to the conflict.’298 The articles are also applicable to ‘rules of international law 
relating to the protection of fundamental human rights during international armed conflict’.299  
Article 75(2)(b) of Protocol I does not specifically prohibit rape. It prohibits ‘civilians and 
military agents’ from inflicting ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.’300 The provision 
offers protection to both males and females, thus taking into consideration men as victims of 
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sexual violence. Article 75(2)(a) of Protocol I also prohibits ‘[t]orture of all kinds, whether 
physical or mental’, and mutilation.301 These are crimes that cover violent sexual acts. Article 
76(1) of Additional Protocol I, on the other hand, specifically protects women against rape and 
other forms of sexual violence committed against women by providing that ‘[w]omen shall be 
the object of special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution 
and any other form of indecent assault’.302   
With regard to non-international armed conflicts, article 4(2)(e) of Additional Protocol II is 
worded similarly to article 75(2)(b) of Additional Protocol I, except for the inclusion of the word 
‘rape’. Article 4(2)(e), which applies to ‘persons who do not take a direct part or who have 
ceased to take part in hostilities’,303 prohibits ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent 
assault.’304 Other provisions in article 4(2) which are relevant to the protection of women and 
men which would cover sexual violence are articles 4(2)(a) and (f). Article 4(2)(a) prohibits inter 
alia ‘cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment’, and article 
4(2)(f) prohibits ‘[s]lavery and the slave trade in all forms’. Through these articles, international 
humanitarian law recognises the vulnerability of women to sexual violence by expressly 
including rape, enforced prostitution and also indecent assault. However, these crimes are 
categorised as crimes against honour or dignity, rather than crimes of violence. 305 In 
commenting on the implications of linking rape as a crime of honour in article 27, 
Coomraswamy stated that: 
By using the honour paradigm, linked as it is to concepts of chastity, purity and virginity, 
stereotypical concepts of femininity have been formally enshrined in humanitarian law. Thus, 
criminal sexual assault, in both national and international law, is linked to the morality of the 
victim. When rape is perceived as a crime against honour or morality, shame commonly ensues 
for the victim, who is often viewed by the community as ‘dirty’ or ‘spoiled’. Consequently, many 
women will neither report nor discuss the violence that has been perpetrated against them. The 
nature of rape and the silence that tends to surround it makes it a particularly difficult human 
rights violation to investigate.306  
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The Fourth Geneva Convention and the other three Geneva Conventions contain a ‘grave 
breaches’ provision, identifying certain crimes as the most serious crimes under international 
humanitarian law.307 Commission of these crimes attaches to them individual criminal 
responsibility. As states have an obligation to prosecute violations of grave breaches listed in 
article 147, the universal jurisdiction principle applies to those grave breaches listed in article 
147.308 Under article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, for example:  
High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal 
sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches. . .  
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have 
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such 
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. 
Rape and the other sexual crimes mentioned in article 27(2) are not listed as crimes of ‘grave 
breaches’ in article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Neither is rape mentioned in common 
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Also, Protocol I which extends the grave breaches system 
found in the Geneva Conventions does not expressly refer to sexual violence.309 Some of the 
following acts which article 147 lists as grave breaches are ‘willful killing, torture or inhuman 
treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected 
person’.310 Torture, inhuman treatment and ‘willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or health’ were not originally considered as acts of rape by those who drafted the Geneva 
Convention.311 Although sexual violence during armed conflict is often used as a means to 
torture both women and men, torture was historically considered as a means to obtain a 
confession or information from the victim, or another person.312 With the adoption of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
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as part of international human rights law, the definition of torture has been given a broader 
meaning. Torture is defined in article 1 of the Convention as: 
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted 
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him [or her] or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him [or her] for an act he [or she] or a third person is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him [or her] or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.313 
The Special Rapporteur to the United Nations has stated that ‘in many cases the discrimination 
prong of the definition of torture in the Torture Convention provides an additional basis for 
prosecuting rape and sexual violence as torture,’314 thus accepting that under international law 
rape can constitute torture. ‘Willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,’ 
was included in the grave breaches list, as the crime of torture was considered as having a narrow 
meaning.315 Gardam and Jarvis also argue that though the crimes mentioned in article 27(2), are 
not expressly listed under article 147 as grave breaches, they would come under the umbrella of 
‘inhuman treatment’.316 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),317 tribunals and 
international courts, such as, the ICTY318 and ICTR,319 the European Court of Human Rights320 
and the ICC321 now recognise that rape can constitute torture. 
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Rape has also been recognised as a crime under common article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, as held in the Prosecutor v Kunarac et al case.322 The three defendants in this case 
were convicted of torture, outrages upon personal dignity and rape of Bosnian Muslim women 
during the armed conflict in and around Foca, a city in former Yugoslavia. With regard to the 
crime of rape, the defendants were convicted under articles 3 and 5 of the ICTY Statute and 
under common article 3.323 The Trial Chamber in this case made reference to the fact that 
common article 3 is part of customary international law, a requirement for the application of the 
article.324 It also referred to the Appeals Chamber decision in the Prosecutor v Tadi case where 
is was held that ‘customary international law imposes criminal liability for serious violations of 
common Article 3 . . . ’325 The Trial Chamber held that ‘rape, torture and outrages upon personal 
dignity, no doubt [constitute] serious violations of common article 3, entail criminal 
responsibility under customary international law’.326 
2.4 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA  
Following the atrocities which occurred in former Yugoslavia327 and Rwanda,328 the 1990s saw a 
change in the recognition and prosecution of SGBCs in international law as war crimes, 
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documented cases of rape ‘occurred between the fall of 1991 and the end of 1993, with a concentration of cases 
between April and November 1992.’ For a historical review of the war in former Yugoslavia see Pratt and Fletcher 
‘Time for Justice The Case for International Prosecutions of Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the Former 
Yugoslavia,’ (2004) 9 Berkely Journal of Gender, Law and Justice at 82-87. Alexandra Stiglmayer ‘The rapes in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’ in Alexandra Stiglmayer (ed) Mass Rape, the War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(1994) at 82-169 (giving a detailed account of the rapes which occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina.) and at 1-34 (giving 
a historical account of the war in former Yugoslavia and the historical response of the international community to 
the war.)  
328 The genocide in Rwanda was from April 1994 to July 1994. For an account of the genocide in Rwanda see 




genocide, and crimes against humanity.329 During the ethnic cleansing which occurred in former 
Yugoslavia, Bosnian and Muslim women were raped by Serbian soldiers.330 Copelon, in drawing 
attention to the mass rapes directed against these women to accomplish the genocidal campaign 
of ethnic cleansing, states that they were examples of how rape of women throughout history was 
perceived as a non-issue or lesser crime.331 She adds that these rape cases were brought to the 
international community’s attention because of the ethnic cleansing or genocide which 
occurred.332 In Pratt and Fletcher’s view, the historical pattern of poor recognition of violence 
against women in former Yugoslavia did not persist because of the press coverage given to the 
mass rape cases which occurred in former Yugoslavia, the intervention of NGOs and women’s 
organisations, and also United Nations’ reports and resolutions recognising the seriousness of the 
occurrence of mass rapes.333 Copelon, also cites the invisibility of rape during the 1994 genocide 
in Rwanda, where the mass rapes committed there were not reported for nine months after 
genocide was made public and a Belgian doctor made known to the media that there were a large 
number of women who were bearing children as a result of having being raped.334  
Due to the extensive international media coverage335 of the ethnic cleansing and other 
atrocious crimes which occurred in former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as 
well as the intervention of NGOs and women’s organisations in investigating these crimes, the 
Security Council was persuaded to act. Adopting the Secretary-General’s report, which had the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath, Human Rights Watch/Africa. Human Rights Watch Women’s Rights Project, 
Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de L’Homme, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996)  
329 Askin ‘A decade of the development of gender crimes’ at 16. Susan M Pritchett ‘Entrenched hegemony, efficient 
procedure or selective justice? An inquiry into charges for gender-based violence at the International Criminal 
Court’ (2008) 17 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 265 at 274. Kimberly E Carson ‘Reconsidering 
the theoretical accuracy and prosecutorial effectiveness of International Tribunals’ ad hoc approaches to 
conceptualizing crimes of sexual violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of genocide’ (2011-
2012) 39 Fordham Urban Law Journal 1249 at 1252. 
330 Though Muslim Croatian and Serbian women were raped by Bosnian Muslim and Croatian forces, the majority 
of Muslim women who were from Bosnia-Herzegovia were raped by Serbian soldiers. Niarchos ‘Women, war and 
rape’ at 655. Pratt and Fletcher ‘Time for justice’ at 86. 
331 Copelon ‘Surfacing gender’ at 244-245. 
332 Idem at 245-246. 
333 Pratt and Fletcher ‘Time for justice’ at 81-82.  
334 Copelon ‘Surfacing gender’ at 245. Copelon ‘Gender crimes as war crimes’ at 224. 
335 The conflict in former Yugoslavia was covered by a large number of women reporters. Gardam is of the opinion 
that this was not coincidental, thus suggesting that without them, the atrocities, which included rape and other 
gender based crimes, would have gone unreported. Judith Gardam ‘Women and the Law of Armed Conflict: Why 




draft statute annexed to it, the Security Council established the ICTY336 in May 1993 ‘for the 
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991’.337 In establishing this tribunal, 
the Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter338 by concluding 
that the crimes being committed in former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace 
and security.339 The ICTY,340 based in The Hague, Netherlands, is the first ad hoc international 
criminal tribunal which the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established. In 
emphasising this point, Theodor Meron, refers to the tribunal as the first truly international 
criminal tribunal established by the Security Council, as the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals 
were considered by some commentators as victors’ courts.341 
The provisions of the tribunal’s statute were considered by scholars as advancing international 
criminal and humanitarian laws,342 although it was only applicable to former Yugoslavia. 
Despite this being proved to be true, Mitchell observes that the ICTY’s statute (and that of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) did not actually develop the law any further, as the 
provisions were drafted cautiously to avoid those issues which might offend the principle of 
                                                            
336 The decision to establish a tribunal was made by the Security Council, by Res 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993. 
The Security Council then requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to prepare a report within 60 days, 
which he did, with a draft sstatue annexed to his report. The Security Council adopted the statute (without any 
changes) on 25 May 1993 thus establishing the Tribunal by SC res 827. SC res 827, 48th Sess., U.N. SCOR, 3217th 
mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
337 Idem at paras 1 and 3. 
338 The Security Council has the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. To carry out this 
responsibility, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter lists the action which the Security Council can take with 
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. See generally United Nations, Charter 
of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, arts 39 -51, I UNTS XVI.  
339 UN Security Council Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Res. 808 
(1993). 
340 The full title of the Tribunal is ‘The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991.’ 
341 Theodor Meron ‘The Normative Impact on International Law of the International Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia’ in War Crimes Law Comes of Age (1998) The American Journal of International Law at 210. Meron, 
argues that the failure of the international community in putting an end to the bloodshed and atrocities which were 
being committed in former Yugoslavia, led to the creation of the ICTY as the preferred means of prosecuting 
perpetrators of the crimes. This suggests that tribunals such as the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunal were not 
considered appropriate in promoting justice and international law. Other scholars, such as Roy S. Lee is also of the 
opinion that the ICTY, is the first true international criminal tribunal for prosecuting criminals. Roy S Lee ‘The 
Rwandan Tribunal’ (1996) 9 Leiden Journal of International Law 37 at 37. 
342 Idem at 214. Meron, however, points out that the ICTY drafters failed to take the opportunity to advance certain 
areas of international law, such as the defence of superior orders. Pratt and Fletcher had predicted in an early article 
that the ICTY’s statute and its judgments would become authoritative statements where international legal principles 




nullum crimen sine lege.343 Niarchos was not as subtle as Mitchell in her comments about the 
drafting of the ICTY’s statute. Although she is also of the opinion that the statute was drafted 
cautiously, she also believes that a conservative approach was used in its drafting ‘to avoid the 
criticism directed at the Nuremberg proceedings of infidelity to the nullum crimen sine lege 
principle.’344 
Just as in the case of the establishment of the ICTY, the UNSC exercised it powers under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to establish the ICTR on 8 November, 1994.345 This 
was as a result of the atrocities that occurred during Rwanda’s internal armed conflicts.346 The 
ICTR was established nearly a year after the creation of ICTY, at the request of the Rwandan 
government to prosecute ‘persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, and Rwandan citizens 
responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring 
                                                            
343 David S Mitchell ‘The prohibition of rape in International Humanitarian Law as a norm of Jus Cogens: Clarifying 
the doctrine’ (2005) 15 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 219 at 240. UN Security Council Report 
of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Res. 808 (1993), paras 34 and 35. In his 
report the Secretary-General stated that the nullum crimen sine lege principle would be applied so as to avoid the 
problem of some states not being able to adhere to specific conventions. The nullum crimen sine lege principle 
provides (as in this case) that the ICTY is expected to apply the rules of international humanitarian law which are 
part of customary law. This would avoid the problem of whether a state should adhere to a particular convention, as 
the application of such international humanitarian law would already be part of customary law. The Secretary-
General identified four conventions as sources of customary law. They are the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 for the Protection of War Victims, the Hague Convention (iv) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and the Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 and The Charter of the IMT of 8 August 1945.  
344 Niarchos ‘Women, war and rape’ at 663. 
345 The full title of the Tribunal is ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighbouring States, Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.’ The tribunal was established by Resolution 
955 which had the Statue of the Tribunal annexed to it. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 
Establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda (with Annexed Statute) S.C. res 955, U. N. SCOR, 49thSess, 
3453rdmtg., Annex, U.N. Doc S/RES/955 ( Nov. 8, 1994) 
346 Whilst the armed conflict in Rwanda was internal and no longer in existence by the time the ICTR was 
established, the conflict in former Yugoslavia was of an international nature with intra-state elements. It was created 
whilst the armed conflict in former Yugoslavia was still going on. This is because of the attention given by the 
media, various NGO’s and feminist academics, which persuaded the United Nations to act quickly. The same 
international response was not given to the Rwandan conflict. The international community only responded after the 
conflict in Rwanda had ended. United Nations Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United 
Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda available at www.cfr.org/rwanda/.../report-independent-inquiry-into-
actions...rwanda/... (accessed on 14 January 2015). (Where the Independent Inquiry which was set up to report on 
the actions taken by the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, stated that the United Nations’ failure 
to prevent and stop the genocide was a ‘failure by the United Nations system as a whole.’ It also stated that there 
was ‘a persistent lack of political will by member states to act, or to act with enough assertiveness.’ Copelon 
‘Gender crimes as war crimes’ at 225 (commenting on the fact that the media and other international observers did 




states, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994  . . . ’347 Thus, the ICTR’s jurisdiction 
was limited to a specific region and conflict. It was agreed at a later date that the tribunal’s seat 
would be at Arusha, Tanzania, following appropriate arrangements between the United Nations 
and the Government of Tanzania.348 
2.4.1 The Jurisdiction of the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunals for former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  
Although the ICTY’s subject-matter jurisdiction explicitly listed rape as a crime against 
humanity in article 5 of the statute,349 it did not specifically mention rape or other sexual crimes 
under its other jurisdictional provisions to try individuals350 for grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949,351 violations of the laws and customs of war352 as well as genocide.353 
                                                            
347 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 Establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, para 1. 
See also Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 1, SC res 995, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453 mtg., 
U.N. Doc S/RES/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994). The Statute was last amended by SC Res. 1878 (2009) of 7 July 
2009.  
348 Idem para 6.  
349 Statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, art.5(g), SC res 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 
3217thmtg., at 1-2 (1993), 32 ILM 1159 (1993). The Statute was last amended on 7 July 2009 by Resolution 1877.  
350 The ICTY provides that the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over natural persons. Thus, it does not have 
jurisdiction over companies as the Nuremberg Tribunal did. ICTY Statute, art 6. 
351 ICTY Statute, art 2 titled ‘Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949’ provides: 
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts against persons or property 
protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: 
(a) wilful killing; 
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; 
(c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;  
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly;  
(e)  compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power; 
(f)  wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of a fair and regular trial;       
(g)  unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian; 
(h)  taking civilians as hostages. 
The Four Geneva Conventions, contain a provision which lists the violations that qualify as grave breaches, see 
section 2.3 above. The lists of these violations as contained in the Geneva Conventions are reproduced in article 3. 
See First Geneva Convention, art. 50, Second Geneva Convention, art. 51, Third Geneva Convention, art 130, 
Fourth Geneva Convention, art 147.  
352 ICTY Statute, art 3 is titled ‘Violations of the laws or customs of war.’ This article provides: 
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war. Such 
violations shall include, but not be limited to: 
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; 
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; 
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings; 
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, 
the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science; 




Scholars debated whether the non-inclusion of rape and other SGBCs in those articles would 
prevent such crimes from being prosecuted under them. However, the Trial Chamber in the 
Prosecutor v Furundzija case has held that ‘rape may also amount to a grave breach of the 
Geneva Conventions, a violation of the laws or customs of war or an act of genocide, if the 
requisite elements are met, and may be prosecuted accordingly.’354 Including rape as a crime 
against humanity in CCL10355 and in the ICTY’s statutes under article 5 (and under article 3 of 
the ICTR Statute), attests to the fact that rape is now considered a crime against humanity in 
international law. As a result of such classification, Mitchell points out that rape under the ICTY 
statute as a crime against humanity can be prosecuted when committed as part of a widespread 
and systematic attack. Mitchell adds that rape could also be prosecuted as a crime against 
humanity under the umbrella of enslavement, torture, persecution on political, racial or religious 
grounds or inhumane acts.356 Niarchos puts the omission of rape from articles 2357 and 3358 down 
to the cautionary approach taken by the drafters of the statue.359 In line with other scholars such 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
The lists of crimes under this article were drawn from the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land and also its annexed regulations. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
Annex (Regulations), Oct. 18, 1907 (citing Amy E Ray ‘The Shame of it: Gender-based terrorism in the former 
Yugoslavia and the failure of International Human Rights Law to comprehend the injuries’ (1997) 46 The American 
University Law Review 793 at 820). 
353 ICTY Statute, art 4 is titled ‘Genocide.’ It reads in part: 
1.    The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing genocide as defined in 
paragraph 2 of this article or of committing any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article. 
2.     Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) killing members of the group; 
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
The provisions in this article were reproduced from the Genocide Convention 1948  
354 Prosecutor v Furundzija, (Trial Judgment) para 172. 
355 Control Council Law No. 10.  
356 Mitchell also uses the same argument for the prosecution of rape under the ICTR Statute. Mitchell ‘The 
prohibition of rape’ at 241. These crimes are listed under article 5 of the ICTY statute as crimes against humanity. 
Enslavement comes under article 5(c), torture under article 5(f), persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds 
under article 5(h) and inhumane acts under article 5(i). Article 5 of the ICTY Statute.  
357 ICTY Statute, art 2. 
358 ICTY Statute, art 3. 
359 Niarchos ‘Women, war and rape’ at 683. In referring to the exclusion of rape under article 2 as a war crime, 
Copelon ‘Gender crimes as war crimes’ at 229 (noting that though this exclusion was initially considered to be 
disappointing, it worked in the prosecutors’ favour because it was easier for prosecutors to argue that the crimes of 




as Ray,360 she believes that rape could be prosecuted as a grave breach under article 2 361 and as 
a war crime under article 3 if the tribunal so wishes.362 She was, however, of the opinion that 
prosecutors would have had in mind prosecuting rape as genocide under article 4, and a crime 
against humanity under article 5 of the ICTY statute.363 Askin’s view was that rape and other 
SGBCs can be prosecuted under article 3 as war crimes, and under article 4 as genocide although 
they are not explicitly mentioned in these articles. In her opinion, failing to prosecute these 
crimes under these articles was a result of historical marginalisation and lack of political will.364 
Sellers, in commenting on the explicit mention of rape in only one article of the statute, aptly 
notes that this is due to the historical neglect of rape and other sexual violent crimes as separate 
prosecutable categories, stating that ‘[t]he conventional wisdom was that only rape as a crime 
against humanity could be prosecuted’.365 
Although Ray reaches the same conclusion as other scholars that rape can be prosecuted 
under other articles of the statute,366 she takes the argument a step further. First, she points to the 
fact that the statute explicitly excludes SGBCs such as forced prostitution, pregnancy and 
maternity from the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Secondly that these crimes which were inflicted 
on the women were gender-specific crimes as they were inflicted on them because they were 
women and as such, each article should explicitly include gender-specific crimes. Thirdly, 
although crimes such as rape appear to be the same between men and women, they do not have 
the same consequences as the groups are distinguishable. She, thus, reached the conclusion that 
the fact that gender-based crimes were excluded from the statute, despite their existence, 
depicted the inadequacy of international human rights law in367 in understanding and addressing 
such crimes.368 The ICTY confirmed that though rape is not explicitly mentioned in articles 2, 3 
                                                            
360 Ray ‘The shame of it’ at 817-819.  
361 This would come under sub-article (b) as torture or inhuman treatment and sub-article (c) as wilfully causing 
great suffering or serious injury to body or health. 
362 Niarchos ‘Women, war and rape’ at 683. 
363 Idem at 684. The definition of genocide is taken verbatim from the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide. As a crime under genocide it would thus be possible to prosecute rape under sub-articles 
(a) to (d). See Ray ‘The shame of it’ at 821. 
364 Askin ‘A decade of the development of gender crimes’ at 16. 
365 Patricia V Sellers ‘Gender strategy is not a luxury for international courts’ (2008) 17 American University 
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 301 at 307. 
366 Ray ‘The shame of it’ at 825. 
367 Although Ray concentrates on the international human rights law aspect of gender-specific crimes in former 
Yugoslavia, the same arguments can be put forward when considered from the international humanitarian law and 
international criminal law aspect. 




and 4 of its statute, it may be prosecuted under them as long as it meets the required elements.369 
With regard to article 3, the ICTY states that the article establishes an ‘umbrella rule’; serious 
violations under international humanitarian law not mentioned in article 3 are thereby covered.370 
In interpreting article 3 the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v Tadi held that this article also 
encompasses other violations of international humanitarian law by stating that: 
[I]t can be held that Article 3 is a general clause covering all violations of humanitarian law not 
falling under Article 2 or covered by Articles 4 or 5 [of the Statute of the Tribunal], more 
specifically: (i) violations of the Hague law on international conflicts; (ii) infringements of 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions other than those classified as “grave breaches” by those 
Conventions; (iii) violations of common Article 3 [of the Geneva Conventions] and other 
customary rules on internal conflicts; (iv) violations of agreements binding upon the parties to the 
conflict, considered qua treaty law, i.e. agreements which have not turned into customary 
international law . . . 371 
Thus, although rape is not explicitly mentioned in article 3, it can be prosecuted under this 
article. Also the crime of outrages upon personal dignity which includes rape would come under 
article 3,372 as article 3 ‘functions as a residual clause designed to ensure that no serious violation 
of international humanitarian law is taken away from the jurisdiction of the International 
Tribunal’.373 
The ICTR has jurisdiction to try an accused person374 for genocide,375 war crimes,376 and 
crimes against humanity.377 The subject matter of its jurisdiction explicitly lists rape as a crime 
                                                            
369 See Prosecutor v Furundzija, (Trial Judgment) Case No.IT-95-17/1/T, Dec. 10, 1998, para 172 
370 Idem para 133. 
371 Prosecutor v Tadi, Case IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, 
2 Oct 1995, para 89. See also Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, (Trial Judgment), para 401 referring to the 
Appeals Chamber decision in the Prosecutor v Tadi case. 
372 Prosecutor v Furundzija, (Trial Judgment) para 173 (referring to the ICTY’s ‘Decision on the defendant’s motion 
to discuss Counts 13 and 14 of the indictment (Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction),’ 29 May 1998, where the Trial 
Chamber held that article 3 of the statute covered outrages upon personal dignity which included rape.) 
373 Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, (Trial Judgment), para 401. 
374 The ICTR’s Statute gives the tribunal jurisdiction over natural persons. It does not have jurisdiction over 
companies as the Nuremberg Tribunal did. ICTR Statute, art 5.  
375 ICTR Statute, art 2. The ICTR’s has jurisdiction to try genocide; its provisions are similar to that of the ICTY’s 
Statute, which are taken verbatim from the definition of genocide in articles 2 and 3 of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention), Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
376 ICTR Statute, art 4. The crimes listed under this article come under the war crimes provisions as ‘serious 
violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Crimes and 
of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977.’ Schaack draws ones attention to the fact that this article was taken 
from parts of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and Protocol II. Schaak ‘Obstacles on the road to gender 
justice’ at 377.  




against humanity.378 Meanwhile, the tribunal can prosecute individuals for rape, as well as other 
crimes listed in the article as crimes against humanity when such crimes are ‘committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, 
racial or religious grounds’.379 This provision differs from that of the ICTY Statute relating to 
crimes against humanity, where the ICTY has power to try one of such crimes ‘when committed 
in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character and directed against any civilian 
population’.380 As Askin points out the difference in the crimes against humanity provisions 
between the ICTR statute and that of the ICTY (and also their war crimes provisions) brings to 
light the difference in the types of armed conflicts committed in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. 
Also, it brings out the different principal crimes committed in the two territories and the Security 
Council’s specific concerns in creating these tribunals.381 Other gender-based crimes that can be 
prosecuted under the ICTR’s Statute as crimes against humanity would include ‘enslavement, 
torture, persecution on political, racial and religious grounds and other inhumane acts.’382 As in 
the case of the ICTY, Askin was of the view that rape and other SGBCs can be prosecuted as 
genocide, war crimes or under other crimes listed as crimes against humanity.383 Schaak notes 
that persecution and other inhumane acts could be charged in situations where acts of gender 
violence, such as assault and forced nudity, fall short of the crime of rape.384 She, nonetheless, 
warns of the danger of bringing many charges of similar crimes which fall short of the crime of 
rape.385 She observes that by doing so, the gendered nature of these crimes could become 
insignificant or less obvious.386  The language of the war crimes provision in article 4 of the 
ICTR Statute is adopted from article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and additional 
Protocol II.387 Rape and other gender-based crimes such as those classified as humiliating and 
                                                            
378 ICTY Statute, art 3(g).  
379 ICTR Statute, art 3.Though the ICTR is an international institution, the jurisdiction conferred on it is much 
narrower than that of the ICTY, in that it does not have jurisdiction to prosecute grave breaches, which are crimes 
under an international armed conflict. Patricia H. Davis ‘The Politics of Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime’ (2000) 
34 The International Lawyer 1223 at 1242.   
380 ICTY Statute, art 5.  
381 Askin ‘Prosecuting wartime rape and other gender-related’ at 306. 
382 ICTR Statute, arts 3(e), 3(f), 3(h) and 3(i). Schaak ‘Obstacles on the road to gender justice’ at 379. 
383 Askin ‘A decade of the development of gender crimes’ at 16.  
384 Schaak ‘Obstacles on the road to gender justice’ at 380. 
385 Ibid. 
386 Ibid.  




degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and indecent assault of any kind, were also 
specifically mentioned as war crimes which were outrages upon personal dignity.388 
2.4.2  The application of Sexual and Gender-based Crimes before the International 
Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda  
Despite the shortfalls in the drafting of rape and other SGBCs in the ICTY and ICTR statutes, 
many scholars express a positive view on their contribution to international humanitarian law 
and also in the area of non-international armed conflicts.389 For scholars such as Pritchett, the 
inclusion of rape as a crime in its own right within the ICTY Statute and its codification was 
‘revolutionary’, since this was the first time that an international court had done so.390 Case-law 
from both tribunals have given recognition to and adjudged gender-based violence crimes as war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, in international criminal law,391 thus breaking the 
resistance of the international community from prosecuting such crimes.392 This, however, did 
not come about without overcoming gender bias which existed in the Office of the Prosecutor.393 
Cases such as Prosecutor v Akayesu,394 where the indictment was amended to include crimes of 
                                                            
388 ICTR Statute, art 4(e). Schaack points out that other generic crimes under article 4(a) of the ICTR Statute could 
be encompassed as gender-based crimes. Schaak ‘Obstacles on the road to gender justice’ at 377. ICTR Statute, art 
4(a) reads as follows: ‘Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as 
well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment.’   
389 Copelon ‘Surfacing gender’ at 264 (this also buttresses Copelon’s argument that recognising rape as a war crime 
is crucial in the understanding of it as a violent crime). In Meron’s opinion, the ICTR Statute has developed 
international humanitarian law in recognising the criminal character of internal atrocities committed in Rwanda. It is 
based on the fact that the armed conflict in Rwanda was a non-international one whilst that of former Yugoslavia 
was international. Theodor Meron ‘The international criminalisation of internal atrocities’ (1995) 89 American 
Journal of International Law 554 at 555. Regarding the ICTR, Lee’s view is that it was an important step forward in 
the enforcement of international law and the punishment of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Lee 
‘The Rwandan Tribunal’ at 60. 
390 Pritchatt ‘Entrenched hegemony, efficient procedure or selective justice?’ at 275.  
391 Luping ‘Investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes’ at 446. Carson ‘Reconsidering the 
theoretical accuracy’ at 1264 and 1268. 
392 Alex Obote-Odora ‘Rape and Sexual Violence in International Law: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ 
(2005) 12 New England Journal of International and Comparative Law 135 at 137. Wood ‘A Woman Scorned for 
the “Least Condemned” ’ at 293 (commenting on the influence which the ICTR’s decisions have had on various 
bodies. For example ICTR’s decisions have been cited by the International Court of Justice and the European Court 
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sexual violence following evidence at trial by a witness of SGBCs,395 and Prosecutor v Dragan 
Nikolic396 where the prosecutor was invited by the ICTY Chamber to amend the indictment to 
include gender crimes, are examples of how the prosecutor overlooked prosecuting SGBCs.  
Akayesu397 was the first case tried by the ICTR to make a historical breakthrough in the 
prosecution of SGBCs. Akayesu, was the bourgmestre of the Taba commune in Rwanda and 
‘was responsible for maintaining law and public order in his commune’, which he failed to do as 
civilians, mainly Tutsi’s who sought refuge at the bureau communal were murdered.398 Females 
were also subjected to sexual violence.399 He was accused of abusing his position of authority by 
allowing the police, and those under his authority, to rape and torture those women who sought 
refuge in his commune, by turning a blind eye to their acts as evidenced from his words 
spoken.400 The three additional SGBC-related counts he was charged with were:  
Count 13: Crimes Against Humanity (rape), punishable by article 3(g) of the Statute of the 
Tribunal; 
Count 14: Crimes Against Humanity, (other inhumane acts), punishable by Article 3(i) of the 
Statute of the Tribunal; 
Count 15: Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of article 4(2)(e) of 
Additional Protocol 2, as incorporated by article 4(e)(outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
rape, degrading and humiliating treatment and indecent assault) of the Statute of the Tribunal.401 
Akayesu was convicted of genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, three 
counts of murder as crimes against humanity, the crimes against humanity of extermination, 
torture, rape and other inhumane acts.402 Akayesu has been considered the most important case of 
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399 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial Judgment). 
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402 See the verdict in Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial Judgment) Case No ICTR 96-4- T, Sept.2, 1998. Count 1 attracted 




rape being prosecuted as a crime under international law.403 The Trial Chamber not only gave the 
first definition of the legal elements of rape as a crime against humanity and sexual violence 
under international law,404 but also recognised that rape was a form of torture when it stated that: 
[L]ike torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when it is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.405  
The Trial Chamber recognised that ‘rape is a form of aggression and that the central 
elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects or body 
parts’.406 Rape was defined by the Chamber ‘as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, 
committed on a person under circumstances that are coercive’.407 In the case of sexual violence, 
the ICTR states that sexual violence ‘include[d] rape as any act of a sexual nature which is 
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive’.408 The ICTR states that sexual 
violence was ‘not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do 
not involve penetration or even physical contact’.409 Forced nudity is an example of such an 
act.410 Apart from finding the definition of rape to be broad, Askin refers to it as being 
sensible.411 Askin, agrees that the definition given by the tribunal is broad as it does away with 
the mechanical description of rape and also the requirement of the penis penetrating the 
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403 Mark Ellis ‘Breaking the silence of rape as an international crime’ (2006-2007) 38 Case Western Reserve Journal 
of International Law 225 at 232. 
404 Obote-Odora ‘Rape and sexual violence in international law’ at 147. Carson ‘Reconsidering the theoretical 
accuracy’ at 1264 .This was the first case in international law to define rape; before that there was no accepted 
definition of rape in international law. Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial Judgment) paras 596-597. On appeal, the 
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405 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial Judgment) para 597 and 687. 
406 Idem paras 597 and 687. See also Prosecutor v Furundzija, (Trial Judgment) para 176 referring to the Trial 
Chamber’s formulation of rape in international law in the Akayesu case.  
407 Idem paras 598 and 688. 
408 Ibid.  
409 Idem para 688 
410 Sita Balthazar ‘Gender Crimes and the International Criminal Tribunals’ (2006) 10 Gonzaga Journal of 
International Law 43 at 45. 




vagina.412 Obote-Odora states that this broad definition considers that victims embroiled in 
armed conflict do suffer violence. He also notes that this definition is broader than the common 
law’s when defining force or coercion.413 The Akayesu definition of rape which has been referred 
to as conceptual414 was later adopted in cases such as Prosecutor v Delialic et al415 and 
Prosecutor v Alfred Musema.416 Askin and other scholars have described the Trial Chamber’s 
decision as historic because it also confirms the complexity involved in linking sexual violence 
to the genocide which occurred in Rwanda.417 Copelon points out that the tribunal’s strongest 
evidence which it relied on in proving genocide was based on the evidence of rape and other 
SGBCs.418 Her opinion that the Chamber recognised women not only as part of an ethnic group 
but also in their own right was drawn from the fact that the Chamber gave cognisance to the 
suffering encountered by the women and also sexual violence’s ‘role as a tool of their destruction 
and the destruction of the group’.419 Hilary Charlesworth, however, in an earlier article, differs 
with Copelon. She states that: 
The emphasis on the harm to the Tutsi people as a whole is, of course, required by the 
international definition of genocide, and the Akayesu decision on this point simply illustrates the 
inability of the law to properly name what is at stake: rape is wrong, not because it is a crime of 
violence against women and a manifestation of male dominance, but because it is an assault on a 
community defined only by its racial, religious, national or ethnic composition. In this account, 
the violation of a women’s body is secondary to the humiliation of the group.420  
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adopting the approach given by the Furundizija Trial Chamber. It also referred to the definition given in the Akayesu 
judgment as being conceptual). Though the sexual assault conviction was successfully overturned on appeal, the 
definition of rape was not appealed against. See Prosecutor v Alfred Musema (Appeal Judgment) Case No. ICTR-
96-13-A, 16 November, 2001. 
417 Askin ‘Sexual violence in decisions and indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals’ at 98. 
418 Copelon ‘Gender crimes as war crimes’ at 227. 
419 Ibid.  
420 Hilary Charlesworth ‘Symposium on method in International Law, Appraising the methods of International Law: 
A Prospectus for readers’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law at 386. See also Ray ‘The shame of it’ 
at 821 and 826-828 (stating that though the crimes inflicted against the women in former Yugoslavia can be 




Akayesu was thus the first case heard by an international tribunal in which the accused was 
convicted of genocide. In finding that rape and sexual violence can constitute genocide the Trial 
Chamber held that:  
[W]ith regard, particularly, to the acts described in paragraphs 12(A) and 12(B) of theIndictment, 
that is, rape and sexual violence, the Chamber wishes to underscore the fact that in its opinion, 
they constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with 
the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such. Indeed, rape 
and sexual violence certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental harm on the 
victims and are even, . . . one of the worst ways of inflict harm on the victim as he or she suffers 
both bodily and mental harm.421  
 
By this finding, the court confirms that rape could evidence the commission of the crime of 
genocide in certain circumstances provided the genocidal intent accompanied the act of rape. 
In considering the meaning of ‘serious bodily and mental harm’ under article 2(2)(b) of 
the ICTR Statute relating to genocide, the Trial Chamber held the term ‘to mean acts of torture, 
be they bodily or mental, inhumane or degrading treatment, persecution’.422 The meaning of 
‘imposing measures intended to prevent birth within the group’ under article 2(2)(d) of the ICTR 
Statute, relating to genocide was also considered by the Trial Chamber, and was construed as 
meaning ‘sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control, separation of the 
sexes and prohibition of marriages’423 as different forms of SGBCs.  The Chamber further held 
that: 
[I]n patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the 
father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is the case where, 
during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated by a man of another group, 
with the intent to have her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother’s 
group.424 
Rape was also held to ‘be a measure intended to prevent births when the person raped refuses 
subsequently to procreate, in the same way that members of a group can be led, through threats or 
trauma, not to procreate.425 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
because the women are also members of an ethnic group just as the men. That prosecuting perpetrators under this 
article will not make them accountable for the gender specific violence which were inflicted on the women.). 
Copelon ‘Surfacing gender’ at 246-247 (making basically the same point as Charlesworth and Ray).    
421 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial Judgment) paras 731, 734 and 295. 
422 Idem para 504. 
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Copelon argues that, contrary to what some scholars thought, the tribunal was right in not putting 
emphasis on the reproductive consequences of rape ‘as the hallmark of rape as a genocidal 
measure.’426 Her reasoning for this is based on:  
Rape and sexual violence are understood as instruments of genocide based primarily on the 
physical and psychological harm to the woman and secondarily on the potential impact of this on 
the targeted community. To emphasise the reproductive impact on the community would threaten 
once again to reduce the woman to being simply vehicles of the continuity of the targeted 
population. It would also tend towards a biological as opposed to socially constructed view of 
identity as the value intended to be protected by the concept of genocide.427 
 
The ICTR decision in Akayesu also recognised rape and other forms of sexual violence as crimes 
in their own right which constituted crimes against humanity.428 In adopting the definition of 
crimes against humanity in article 3 of the ICTR Statute, the Trial Chamber held that the act of 
rape must be committed ‘as part of a widespread or systematic attack, on a civilian population, 
on certained catalogued discriminatory grounds, namely national, ethnic, political, racial, or 
religious grounds.’429 In commenting on rape as a crime in its own right, Baltheazar states that it 
was an important finding by the Trial Chamber, as it recognised that the crime of rape cannot be 
isolated.430 Forced nudity was also recognised by the tribunal as an inhumane act under the 
provision of crimes against humanity.431 
The Prosecutor v Furundzija432 case, the shortest to be tried by the ICTY,433 is 
significant in that it did not follow the definition of rape given by the Trial Chamber in the 
Akayesu case, although it considered the definition and those from various domestic legal 
systems.434 This departure from the use of the definition of rape in the Akayesu case was, in 
Cole’s view, a result of the Trial Chamber in the Furundzija case disapproving of the analogy 
placed by the Akayesu Trial Chamber with the conceptual approach used in the Torture 
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Convention.435 The Furundzija Trial Chamber’s definition of rape, which is narrower than that 
of Akayesu, defined the elements of rape as:  
(i)  [T]he sexual penetration, however slight:  
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object 
used by the perpetrator; or  
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator;  
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.436  
 
The Chamber in the Furundzija case, thus, adopted a mechanical approach in defining the 
elements of rape, and also included what Sellers refers to as a ‘gender neutral use’ of a third 
person.437 Although Askin welcomes the verdict and language used by the Chamber as being 
sensitive to gender-based crimes, she is of the opinion that the narrower definition of the 
elements of rape in Furundzija could amount to a regression from the definition given by the 
ICTR, though the judgment expands the protection given to victims of gender-based violence.438 
In a subsequent article Askin, however, praises the judgment in that it developed the law by 
recognising torture as a sexually violent crime. She is also of the view that the ICTY set an 
important precedent in international law by recognising that multiple rapes committed on a 
single victim is a serious violation of the law as a crime in its own right.439 Pegorier is of the 
view that the Furundzija’s definition of rape is retrogressive in that it restricts the crime of rape 
to one of penetration, thereby limiting the definition given in the Akayesu case, which is broader 
and more progressive.440 Palmer takes another view by stating that the definition of rape has 
been expanded by the ICTY by including oral and anal penetration, thereby, advancing the 
prosecution of sexual violence.441 Though Swawk-Goldman finds the Furundzija definition of 
rape to be more technical than that of Akayesu, she concludes that both definitions do not 
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conflict.442 In the Furundzija case, the Chamber also found the accused guilty of the crime of 
‘outrages upon personal dignity’ including rape, as a war crime under article 3 of the statute.443 
This was because the accused’s presence and his continual interrogation of the victim was found 
to have aided and abetted the forced oral and vaginal intercourse which a soldier under his 
command had with the victim.444    
The case of Prosecutor v Kunarac et al 445 decided by the ICTY was the first 
international hearing to convict two of the three accused for enslavement as crimes against 
humanity and for acts of sexual slavery under article 5 of the statute.446 It was also the tribunal’s 
first conviction of an accused for rape as a crime against humanity,447 and also as a war crime 
with regards to customary international law.448 Askin contends that this case shows the close link 
between rape and enslavement.449 Askin and Sellers are, however, of the opinion that the term 
sexual slavery would have been the preferred charge, rather than enslavement, since the 
conviction was based mainly on sexual slavery.450 
In the Kunarac case, the Trial Chamber was of the opinion that rape, defined as a crime 
against humanity in paragraph (ii) of the Furundzija case, was narrowly stated for the 
requirements of international law. In its opinion the definition given in paragraph (ii) above of 
the findings in the Furundzija case (coercion or force or threat of force against the victim) did 
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‘not refer to other factors which would render an act of sexual penetration non-consensual or 
non-voluntary on the part of the victim.’451 The Kunarac Trial Chamber defined rape as: 
The actus reus of the crime of rape in international law is constituted by: 
the sexual penetration, however, slight:  
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by 
the perpetrator, or  
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator where such sexual penetration 
occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given 
voluntarily as a result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding 
circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge 
that it occurs without the consent of the victim.452  
The Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s definition of rape, upholding finding that 
there could be no consent to the appellant’s sexual acts in this case because of the coercive 
circumstances present.453 
This is the first time that an international Trial Chamber has directly examined consent in 
rape without inferring lack of consent from the coercive circumstances in which the rape was 
committed.454 The Chamber, thus, developed its own definition of rape by retaining the 
mechanical element of rape of the Furundzija judgment, but removing the requirement of 
coercion, force or threat of force. It adopted what Sellers refers to as ‘a two-pronged lack-of-
consent requirement’.455 First, the consent given by the victim must be voluntary and also given 
freely, determined by the surrounding circumstances at the time of the crime. The mens rea of 
rape which must be proved by the prosecutor is the intention of the accused to carry through with 
the prohibited sexual penetration knowing that the victim does not consent to it.456 Following the 
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Kunarac Appeals Chamber upholding the definition of rape given by the Kunarac Trial 
Chamber, certain ICTR cases such as Semanza457 and Kajelijeli458 adopted the definition.   
Whilst Askin views the Kunarac definition as clarifying the elements of rape and torture 
in international law,459 Obote-Odora opines that legal scholars have viewed this judgment as ‘a 
step backward from the Akayesu threshold’, 460 and considers the definition of rape handed down 
by the ICTY as restrictive.461 Ellis’s opinion, however, is that the Trial Chamber’s definition of 
rape has broadened the requirement of non-consent, as it is more difficult to prove the narrower 
elements of coercion, force, and threats of force as required by the Furundzija judgment.462 
Maravilla, in considering the gender aspect of the definition, states that it is gender neutral by 
ensuring that rape is a crime against humanity, without distinguishing a victim on ground of sex, 
thus protecting women and men.463 In referring to the Kunarac definition of rape, Carson’s 
opinion is that the elements of rape were further clarified by the Appeals Chamber.464 
In Gacumbitisi v Prosecutor465 the prosecution appealed to the ICTR Appeals Chamber 
against the Trial Chamber’s judgment on the significant issue of the definition of rape.466 The 
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prosecution asked the Appeals Chamber to clarify as a matter of ‘general significance’ the law 
relating to rape as a crime against humanity and also as an act of genocide, with particular 
reference to the element of non-consent,.467 This was the first time that an Appeals Chamber was 
seized of the issue after the conflicting judgments in the Akayesu and Kunarac cases.468 The 
Appeals Chamber adopted the interpretation of rape given in the Kunarac appeal judgment, that 
is, the required elements of the crime of rape as a crime against humanity are proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the absence of consent of the victim and that the accused was aware of such 
non-consent.469 It also ruled that absence of consent might be inferred from existing coercive 
circumstances, without having to actively prove that the victim did not consent.470 This latter 
element of the crime held by the Appeals Chamber has, in Mackinnon’s opinion, kept in place 
the crux of the Akayesu definition of rape.471 Schomburg and Paterson conclude that the 
judgment has clarified that the prosecution does not have to adduce evidence of non-consent 
from the victim, and that this was an improvement from earlier decisions as it protected the 
victim from being questioned about consent.472 They then point out that the Appeals Chamber 
would still need to resolve the tensions regarding substantive law issues despite having 
developed a practical solution regarding procedural issues.473 Sellers cites an earlier article of 
hers, where she concludes that the Gacumbitsi Appeals Chamber should have overruled as per 
incuriam474 the decision given by the Kunarac Appeals Chamber475 because, as described above, 
the Kunarac Appeals Chamber summarily rejected relevant municipal rape laws dealing with 
prison rapes and other such sexual abuses which do not require proof of consent.476 Also, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Judgment) Case No. ICTR- 2001-64-T, June 17, 2004, paras 321 and 325. Prosecutor v Muhimana, (Trial 
Judgment) Case No. ICTR-95-IB-T, April 28, 2005, para 549-551.  
467 Gacumbitsi v Prosecutor (Appeal Judgment) Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, July 7, 2006, paras 147 and150. 
468 Cole ‘Prosecutor v Gacumbitisi: The new definition for prosecuting rape under international law’ at 49, 55-56 
and 68. 
469 Gacumbitsi v Prosecutor (Appeal Judgment) para 152. 
470 Idem para 155 
471 Catherine A. Mackinnon ‘The ICTR’s Legacy on Sexual Violence’ (2008) 14 New England Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 211 at 213. 
472 Wolfgang Schomburg and Ines Paterson ‘Genuine Consent to Sexual Violence under International Criminal Law’ 
(2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 121 at 140.  
473 Ibid.  
474 A per incurium decision made by a court is one which ignores a ‘contradictory statue or binding authority.’ Since 
it has been decided wrongly, it is of no force.  
475 Sellers ‘The prosecution of sexual violence in conflict’ at 23-24 (citing Patricia V Sellers ‘The “Appeal” of 
Sexual Violence: Akayesu/Gacumbitsi’, in Gender-Based Violence in Africa, Karen Stefisyn (ed.), at 91.   




Kunarac Appeals Chamber relied solely on national definitions of rape law.477 In Sellers’ 





2.5 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT  
The Rome Statute established the ICC 479 after the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentianes adopted the statute on 17 July 1998.480 The statute came into force after 
obtaining 60 ratifications on 1 July, 2002. It is the first international treaty which recognises 
various forms of SGBCs, apart from rape,481 as crimes against humanity and war crimes. The 
ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to try ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole’.482 These crimes are genocide,483 crimes against humanity,484 war 
crimes485 and the crime of aggression.486 When a state party refers a situation to the ICC or the 
Prosecutor acts proprio moto, the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction over these crimes, where they 
                                                            
477 Ibid. 
478 Idem at 24. 
479 Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF 183/9, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90, 37 
ILM 1002, 1030.  
Halley describes the Rome Statute as ‘the highest-order code for the ICC’. The statute defines the scope of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction. It also sets up the various institutional authorities of the Court providing for the ‘interpretive rules for 
the ICC to use in construing the Statute’, and authorises the promulgation of rules of evidence and further definition 
of crimes. Janet Halley ‘Rape at Rome: Feminist interventions in the criminalization of sex-related violence in 
positive international criminal law’ (2008) 30 Michigan Journal of International Law 1 at 10.  
480 Roy S Lee ‘The Rome Conference and the Contributions to International Law’ in Roy S Lee (ed) The 
International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute Issues, Negotiations, Results, (1999) at 1-2 (stating 
that the ICC was one of the projects which was laid before the United Nations General Assembly for consideration 
in the 1940s. Due to controversy about the creation of the ICC, the proposal was not carried out.) 
Thomas H Clark ‘The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, amnesties, and the “Interests of justice”: 
Striking a delicate balance’ (2005) 4 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 389 at 392 (stating that the 
historical roots of the ICC can be traced to 1899).  
481 Cate Steains ‘Gender Issues’ in Roy S Lee (ed) The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome 
Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, (1999) 357 at 357. A Windney Brown and Laura Grenfell ‘The international 
crime of gender-based persecution and the Taliban (2003) 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law at 347 (stating 
that ‘the Rome Statute is the only binding international instrument that explicitly recognises gender-based 
persecution’.) 
482 Rome Statute, art 5. 
483 Idem arts 5(a) and 6. 
484 Idem arts 5(b) and 7. 
485 Idem arts 5(c) and 8. 




were committed on the territory of a state party or by a national of a state party.487 In the case of 
territorial jurisdiction, the nationality of the accused is irrelevant. With regard to the ICC 
exercising its jurisdiction over a national of a state party, it is irrelevant whether the accused 
committed the crime on the territory of a state party or non-state party. In the case of the ICC 
exercising its jurisdiction over these crimes when the UNSC acts under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, by referring a situation to the ICC, these restrictions will not apply; the ICC can exercise 
its jurisdiction over any territory or national.488 The situation of a case referred to the ICC, by the 
UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter must be ‘a threat to international peace and 
security’. The ICC’s jurisdiction extends to crimes committed after it came into force. Also, 
crimes committed in a state which ratifies the Rome Statute after 1 July 2002 would come within 
the ICC’s jurisdiction where that state makes a declaration under article 12(3) of the Rome 
Statute.489  
2.5.1 The inclusion of gender in the Rome Statute. 
The creation of the ICC has been described by scholars as a ‘monumental response to ‘the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’,490 ‘an important step 
forward for humankind’491 and also ‘the most powerful symbol of the progress made in the fight 
against impunity for international crimes’.492 Hard work and lobbying by the Women’s Caucus 
for Gender Justice in the ICC (Women’s Caucus),493 resulted in the Rome Statute capturing a 
gender sensitive perspective.494  
                                                            
487 Idem, art 12. 
488 Idem, art 13. 
489 Idem art 11.Rome Statute, art 12(3) provides that:  
If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, that State may 
by declaration lodge with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the 
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490 Clark ‘The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, amnesties’ at 389  
491 Barbara Bedont and Katherine Hall-Martinez ‘Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes and the International Criminal 
Court’ (1999) 6 Brown Journal of World Affairs 65 at 65. 
492 This statement was made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein. 
Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, Is the international community abandoning the fight against impunity? 
available at www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/WI-WomVoices3.../WomVoices3-15.ht... (accessed 17 February 2015).  
493 The Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice in the ICC is a grouping of feminist and human rights women 
organisations from all parts of the world. 
494 Bedont and Hall-Martinez ‘Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes’ at 65 and 67 (stating how the in the early stages 
of the Rome Statute’s drafting, little attention was given to gender issues by governments and mainstream human 
rights groups. The authors also give an account of the opposition which the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice 




The term ‘gender’ included in the Rome Statute is considered a victory for the Women’s Caucus, 
which pushed for the term to be included, rather than the term ‘sex’.495 Before the statutes of the 
ICTY and ICTR were drafted,496 men drafted conventions and treaties, in such a way that they 
reflected the ‘gender bias towards SGBCs such as rape’.497 Although there were mixed feelings 
about the term ‘gender’ in the Rome Statute, it did away with the gender bias towards men or 
women, recognising that men could also be victims of rape. Bedont and Hall-Martinez 
considered the inclusion of the term ‘gender’ and ‘gender crimes’ instead of the terms ‘sex’ and 
‘sex crimes in the Rome Statue as a ‘significant victory’ because they considered terms ‘sex’ and 
‘sex crimes’ to be narrower in scope.498 The inclusion of the terms ‘gender’ and ‘gender crimes’ 
was widely regarded as positive because the use of the terms would serve to continue the well-
established practice of them being used in international instruments. Bedont and Hall-Martinez 
also argued that the use of the words, ‘context of society’, within the definition of ‘gender’, 
covered the sociological differences between the two sexes’.499 Although the inclusion of the 
term ‘gender’ was welcomed, the qualification of the term in the Rome Statute was also 
considered a failing. The Rome Statute defines ‘gender’ as ‘two sexes, male and female, within 
the context of society.’500 The article goes on to state that ‘[t]he term “gender” does not indicate 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A step forward or back for International Criminal Justice?’ 
(2005) 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal at 56-66 (giving an account of the negotiations involved in getter the 
word ‘gender’ included in the statute and the opposition faced). Oosterveld played an active part in the negotiation 
of the definition of ‘gender’. Brook S Mosham ‘Women, war and words: The Gender component in the Permanent 
International Criminal Courts definition of crimes against humanity’ (1998-1999) 22 Fordham International Law 
Journal 154 at 171 (stating that ‘gender issues framed some of the most fiercely contested debates at the PrepCom 
Sessions and the Rome Conference.) Cate Steains ‘Gender Issues’ in Roy S Lee (ed) The International Criminal 
Court, The Making of the Rome Statute Issues, Negotiations, Results, (1999) at 360 (stating that the draft Rome 
Statute, which was prepared by the International Law Commission in 1994, did not contain any reference to gender 
issues. Omitting gender issues from the draft Rome Statute, resulted in the Ad Hoc and Preparatory Committee, at 
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title of the PrepCom is Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. The 
PrepCom was established in December 1995 by the United Nations General Assembly, to prepare a draft text of the 
statute for a diplomatic conference to consider. Mosham ‘Women, war and words’ at 169. 
495 Halley ‘Rape at Rome’ at 82.   
496 The definition of rape adopted by the ICTY and ICTR is gender neutral. 
497 Goldstone ‘Prosecuting rape as a war crime’ at 279 (stating that ‘Men had written the laws of war in an age when 
rape was regarded as being no more than an inevitable consequence of war.’ Christopher Maravilla ‘Rape as a war 
crime: The implications of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s decision in Prosecutor v 
Kunarac, Kovac, Vukovic on international humanitarian law’ (2000-2001) 13 Florida Journal of International Law 
321 at 339 (stating that ‘one of the problems with International Conventions and Treaties thus far with regard to rape 
has been the gender bias of the male diplomats charged with drafting.)  
498 Bedont and Hall-Martinez ‘Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes’ at 68. 
499 Ibid. 




any meaning different from the above’.501 As pointed out by Oosterveld, there were mixed 
reactions as to the definition of the term ‘gender’. Scholars such as Crossman, referred to it as 
‘stunningly narrow’, and Moshan as ‘a failure’, whilst Charlesworth is quoted as stating that it 
wrongfully ‘elides the notions of “gender” and “sex,” making “gender” mean the same as 
biological “sex” and therefore recognising that gender is a constructed and contingent set of 
assumptions about female and male roles’.502 Oosterveld quotes those who welcomed the 
definition of gender as stating that it was ‘consistent with other, more clearly stated formulations 
adopted within the United Nations.’503 Moshan considers the definition of ‘gender’ a failure, as 
qualifying it went against the wishes of the women activists, who believed that by so doing, it 
would make it difficult to prosecute gender-based crimes. She is of the same opinion as the 
women activists that it is an unworkable and unpractical term.504 Hamid, on the other hand, 
focuses on the construction of article 7(1) (g) of the Rome Statute.  
2.5.2  Defining gender crimes in the Rome Statute.  
The codification of rape and other forms of SGBCs in the Rome Statue as crimes against 
humanity and war crimes505 is a significant advancement for international humanitarian and 
criminal law.506 Together with rape, ‘sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity’507 they have 
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502 Oosterveld ‘The definition of “Gender” in the Rome Statute’ (2006) 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal  
at 55-56. 
503 Ibid. 
504 Mosham ‘Women, war and words’ at 178-179.  
505 Persecution based on gender is prohibited by the Rome Statute, which was not the case with the ICTY and ICTR 
Statutes. Rome Statute, art 7(1)(h) provides that : 
Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial national, ethnic, cultural, 
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See also Ellis ‘Breaking the silence: Rape as an international crime’ at 241. 
506 Valerie Oosterveld ‘Gender persecution and the International Criminal Court: Refugee law’s relevance to the 
crime against humanity of gender-based persecution’ (2006) 17 Duke Journal of Comparative and International 
Law 49. Though persecutors of the crimes of sexual slavery and sexual violence have been convicted by the ICTY 
and ICTR, these crimes are not listed in the ICTY or ICTR Statutes − only rape is listed as a crime against humanity 
under article 5(g) of the ICTY Statute, and Article 3(g) of the ICTR Statue. Article 4(e) of the ICTR Statute lists 
rape, together with other gender-based crimes as war crimes which are outrages upon one’s personal dignity. Steains 
‘Gender Issues’ at 362-363 (referring to the OTP in the ICTY being able to prosecute for rape and other gender-
based crimes under other articles of the statute as doing so ‘through creative interpretation of the Statute’.)   




been included as crimes against humanity and war crimes in separate sub-paragraphs.508 This is 
significant as it shows that these crimes are recognised in their own right and are peculiar to 
women.509 Brown and Grenfell, however, observe that the codification of these crimes is not 
new, as the Rome Statute codifies existing customary international law.510 Scholars such as 
Hamid, however, take issue with the construction of article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute on the 
ground that the article still puts women in a subordinate position, as the crimes of sexual 
violence are isolated in the article and as a result sexual violent crimes are not ‘part of the 
narrative of larger sexual offending’.511 
Under the Rome Statute, an act of rape can constitute genocide when ‘committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’.512 In 
addition, ‘acts of torture. . . sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment’ may constitute 
genocide when ‘serious bodily or mental harm’ was caused ‘to one or more persons’.513 Rape 
and other criminal acts mentioned in article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute are crimes against 
humanity ‘when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
                                                            
508 Mosham ‘Women, war and words’ at 177 and 181. Cate Steains ‘Gender Issues’ at 363 (pointing out that the 
reason why article 6, which relates to genocide does not specifically refer to SGBC, is because during the PrepCom 
negotiations the drafters wanted to maintain the definition of genocide found in the 1948 Convention on the 
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509 Mosham ‘Women, war and words’ at 177 and 181. Ellis ‘Breaking the silence: Rape as an international crime’ at 
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crimes at the International Criminal Court: Challenges and opportunities’ (2011) 11 International Criminal Law 
Review 775 at 786. 
510 Brown and Grenfell support their argument by referring to the International Committee of the Red Cross 
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and principles of IHL as customary criminal law’. Brown and Grenfell ‘The international crime of gender-based 
persecution and the Taliban’ (2003) 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law at 358. 
511 Noor Hamid ‘The Untold Story of the Girl Soldiers of the Congo: The International Criminal Court Case of the 
Prosecutor v Lubanga’ at 1, 4 and 5 available at https://cdn.auckland.ac.nz/assets/humanrights/.../Noor-Hami-
final.pdf (accessed 17 February 2015). 
512 Rome Statute, art 6. 
513 ICC, Elements of Crimes, ISBN No 92-9227-232-2, art 6(b). The Elements of Crimes was adopted by a two-
thirds majority of the Assembly of State Parties on 9 September 2002 and entered into force on the same day. See 
Rome Statute, art 9(1) which provides that the Elements of Crimes. . . shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of 




civilian population, with knowledge of the attack’.514 Article 7(2) defines an ‘attack directed 
against any civilian population’ as:  
A course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against 
any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit 
such attack.515 
The Elements of Crimes (EOC) provides conditions for the conduct of rape and the other 
criminal acts under article 7(1)(g). As with article 7(1)(g), the EOC also provides that the 
conduct must be committed ‘as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a 
civilian population’.516 The perpetrator’s [’] knowledge is also an important condition. The EOC 
thus provides for the perpetrator knowing ‘that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to 
be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population’.517 There are, 
therefore, five contextual elements involved in a crime against humanity:  
• An attack directed against any civilian population;  
• A State or organisational policy;  
• An attack of a widespread or systematic nature;  
• A nexus between the individual act and the attack; and 
•  Knowledge of the attack.518  
Regarding war crimes, SGBCs may either be committed in an international or non-international 
armed conflict situation. SGBCs listed in article 8(2)(b)(xxii) of the Rome Statute can be 
committed in an international armed conflict situation, whilst those listed in article 8(2)(e)(vi) in 
a non-international armed conflict situation. As noted in chapter 1,519 the definition of armed 
conflict, which the ICC has adopted, was defined by the Appeals Chamber in the Prosecutor v 
Dusko Tadic case as existing ‘whenever there is a resort to armed force between states or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or 
                                                            
514 Rome Statute, art 7(1). 
515 See also ICC, Elements of Crimes, art 7(3).  
516 Idem art 7(1)(c) para 2–enslavement, art 7(1)(g) -1 para 3 – rape, art 7(1)(g) -2 para 3 – sexual slavery, art 
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between such groups within a state’.520 As war crimes are applicable in an international armed 
conflict situation relating to SGBCs listed in the Rome Statute, article 8(2)(b) provides that war 
crimes means: 
Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within 
the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:521  
(xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in 
article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also 
constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions;522   
For each of the criminal acts mentioned in article 8(2)(b)(xxii), the EOC requires the mental 
element, namely that ‘the perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict’.523 
An armed conflict is international in character: 
[i]f it takes place between two or more States; this extends to the partial or total occupation of the territory 
of another State, whether or not the said occupation meets with armed resistance. In addition, an internal 
armed conflict that breaks out on the territory of a State may become international - or, depending on the 
circumstances, be international in character alongside with an internal armed conflict - if (i) another State 
intervenes in that conflict through its troops (direct intervention), or if (ii) some of the participants in the 
internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other State (indirect intervention.524 
With regard to war crimes relating to SGBCs committed in a non-international armed conflict 
situation, article 8(2)(e) provides that war crimes means: 
Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an 
international character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the 
following acts:525   
(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in 
article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also 
constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.526 
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524 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui ‘Decision on the confirmation of charges’ ICC-
01/04-01/07  (30 September 2008) para 238 referring to the definition which was held in the Lubanga case which 
adopted the definition of the International Court Justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda case. 
525 Rome Statute art 8(2)(e). 




The same mental element applies for non-international armed conflicts as with international 
armed conflict, that is, ‘the perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established 
the existence of an armed conflict’.527  
The Trial Chamber has held that sexual violence as enumerated in articles 8(2)(b)(xxii) 
and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute is not ‘limited to acts constituting grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 or serious violations of Common article 3’.528 The implication of 
this is that combatants in ‘same armed force are not per se excluded as potential victims of the 
war crimes’.529  
Apart from the contextual elements already mentioned to prove sexual crimes as crimes 
against humanity, or war crimes of an international or non-international nature, other contextual 
elements relating to each individual sexual crime enumerated in the statute must be proved to 
establish that crime. Rape and sexual slavery are two of the sexual violent crimes which have 
mainly been prosecuted as crimes against humanity and war crimes, before the ICC. 
Consideration is, therefore, given to the other elements required to prove these two crimes.   
 
2.5.2(i) Rape constituting genocide, a crime against humanity and war crime 
As the elements of rape are codified in the EOC, the ICC will not have to refer to other legal 
systems for a definition of rape, as was the case in the ICTY and ICTR.530 This is because the 
EOC assist the ICC ‘in the interpretation and application’ of crimes within its jurisdiction.531 As 
a crime against humanity under article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute and war crimes under articles 
8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute, other elements necessary to establish the crime 
of rape as provided in the EOC are: 
1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however 
slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the 
anal or genital opening of the victim with any object of any other part of the body. 
                                                            
527 ICC, Elements of Crimes, art 8(2)(e)(vi)-1, para 4 - rape, art 8(2)(e)(vi) - 2, para 4  - sexual slavery, art 
8(2)(e)(vi) -3, para 4- enforced prostitution, art 8(2)(e)(vi) - 4, para 3 – forced pregnancy, art 8(2)(e)(vi) - 5, para 4 – 
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528 Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda ‘Second decision on the defence’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the court in 
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529 Idem para 54. 
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2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused 
by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against 
such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the 
invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.532 
Though the definition is similar to that used in the Furundzija case, it has been modified so that 
the invasion of the victim’s body is ‘broad enough to be gender-neutral’.533 Thus, the first 
constituent element of rape is where the perpetrator invades a person’s body by conduct which 
results in penetration with a sexual organ. Apart from penetration of the vagina, this would 
include, for example, penetration of the victim’s mouth with a sexual organ.534 Penetration of the 
victim’s anal or genital opening with any object or any other part of the victim’s body can also 
constitute rape. Invasion, therefore, includes same-sex penetration, and invasive conduct by male 
and female perpetrators or victims who are male or female.535 The second constituent element 
provides the circumstances and conditions in which invading a victim’s body attracts criminal 
character.536 An example provided in the EOC is where the invasion was committed by force 
because the victim or another person was under duress or in detention. The only reference to lack 
of consent which the EOC refers to is when the invasion of the perpetrator or victim’s body is 
committed against a person who is incapable of giving genuine consent, that is, a person who is 
‘affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity’.537 The prosecution in this situation, has 
to prove that ‘the victim’s capacity to give genuine consent was affected by natural, induced, or 
age-related incapacity.’538 In all other circumstances, a victim’s lack of consent does not have to 
be proved as the EOC does not refer to it. No provision for mens rea for rape is made in the 
Rome Statute or EOC. Reference therefore must be made to article 30 of the Rome Statute, 
where ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ are a legal requirements. In proving ‘intent’ it must be proved 
‘that the perpetrator intentionally committed the act of rape’ or that the ‘perpetrator meant to 
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engage in the conduct in order for penetration to take place’.539  In the case of knowledge, the 
prosecutor must prove that the ‘perpetrator was aware that the act was committed by force, by 
the threat of force or coercion, by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or against a 
person incapable of giving genuine consent.'540 Intent and knowledge are additional to the 
requirement of the perpetrator’s ‘awareness of the factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict’.541 
2.5.2(ii)   Sexual slavery as a crime against humanity and war crime  
As a crime against humanity under article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute and war crime under  
articles 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute, other elements necessary to establish 
the crime of sexual slavery as provided in the EOC are: 
The perpetrator exercised any or all the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or 
more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by 
imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty. 
The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature.542 
The Trial Chamber in the Katanga case avowedly adopted a case-by-case approach when 
considering ‘the exertion of powers which may be associated with the right of ownership or 
which may ensue therefrom’.543 Various factors which the ICC may take into account include:  
Detention or captivity and their respective duration; restrictions on freedom to come and go or on 
any freedom of choice or movement; and, more generally, any measure taken to prevent or deter 
any attempt at escape. The use of threats, force or other forms of physical or mental coercion, the 
exaction of forced labour, the exertion of psychological pressure, the victim’s vulnerability and 
the socioeconomic conditions in which the power is exerted.’544 
The Trial Chamber also stated ‘that the exercise of the right of ownership over someone need not 
entail a commercial transaction’.545 
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This chapter examined the marginalisation of SGBCs, particularly rape committed in armed 
conflicts at the international level. Although early documents prohibited rape, wartime rape was 
permitted, for example, to boost the morale’s of soldiers, as a means of subjugating the side that 
lost the war as women were considered men’s property, and because rape was considered an 
inevitable consequence of war, or collateral damage to be tolerated. Later, legal documents were 
constructed so as to make rape an offence against a woman’s honour and dignity, rather than a 
crime against her. With the first codification of crimes against humanity by the IMT after World 
War II, rape was not included as a crime in its own right (unlike crimes such as murder), but was 
subsumed by implication under the catch-all phrase ‘other inhumane acts’. Neither were other 
tribunals, such as the Tokyo Tribunal, very successful in prosecuting rape, as observed in the 
‘comfort women’s situation, even though rape was a crime included in its indictment. Rape and 
other SGBC’s were excluded from the ‘grave breaches’ list of the Geneva Convention and not 
mentioned in common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, thus raising doubts as to the gravity 
of these crimes at the international level. Such marginalisation of rape and other SGBCs led to 
the struggle by feminist scholars and women’s human rights organisations to get SGBCs 
recognised in their own right. The inclusion of SGBCs in the ad hoc tribunals’ statutes and the 
Rome Statute as genocide, war crimes, and/or crimes against humanity have undoubtedly 
brought the recognition of these crimes to the forefront. Both the ICTY and ICTR developed a 
definition of rape, as there was no agreed definition at international level before their formation. 
This has helped to halt the misperception that women are men’s property and can be maltreated, 
and has helped erase the concept that rape is an offence against a woman’s honour and dignity 
rather than an offence against her person, or that rape committed in an armed conflict situation is 
an inevitable consequence of war, or collateral damage to be tolerated. Unfortunately, it took the 
atrocities which occurred in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda for the international community 
to respond to the cries of feminists and women’s human rights organisations. Perhaps if the 
international community had acted earlier, the experience of women might have been different.  
The chapter also reveals the teething problems faced by the ICTY and ICTR in applying 
the statutes in armed conflict situations with respect to SGBCs, particularly in instances of rape. 
Different interpretations of rape were adopted by the tribunals in cases such as Prosecutor v 




jurisprudence of these two tribunals helped pave the way for the codification of SGBCs in the 
Rome Statute, although only rape was codified in the ICTY and ICTR statutes. 
Although the inclusion of SGBCs in international treaties is welcomed, it is suggested 
that the inclusion of these crimes in international treaties is just one step towards getting them 
recognised or acknowledged by the international community as crimes which cannot be 
condoned and consequently must be prosecuted. As will be observed in chapters three and four, 
investigating and prosecuting SGBCs at the ICC has been challenging. Since the ICC came into 
force in 2002, it has not had a successful conviction for SGBV. It is not only necessary to have 
SGBCs committed in armed conflicts included in treaties to prevent their marginalisation, but 
they must be effectively investigated and prosecuted to prevent impunity for these crimes. The 
next two chapters consider the investigation and prosecution of SGBCs committed in armed 
conflict before the ICC. By effectively investigating and prosecuting SGBCs, it is suggested that 
the impunity gap for these crimes will be bridged, as a result of which victims of these crimes 





THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S 
DISCRETIONARY POWERS IN BRIDGING THE IMPUNITY GAP IN SEXUAL AND 
GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE COMMITTED DURING ARMED CONFLICTS  
The Office of the Prosecutor is the engine; systematic efforts for professional 
investigations and effective cooperation are the fuel of the entire Court!546 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter of this thesis gave an account of the marginalisation of crimes of sexual 
and gender-based violence (SGBV) in international treaties and before certain international 
tribunals although there was ample evidence that these crimes had been committed. The 
successful campaign to include crimes such as rape, forced pregnancy and sexual slavery in the 
Rome Statute by feminists and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)547 have raised these 
crimes to a level with those recognised as the ‘most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community’.548 
The Rome Statute specifically refers to the ‘effective investigation and prosecution’ of 
sexual and gender-based crimes (SGBCs) within the International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) 
jurisdiction.549 A careful analysis of SGBV-related crimes that occurred in an armed conflict 
context and brought before the ICC shows that it is not enough to have these crimes included in 
the Rome Statute as crimes in their own right, as this alone does not guarantee their successful 
prosecution. The steps taken by the Prosecutor, right from the preliminary examination stage to 
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the investigation of crimes, plays an important part in the selection of cases for trial.550 These 
steps also play a key role in the successful prosecution of SGBCs at trial. The Prosecutor also has 
to be highly selective about which types of case to prosecute on account of insufficient resources 
to try all cases before the ICC; an increase in caseload could result in the non-prosecution of 
SGBV crimes. The Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP) current strategic plan for the number of 
cases it will handle also gives an insight as to how many cases the ICC will actually handle. Its 
forecast for 2016-2018 are nine preliminary examinations, one new situation under investigation, 
six active investigations, nine hibernated investigations, five pre-trial phase cases, five-trial 
phase cases and two final appeals.551 Although, the prosecution of SGBCs is currently not 
affected, it is possible that as the ICC’s caseload increases the Prosecutor will have to select for 
trial only cases of serious concern. In particular, as stated by the Prosecutor in referring to the 
Appeals Court decision acquitting Bemba of charges, which included rape: ‘[t]he level of detail 
that the Prosecution may now be required to include in the charges may render it difficult to 
prosecute future cases entailing extensive campaigns of victimisation’.552 This she stated might 
apply ‘where the accused is not a direct perpetrator, but a commander remote from the scene of 
the alleged crimes but who may bear criminal responsibility as the superior having effective 
control over the perpetrators, his subordinates’.553 Apart from this, the ICC is a court of last 
resort; created as a small organisation that investigates and prosecutes a limited number of 
cases.554 Therefore, SGBV-related cases could be marginalised if the Prosecutor has to choose 
from a large caseload, especially since the duty to investigate and prosecute cases is primarily 
that of states.  
With this in mind, this chapter examines the Prosecutor’s discretionary powers and their 
application in admitting situations and cases of SGBV committed in an armed conflict situation 
to the ICC. This will provide the foundation for chapter 4, which examines the difficulties 
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encountered at the ICC in obtaining a conviction for SGBCs, despite the inclusion of these 
crimes in the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute, the policies and strategies adopted by the ICC 
and those instances where the Prosecutor’s decisions affected the admissibility of situations and 
cases relating to SGBCs are considered. Although scholars have written about the Prosecutor’s 
discretionary powers, their focus has been on the political interference in the discretionary role 
and the determination of ‘gravity’ relating to situations and cases.555 This chapter differs from 
such writings; as mentioned above, it examines the application of the Prosecutor’s discretionary 
powers to situations and cases before the ICC in the context of SGBCs committed in armed 
conflict situations.  
3.2 THE PROSECUTOR’S DISCRETIONARY POWERS IN BRINGING A CASE 
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT. 
For a clear understanding of the discretionary powers of the Prosecutor in selecting situations 
and cases to be prosecuted before the ICC, this section first examines the legal framework of the 
procedure that the Prosecutor must follow in exercising her discretionary powers under the Rome 
Statue.556 The examination reveals that the Rome Statute’s provisions do not distinguish how the 
Prosecutor should apply her discretionary powers in the case of SGBCs as opposed to other 
crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. However, there appears to be evidence of a distinction in 
the way the Prosecutor exercises discretionary powers in the selection of SGBCs on the one hand 
and other crimes for trial. The section commences by differentiating between a situation and a 
case, which the Rome Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) refer to as the 
discretionary powers of the Prosecutor.  
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3.2.1 Distinguishing between Situations and Cases.  
Although the Rome Statute and its RPE refer to situations and cases, these two words are not 
defined in their provisions.557 The distinction between these two words has been for ICC judges 
to determine. It is therefore necessary to have a clear understanding of their meaning as different 
legal implications flow from their selection. Pre-Trial Chamber I in its decision relating to victim 
participation gave the distinction between situations and cases. The Chamber stated that: 
Situations, which are generally defined in terms of temporal, territorial and in some cases 
personal parameters, such as the situation in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo since 1 July 2002 entails the proceedings envisaged in the Statute to determine whether a 
particular situation should give rise to a criminal investigation as well as the investigation as such. 
Cases, which comprise specific incidents during which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court seem to have been committed by one or more identified suspects, entail proceedings 
that take place after the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear.558 
Thus, a situation defines the parameters that the Prosecutor uses in determining whether to 
commence an investigation during the preliminary examination and investigation stage, based on 
grounds of reasonableness.559 At this stage, it is not a case in the strict sense of the word as only 
a hypothesis may be built, premised on the Prosecutor’s findings.560 This is because at this point 
the Prosecutor does not yet know what her evidence will be, the person or persons she will 
charge and for what crimes.561 A case, on the other hand is concrete, in that the Prosecutor has 
defined the crime to be charged and the alleged perpetrator.562 A case commences when the 
Prosecutor requests that the Pre-Trial Chamber issues a warrant of arrest or summons to 
appear,563 or when she brings charges against a person, confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chambers 
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under article 61 of the Statute.564 Compared to a ‘situation’, a ‘case’ triggers the possibility of a 
challenge of jurisdiction or admissibility under article 19 of the Rome Statute. Notably, once a 
trial has commenced, a challenge against the admissibility of a case brought under articles 
17(1)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute cannot be made by a state or any person referred to under 
the Statute’s article 19(2).565  
3.2.2 Triggering the International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction: The Preliminary 
Examination of a Situation. 
The preliminary examination of a ‘situation’ is the first stage that the Prosecutor conducts 
regarding potential cases that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC. During this stage of the 
proceeding, the Prosecutor does not have full investigative powers, but carries out a preliminary 
examination to determine if a reasonable basis exists to open an investigation into the crimes that 
fall under its jurisdiction and the persons to charge.566 The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) carries 
out a preliminary examination of a situation when a state party to the ICC triggers its 
jurisdiction,567 or a non-state party to the Rome Statute makes a declaration accepting the ICC’s 
jurisdiction.568 The OTP also carries out a preliminary examination of a situation when the 
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, refers a situation to 
the Prosecutor.569 The Rome Statute also grants the Prosecutor discretionary power to initiate 
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investigations proprio motu, based on information received or from information collected when 
acting on her own initiative.570 With regard to investigations initiated proprio motu, the 
Prosecutor has an obligation to ‘analyse the seriousness of the information received’.571 In the 
case of SGBCs, the Prosecutor examines the general context in which these crimes occurred, and 
together with other crimes alleged to have been committed she may obtain additional 
information from sources such as ‘state, organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental or non-
governmental organisations’, and ‘may receive written or oral testimony at the seat of the 
Court’.572 If the Prosecutor concludes ‘there is a reasonable basis to proceed with a [full] 
investigation’, based on the criteria laid down in article 53(1)(a)-(c) of the Rome Statute, she 
must obtain judicial authorisation to commence the investigation from the Pre-Trial Chamber.573 
This she does by submitting ‘a request for authorisation of an investigation, together with any 
supporting material collected’.574 Such a request is not required from the Pre-Trial Chamber 
where the Security Council575 or the state party has made the referral. Thus, though the 
Prosecutor is independent of the ICC, the Pre-Trial Chamber acts as a check on the decision 
made by the Prosecutor.576  
3.2.3 Factors taken into Account to Initiate an Investigation. 
Article 53 provides the procedural requirements for the Prosecutor to follow for the investigation 
of a situation and prosecution of a case.577 This article applies when the ICC’s jurisdiction is 
triggered by way of a SC referral or that of a state party, and when the Prosecutor exercises her 
discretion proprio motu. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
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investigation, the Prosecutor must consider whether the crime falls within the court’s 
jurisdiction, the admissibility of the case under article 17 of the Rome Statute and whether the 
interests of justice justify an investigation being carried out.578 With regard to the jurisdictional 
assessment, as previously stated, the Prosecutor must ensure that the crimes fall within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction by being committed on a state party’s territory or by a national of the state party.579 
Apart from this, the ICC’s jurisdiction would only extend to crimes which occurred after 1 July 
2002, the date its Statute came into effect, or the date after which the state acceded to the ICC’s 
jurisdiction. Where SGBCs are genocidal acts, [acts of] crimes against humanity or war crimes, 
the Prosecutor can exercise jurisdiction over these crimes.580 Where the Prosecutor is satisfied 
that the crimes, including SGBCs, are within the ICC’s jurisdiction, an admissibility assessment 
test is applied, in which the Prosecutor applies the provisions of article 17 of the Rome 
Statute.581 This article, couched in the negative, not only provides the framework for 
admissibility of a case before the ICC, but also develops the rules constituting the 
‘complementarity principle’ under which states are expected to investigate and prosecute the 
most serious crimes of international concern as listed under article 5 of the Rome Statute. States 
have primacy over such cases, with the ICC being a court of last resort.582 As a court of last 
resort, the ICC is only able to investigate and prosecute crimes within its jurisdiction when the 
exceptions to article 17 of the Statute apply.  
The text of article 17(1) provides: 
Having regard to paragraph 10 of the preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is 
inadmissible where: 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, 
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution; 
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(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has 
decided not to prosecute the person concerned unless the decision resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for the conduct which is the subject of the 
complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3; 
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.  
Although article 17(1) provides four scenarios in which a case will not be admissible before the 
ICC, it is only in the first three situations that the complementarity principle is embodied. There 
are therefore, two main parts to article 17: complementarity under sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) and 
the ‘sufficient gravity’ principle under sub-paragraph (d).583 Under paragraphs (a) to (c), the 
Prosecutor must consider whether genuine proceedings or relevant national proceeding exist or 
existed.584 Barriers to genuine proceedings by the state concerned are considered. With regard to 
SGBCs, these include the lack of protective measures for victims, inadequate steps undertaken in 
the investigation and prosecution of these crimes, and ‘discriminatory585 attitudes and gender 
stereotypes in substantive law’.586 Given that the Prosecutor’s determination at this stage is case 
specific, the Prosecutor must examine ‘whether the national proceedings encompass the 
investigation and/or prosecution of the same person(s) for the same conduct as that which forms 
the basis of the preliminary examination.’587 In assessing the interest of justice the Prosecutor 
takes into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims.588 The gravity of the 
crime entails considering the scale, the nature, the manner of commission, and the impact of the 
crime. In weighing the gravity of the crime in the case of SCBCs, the OTP also considers ‘the 
multi-faceted character and the resulting suffering, harm, and impact of such acts’  . . .and the 
‘specific elements of each offence, such as killings, rapes, and other crimes involving a sexual 
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and/or gender element’, are relevant considerations.589 Article 17(2) spells out the factors, which 
determine unwillingness, whilst article 17(3) spells out the factors which determine inability. 
Article 17(2) provides that the court shall consider whether: 
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the 
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC referred to in article 5;  
(b)  [t]here has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;  
(c)  [t]he proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and 
they were or are being conducted in a manner which in the circumstances is inconsistent with 
an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.’590 
With regard to inability, Article 17(3) provides that: 
The Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its 
national judicial system, the state is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and 
testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.591 
This paragraph, which takes care of those situations where a state’s national judicial system is 
destroyed, was considered necessary just as was the case in the Rwandan genocide in 1994.592 
3.2.4. Making a Decision on the Preliminary Examination.  
If, having conducted the preliminary examination, the Prosecutor concludes that there is no 
reasonable basis to initiate an investigation she must inform those who provided her with the 
information.593 Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is no reasonable basis to initiate an 
investigation, because the investigation would not serve the interests of justice, the Prosecutor 
must inform the Pre-Trial Chamber of her decision.594 Nonetheless, this does not prevent her 
from considering the situation afresh where new facts or evidence are provided.595 The Pre-Trial 
                                                            
589 ICC, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes at paras 44. 
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592 J T Holmes ‘Complementarity: National courts versus the ICC’ in Antonio Cassese Paola Gaeta John R W D 
Jones (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A commentary Vol 1 (2002) at 667.Kevin J 
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Chamber may review this decision,596 and either affirm the Prosecutor’s decision not to 
investigate or request that the Prosecutor reconsider her decision. 
Where the Prosecutor commences a preliminary examination proprio motu and 
determines that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with a full investigation, she must obtain 
judicial authorisation to commence the investigation from the Pre-Trial Chamber.597 This does 
not apply where the Security Council598 or the state party makes the referral. Based on an 
examination of the supporting material(s) presented before it, the Pre-Trial Chamber must 
consider whether there is a reasonable basis to commence investigation, and at the same time 
evaluate the jurisdictional aspect of the case.599 The Pre-Trial Chamber therefore applies the 
same test as that applied by the Prosecutor, which includes an admissibility assessment. In the 
event that the Pre-Trial Chamber denies the Prosecutor’s request to commence an investigation, 
the Prosecutor may still present a subsequent request based on new facts and evidence.600 Where 
the Pre-Trial Chamber authorises the investigation, or where the referral of the situation was by a 
state and the Prosecutor believes that there is a reasonable basis to initiate an investigation, the 
Prosecutor must notify all state parties and those states which under normal circumstances would 
have jurisdiction over the crimes in question.601 This would not apply were the referral of a 
situation was made by the Security Council.602 Notification to states of the Prosecutor’s intention 
to initiate an investigation affords states primacy over national proceedings under its 
investigation and thereby avoids the same investigation or proceedings being carried out by both 
the Prosecutor and the state.603 States have a month to reply to the Prosecutor’s notification, and 
can request that she defers to national investigation where any of the conditions under article 
17(1)(a) to (c) apply.604 In such circumstances, if the Prosecutor wishes to challenge a state’s 
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assertion of admissibility, she must apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber for authorisation to 
investigate.605 To decide whether to authorise an investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber must 
consider whether article 17 would apply when considering the Prosecutor’s application and 
observations made by the state requesting a deferral.606 
3.2.5 From Investigation to Case Stage 
At the case selection stage, the OTP considers the same facts as those considered at the 
preliminary examination stage, applying a more focused test than that previously done.607  
In its Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-based Crimes, the OTP states that it will investigate 
crimes of SGBV concurrently with other crimes that come within its jurisdiction, thereby moving 
away from the sequential approach of investigating crimes.608 The OTP previously adopted a 
sequential approach due to lack of resources. The OTP states that adopting a concurrent 
approach in its investigation would result in more effective utilisation of its resources and the 
prosecution of SGBCs would stand a better chance. The concurrent method would also provide 
enough time to collect and analyse evidence and to identify and select witnesses.609 Once the 
Prosecutor has completed an investigation, and identified crimes, which include SGBCs within 
the ICC’s jurisdiction, she must consider whether there is a sufficient basis for prosecution.610  
The Prosecutor can determine that there is not a sufficient basis to prosecute when:  
(a) There is not a sufficient legal or factual basis to seek a warrant or summons under 
article 58;  
(b) The case is inadmissible under article 17; or  
(c) A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances, 
including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the 
alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime.611 
When the Prosecutor makes such a determination based on any of the above grounds, she must 
inform the Pre-Trial Chamber of her decision.612 Where a state party or the Security Council 
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makes the referral, the Prosecutor must also inform them of her decision not to prosecute, and 
her reasons for reaching such a conclusion.613 A state party or the Security Council may also 
request the Pre-Trial Chamber to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute.614 The Pre-
Trial Chamber, on its own initiative, may also review the Prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute 
on the ground that the decision was not in the interest of justice.615 The Pre-Trial Chamber may 
confirm the Prosecutor’s decision or ask the Prosecutor to reconsider her decision not to 
prosecute.616 Where the Prosecutor determines that there is sufficient basis to prosecute, she may 
apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber for the issue of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear.617 
A case would come into existence upon the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons 
to appear by the Pre-Trial Chamber. This may inform the initiation of an article 19 challenge to 
the ICC’s jurisdiction or the cases admissibility. The article places a duty on the ICC to ensure 
that it has jurisdiction to hear a case brought before it and determine the issue of admissibility of 
the case pursuant to article 17.618 An accused or any person issued with a warrant of arrest or 
summons to appear can also bring a challenge as to jurisdiction or admissibility.619 A state which 
has jurisdiction over the case or which accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC as required by article 
12 of the Statute may also challenge the ICC on its jurisdiction or admissibility to hear a case.620 
Whilst an accused or person on whom an arrest warrant or summons to appear is served can 
challenge the admissibility of the case based on insufficient gravity under article 17(1)(d), a state 
does not have this option. It can only make a challenge on the ground that it is investigating or 
prosecuting the case or on the ground that it has already investigated or prosecuted the case.621 A 
non-state party that has accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction can also make a challenge.622  
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3.3 THE APPLICATION OF THE PROSECUTOR’S DISCRETION RELATING TO 
SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED CRIMES  
The first few situations in which the previous Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, opened 
investigations contained crimes of SGBV that occurred in armed conflict situations. These were 
self-referred situations to the Prosecutor by Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali.623 These self-referrals were criticised by scholars, 
who pointed out that self-referrals of situations from states on whose territory such crimes were 
committed were not anticipated by the drafters of the Rome Statute.624 The Appeals Chamber in 
Katanga has however ruled that the Rome Statute permits self-referrals, and that the ICC must be 
able to investigate and prosecute crimes within its jurisdiction when states fail to do so.625 Thus, 
although self-referrals have become part of the ICC’s jurisprudence, no other African state has 
self-referred crimes, which contain SGBV that occurred in an armed conflict situation.626 The 
                                                            
623 The Government of Uganda referred the Ugandan situation to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in December 
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2004 by the Government of the DRC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. ‘Decision assigning the Situation 
in The Democratic Republic of Congo to the Pre-Trial Chamber I’ ICC-01/04, 5 July 2004 (where a letter from the 
Prosecutor dated 17 June 2004 was annexed to this decision making mention of the referral by the DRC and 
Uganda). The Government of Central African Republic made the first referral to the ICC regarding situations in 
Central African Republic in December 2004. Its transitional government made a second referral on 30 May 2014 
referring the situation in its territory since 1 August 2012. OTP, Situation in the Central African Republic II, Article 
53(1) Report, 24 September 2014 available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/Art_53_1_Report_CAR_II_24Sep14.pdf (accessed on 31 October 2016). The situation occurring 
in Mali going back to January 2012 was referred by its government to the OTP on 18 July 2012, in a letter dated 13 
July 2012 to the OTP. Presidency, Decision assigning the situation in the Republic of Mali to Pre-Trial Chamber II 
(19 July 2012)’ ICC-01/12. 
624 Paola Gaeta ‘Is the practice of “self-referrals” a sound start for the ICC’ (2004) 2 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice at 949- 952. Burke-White and Kaplan ‘Shaping the contours of domestic justice’ at 259. Darryl 
however argues that the records of the ICC’s drafting history show the opposite. Darryl Robinson ‘The controversy 
over territorial state referrals and reflections on the ICL discourse.’ (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice at 355-384.  
625Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr Germain Katanga 
against the oral decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the admissibility of the case’ (25 September 2009) 
ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, para 85 (stating that ‘the Appeals Chamber is not persuaded by the argument of the 
Appellant that it would be to negate the obligation of States to prosecute crimes if they were allowed to relinquish 
domestic jurisdiction in favour of the International Criminal Court’). Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
‘Decision on the admissibility and abuse of process challenges’ (24 June 2010) ICC-01/05-01/08, para 259 referring 
to the Appeals Chamber ruling on self-referrals. Trial Chamber III also stated that ‘[i]n any event, the Appeals 
Chamber, in the context of describing the balance between the complementarity principle and the goal of ending 
impunity, has cautioned against inappropriately deterring States from relinquishing jurisdiction in favour of the 
Court’.     
626 Situations have also been referred to the ICC by way of a Security Council referral, such as situations from 
Darfur, Sudan and Libya. These states are not parties to the Rome Statute. The Darfur, Sudan situation relates to an 
armed conflict involving crimes of sexual violence, whilst that in Libya relates to alleged crimes against humanity, 




Prosecutor also adopted a policy of inviting states to self-refer situations to the ICC ‘to increase 
the likelihood of important cooperation and support on the ground’.627 Regardless of the method 
used to trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction, the Prosecutor applies the same criteria and standards 
relating to all preliminary examination activities.628 
In applying his discretionary power in investigating of these situations, and having 
formed an opinion as to whom to prosecute, and what crimes to charge, the Prosecutor has made 
choices that have hindered the effective prosecution of SGBCs. In this section, these choices are 
considered.  
 
3.3.1 Avoiding Prosecuting Sexual and Gender-based Crimes. 
The Thomas Lubanga Dyilo case was the first that the Prosecutor brought before the ICC. 
Lubanga was the President of the Union des Patriotes Congolais/Réconciliation et Paix 
(UPC/RP), a group that committed various atrocities, including SGBCs in Ituri, situated in the 
north-eastern part of the DRC. A letter addressed to the President of the Security Council from 
the Secretary-General confirms that this group committed crimes of sexual and gender-based 
violence: 
UPC forces shelled hundreds of Lendu villages without making any distinction between armed 
combatants and civilians. Some villages in Djugu territory were the object of repeated attacks 
when the inhabitants returned and rebuilt during calmer periods. Each time that they took control 
of Bunia — August 2002 and May 2003 —UPC forces conducted a manhunt for Lendu, Bira, 
Nande and non-Iturians whom they considered opponents: many persons were killed and many 
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others disappeared or chose to leave Bunia. UPC soldiers also committed large-scale rape in the 
different areas of the town, sometimes abusing girls as young as 12. 
The team received reports of 18 cases of rape, some of the victims being as young as 11, 
committed by UPC soldiers after the ceasefire was signed. Most of the victims were abducted 
while they were out to look for food or water, and were taken to military places or private houses 
for sexual abuse. 
During those two periods, the MLC and RCD-N forces, although under different command, 
committed serious human rights abuses such as summary executions, systematic rape, systematic 
looting and acts of cannibalism. After Mambasa, similar abuses were also systematically carried 
out in the villages south of the town and between Komanda and Eringeti, with the involvement of 
UPC. The number of rape cases — mainly young girls or women between 12 and 25 years old — 
also rose to an alarming level.629 
Although there was evidence that the UPC had committed SGBCs, the Prosecutor chose to 
charge its President, Lubanga solely with the crime of conscripting, enlisting and using child 
soldiers under the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities, without establishing whether 
SGBCs could be linked to Lubanga.630 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo’s initial reason for charging Lubanga solely with the crime of 
conscripting, enlisting and using child soldiers was to avoid a ‘possibly imminent release’ from 
the DRC’s custody. Lubanga had been in the custody of the DRC authority for nearly a year 
before his transfer to the ICC.631 Interviews given by ex-prosecution investigators, however, 
state otherwise. After a year and a half of probing Lubanga, these investigators were instructed to 
‘focus solely on the use of child soldiers’, although they had also found evidence of rape, 
enslavement, torture and pillage.632 The investigators suggested that the reason for such 
instruction was that the investigations were taking too long and that prosecutors were under 
pressure to start cases.633 Luis Moreno-Ocampo had notably stated that he was prepared to add 
further charges if there was sufficient information and evidence to do so.634 The letter from the 
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Secretary General, which was based on a report from the United Nations Organisation Mission in 
the DRC, contained sufficient evidence for a preliminary examination into these crimes to have 
concluded that the UPC, of which Lubanga was President, carried out SGBCs. The Prosecutor 
would then have been able to establish whether there was sufficient evidence which linked 
Lubanga to the crimes committed by the UPC. Other statements from the Prosecutor did not 
revolve round the prosecution not being able to obtain sufficient evidence to prosecute Lubanga 
for SGBCs. When the Prosecutor later stated he was willing to investigate crimes other than what 
was charged, these crimes did not include SGBCs committed in armed conflict, but ‘allegations 
related to the intentional direction of attacks against the civilian population, murders committed 
during and after these attacks, the pillaging of towns and places, and ordering the displacement 
of the civilian population’.635 This shows that SGBCs continued to be marginalised, even though 
there was evidence that may have linked Lubanga to SGBCs. The Prosecutor also informed the 
ICC that he was not going to bring further charges against Lubanga, as amending the charges 
would add to the difficulties of providing adequate protection for the victims and witnesses. In 
addition to this, the Prosecutor stated that it would delay the proceedings, thereby prejudicing the 
right of Lubanga to be heard without further delay.636 The Prosecutor at a much later stage stated 
that he did not bring any charges for SGBV due to the small scale of the pre-trial investigations, 
the insufficient evidence, and the opportunistic nature of the crimes.637 It appears that the OTP 
was focused on the likelihood of success in prosecuting Lubanga for enlisting and conscripting 
children, despite the wealth of evidence that the UPC committed SGBCs. The ICC’s then Deputy 
Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, stated that the child soldiers’ case against Lubanga was a very 
strong one, and that they were comfortable with the evidence on this charge.638 As will be 
observed in chapter 4, although the Prosecutor had many opportunities to amend the charges to 
include SGBCs in proceedings before the ICC, he refused to do so. In its prosecutorial strategy 
report, the Prosecutor’s office stated that it relied on a focused approach in its investigations and 
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prosecutions. By this, it ‘adopted a policy of focusing its efforts on the most serious crimes and 
on those who bear the greatest responsibility for these crimes.’639 The aim of the focused 
approach was ‘to carry out short investigations and propose expeditious trials while aiming to 
represent the entire range of criminality. In principle, incidents will be selected to provide a 
sample that is reflective of the gravest incident and the main types of victimisation’.640 Adopting 
a focused approach in the Lubanga case resulted in the non-prosecution of SGBCs. However, 
just as crimes of conscripting, enlisting and using child soldiers come within the class of crimes 
which are the ‘most serious crimes of concern to the international community’,641 so also are 
crimes of SGBV. The crime of conscripting, enlisting and using child soldiers, as a ‘sample’, 
was not representative of the SGBV crimes by Lubanga as the leader of the UPC and his troops; 
neither did they represent the harm committed to victims of SGBV.642  
The Prosecutor, made a choice similar to that in the Luganda case in the case against 
Bosco Ntaganda, by narrowing the charges against Ntaganda when he applied for an arrest 
warrant. Ntaganda was initially charged with conscripting, enlisting and using child soldiers 
under the age of 15 to participate in hostilities.643 A second warrant of arrest, issued six years 
later contained charges of rape and sexual slavery as war crimes and crimes against humanity.644  
In the case against Dominic Ongwen, the commander of a rebel group known as the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, the Prosecutor brought 70 counts of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, against him.645 Eighteen of these counts were crimes related to SGBV, 
such as forced marriage, rape and sexual slavery, thus indicating the current Prosecutor’s 
willingness to charge SGBCs where evidence of these crimes exists. The move away from 
bringing charges within a narrow scope is proof that the current Prosecutor is fulfilling her aim 
‘to represent as much as possible the true extent of the criminality which has occurred within a 
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given situation, in an effort to ensure . . . that the most serious crimes committed in each situation 
[do] not go unpunished’.646 It is also proof that her office is taking into consideration ‘crimes that 
have been traditionally under-prosecuted, such as. . . rape and other sexual and gender-based 
crimes’.647 
3.3.2 Lack of Proper Investigation of Crimes Relating to SGBV. 
The focused approach adopted by the Prosecutor in carrying out expeditious and short 
investigations resulted in insufficient investigations of SGBCs, as reflected in cases of Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo.648 Ex-employees of the ICC confirmed the flawed approach 
used by the ICC before and during its investigations of crimes relating to SGBV, which resulted 
in their non-prosecution.649 Two identified factors in the non-prosecution of SGBCs were 
complexity and difficulty of proof. In addition, insufficient resources needed to prove all crimes 
before the ICC meant that only a few selected crimes could be thoroughly investigated.650 
Although the ICC applied a focused approach to all crimes, SGBCs were not given the priority 
afforded to other crimes. This was reflected, for example, in the Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo trials.651 
3.3.3 Risk of Sexual and Gender-based Violence Charges being withdrawn where 
Evidence Supporting the Charges is Limited. 
In adopting a focused approach of short investigations and expeditious trials in its selection 
process relating to incidents and charges, the Prosecutor called few witness to testify. This was 
also intended to cope with security challenges.652 However, the risk of having a limited number 
as witnesses to testify on a particular charge meant that if the court refused to accept their 
statements the charge fell to be removed.653 This is what happened in the cases against Katanga 
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and Ngudjulo, where the Pre-Trial Chamber did not allow the admission of two witnesses’ 
statements from the Prosecutor to support the charges relating to sexual slavery as a war crime 
and crime against humanity.654 The ICC judges excluded the statements due to concern about the 
witnesses’ security. Article 68 of the Rome Statute provides that all organs of the ICC ‘shall take 
appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and 
privacy of victims and witnesses’.655 In the result, the Prosecutor had to drop the charges brought 
against Katanga and Ngudjulo. Only when the court’s witness protection programme was in 
place and accepted by the judges with respect to the witnesses, was the Prosecutor able to 
reintroduce these charges, as well as bring additional charges of rape and outrage upon personal 
dignity.656 
To ensure the protection and support of witnesses as well as their families, the OTP has 
set up a Protection Strategies Unit (PSU) and an Operations Support Unit (OSU). These units 
also protect and support those at risk for having dealings with the OTP.657 In working with the 
Victims Witness Unit (VWU),658 the OTP, especially its PSU, ‘will cooperate with the VWU on 
matters of protection and support, including . . .sharing any relevant information, and providing 
any assistance in the implementation of protective measures and support where necessary and 
appropriate’.659 The Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-based Crimes goes on to state that the 
OTP ‘is mindful of the need for timely intervention, and will facilitate the provision of the 
required assistance where necessary to maintain the physical and psychological welfare of 
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The measures shall not be prejudicial to or in consistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
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656 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui ‘Decision on Prosecution’s urgent application for the 
admission of the evidence of witnesses 132 and 287’ (28 May 2008) ICC-01/04-01/07 at 6-7. Sacouto and Cleary 
‘The importance of effective investigation’ at 342. Sacouto ‘International law weekend’ at 270 – 271.  
657 ICC, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes at para 85. 
658 Idem at para 86. The VWU is the unit of the Registry at the ICC, which is ‘primarily responsible for the provision 
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witnesses, particularly victims of sexual and gender-based crimes. The Office will also work 
with states and other relevant actors in order to give full effect to this provision’.660 
3.3.4 Impartiality  
The OTP in its early years stated that it would focus its investigations and prosecutions on ‘the 
most serious crimes and on those who bear the greatest responsibility for these crimes’.661 It 
therefore sets out to target people in high positions who had ordered, financed or organised 
crimes alleged to have been committed.662 In addition, its policy papers stated that general 
principles on preliminary examinations, case selections and their prioritisation (carefully 
packaged) were based on ‘the overarching principles of independence, impartiality and 
objectivity’.663 The previous ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, was accused of being 
biased and impartial as he only targeted rebel groups in the DRC, Uganda and the CAR conflicts, 
thereby failing to apply the aims of the OTP on whom to investigate and prosecute.664 In 
endorsing the Prosecutor’s alleged bias and impartiality in the DRC, Human Rights Watch, for 
example, stated that: 
Key political and military figures in Kinshasa, as well as in Uganda and Rwanda also played a 
prominent role in creating, supporting and arming Lubanga’s Union of Congolese Patriots, 
Katanga’s Nationalist and Integrationist Front, and Ngudjolo’s Ituri Patriotic Resistance Forces. 
The availability of political and military support from these external actors encouraged local 
leaders in Ituri to form more structured movements and significantly increased their military 
strength. We therefore urge the Prosecutor to investigate senior officials in Kinshasa, Kampala 
and Kigoli and, evidence permitting, to bring cases against them.665 
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The Prosecutor defended his actions in the Ugandan situation by saying that he based the 
decision on whom to prosecute on the gravity criteria.666 This included an assessment from ‘a 
quantitative and qualitative viewpoint and factors such as the scale, nature and manner of 
commission of the crimes, and their impact on victims’.667 In applying the gravity criteria, the 
Prosecutor concluded that the alleged crimes committed by the LRA were of a higher gravity 
than those committed by the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF), and other groups,668 thus 
indicating that the alleged SGBCs committed by the UPDF and other groups were not serious 
enough to prosecute, even though various international bodies had brought to light the gravity of 
these crimes. A 2005 report by Human Rights Watch, for instance, confirms that the UPDF were 
equally to blame for SGBCs committed in Uganda. It states that ‘soldiers and officers of the 
Ugandan army, which is deployed in or near every displaced persons camp in northern Uganda, 
engaged in abuses in 2005, beating, raping and even killing civilians with near total impunity’.669 
These civilians obviously trusted the government to protect them. Scholars have also criticised 
the ICC for only prosecuting the LRA as a political move.670 In the DRC and CAR situations, the 
Prosecutor should have also applied the gravity criteria, given that they were an important factor 
he was obliged to consider in opening an investigation or selecting cases.671 
The Prosecutor in policy papers has consistently stated that impartiality  
. . . does not mean ‘equivalence of blame’ between different persons and groups within a 
situation, or that the Office must necessarily prosecute all sides in order to balance off perceptions 
of bias; instead it requires the Office to focus its efforts objectively on those most responsible for 
the most serious crimes within the situation in a consistent manner, irrespective of the States or 
parties involved or the person(s) or group(s) concerned.672 
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If the OTP had investigated the alleged crimes committed by senior government officials in the 
DRC and CAR situations it would have found that the SGBCs alleged to have been committed 
by these senior government officials were serious enough to be prosecuted. With regard to the 
Ugandan situation, contrary to Luis Moreno-Ocampo’s assertion that the crimes committed by 
the UPDF were not of greater gravity than those committed by the LRA is contradicted by the 
statement of the OTP that no complaints had been received against the UPDF.673 The non-
prosecution of senior government officials or heads of state shows the difficulty in bringing 
charges of SGBCs against this set of people, thus creating an impunity gap in the investigation 
and prosecution of these officials. Uganda and the DRC, for example, were politically motivated 
in referring of the situations to the ICC, and such referrals helped the Prosecutor in bringing 
situations before the ICC.674 Although the Prosecutor could have brought these situations 
proprio motu before the ICC, he would have faced the hurdle of proving that the states in 
question were ‘unable or unwilling genuinely to carry out’ domestic proceedings, especially if 
these states opposed him.675 The ICC was certain of the cooperation of the Ugandan and the 
DRC governments by choosing not to investigate or prosecute the governments of these states 
(which also committed SGBCs) but rather their opponents for crimes committed in their 
territory.676  
Gaeta is of the opinion that self-referrals may be the best option in bringing situations 
before the ICC, compared to the other options for triggering the ICC’s jurisdiction.677 As 
observed by one of the ICC’s former judges, the ICC ‘will almost inevitably be caught between 
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the poles of brutal power politics on the one hand and law and human rights on the other’.678 If 
there is to be accountability for crimes of SGBV, the ICC has to make a choice of whom it will 
investigate and prosecute.  
In its recent Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, the OTP states that it ‘shall 
apply its methods and criteria equally to all persons without any distinction based on official 
capacity pursuant to article 27(1) or other grounds referred to in article 21(3)’.679 Yet, aside from 
the OTP’s statement that it had not received any complaints against the UPDF, the OTP has not 
investigated alleged crimes against the government forces in the DRC and CAR, based on the 
purported knowledge that these states prosecute their own government forces. The OTP goes on 
to state in its policy paper that it would ‘not seek to create the appearance of parity within a 
situation between rival parties by selecting cases that would not otherwise meet the criteria set 
out’ in its paper.680 This statement indicates that the OTP realises the difficulty in investigating 
high-placed officials where a state government is unlikely to allow them to investigate crimes 
allegedly committed on their territory by their officials. As scholars have noted, in the self-
referral cases the expectation is that the Prosecutor would not investigate government officials, 
but those who were against the government.681 The pertinent question for the Prosecutor is 
whether he should solely pursue the rebel leaders as the cooperation of states makes a difference 
as to what evidence he obtains. It also means at least the prosecution of some perpetrators, and 
victims of the alleged crimes, which include SGBCs, would feel that justice has been done.  
3.4 RECTIFYING PAST MISTAKES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND 
PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED CRIMES 
Since her appointment as the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC in December 2011, Fatou Bensouda 
has been committed to the investigation and prosecution of SGBCs and enhancing victims’ 
access to justice before the ICC.682 Under her leadership, the Prosecutor has produced a Policy 
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679 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation at para 19. 
680 Idem at para 20. 
681 Jan Wouters and Kenneth Chan ‘Policies, not politics: The pursuit of justice in prosecutorial strategy at the 
International Criminal Court’ (2012) available at  
https://www.researchgate.net/.../251354817_Policies_Not_Politics_The_Pursuit_of_Justi. (accessed 17 November 
2016). 
682 Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor-elect of the ICC ‘Gender justice and the International Criminal Court – Progress and 
reflections’ 14 February 2012 available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/.../StatementgenderSydney140212.pdf  




Paper on Sexual and Gender-based Crimes, setting out the OTP’s policy relating to SGBCs with 
the purpose of guiding the OTP on matters relating to SGBCs.683 The policy paper ‘is based on 
the Statute, the Rules, the Regulations of the Court, the Regulations of the Office, the Office’s 
Prosecutorial Strategies and other related policy documents’.684 It also seeks to address the past 
mistakes made by the OTP in its first few years of investigating and prosecuting SGBCs685 
caused by the ICCs lack of defined goals and priorities in its selective decisions.686 This section 
will consider how the OTP has sought to rectify these mistakes and its improvement in its 
investigation and prosecution of SGBCs. 
3.4.1 Incorporating a Gender Perspective in the Work of the International Criminal 
Court. 
Throughout the Policy Paper, the OTP states its commitment to applying a gender perspective 
and analysis in all areas of its work. It aims to do this from the preliminary examination stage 
through to the prosecution of SGBCs and reparations proceedings.687 The OTP has made the 
integration of gender analysis one of its core strategic goals, as well as focus on SGBCs and 
those crimes committed against children.688  
The Policy Paper for example provides that: 
All staff from the various Divisions involved in the investigation shall be responsible for 
integrating a gender perspective within the investigations, and for ensuring that sexual and 
gender-based crimes are thoroughly addressed at each stage of the investigative process.689 
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In applying a gender perspective throughout its work, right from when it triggered its 
jurisdiction, the OTP attempts to ensure that the mistakes, which occurred in the Lubanga case, 
do not reoccur, in which case it would have had sufficient evidence to bring charges against 
perpetrators of SGBCs. The OTP would therefore be in a position to ‘react promptly to [an] 
upsurge of violence’,690 including SGBV. 
3.4.2 Effective Investigations of Sexual and Gender-based Crimes 
The OTP admits that SGBCs are some of the most difficult crimes to investigate and prosecute, 
given the challenges specific to these crimes. These challenges include:  
The under – or non-reporting of sexual violence owing to societal, cultural, or religious factors, 
stigma for victims of sexual and gender-based crimes, limited domestic investigations, and the 
associated lack of readily available evidence; lack of forensic or other documentary evidence 
owing inter alia, to the passage of time; and inadequate or limited support services at national 
level.’691 
The OTP has adopted specific measures to address these problems, for instance not relying 
solely on witness statements, but also obtaining other evidence such as documentary and forensic 
evidence.692 Such evidence would be collected to strengthen its case, and by doing so would 
overcome the problem faced in the Katanga and Ngudjulo cases in which the Pre-Trial Chamber 
refused to allow the Prosecutor to introduce two witnesses’ statements until it was satisfied about 
the witnesses’ security.693 This would entail improving the Prosecutor’s resources to enable 
resort to high technical means required to obtain such evidence.694 
By the time the OTP starts investigating SGBCs, the evidence relating to these crimes may 
appear unreliable at trial due to the time lag between when the SGBV occurred and the collection 
of evidence. The policy paper seeks to address this point by taking into account the 
circumstances in which the evidence emerged when a SGBC first occurred, and how reliable it 
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might be by the time the OTP investigated the incident. The policy paper provides for this by 
stating that the OTP will: 
. . . react promptly to upsurges of violence, including sexual and gender-based crimes, by 
reinforcing early interaction with States and international and non-governmental organisations, in 
order to verify information on alleged crimes, to encourage genuine national proceedings and to 
prevent the recurrence of crimes.695 
The OTP will therefore, engage the community networks and contacts and enlist their 
cooperation, especially that of first responders to SGBCs.696 In doing so, the OTP stands a better 
chance of obtaining reliable evidence relating to these crimes, as it is these first responders who 
gather the information when the evidence is still fresh. In its 2016 to 2018 Strategic Plan, the 
OTP stated that it had entered discussions with various first responders, such as NGOs, as to how 
each could support the other in their work.697 The OTP would need to educate these first 
responders on to how to obtain admissible evidence. The publication of its policy papers, such as 
its SGBC Policy Paper, has helped promote transparency and clarity in the hope that the OTP 
and the other actors will cooperate with the policy.698 
Although the OTP maintains its focused approach of investigating crimes within its 
jurisdiction, it has adopted an ‘in-depth, open ended’ method of investigating these crimes,699 so 
that the OTP will be able to obtain more evidence from various sources, thereby meeting a 
higher evidentiary threshold. This method of investigation will assist the OTP in applying 
various case hypotheses, thus strengthening its decision-making in cases it prosecutes.700 It also 
means that SGBCs will be considered, especially as the OTP now applies a gendered analysis to 
crimes within its jurisdiction.701 Thus, the OTP will investigate allegations of SGBCs 
thoroughly, since a wide range of alleged crimes and incidents would be investigated. 
3.4.3 Bringing charges for Sexual and Gender-based Crimes. 
In bringing charges, the OTP will give attention to crimes, which are under-prosecuted, including 
SGBCs such as rape.702 The OTP will bring charges for SGBCs where there is sufficient 
                                                            
695 ICC, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes at para 55. 
696 Idem at paras 39 and 47. 
697 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan| 2016-2018 at 12-13. 
698 ICC, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes at para 12. 
699 Idem at para 52. ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan June 2012 – 2015 at 6. 
700 Ibid. Ibid.  
701 Idem at paras 20 and 59. 




evidence that these crimes have been committed.703 The OTP will also bring charges for SGBV 
where the crimes form acts of other violence such as rape, which is charged as torture or 
genocide.704 By doing so, the OTP is ensuring that crimes of SGBV are charged and prosecuted 
wherever possible, thereby ensuring that perpetrators of SGBV are brought to book. As will be 
seen in chapter 4, although the OTP brought cumulative charges in the Bemba case, the Pre-trial 
Chamber rejected the cumulative-charging approach. This suggests that the Prosecutor will still 
encounter problems at trial relating to SGBCs where the judges are not convinced of the 
propriety of the reasons for which why such charges are brought before the court.  
The OTP is also prepared to change its strategy as to whom it would investigate and 
prosecute in order to carry out the Rome Statute’s object and purpose. It acknowledges that there 
will be instances when it will be difficult for it to investigate those most responsible for the most 
serious crimes, which include SGBCs. In order to bridge this impunity gap, the OTP would 
investigate and prosecute ‘middle or even low ranking officers or individuals’.705 Victims would 
also welcome the prosecution of these classes of perpetrators, since they would be the actual 
perpetrators of the SGBV against them. Seeing middle or even low ranking officers or 
individuals convicted and imprisoned would mean that the victims would see them removed 
from the community where they would have been constant reminders of the harm committed on 
them.706 
In addition to this change of strategy the OTP would bring to court cases which were 
ready for trial, taking its cue from judges such as Judge Hans-Peter Kaul to ensure that cases be 
‘as trial ready as possible’ by confirmation of hearing stage. 707 In a dissenting opinion, Judge 
Kaul advised the Prosecutor to complete investigations ‘at the time of the hearing . . . unless the 
Prosecutor justifies investigations after confirmation with compelling reasons’.708 An example of 
this is evidence that becomes available after the confirmation hearing for the first time during an 
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ongoing conflict.709 As stated by Judge Kaul, obtaining evidence before trial would assist the 
OTP from the danger of the Pre-Trial Chamber refusing to commit a suspect for trial due to 
inadequate evidence.710 The OTP states that where this is ‘not possible when the Prosecutor 
applies for a warrant of arrest or summons to appear . . . the Office will only proceed with the 
application if there are sufficient prospects to further collect evidence to be trial-ready within a 
reasonable time frame’.711 By being as trial ready as possible by the confirmation of hearing 
stage, the length of its trials would be reduced which would help reduce costs. In the Mathieu 
Ngudjolo trial for instance, which resulted in an acquittal, the Chamber heard 54 witnesses and 
sat for 265 days and 643 exhibits were presented in evidence.712 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
Through an analysis of the Prosecutor’s powers in the admissibility of situations and cases as 
provided for under the Rome Statute, this chapter concludes that the Prosecutor applies the same 
criteria and standards for all preliminary examinations, including those relating to SGBCs 
committed in armed conflict situations. However, the Prosecutor’s powers diverge when she 
applies her discretion as to which types of crimes are investigated and prosecuted. It was 
established that the first Prosecutor’s lack of defined goals and priorities in his selection of 
situations and cases created lost opportunities in prosecuting and in obtaining convictions for 
SGBCs. In his first opportunities to prosecute SGBCs, he preferred to investigate and prosecute 
crimes that were easier to prosecute in order to secure positive outcomes for the ICC and 
minimise the OTP’s financial costs. The current Prosecutor is attempting to address these failures 
as set out in the Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes released by her. The 
persuasive weight of this paper was enhanced by consulting and obtaining input from various 
bodies. 
It is important that the Prosecutor applies the objectives set out in this policy paper when 
making decisions on the selection of situations and prosecution of cases for trial. The success of 
these objectives will only be established when the Prosecutor brings more cases relating to 
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SGBC to trial. Whilst it would be impossible to meet the expectations of all SGBV victims, the 
Prosecutor still needs to prosecute more cases relating to SGBV and obtain convictions. This is 
necessary so that perpetrators of SGBCs may come to realise that crimes are ‘the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’ which ‘must not go 
unpunished’.713 At the same time as the Prosecutor’s caseload increases, states would need to 
take up their responsibility and adapt their legislation to prosecute SGBCs themselves. The DRC, 
for instance, recently implemented the Rome Statute as part of its law, 14 years after the ICC 
was established. Many other states which are experiencing SGBV on a daily basis must first take 
active steps to bring cases relating to SGBCs before its courts. Such issues will be dealt with in 
chapter six. 
A major area of concern, which this chapter evidences, is that despite the publication of the 
Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes attempting to bridge the impunity gap for 
SGBCs, the ICC will still face the challenge of trying to prosecute heads of state and senior 
government officials who are guilty of committing SGBCs in armed conflict situations. This will 
create an impunity gap in the number and range of perpetrators the ICC can try. Although the 
2016 Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation is in line with article 27 of the Rome 
Statute, it will be difficult for the Prosecutor to prosecute and obtain convictions against heads of 
state and senior government officials. Given that the ICC does not have its own independent 
police force, states are unlikely to cooperate with the ICC in the arrest and surrender of these 
senior state actors, as witnessed in the case against Al-Bashir. In addition, an African state could 
decide not to cooperate with the ICC in the investigation and prosecution of SGBCs which were 
committed on its territory where its official is the defendant in the ICC case. The ICC cannot 
avoid being caught up in the politics of that state if it decides to carry out an investigation in its 
territory. The ICC should prosecute perpetrators of SGBCs, other than heads of state or senior 
governmental officials, if it seeks the cooperation of that state in its investigation and prosecution 
of that case. As chapter 5 will show, the African Union (AU) granted heads of state and their 
senior government officials’ immunity at the regional level. The current dispute between the ICC 
and the AU on immunity for these sets of people means that it is unlikely that many African 
states will be willing to have this set of perpetrators prosecuted at the international level. 
                                                            





THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 
COMMITTED IN ARMED CONFLICT SITUATIONS BEFORE THE ICC 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Despite promising provisions in the Rome Statute relating to the investigation and prosecution of 
sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) committed during armed conflict situations,714 the 
ICC has not since its coming into force in 2002 successfully obtained a conviction for sexual and 
gender-based crimes (SGBCs). The first few cases before the ICC relating to SGBV, which 
occurred during armed conflict situations, have highlighted the difficulties involved in obtaining 
a conviction for these crimes. Such challenges are not peculiar to ICC cases. The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) faced similar problems, with prosecutors omitting charges for these crimes, drafting 
improper charges and judges requiring a high evidential standard for convictions.715 The Appeals 
Chamber decision acquitting Bemba of all charges, including rape, is a recent example of the 
high evidential standard required by the ICC.716 In addition, the conflict between the Office of 
the Prosecutor (OTP) and the ICC Chambers on the interpretation of certain provisions in the 
Rome Statute has affected whether or not certain SGBV charges proceed to trial.717 Although 
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acquitting Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180613-OTP-
stat (accessed 20 July 2018) (stating that ‘the level of detail that the Prosecution may now be required to include in 
the charges may render it difficult to prosecute future cases entailing extensive campaigns of victimisation.’ See 
Chapter 3, section 3.1 already referring to this statement. 
717 Virginia C Lindsay ‘A review of International Criminal Court proceedings under Part V of the Rome Statute 
(investigation and prosecution) and proposals for amendments’ (2010) Revue Quebecoise de Droit International 165 
at 189 referring to Matthew Happold, ‘Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga, Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of the 
International Criminal Court, 29 January 2007’ (2007) 56 International and Comparatively Law Quarterly at 713 
(stating that ‘it is also evident that there is a struggle between the Office of the Prosecutor and Chambers over the 




scholars welcomed the fact that the Rome Statute makes provision for fair representation of 
female and male judges,718 the representation of female judges in the ICC has not necessarily 
helped overcome the problems faced in obtaining a successful prosecution of these crimes.  
Whilst chapter 3 considered the prosecutor’s discretionary powers relating to SGBV, this 
chapter examines cases relating to SGBV in armed conflict situations which have come before 
the ICC. The purpose of such consideration is to highlight the recognition that SGBV-related 
crimes in international treaties are still among the most difficult crimes to prosecute.719 After the 
Lubanga case the prosecution dragged its heels in prosecuting such crimes, and when it did, it 
faltered in obtaining substantial evidence to prove its case. At the same time, the judges were not 
comfortable ‘to hold individuals accountable for sex crimes unless they [were] the physical 
perpetrators, they were present when crimes were committed, or they [could] be linked to 
evidence encouraging the crimes.’720 
This chapter commences in the first section, by considering those cases before the ICC 
relating to SGBV which occurred in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The next section 
considers a Ugandan case and the section thereafter on the Central African Republic (CAR) case. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
commentary (part 2) Regulation 55 and the modes of liability’ available at https://dovjacobs.com/.../the-icc-katanga-
judgment-a-commentary-part-2-regulation-5... (accessed 13 March 2016). With regard to Regulation 55 of the 
Regulations of the Court Jacobs argues that the judges’ adoption of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court 
adds a ‘new element to the Rome Statute’s framework on the amendment of charges,’ thus giving judges’ proprio 
motu powers to amend charges at various stages of proceedings. 
718 Rome Statute, art 36(8)(a)(iii) provides that ‘[t]he State Parties shall, in the selection of judges, take into account 
the need, within the membership of the Court, for … [a] fair representation of female and male judges.’ There are 
currently six female judges and 12 male judges at the ICC. This number excludes Judge Sylvia Steiner, who has 
served her term as a judge but will be staying to complete a trial. Current Judges – Biographical Notes available at 
https://www.icc/.../the%20judges/Pages/judges.aspx  (accessed 13 March 2016). Cherie Booth and Max Du Plessis 
‘The International Criminal Court and victims of sexual violence,’ (2005) 18 South African Journal of Criminal 
Justice 241at 248 (where the authors state that ‘states are finally taking seriously the idea of a ‘legitimate’ 
international judiciary. International justice must be seen to be fair and representative of international society as a 
whole, and the Rome Statute has thankfully set a new standard among international courts, which have tolerated for 
too long a time an under-representation, or all too often a complete absence, of female judges.’). Kelly Askin 
‘Katanga judgment underlines need for stronger ICC focus on sexual violence’ available at 
www.ijmonitor.org/.../katanga-judgment-underlines-need-for-stronger-icc-focus-on-sexual violence... (accessed 25 
July 2016) (stating that ‘many of the gains we have seen, in the recognition of various forms of sexual violence as 
serious violations of international laws, are due in no small part to having more women in positions of power as 
investigators, prosecutors and judges in the international tribunals, as well the impact of an effectively organised 
caucus of women’s groups who have pushed for changes’).  
719 Margot Wallstrom for example, a former Special Representative on sexual violence in conflict has pointed out 
that it is not because the laws are inadequate that women are not being protected from sexual violence, but because 
the laws are inadequately enforced. UN News Centre ‘Tackling Sexual Violence must include prevention, ending 
impunity – UN Official’ available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34502 (accessed 15 March 2016). 




The section also considers how the Appeals Chamber decision in the Bemba case affects the 
prosecution of SGBC’s committed in armed conflicts.  
4.2  THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CASES 
The referral of crimes which have been committed in DRC since the Rome Statute came into 
force on 1 July 2002 came about after the President of the DRC referred matters to the ICC’s 
Chief Prosecutor in a letter dated 3 March 2004.721 The armed conflict situation occurred in the 
DRC in the late 1990s over land allocation and natural resources and cost many civilians their 
lives amidst allegations of SGBV and other crimes.722 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the Chief 
Prosecutor at that time, having fulfilled the requirements under article 53 of the Rome Statute 
and Rule 104, made a determination that there was a reasonable basis to conduct an investigation 
into the crimes, allegedly committed on the territory of the DRC.723 The ICC Presidency assigned 
the situation in the DRC to Pre-Trial I on 5 July 2004.724 
4.2.1 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’s Case. 
As already discussed in chapter 3,725 the Prosecutor did not bring charges for SGBCs against 
Lubanga even though rape and other sexual offences had been a dominant feature in north-
eastern DRC and had been widely documented by United Nations (UN) agencies, various human 
rights groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).726 Chapter 3 has already outlined the 
                                                            
721 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo ‘Decision assigning the situation in The Democratic Republic of 
Congo to the Pre-Trial Chamber I’ (5 July 2004) ICC-01/04 (where a letter from the Prosecutor dated 17 June 2004 
was annexed to this decision making mention of the referral by the DRC and Uganda). 
722 The Office of the Prosecutor of the International … ICC, available at  
www.icc-cpi.int/.../icc/.../the%20office%20ol%20the%20prosecutor%20(accessed on 15 March 2016). AMICC 
‘Proceedings before trial in the case of The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui at the 
International Criminal Court’ available atwww.amicc.org/docs/KatangaandNgudjolocc.pdf  (accessed 15 March 
2016). 
723 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo ‘Decision assigning the situation in The Democratic Republic of 
Congo to the Pre-Trial Chamber I.’ Article 53 of the Rome Statute provides the requirements, which the Prosecutor 
will take for the initiation of an investigation. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC is the ‘instrument for 
the application of the Rome Statute of the ICC, to which they are subordinate in all cases.’ Rule 104 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence provides for the evaluation of information by the prosecutor. 
724 Ibid. 
725 See chapter 3, section 3.3.1 
726 Re-dated version of confidential letter submitted to the Office of the Prosecutor, written by Brigid Inder, 
Executive Director of Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice to Luis Moreno Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the ICC 
available at http://www.iccwomen.org/documents/Prosecutor_Letter_August_2006_Redated.pdf (accessed 5 March 
2016). Gender Report Card 2009, 55 at 69 available at www.iccwomen.org/publications(accessed 5 March 2016). 
DR Congo: ICC charges raise concern, joint letter from various human rights organisations to Luis Moreno 
Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the ICC available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/07/31/dr-congo-icc-charges-raise-




Prosecutor’s inconsistent reasons for his reluctance to prosecute SGBCs such as rape.727 Thus, 
the focus in this case is the victims’ lost opportunity in receiving reparations, due to the non-
prosecution of SGBCs. 
In the Document Containing the Charges (DCC)728 filed by the Prosecutor on 28 August 
2006, Lubanga was charged with three counts of war crimes under articles 8(2)(e)(vii)729 and 
25(3)(a)730 of the Rome Statute. These counts were in relation to ‘conscripting and enlisting 
children under the age of fifteen years’ into the Force Patriotique pour la Liberation du Congo 
(FPLC), of which he was commander-in-chief, between 1 July 2002 and 31 December 2003, and 
‘using them to participate actively in hostilities’, in a non-international armed conflict context.731 
Notably, in its decision of 29 January 2007 given at the confirmation hearing,732 which was held 
from 9 to 28 November 2006,733 the Pre-Trial Chamber 1 went further than merely confirming 
the charges contained in the DCC by holding that Lubanga should also be charged for these 
crimes in an international armed conflict context. Consequently, the charges confirmed by Pre-
Trial Chamber 1 against Lubanga provided that: 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is responsible, as co-perpetrator, for the charges of enlisting and 
conscripting children under the age of fifteen years into the FPLC and using them to participate 
actively in hostilities within the meaning of articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 25(3)(a) of the Statute from 
early September 2002 to 2 June 2003. 
 
                                                            
727 See chapter 3, section 3.3.1. 
728 The Document Containing the Charges (DCC) is the document containing ‘a detailed description of the charges’ 
which the Prosecutor intends to bring the person charged to trial. As it establishes ‘in detail the nature, cause and 
content of the charge(s) brought against the accused, this document frames the confirmation hearing. The Prosecutor 
must provide the Pre-Trial Chamber and the accused with the DCC ‘no later than thirty days before the date of the 
confirmation hearing.’ Rome Statute, arts 61(3)(a) and 67(1). Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 121(3).  
729 Rome Statute, art 8(2)(e)(vii) refers to war crimes applicable to armed conflicts not of an international character.  
See Chapter 2 regarding the contextual elements of a war crime in the Rome Statute.  
730 Rome Statute, art 25(3)(a) provides that: 
Article 25(3) In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:  
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, 
regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;  
731 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Document containing the charges article 61(3)(a)’ (28 August 2006) ICC-
01/04-01/06, paras 6 and 20.  
732 The confirmation hearing is a hearing where the Pre-Trial Chamber confirms the charges on which the Prosecutor 
intends to seek trial. The Pre-Trial Chamber thus ‘determines whether there is sufficient evidence to establish 
substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged.’ It, thus, protects the 
defendant’s rights against ‘wrongful and wholly unfounded charges.’ Rome Statute, art 61(7). Prosecutor v Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (30 September 2008) ICC-01/04-01/07, para 63. 
733Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Decision on the confirmation of charges’ (29 January 2007) ICC-01/04-




Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is responsible, as co-perpetrator, for the charges of enlisting and 
conscripting children under the age of fifteen years into the FPLC and using them to participate 
actively in hostilities within the meaning of articles 8(2)(e)(vii) and 25(3)(a) of the Statute from 2 
June to 13 August 2003.734 
The Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed these charges without giving the prosecutor an opportunity to 
amend them as required by article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute.735 The Chamber stated that 
this was not necessary, as articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute criminalised 
the same conduct, regardless of whether the conflict was classified as international or non-
international.736 Thereafter, the Trial Chamber ordered the prosecution to amend the DCC. In 
response to the Trial Chamber’s order, the prosecution filed the amended document on 
22 December 2008.737 In handing down its judgment on 14 March 2012, the Trial Chamber re-
modified the legal characterisation of the facts to a non-international armed conflict as 
characterising the conflict during the period September 2002 to 13 August 2003.738 
During the course of the trial, victims’ legal representatives filed a joint application on 
22 May 2009 requesting the Trial Chamber to modify the legal characterisation of the facts to 
include crimes against humanity and war crimes of sexual slavery and war crimes of inhuman or 
cruel treatment.739 The Prosecutor and Lubanga appealed against the majority Trial Chamber’s 
decision to modify the legal characterisation of the facts.740 Consequently, the Appeals Chamber 
                                                            
734 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-
01/04-01/06, paras 1 and 525. 
735 Rome Statute, art 61(7)(c)(ii) provides: 
61(7) The Pre-Trial Chamber shall on the basis of the hearing, determine whether there is sufficient evidence 
to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged. Based on its 
determination, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall: 
(c) Adjourn the hearing and request the Prosecutor to consider: 
 (ii) Amending a charge because the evidence submitted appears to establish a different crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.     
736 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Decision on the confirmation of charges’ at paras 202 and 204. For a critic 
on the Pre-Trial Chamber I sua sponte amendment of the charges which it confirmed see Dov Jacobs, ‘A shifting 
scale of power: Who is in charge of the charges at the International Criminal Court and the uses of regulation 55’ in 
William Schabas, Niamh Hayes and Yvonne McDermott (eds) The Ashgate Research Companion To International 
Criminal Law Critical Perspectives (2011) 1 at 8-9. 
737 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Prosecution’s provision of the amended document containing the charges’ 
(23 December 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06.  
738 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute’ at paras 566, 567 and 1359. 
739 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal 
characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the 
Court ’(14 July 2009) ICC-01/04-01/06, para 1.  
740 Lubanga appealed on the 11 August 2009 whilst the Prosecutor appealed on 12 August 2009. Prosecutor v 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Judgment on the appeals of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the decision of 




reversed the decision of the Trial Chamber to modify the legal characterisation of the facts in the 
charges.741 
4.2.1.1  Sentencing of Lubanga 
The Trial Chamber I convicted Lubanga on 14 March 2010 for war crimes of 
conscripting, enlisting and using children under the age of 15 years into the FPLC ‘to participate 
actively in hostilities within the meaning of article 8(2)(e)(vii) and 25(3)(a) of the Statute from 
early September 2002 to 13 August 2003’.742 The Trial Chamber found that its hands were tied 
in making a decision on the evidence of sexual violence, as the Prosecution had failed to bring 
charges against the accused for such crimes.743 It found that the allegations of sexual violence 
were only relevant to provide context, and reserved the issue of sexual violence as a matter for 
sentence and reparations.744 
Lubanga was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment, with the time he had already spent in 
custody taken into consideration.745 In its judgment on sentence on 10 July 2012, the Trial 
Chamber I strongly strongly criticised the method and manner in which the Prosecutor, Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo, had handled the issue of sexual violence. The Chamber observed that whilst 
the Prosecutor had made substantial submissions regarding sexual violence in his opening and 
closing speeches at trial, and that he had asked the Trial Chamber to take into account sexual 
violence as an aggravating factor in sentencing,746 he had failed to apply for charges of sexual 
violence or sexual slavery to be added to the original charges either ab initio or during the trial, 
and in fact opposed the addition of such crimes to the charges during the trial on the basis that 
this would be prejudicial to the accused.747 In his closing speech, the prosecutor had argued that 
as he sought the charges to be confined to conscripting, the evidence of the crimes of rape and 
sexual slavery was presented to highlight the suffering of the girl soldiers under the main 
                                                            
741 Idem at para 112.  
742 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute’ at para 1358. 
743Idem at para 896. Judge Odio Benito gave a separate and dissenting opinion.  
744 Idem at paras 29 and 896. 
745 Idem at paras 107-108. 
746  Idem at para 60. 
747Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Decision on sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute’ (10 July 2012) 
ICC-01/04-01/06, para 60. Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Prosecution’s application for leave to appeal the 
“Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterization of the facts may be subject to 




charge.748 The Trial Chamber also noted that whilst the prosecutor argued that the witnesses’ 
evidence on sexual violence and rape was reliable and credible, it was only relevant to sentence 
because it did not form part of the case faced by Lubanga.749 The prosecutor’s failure to charge 
the accused with sexual violence and rape did not deter the Chamber from considering such 
crimes as relevant factors in its determination of sentence as required by Rules 145(1)(c)750 and 
145(2)(b)(iv)751 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, (the Rules).752 The Chamber, however, 
found that the evidence failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the link between the 
accused’s conduct and sexual violence.753 The Chamber reserved for a later decision the issue of 
whether sexual violence would be relevant to the determination of reparations.754  
In her dissenting opinion, in accordance with Rule145(1)(c) of the Rules on sentencing, 
Judge Odio Benito disagreed with the majority decision, finding the evidence of sexual violence 
was relevant to the harm caused to the victims and their families,.755 She found that there was 
sufficient evidence before the Trial Chamber that sexual violence had caused the children to 
suffer harm because of recruitment into the militia. Her colleagues should have distinguished 
‘between the factual allegations of the case’, and the legal concept of ‘use to participate actively 
in the hostilities’, as both were independent factors.756 In Judge Benito’s opinion, SGBV crimes 
‘should have been included within the legal concept “use to participate actively in the 
                                                            
748Office of the Prosecutors closing statements (Open Session), at 54 available at http://www-icc-
cpi.int/icc.docs/doc/doc1210316.pdf  (accessed 25 March 2016). 
749 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Decision on sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute’ (10 July 2012) 
ICC-01/04-01/06, para 61. 
750 Rule 145(1)(c) Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides: 
145(1) In its determination of the sentence pursuant to article 78, paragraph 1, the Court shall:  
(c) In addition to the factors mentioned in article 78, paragraph 1, give consideration, inter alia, to the 
extent of the damage caused, in particular the harm caused to the victims and their families, the nature of 
the unlawful behavior and the means employed to execute the crime, the degree of participation of the 
convicted person; the degree of intent; the circumstances of manner, time and location; and the age, 
education, social and economic condition of the convicted person. 
751 Rule 145(2)(b)(iv) Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides: 
145(2)  In addition to the factors mentioned above, the Court shall take into account, as appropriate: 
(a) As aggravating circumstances: 
(iv)  Commission of the crime with particular cruelty or where there were multiple victims; 
752 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Decision on sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute’ at para 67. 
753 Idem at para 75. 
754  Idem at para 76. 
755Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Decision on sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute, separate 
dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito’(10 July 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06, paras 2, 6, 8 and 22. 
756 Idem at para 16.The phrase ‘using to participate actively in hostilities’is taken from article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the 
Rome Statute which reads ‘conscription or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or 




hostilities” ’, as these crimes were an intrinsic part of the boys and girls ‘involvement with the 
armed group.’757 She stated that the Chamber had a duty to make such a finding, even though it 
was prevented from considering evidence relating to sexual violence due to the provisions of 
article 74(2) of the of the Rome Statute.758 She also pointed out that although sexual violence 
was an element which should have been included within the legal concept ‘use to participate 
actively in the hostilities’, crimes of sexual violence were separate crimes, which the Chambers 
could determine if charges for them had been brought by the Prosecutor. She was also of the 
opinion that taking these factors into consideration in the determination on sentencing would not 
be prejudicial to Lubanga, as he would have had sufficient notice, time and facilities to prepare 
his defence during the hearing.759 Judge Benito’s dissenting opinion, underlines the necessity of 
having female judges on the bench, who are sensitive to gender issues.  
Lubanga’s appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed by a majority of the 
Appeals Chamber on 1 December 2014. The Trial Chamber’s I conviction and sentence of 14 
years imprisonment was upheld.760 
4.2.1.2   A lost cause in obtaining reparation for victims of SGBV 
The decision on reparations by Trial Chamber I on 7 August 2012 in the Lubanga case was the 
first decision of its kind before the ICC.761 With regard to SGBV, the Trial Chamber held that 
‘the court should formulate and implement reparations awards that were appropriate for the 
victims of sexual and gender-based violence’.762 It also held that the court should implement 
gender-sensitive measures in order to overcome the obstacles which women and girls may face 
when seeking justice.763 On 3 March 2015, the Appeals Chamber amended the order on 
reparations given by the Trial Chamber on the ground that the crimes did not come within the 
definition of harm that resulted from the crimes for which Lubanga was convicted,764 in that the 
                                                            
757 Ibid. 
758 Idem at para 17. 
759 Idem at paras 6 and 8. 
760Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his 
conviction’ (1 December 2014) ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5. Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Judgment on the 
appeals of the Prosecutor and Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the “Decision in Sentence pursuant to Article 76 
of the Statute.”’   
761 Trial Chamber I, The Prosecution v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision establishing the principles and procedures 
to be applied to reparations (7 August 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06. 
762 Idem at para 207. 
763 Idem at 208. 
764Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principle 




Trial Chamber had not found Lubanga guilty of harm which resulted from SGBV. The Appeals 
Chamber stated that the Trial Chamber should have explained how it reached the conclusion that 
Lubanga was liable for reparations relating to harm which resulted from SGBV.765 The Appeals 
Chamber, however, pointed out that the victims were not prevented from obtaining assistance 
offered by the Trust Fund.766  
NGOs have expressed their disappointment of the Appeals Chamber’s ruling as the latest 
in the string of decisions which have failed to recognise the harm suffered by victims because of 
SGBV, despite the wealth of evidence of such crimes before the Court.767 Child soldiers and 
victims who were not child soldiers who suffered from SGBV were denied reparations for 
SGBCs committed against them simply because the prosecutor failed to bring charges for 
SGBCs. This illustrated the need for the prosecutor not to bring charges within a narrow compass 
when the evidence pointed to other crimes. Oosterveld argues that shorter and more focused 
indictments could lead to the exclusion of charges relating to gender-based crimes,768 especially 
when the ICC Trial Chamber would not necessarily go out of its way to include crimes which 
had not been pleaded by the prosecutor. This would apply even though the ‘Chamber has a 
responsibility to define the crimes based on the applicable law and is not limited to the charges 
brought by the prosecution against the accused’.769 The prosecutor’s failure to include charges of 
SGBV, and the Trial Chamber’s failure to include SGBV within the legal concept of ‘use to 
participate actively within hostilities’ means that victims in this case forfeited their right to 
compensation for these crimes, as some of the victims were not children under the age of 15.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and public annexes 1 and 2’ (3 March 2015) ICC-01/04-01/06 A A 2 A 3, para 196. Lubanga Case: ICC Appeals 
Chamber amends Trial Chamber’s order for reparation to victims available at www.icc-cpi-
int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/.../pr1092.aspx (accessed 15 March 2016). The legal representative of the 
victims, the Office of Public Counsel for victims on behalf of the victims they represented and Lubanga, appealed 
against the decision of Trial Chamber I. 
765 Idem at paras 197-8.  
766 Idem at para 199.  
767 See for example Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice. ICC issues first appeal judgment on reparations in the 
… www.icc.women.org/.../icc-issues-first-appeal-judgment-on-reparations(accessed 15 March 2016). 
768 Valerie Oosterveld ‘Gender-sensitive justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Lessons 
learned for the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 12 New England Journal of International and Comparative Law 
119 at 131-132. 
769 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, separate dissenting opinion 




4.2.2 Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui’s Case. 
The case of Katanga and Ngudjolo was another missed opportunity for the OTP to obtain a 
conviction for crimes of SGBV. Interestingly, Heller argues that if the Trial Chamber had not re-
characterised the facts, Katanga would have been acquitted of all the charges against him, just as 
Chui was acquitted.770 Katanga was the military commander of Force de resistance patriotique 
en Ituri (FRPI), one of the militia groups operating in the Ituri region of the DRC. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber 1 issued a warrant of arrest under seal for his arrest on 2 July 2007771 having found 
reasonable grounds to believe that he was ‘criminally responsible under article 25(3)(a) or, in the 
alternative under article 25(3)(b)772 of the Statute, for six counts of war crimes and three counts 
of crimes against humanity as an indirect co-perpetrator. The crimes related to attacks which 
occurred in Bogoro, a village in the DRC, on about 24 February 2003’, which included sexual 
slavery as a war crime under article 8(2) (b)(xxii) or 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute, and under 
article 7(1)(g) as crimes against humanity of the corresponding statute.773 Katanga who was 
already detained by the Congolese authorities on another matter without charge, was surrendered 
to the ICC by the Congolese authorities on the 17 October 2007. 
In the case of Ngudjolo, it was alleged by the prosecutor that he was the highest-ranking 
commander of Front de nationalistes et integrationnistes (FNI), another militia group from the 
Lendu ethnic tribe operating in the Ituri region of the DRC. In issuing a sealed warrant for his 
arrest on 6 July 2007, the Pre-Trial Chamber 1 found reasonable grounds to believe that 
Ngudjolo was criminally responsible for six counts of war crimes and three counts of crimes 
against humanity. Ngudjolo was also charged under article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, 
alternatively under article 25(3)(b) of the same statute, as an indirect co-perpetrator for attacks 
which occurred in Bogoro on about 24 February 2003.774 These charges included sexual slavery 
as a war crime under article 8(2)(b)(xxii) or 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute, and crimes against 
                                                            
770 Kevin Jon Heller ‘Another Terrible Day for the OTP’ available at opiniojuris.org/2014/03/08/another-terrible-
day- otp/ (accessed on 25 March 2016). 
771 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga ‘Warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga’ (2 July 2007) ICC-01/04-01/07. The 
warrant of arrest was unsealed on 18 October 2007. 
772 For the text of article 25(3)(a) see footnote 20.  
Rome Statute, art 25(3)(b) provides that: 
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: 
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted; 
773Prosecutor v Germain Katanga ‘Warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga.’ 





humanity under article 7(1)(g) of the corresponding statute.775 The Congolese authorities arrested 
Ngudjolo on 6 February 2008 and handed him over to the ICC the next day.776 The cases against 
both accused were joined by Pre-Trial Chamber I on 10 March 2008, decisions which were 
upheld by the Appeals Chamber. The decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber to join both cases was 
based on the fact inter alia that the supporting evidence and material facts relating to them 
concerned the same incident.777 
4.2.2.1   The confirmation hearing and severance of trial 
The confirmation hearing, relating to both accused was held from 27 June to 16 July 2008. On 
26 September 2008, based on the Amended Charging Document charges presented to Pre-Trial 
Chamber I,778 the Chamber confirmed seven counts of war crimes, and three counts of crimes 
against humanity, but declined to confirm three other charges for insufficient evidence. The 
majority Chamber confirmed sexual slavery and rape as war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
but Judge Anita Usacka dissented on the ground that the prosecution’s allegations were not 
sufficiently strong to prove that Katanga and Ngudjolo were criminally responsible for the 
commission of these crimes.779 She could not find that 
. . . the evidence presented is sufficient to establish substantial grounds to believe that the 
suspects intended for rape and sexual slavery to be committed during the attack at Bogoro village 
or even in the aftermath of the Bogoro attack, or to establish the suspects’ knowledge that rape 
and sexual slavery would be committed by the combatants in the ordinary course of the events.780 
Judge Usacka supported her decision by stating that the prosecution had not provided ‘any direct 
evidence’ that the suspects ‘intended the common plan to attack Bogoro village to include rape 
or sexual slavery.’781 The evidence was not sufficient to support the allegations made or to link 
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the suspects with the crimes alleged.782 She suggested that the Chamber adjourn the hearing to 
allow the Prosecutor obtain further evidence linking the suspects with these crimes.783 
Katanga and Ngudjolo were committed for trial to a Trial Chamber by Pre-Trial 
Chamber I. On 24 October 2008 the Presidency of the ICC constituted Trial Chamber II, where 
the trial against Katanga and Ngudjolo commenced on 24 November 2009; with evidence 
presented from 25 November 2009 to 11 November 2011784 and closing statements made from 
15 to 23 May 2012.785 At the deliberation stage, on 21 November 2012, the majority of Trial 
Chamber II, Judge van den Wyngaert dissenting, gave notice to the parties and participants, 
pursuant to regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court of a re-characterisation of the mode 
of liability of the crimes relating to Katanga.786 The re-characterisation included a charge against 
Katanga as an accessory under article 25(3)(d)(ii) of the Rome Statute. The Trial Chamber II 
stated that such a change was necessary as it reflected ‘the facts described in the Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, scilicet’.787 The Chamber was of the opinion that the accused was not 
prejudiced, as he had the opportunity to defend himself on each of the relevant facts relating to 
article 25(3)(d) that had been raised at the trial.788 This suggests that the ICC judges used 
regulation 55 to get round article 61(11) of the Rome Statue, which prevents Trial Chambers 
from amending charges that had been confirmed by Pre-Trial Chambers.789 After the trial has 
commenced the prosecutor may only withdraw the charges with the Trial Chamber’s 
permission.790 At this stage of the proceedings, neither the prosecutor nor the Trial Chamber can 
modify the charges.791 The danger, however, of a re-characterisation in the mode of liability is 
that the Prosecution may not have the necessary evidence to support its case. In any event, the 
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ICC has a duty to ensure that the accused’s rights are protected, which was not the case with re-
characterisation of charges six months after the end of the trial, thus placing in question the 
legality of the judges’ decision to change the mode of liability. 
By a unanimous decision, the Trial Chamber II severed the proceedings against Katanga 
and Ngudjolo to avoid prolonging the proceeding against Ngudjolo, which would cause him 
serious prejudice.792 On 27 March 2013 a majority of the Appeals Chamber dismissed Katanga’s 
appeal against the re-characterisation of the mode of liability against him. It ordered that the 
legal characterisation of facts be modified pursuant to regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the 
Court – subject to the rider that this would not necessarily assure fairness of the trial.793 
4.2.2.2  Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui Trial. 
On 18 December 2012, the Trial Chamber II unanimously acquitted Ngudjolo of all charges 
against him despite noting the wealth of evidence of, inter alia, rape of women and their 
captivity in Bogoro during and after the 24 February 2003 attack.794 Having found the 
prosecution investigation evidence weak, and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses so 
contradictory as to be unreliable, the Trial Chamber concluded that the prosecution had failed to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ngudjolo was the commander-in-chief of the Lendu militia 
when the attacks on the Bogoro village occurred on 24 February 2003.795 Although Ngudjolo 
seemed to be ‘one of the military commanders, who held a senior position among the Lendu 
combatants from Bedu-Ezekere groupement’, this could not be established beyond reasonable 
doubt.796 In addition there was no credible evidence proving ‘Ngudjolo had issued military orders 
or instructions, taken steps to enforce such orders or instructions, initiated disciplinary 
proceedings or ordered sanctions of this kind’.797 Consequently, Trial Chamber II did not find it 
necessary to consider the actual crimes with which Ngudjolo had been charged.798 The Trial 
Chamber II found flaws in the prosecution’s case, including in its initial investigative documents, 
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which related to events that occurred in mid-2006, three years after the Bogoro attack occurred. 
The Trial Chamber suggested that testimony of witnesses and forensic findings to identify 
victims in the loci in quo should have been obtained soon after the event in question. The 
prosecution’s failure to obtain such evidence led it to having to rely on witnesses’ statements and 
reports prepared by MONUC investigators and NGOs.799 The Trial Chamber also pointed out 
that the prosecution should have visited the accused’s home and the areas around Bogoro, which 
would have given the prosecution a better understanding of its case, and would have helped them 
to verify witness testimonies.800 Thirdly, the Chamber stated that the prosecution should have 
obtained evidence statements from certain commanders who had played a key role before, during 
and after the attack.801 Lastly, the Trial Chamber pointed out that a statement obtained from the 
accused during investigation would have helped the prosecution distinguish unreliable 
evidence.802 The Trial Chamber, however, appreciated the difficulties involved in conducting an 
investigation in a conflict-affected area. It subsequently, added that the prosecution should have 
obtained a thorough analysis of the marital status and education history of its witnesses, as this 
would have helped enhance their credibility.803 
The Prosecutor appealed on three grounds.  
1. The Trial Chamber erred in law by misapplying the standard of proof, that is, the beyond 
reasonable [doubt] standard. The prosecutor submitted that the Trial Chamber’ had 
required proof to a degree of absolute certainty (ie beyond any doubt)’. [own emphasis]804  
2. The Trial Chamber had erred in law by failing to take into consideration the total 
evidence before it; and  
3. The Trial Chamber erred in procedure by violating the prosecution’s right to a fair 
hearing.805  
In considering the prosecution’s grounds of appeal, the Appeals Chamber took into account 
article 83(2) of the Rome Statute, the relevant part of which provides that: 
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If the Appeals Chamber finds that the proceedings appealed from were unfair in a way that 
affected the reliability of the decision or sentence, or that the decision or sentence appealed from 
was materially affected by error of fact or law or procedural error, it may:  
(a) Reverse or amend the decision or sentence; or  
(b) Order a new trial before a different Trial Chamber. 
Regarding the first ground of appeal, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the prosecutor did not 
establish that the Trial Chamber had not applied the correct standard of proof beyond reasonable 
doubt or had applied ‘a standard that was too exacting’.806 The Appeals Chamber also rejected 
the second ground of appeal, as the prosecutor had not established error by the Trial Chamber 
that would have made its approach unreasonable.807 By way of example, in finding the testimony 
of witness P-250 unreliable it was not per se unreasonable for a Trial Chamber to ‘reject 
potentially corroborative evidence when making its credibility assessments’.808 With regard to 
the third ground, that the Trial Chamber had made procedural errors, it concluded that these 
errors did not have a material impact on the decision to acquit Ngudjolo.809 The Appeals 
Chamber thus, confirmed the Trial Chamber’s decision, holding ‘that the acquittal was not 
materially affected by an error of fact, law or procedure’.810  
4.2.2.3 Germain Katanga trial. 
The liability of Katanga as an accessory under article 25(3)(d)(ii) of the Rome Statute was held 
by the Chamber to be ‘contingent on the existence of a principal’,811 and he only incurred 
criminal responsibility for crimes which ‘formed part of the common purpose and to which he 
contributed’.812 Thus, Katanga’s actions must ‘be connected to the commission of the crime’.813 
Article 25(3)(d)(ii) of the Rome Statute provides that: 
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment 
for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: 
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(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a 
group of persons acting within a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and 
shall:  
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.  
Thus, five constituent elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt under article 
25(3)(d)(ii), for the Trial Chamber to find Katanga criminally responsible for the crimes charged 
under this article. These elements are that: 
1. A crime within the jurisdiction of the Court was committed; 
2. The persons who committed the crime belonged to a group acting with a common purpose; 
3. The accused made a significant contribution to the commission of the crime; 
4. The contribution was intentional; and 
5. The accused’s contribution was made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit 
the crime.814 
The majority Chamber convicted Katanga815 as an accessory under article 25(3)(d) of the Rome 
Statute for the crime of murder as a crime against humanity, and the crimes of murder, attacking 
a civilian population and the destruction of property and pillaging as war crimes in the attacks, 
which occurred on Bogoro village on 24 February 2013. They found that these crimes were part 
of the combatants’ common purpose.816 Katanga’s conviction as an accessory to these crimes 
was, based on the significant role he played in facilitating these crimes, which formed part of the 
common purpose, although he was not present when the attack took place. He had intentionally 
contributed to the commission of these crimes, knowing that the combatants intended to commit 
them.817  
The Trial Chamber unanimously acquitted Katanga of the crimes of rape and sexual 
slavery as crimes against humanity and war crimes under article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, 
and also of using child soldiers as a war crime under article 25(3)(a) of the same statute.818 The 
acquittal was based on lack of evidence that these crimes had been committed on a wide scale 
and repeatedly on the day in question, or that the destruction of Bogoro led to the commission of 
these crimes.819 The Trial Chamber found that the prosecution had not established that the 
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combatants committed these crimes before destroying Bogoro,820 and adverted to the fact that 
women who were raped, abducted and enslaved had their lives spared because they claimed to 
belong to a non-Hema ethnicity.821 The Chamber further stated that ‘although the acts of rape 
and enslavement formed an integral part of the militia’s design to attack the predominantly Hema 
civilian population of Bogoro’, it could not ‘find, on the basis of the evidence put before it, that 
the criminal purpose pursued on 24 February 2003 necessarily encompassed the commission of 
the specific crimes proscribed by articles 7(1)(g) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute’.822 As a result, the 
Trial Chamber held that the evidence did not prove that the acts of rape and sexual slavery were 
part of the common purpose of the combatants.823 As mentioned above, the Trial Chamber had to 
be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Katanga belonged to a group acting with a common 
purpose. As the prosecution could not establish that the combatants had a common purpose to 
rape and inflict sexual slavery, Katanga could not be found belonging to a group acting with a 
common purpose.  
4.2.2.4   Germain Katanga’s sentencing 
Katanga was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. The time, spent in the ICC’s detention centre 
(between 18 September 2007 and 23 May 2014), was deducted from his sentence.824 Katanga 
discontinued the appeal against conviction he lodged with the Appeals Chamber on 25 June 
2014, attaching a declaration to the notice of discontinuance that he accepted the Chamber’s 
conclusion as to his role and conduct in the Bogoro attack, and also expressed his sincere regret 
to those affected by his conduct.825 The prosecutor withdrew her appeal against Katanga’s 
acquittal for rape and sexual slavery, as well as sentence, as lacking sufficient grounds for 
success before the Appeals Chamber. She was satisfied with Katanga’s ‘acceptance of the 
conclusions reached in the article 74 judgment as to his role and conduct, as well as the sentence 
imposed’, and his ‘expression of sincere regret to all those who have suffered as a result of his 
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conduct, including the victims of Bogoro’.826 The legal representative of victims and various 
other interested bodies viewed the prosecutor’s withdrawal of the appeal with disappointment.827 
The withdrawal represents another indication of prosecutors’ reluctance to pursue a conviction 
for possible crimes of SGBV, especially when they are satisfied with convictions for other 
crimes. 
Pursuant to article 110 of the Rome Statute,828 three judges of the Appeals Chamber 
reviewed Katanga’s sentence, on 15 November 2015 and reduced his sentence by three years and 
eight months. His imprisonment ended on 18 January 2016.829 Katanga is presently facing trial 
for other crimes in the DRC, relating to ‘war crimes, crimes against humanity and participation 
in an insurrectional movement’ in the Ituri region of the DRC.830 
4.2.2.5   The need to investigate and formulate cases properly 
The Ngudjolo and Katanga cases shows how ineffective investigation carried out by the OTP 
resulted in weak evidence from which acquittals of the accused for crimes of SGBV resulted. 
The ICC judges expressed their displeasure at the OTP’s investigations. In Katanga’s case, the 
observations made by the Trial Chamber with respect to Ngudjolo were along the same lines.831 
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Therefore, Katanga’s acquittal of SGBV was not surprising, given that the prosecutor used the 
same evidence as in the case in which Ngudjolo was acquitted.832 
Although the inclusion of gender-sensitive provisions in the Rome Statute was due to the 
lessons learnt from previous tribunals, such as the mistakes made by the ICTR in its investigation 
and prosecution of SGBV,833 the ICC repeated the mistakes of those tribunals. The flaws in the 
OTP’s investigation, for example, were due to insufficient planning834 and short-focused 
scrutiny.835 The OTP’s low-cost approach in its investigations in situation states resulting in its 
minimal field presence, and its preference for intermediaries over its own staff and failure to 
develop a partner-based relationship with them were problematic. Ultimately, staff were 
overburdened and the use of inexperienced investigators, who were nationals of these situation 
states, compounded the problem.836 In particular, sexual and gender-based cases such as in the 
Njudjolo case have highlighted the importance of obtaining forensic medical evidence to 
strengthen the prosecution’s case837 − not easily obtained due to the stigma attached to such 
crimes. The OTP’s concern for its safety in war-torn areas this has hindered it from obtaining 
quality evidence.838 
The ICC’s nine strategic goals for 2016 to 2018 included the OTP improving the quality 
of its preliminary examinations, investigations and prosecutions, showing that it has taken into 
consideration previous mistakes made.839 The areas, which the OTP has given priority to, are: 
1. Closing the time gap between events on the ground and the office’s investigations by creating 
partnerships with first responders, creating a gateway for crime reporting and working with 
partners to preserve relevant information on the internet.  
2. Increasing its ability to collect different forms of evidence other than witness statements 
through continually enhancing its scientific and technology-related capabilities. Additionally, it 
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will develop further partnerships to support this strategic need, so that in-house capacity is only 
developed where it is justified. 
3. Continuing to strengthen the Office’s analysis function through the further roll-out of the 
Factual Analytical Database, the upgrade of analytical software, the roll-out of the Gender 
Analysis, and though strengthening the use of analytical products in investigative decision-
making for planning, case selection and case review. 
4. Enhancing the financial investigative capabilities. 
5. Continuing to review investigative standards and to develop certification possibilities for staff. 
6. Continuing to increase the Office’s investigative field presence.’840 
4.2.3 The Callixte Mbarushimana Case. 
In contrast to the other cases relating to gender-based crimes in the Ituri region of the DRC, the 
case against Callixte was for crimes within the Kiva province of the DRC. A warrant was issued 
for Callixte’s arrest on 28 September 2010 by Pre-Trial Chamber I for six counts of war crimes 
and five counts of crimes against humanity which occurred in the Kiva province of the DRC 
between January 2009 and 20 August 2010, the date of the prosecution’s application for the 
warrant.841 These crimes; were committed by the Forces democratiques pour la liberation du 
Rwanda – Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR), of which Callixte was their de facto leader 
and first vice president for a brief period in 2010.842 Callixte was charged with being criminally 
responsible for these crimes under article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute843 in that he ‘knowingly 
and intentionally contributed ‘in any other way’ ie in a way other than the ones listed in article 
25(3)(a),(b) and (c) of the Statute, to the commission of the war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.’844 Both the war crimes and crimes against humanity counts contained charges of rape 
and other gender-based crimes such as torture in the form of genital mutilation.845 On 11 October 
2010 Callixte was arrested French authorities in France, where he was a refugee.846 He was 
subsequently, transferred to the ICC detention centre on 25 January 2011.847 At the confirmation 
of charges hearing from 16 to 21 September 2011 a majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber, whilst 
concluding that whilst there were ‘substantial grounds to believe that acts amounting to war 
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crimes were committed on 5 out of the 25 occasions alleged by the Prosecution’, declined to 
confirm the charges against Callixte,.848 The Pre-trial Chamber declined to confirm the charges 
of rape as a war crime in Manje as based on hearsay evidence of a Human Rights Watch 
Report.849 Even though this was the only piece of evidence which could not be corroborated, the 
Chamber held that it was insufficient ‘to establish substantial grounds to believe that rape under 
article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute was committed during the attack in Manje’.850 Charges of rape in 
Mianga were not confirmed for the same reason, namely that the evidence of the witness who 
testified to the commission of rape was hearsay and could not be corroborated.851 
Furthermore, the contextual elements of crimes against humanity had not been satisfied, 
taking into account all the evidence and ‘the several discrepancies between the prosecution's 
allegations and the evidence submitted’.852 It then held that it was not satisfied that ‘the threshold 
of substantial grounds to believe that the FDLR pursued the policy of attacking the civilian 
population’ had been met.853 It also noted ‘that the policy alleged by the prosecution to create a 
“humanitarian catastrophe” could not be inferred to the requisite threshold, of War Crimes’.854 
Consequently, the evidence submitted was not sufficient for it ‘to be convinced, to the threshold 
of substantial grounds to believe, that such acts were part of a course of conduct amounting to 
“an attack directed against the civilian population”, within the meaning of article 7 of the 
Statute’.855 The Pre-Trial Chamber noted the importance of the prosecution clearly stating the 
contents of the charges and statement of facts brought against an accused and the effect of failing 
to do so. ‘The charges and the statements of facts in the Document Containing the Charges’ had 
‘been articulated in such vague terms that the Chamber had serious difficulties in determining, or 
could not determine at all, the factual ambit of a number of the charges’.856 For example the 
prosecution failed to clearly characterise certain SGBCs – crimes of violent attacks, which were 
charged as, ‘rape, torture and mutilation and other forms of sexual violence, forcing family 
members to witness the perpetration of rape, sexual violence and atrocities on their loved ones 
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and an incident in which a number of women were allegedly captured, raped, tortured and killed 
by the FDLR’.857 The Chamber also expressed displeasure at the techniques used in the OTP’s 
investigations as being unprofessional and impartial when questioning witnesses, which affected 
the probative value of the evidence.858 The techniques were contrary to the provisions of the 
Rome Statute which provided for the use of appropriate measures ‘to ensure the effective 
investigation and prosecution of crimes’.859 This involved giving respect to ‘the interests and 
personal circumstances of victims and witnesses, including [their] gender’ and taking into 
account ‘the nature of the crime, in particular when it involves sexual violence, gender violence 
or violence against children’.860 In addition to this, there should be respect for the rights of such 
persons.861 
In assessing Callixte’s criminal liability under article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, the 
Chamber stated the importance of the accused making ‘a significant contribution to the crimes 
committed or attempted’.862 ‘The extent of the person’s contribution is determined by 
considering the person’s relevant conduct and the context in which this conduct is performed.’863 
The Chamber also concluded that a ‘25(3)(d) liability can include contributing to a crime’s 
commission after it has occurred, so long as this contribution had been agreed upon by the 
relevant group acting in common purpose with the suspect prior to the perpetration of the 
crime.’864 The Chamber majority held that it was ‘unable to be satisfied to the threshold of 
substantial grounds to believe that the FDLR pursued the policy of attacking the civilian 
population’.865 It took the view that: 
. . . based on the analysis of the evidence as a whole, there are likewise not substantial grounds to 
believe that the FDLR leadership constituted “a group of persons acting with a common purpose” 
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within the meaning of article 25(3)(d) of the Statute, in particular in light of the requirement that 
the common purpose pursued by the group must have at least an element of criminality. 866 
Thus the prosecution was not able to prove that Callixte was individually responsible under 
article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute for crimes committed by the FDLR.867   
The prosecutor appealed the impugned decision on four grounds, and the Appeals 
Chamber granted leave to appeal three of these grounds, the first two of which were ‘intrinsically 
connected’.868 In examining these grounds, the Appeals Chamber considered ‘whether the Pre-
Trial Chamber erred in finding that it may evaluate the credibility of witnesses and that it may 
resolve inconsistencies, ambiguities or contradictions in the evidence for the purpose of 
determining whether to confirm the charges against a person’. The Appeals Chamber’s found 
that as an issue of law the Pre-Trial Chamber could ‘evaluate ambiguities, inconsistencies and 
contradictions in the evidence or doubts as to the credibility of witnesses’ when considering the 
application of article 61 of the Rome Statute.869 The third ground of appeal concerned the 
interpretation of article 25(3) (d) of the Rome Statute, under which the accused had been 
charged. The prosecutor submitted that the misinterpretation of this article by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber resulted in a misapplication of the correct legal standard which materially affected the 
outcome of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision.870 This resulted in an error of law.871 The Appeals 
Chamber held that even if it agreed with the prosecution’s submission, it would not reverse the 
decision, as the alleged error did not materially affect the decision.872 The Appeals Chamber 
confirmed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision. Judge Fernandez de Gurmendi appended a separate 
opinion on the third ground of appeal. 
4.2.4 Bosco Ntaganda Case. 
The first warrant of arrest which was issued against Ntaganda in 2006 did not contain charges for 
gender-based crimes, but charges for conscripting and enlisting children of 15 years and under, 
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and also using them as child soldiers in the Ituri region of the DRC in 2003.873 The second 
warrant of arrest issued against Ntaganda however contained inter alia gender-based charges of 
rape and sexual slavery as war crimes and crimes against humanity.874 After avoiding arrest from 
the ICC, the accused voluntarily surrendered to the ICC on 22 March 2013.875 The hearing 
affirming the charges against the accused; was held from 10 to 14 February 2014876 at which the 
charges confirmed against Ntaganda included inter alia charges of rape and sexual slavery 
against civilians as war crimes and crimes against humanity and rape and sexual slavery of child 
soldiers. These crimes occurred in the Ituri region, a north-eastern part of the DRC, between 
2002 and 2003. This was the first time the ICC charged a commander for such crimes committed 
against child soldiers who were under his command.877 The Pre-Trial Chamber found Ntaganda 
criminally responsible for these crimes according to articles 25(3)(a) and (b), article 25(3)(d) and 
article 28(a) of the Rome Statute.878 The trial against Ntaganda, which began on 2 September 
2015, has been criticised for limiting his crimes to the Ituri region, because his troops were 
alleged to have also committed crimes in North Kivu.879 
4.3 THE UGANDAN CASES 
The Ugandan cases are the oldest cases before the ICC, having lain dormant for 10 years, 
because of the suspects being unavailable.880 The decision to investigate the situation in Uganda 
was based on a referral by the Government of Uganda in December 2003. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber II granted the OTP’s application for warrants of arrest against five top Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) leaders on 8 July 2005.881 These arrest warrants were issued for the 
arrest of Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya and Dominic Ongwen for 
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war crimes and crimes against humanity. The ICC terminated the case against Raska Lukwiya on 
8 January 2010, following confirmation of his death.882 The ICC has withdrawn the case against 
Kotok Odhiambo, whose death has also been confirmed.883 The arrest warrants against Joseph 
Kony and Vincent Otti, whose deaths’ are not yet confirmed, are still outstanding.884 
4.3.1 Dominic Ongwen Case.  
Ongwen’s case is unique as it will be the first time that the ICC will try an accused for the 
gender-based violence crime of enslavement. Ongwen was the brigade commander of the Sinia 
Brigade of the LRA.885 The warrant of arrest issued against Ongwen contained four counts of 
war crimes of murder, cruel treatment of civilians, intentionally directing an attack against a 
civilian population and pillaging, and three counts of crimes against humanity of murder, 
enslavement and inhumane acts of inflicting serious bodily injury and suffering, committed on or 
about 20 May 2004.886 Ongwen was charged under article 25(3)(b) of the Rome Statute as being 
‘criminally responsible and liable for punishment’ for soliciting or inducing the above crimes.887 
After years in hiding, Ongwen surrendered to ICC custody on 16 January 2015. He was 
transferred to the ICC’s Detention Centre on 21 January 2015. The case against Ongwen and his 
co-accused was separated on 6 February 2015.888  
The Pre-Trial Chamber II had recommended to the Presidency that the hearing be held in 
Uganda so as to bring the proceedings closer to the communities affected by Ongwen’s acts, and 
also as it would contribute to a better perception of the ICC on the African continent.889 
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However, the confirmation of charges hearing took place from 21 January to 22 January 2016 
not in Uganda but at The Hague. If it had taken place in Uganda, it would have been the first 
time that the ICC had applied its positive complementarity concept, that is, ‘a proactive policy of 
cooperation aimed at promoting national proceedings’.890 By applying this concept the OTP 
encourages ‘genuine national proceedings where possible, including in situation countries’.891 
The OTP has expanded the complementarity principle laid down in the Rome Statute by 
recognising positive complementarity as a second dimension to complementarity.892 The first 
dimension is the admissibility test under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, that is, ‘how to assess 
the existence of national proceedings and their genuineness, which is a judicial issue’.893 The 
Office of the President of Uganda put out a statement as to why Uganda could not try Ongwen, 
despite hopes that the case would be heard in Uganda. The statement read that although the 
Ugandan government had established ‘the International Crimes Division of the High Court 
which was mandated to try international crimes’, Ongwen had to be tried by the ICC as his 
offences were cross-border offences.894 It also stated that Uganda had already referred the 
situation concerning the LRA to the ICC.895 This shows that although a domestic court may be 
established to try international crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, other factors have to be 
taken into consideration as to why it would not be feasible to try these crimes at a domestic level. 
As the number of charges against Ongwen multiplied from seven to 70 counts by December 
2015, the Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed the charges on 23 March 2016.896 The war crimes 
charges were rape, outrages upon personal dignity, sexual slavery, cruel treatment and torture, 
whilst the crimes against humanity charges included rape, torture, enslavement, sexual slavery, 
forced marriage as an inhumane act, persecution and other inhumane acts.897 The Pre-Trial 
Chamber was differently constituted to the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Bemba case, and held a 
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different view regarding the application of article 61(7) and cumulative charging. The Chamber 
held that article 61(7) of the Rome Statute mandated the Chamber: 
[t]o decline to confirm charges only when the evidence does not provide substantial grounds to 
believe that the person committed the charged crime and not when one possible legal 
characterisation of the relevant facts is to be preferred over another, equally viable. When the 
Prosecutor meets the applicable burden of proof, the Chamber shall confirm the charges as 
presented.898 
The Chamber in effect was agreeing with the prosecution’s argument in Bemba’s case.899 In other 
words, the Pre-Trial Chamber must confirm charges when the prosecution has met the applicable 
burden of proof. Declining charges should not be on the grounds that a ‘possible legal 
characterisation of the relevant facts is . . . preferred over another’.900 
With regard to cumulative charging, the Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the argument of the 
defence that ‘cumulative charging should be avoided as there exists the possibility to “re-
characterise crimes at trial”’.901 Though it agreed with the ‘distinct legal element’ principle 
regarding cumulative charging, the Pre-Trial Chamber differed from the Bemba Pre-Trial 
Chamber regarding the requirements of regulation 55.  
The Pre-Trial Chamber stated that: 
Regulation 55 provides for a procedural remedy to situations in which the evidence heard at trial 
warrants a modification to the legal characterisation of the facts confirmed by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. This provision does not address or otherwise concern situations in which the same set 
of facts could constitute simultaneously more than one crime under the Statute, i.e. those 
situations warranting cumulative charging or cumulative convictions.902 
The Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed all 70 counts against Ongwen on 23 March 2016.903 The trial 
began on 6 December 2016.  
4.4   THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CASE  
The President of the Central African Republic (CAR) referred the situation in CAR to the OTP, 
on 21 December 2004, to investigate crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction which had been 
committed in CAR since 1 July 2002. Based on the Prosecutor’s letter, dated 22 December 2004, 
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informing the ICC of the referral by President Bozize of the CAR, the CAR’s situation was 
assigned by the Presidency of the ICC to Pre-Trial Chamber III.904 Meanwhile, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber III was dissolved on 19 March 2009 by the Presidency, which then assigned the 
situation in CAR to the Pre-Trial Chamber II.905 
4.4.1 Jean-Pierre Bemba Case. 
4.4.1.1 The Prosecution’s charges against Bemba. 
A warrant for the arrest of Bemba; was issued by Pre-Trial Chamber III on 23 May 2008 for the 
crimes of rape, torture, outrages upon personal dignity and pillaging as war crimes, and rape and 
torture as crimes against humanity.906 These crimes were alleged to have been committed when 
Bemba led his militia group known as Movement de Liberation du Congo (MLC), to assist 
President Ange-Felix Patasse, who was the President of CAR at that time, to fight an armed 
conflict against a rebel movement led by Francoss Bozize.907 The armed conflict took place 
between 26 October 2002 and 15 March 2003. Belgian authorities arrested Bemba on 24 May 
2008. A second warrant of arrest issued on 10 June 2008 replaced the previous warrant of arrest. 
The second arrest warrant not only maintained the same charges and facts contained in the 
previous arrest warrant, but also included two additional counts of murder characterised as a war 
crime and a crime against humanity.908 Thereafter, Bemba was handed over to the ICC by the 
Belgian authorities on 3 July 2008.909 
4.4.1.2 The Confirmation of Charges Hearing. 
Following the confirmation of charges hearing, held between 12 January and 15 January 2009, 
the Chamber on 3 March 2009 requested the prosecutor to consider including an article 28 mode 
of criminal responsibility charge against the accused, which provision refers to a military 
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commander or superior’s responsibility.910 The prosecutor accordingly filed an amended 
Document Containing the Charges on 30 March 2009 with other amended documents,911 adding 
an article 28 mode of criminal responsibility as an alternative to the primary article 25(3)(a) 
mode of criminal responsibility.912 The charges contained in the arrest warrant of 10 June 2008 
were retained. In its decision on the confirmation hearing given on 15 June 2009, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber II confirmed charges of Bemba being criminally responsible as a superior under article 
28(a) of the Rome Statute, for murder as a crime against humanity and war crime, rape as a 
crime against humanity and war crime, and pillaging as a war crime.913  
Article 28 of the Rome Statute provides: 
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court: 
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be 
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under 
his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as 
a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where: 
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, 
should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and 
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures 
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. 
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a), a 
superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed 
by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to 
exercise control properly over such subordinates, where: 
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that 
the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes; 
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of the 
superior; and 
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to 
prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution. 
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Thus, article 28(a) of the Rome Statute provides for liability of a military commander who either 
‘knew’ or ‘should have known’ that his ‘forces were committing or about to commit’ the crimes 
being charged.914 The Chamber found that there was sufficient evidence to establish that Bemba 
‘knew about the occurrence of the crimes’ committed during the period in question.915 As a 
consequence, the ‘should have known’ requirement of article 28(a) of the Rome Statute was not 
considered by the Pre-Trial Chamber. The Pre-Trial Chamber declined to confirm the criminal 
responsibility of the accused under articles 25(3) (a) and 28(b) of the Rome Statute.916 
The Chamber declined to confirm the charges of torture as a crime against humanity and 
war crime, and outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime under article 28(a) of the Rome 
Statute.917 In the Amended Document Containing the Charges the crimes of torture as a crime 
against humanity and outrages upon personal dignity, as a war crime; were cumulatively charged 
by the prosecutor with that of rape. The Chamber rejected this cumulative charging approach. 
Applying a restrictive interpretation to these crimes, the Chamber found that the prosecutor’s 
evidence relating to both crimes exhibited the same conduct as that of rape, and thus concluded 
that both these crimes were ‘fully subsumed by the count of rape, which was the most 
appropriate legal characterisation of the conduct presented’.918 The Chamber differentiated 
between the definition of torture as a crime against humanity and torture as a war crime by 
stating that ‘the definition of torture as a crime against humanity, unlike the definition of torture 
as a war crime, does not require the additional element of a specific purpose’.919 In addition, the 
Chamber stated that ‘the specific material elements of the act of torture, namely severe pain and 
suffering and control by the perpetrator over the person, are also the inherent specific material 
elements of the act of rape. However, the act of rape requires the additional specific material 
element of penetration, which makes it the most appropriate legal characterisation in this 
particular case’.920 
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The Chamber also found the term ‘other forms of sexual violence’, which the prosecutor 
used in characterising the crime of torture as a crime against humanity,921 was not qualified in the 
Amended Document Containing the Charges by the other acts of torture apart from those of rape 
he was relying on.922 The Pre-Trial Chamber also stated, that the method by which these acts of 
torture had been committed was not stated in the Amended Document Containing the Charges; it 
was only by examining the disclosed evidence that the Pre-Trial Chamber was able to identify 
the acts and method of commission of torture on which the prosecutor was relying, and this only 
when the Prosecutor presented ‘at the Hearing some material facts parenthetically’.923 The 
Chamber pointed out that it was the prosecutor’s duty to provide the Chamber with all the facts 
which supported the charges, as it would not give credit for such flaws.924 The Chamber 
concluded that the material facts of ‘torture as a crime against humanity through other acts of 
torture’ had not been provided in the Amended Document Containing the Charges, nor their 
method of commission. This resulted in the Chamber declining to confirm this part of the charge 
relating to torture on the ground that the accused would otherwise be placed at a disadvantage in 
preparing his case.925 The Chamber also held that the information relating to the outrage upon 
personal dignity charge was insufficient, as the prosecution had not specified the facts relating to 
this charge in the Amended Document Containing the Charges.926 It was at the hearing that the 
factual basis of the prosecutor’s case was unveiled, when he unfolded seven groups of facts, on 
which he was relying.927 
Though the Pre-Trial Chamber declined to confirm the count of torture as a crime against 
humanity, and outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime, due to the cumulative charging 
approach used by the prosecution, it recognised that various national courts and international 
tribunals had applied the cumulative charging approach in certain circumstances.928 The Pre-Trial 
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Chamber II, however, pointed out the undue burden, which the cumulative charging approach 
placed on the accused. The Chamber and stated that: 
As a matter of fairness and expeditiousness of the proceedings, only distinct crimes may justify a 
cumulative charging approach and, ultimately, be confirmed as charges. This is only possible if 
each statutory provision allegedly breached in relation to one and the same conduct requires at 
least one additional material element not contained in the other.929 
The Chamber further pointed out, that the provisions of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court, allowed a Trial Chamber to change the legal characterisation of a crime not provided for 
in the legal framework of the ad hoc tribunals. Due to this power given to the ICC by its judges, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber II was of the opinion that a cumulative charging approach was not 
necessary.930  
With regard to non-confirmation of the charge of torture as a war crime, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber held that ‘the prosecutor failed to provide the factual basis in the Amended Document 
Containing the Charges underpinning the charge of torture as a war crime’.931 Furthermore, the 
prosecutor’s failure at the hearing to ‘elaborate on the specific intent of alleged MLC soldiers 
which would have clearly characterised the alleged acts of torture as a war crime’, placed the 
accused at a disadvantage in preparing his case.932 The Pre-Trial Chamber II reiterated the fact, 
that the Chamber did not have a duty to correct flaws in the prosecution’s case.933 
4.4.1.3   The Prosecutor’s appeal against the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision  
The prosecutor, on 22 June 2009, applied for leave to appeal against the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
decision of 15 June 2009, pursuant to article 82(1)(d) of the Rome Statute, which provides that 
either party may appeal:  
[a] decision that involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct 
of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and for which, in the opinion of the Pre-Trial or 
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Trial Chamber, an immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially advance the 
proceedings. 
Leave to appeal was granted on two grounds. The first was that the Pre-Trial Chamber did not 
have authority to refuse to confirm the charge of torture as a crime against humanity and the 
charge of outrages against personal dignity as a war crime. This was because these two charges 
were ‘cumulative of rape charges’ and, whether these two crimes were ‘either objectively as a 
matter of law or in particular based on the facts alleged. . ., they were wholly subsumed within 
rape charges’.934 The Chamber had misapplied the relevant principles relating to each offence, 
since it failed to analyse whether each offence required ‘a material legal element not contained in 
the other’.935 In explaining how the elements of rape as a crime against humanity differed from 
that of torture as a crime against humanity, the prosecution stated that in securing a conviction 
for rape, it did not need to prove that the victim had to endure ‘a certain quantum of pain or 
suffering’.936 Also regarding a torture, it did not have to prove that such a victim endured ‘a 
physical invasion of a sexual nature’. By example, a man who was forced to watch his wife 
repeatedly raped would not be the victim of rape, but of torture.937 ‘Men, women and children 
were raped by multiple MLC perpetrators in their homes, raped in front of family members, 
forced to watch rapes of family members, and raped in public locations.’938 There were also 
lootings, rapes and murders by MLC troops who punished rebel sympathisers. The prosecutor 
gave as an example of torture as a crime against humanity a victim who was forced to watch his 
four daughters and wives raped by MLC soldiers.939 The prosecution recommended that the 
applicable test which the Court should apply to cumulative crimes, was: 
if the victim is the same in both offences and the facts overlap, or whether it should be based on 
the traditional examination of the provisions, to determine if the crimes contain different and 
separate elements and protect distinct and separate interests.940  
Another argument advanced by the prosecutor was that victims would be denied a fair hearing if 
‘the full range of their suffering and victimisation [was not] reflected in the charges’.941 In 
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addition, this would exclude certain victims from giving evidence and exclude the seeking of 
evidence, from victims such as those who were forced to watch their family members raped.942 
The prosecutor’s second ground of appeal, related to whether the Pre-Trial Chamber had 
authority to refuse to confirm charges where the accused was not given sufficient pre-
confirmation notice but ‘the Document Containing the Charges, and the In-Depth Analytical 
Chart gave the accused sufficient notice of the changes and the supporting facts’.943 
In responding to the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal, the Office of Public 
Counsel for Victims (OPCV) filed its observations to the effect that it was the prosecutor’s 
discretion and not that of the Trial Chamber to decide what charges are brought against an 
accused. The OPCV expressed concern inter alia about a situation in which many victims would 
be denied their right to participate in the trial [and] to express their views and concerns, as ‘the 
victim status is linked to the charges of the case’.944 
The Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice (WIGJ); an international human rights 
organisation, was granted leave to submit an amicus curiae observation, regarding the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s decision of 15 June 2009 relating to cumulative charging945 to assist the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in determining the case.946 The WIGJ observed inter alia that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
had applied the correct standard relating to cumulative charges, that is, the test in the Prosecutor 
v Delalic case as applied by the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber. It however, observed that the test had 
been incorrectly applied to ‘at least three categories of the witnesses’ in this case.947 WIGJ 
observed that Pre-Trial Chamber ‘had applied in a too narrow fashion the cumulative charging 
test with regard to torture and rape’ to these categories of witnesses. It had also done the same 
with regard to rape and the outrages upon personal dignity charge.948  
The Pre-Trial Chamber II rejected the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal on 
18 September 2009, on the basis that both grounds of appeal did not ‘significantly affect both the 
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944 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gambo ‘Decision in the Prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal the 
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946 Idem para 17. 
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fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial’.949 Regarding the first 
ground of appeal, the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that it could not make a decision on the ‘proper 
interpretation of the constitutive elements of the crimes concerned and the assessment of the 
evidence of the case’ as these issues were not within the scope of article 82(1)(d) of the Rome 
Statute.950 In disagreeing with the prosecution that the Pre-Trial Chamber did not have authority 
to decline to cumulate the charges, the Appeals Chamber held that: 
[a]ccording to article 61(3) of the Statute, the Prosecutor is under an obligation to present the 
charges, but it is incumbent upon the Pre-Trial Chamber to delineate the scope of the trial 
proceedings by way of its decision pursuant to article 61(7) of the Statute, in which it evaluates 
the evidence and applies the law. To limit such a decision to a mere formality, barring the 
Chamber from one of its core functions, would run counter to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
understanding of its statutory role and mandate. The duty of the Prosecutor is to present the facts 
that he has investigated and to provide his view on their legal characterisation in the document 
containing the charges. But it is for the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber to apply the law to those 
facts as presented by the Prosecutor and give the legal characterisation to those facts951 
4.4.1.4 The Trial Chamber’s Judgment. 
The trial against Bemba commenced on 22 November 2010.952 The prosecution opened its case 
on 23 November 2010, whilst the defence opened its case on 14 August 2012.953 A few months 
into the defence case, the Trial Chamber, on 21 September 2012, gave notice according to 
regulation 55(2) of the Regulations, to the parties and participants of its intention to modify the 
legal characterisation of the facts. Its reason given was to enable it 
to consider in the same mode of responsibility the alternative form of knowledge contained in 
article 28(a)(1) of the Statute namely that owing to the circumstances at the time, the accused 
“should have known” that the forces under his effective command and control or under his 
effective authority and control, as the case may be were committing or about to commit the 
crimes included under the charges confirmed in the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges.954 
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The defence objected to the proposed re-characterisation by the Trial Chamber stating that it 
‘would result in manifest unfairness and actual prejudice to the accused’.955 On 13 December 
2012, to enable the defence to prepare for a possible re-characterisation and obtain further 
evidence, the Trial Chamber suspended the proceedings until March 2013.956 The defence 
however, filed a motion requesting that the Chamber to vacate the temporary suspension of 
proceedings.957 In lifting the suspension of the proceedings on 6 February 2013, the Trial 
Chamber noted that the defence’s motion to vacate the proceedings was based on a misconceived 
allegation that the Trial Chamber had not made a ‘formal decision to amend the charges 
accordingly or to render a decision that regulation 55 is in fact being relied upon in the 
proceedings’.958 The Trial Chamber stated that there was no need for a ‘formal decision to amend 
the charges’ as it could re-characterise the facts ‘on its own motion, “at any time during the 
trial”’.959 In handing down its judgment on 21 March 2016, the Trial Chamber did not find that 
the facts warranted a re-characterisation to include the ‘should have known’ mens rea.960 The 
Trial Chamber found Bemba criminally responsible under article 28(a) for the crime of rape and 
murder as a crime against humanity and the crime of rape, murder and pillaging as a war 
crime.961 In finding Bemba criminally responsible under article 28(a), the Trial Chamber found 
sufficient evidence that the accused ‘knew that the MLC forces under his effective authority and 
control were committing or about to commit’ the said crimes.962 Factors such as: ‘the notoriety of 
the crimes, Mr Bemba’s position, . . . direct knowledge of allegations of murder, rape and 
pillaging by MLC soldiers at specific times throughout the 2002-2003 CAR operation’ were 
taken into account to determine Mr Bemba’s knowledge.963 
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4.4.1.5 The Sentencing of Bemba. 
In handing down its judgment, the Trial Chamber III considered cumulative convictions once 
again, relying on the rulings in the Katanga case and the ad hoc tribunals.964 In the Katanga case, 
The Trial Chamber stated that cumulative convictions were allowed where: 
The conduct in question clearly violates two distinct provisions of the Statute, each demanding 
proof of a “materially distinct” element not required by the other. An element will be considered 
distinct if it requires proof of a fact not required by the other.965 
In agreeing with the decisions in Katanga and the ad hoc tribunals, the Trial Chamber III held 
that crimes against humanity and war crimes had ‘materially distinct elements, each requiring 
proof of a fact not required by the other’ and ‘not the acts or omissions of the accused’.966 The 
Trial Chamber therefore found that it could convict Bemba for rape as a war crime and crime 
against humanity, and murder in the like manner.967  
The Trial Chamber III sentenced Bemba on 21 June 2016. For each crime committed the 
Trial Chamber considered the gravity of the crime and aggravating circumstances. It stated that 
the gravity of the crime was 
a principal consideration in imposing a sentence. In cases of command responsibility, the 
Chamber must assess the gravity of (i) the crimes committed by the convicted person’s 
subordinate, and (ii) the convicted person’s own conduct in failing to prevent or repress the 
crimes, or submit the matter to the competent authorities.968 
In assessing the gravity of rape, the Trial Chamber heard evidence from two experts in ‘post-
traumatic stress disorder and sexual violence in armed conflict’ who testified as to the medical, 
psychological, psychiatric and social consequences that rape victims suffer.969 The Trial 
Chamber also heard the evidence from another expert who testified on the ‘longitudinal and 
intergenerational impact of mass sexual violence’, who noted that: 
The more severe the crime is – for instance someone who “was gang raped multiple times”, 
particularly intimate and humiliating traumatic experiences like rape … witnessed by family 
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members, and the rape of children – the more likely it will increase the magnitude of negative and 
permanent psychological issues.970 
With regard to the crime of rape and pillaging, the Trial Chamber III took into account the 
following aggravating circumstances, which included: 
Whether the victims were armed, the location of a crime, for example, whether it was committed 
in places of civilian sanctuary, such as churches and hospitals or the victims’ homes, the victims 
ages, particularly in cases of sexual violence, the duration and repeated nature of the acts, the 
perpetrators’ motives, and the violent and humiliating nature of the acts, including their public 
nature, and any verbal, physical, or other abuse or threats accompanying the crime.971 
The Trial Chamber found that the crime of rape along with the crime of murder and pillaging 
were of serious gravity.972 In the case of the aggravating circumstance regarding rape, the Trial 
Chamber found that this crime was ‘committed against particularly defenceless victims and with 
particular cruelty.’973 The Chamber found no mitigating circumstance974 on the cumulative 
convictions when giving its judgment in Bemba’s case.975 It therefore imposed the same 
sentence for rape as a crime against humanity and war crime, as they had ‘distinct contextual 
elements.’976 Consequently, the Chamber sentenced Bemba to 18 years imprisonment for rape 
as a crime against humanity and 18 years for rape as a war crime – the highest sentence, which 
it could impose.977 The sentences were to run concurrently with those for murder and 
pillaging.978 
Although the prosecutor was successful in convicting Bemba for SGBCs committed in 
armed conflict, the full extent of the suffering experienced by the victims, and the gravity of the 
accused’s criminal conduct was diminished when the Pre-Trial Chamber dismissed the 
cumulative charges of torture and outrages upon personal dignity.979 The full extent of Bemba’s 
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culpability and ‘complete picture of his criminal conduct’ was not portrayed on account of the 
charges of torture and outrages upon personal dignity relating to these SGCCs not being 
charged cumulatively.980 In finding that it was not feasible to cumulatively charge the crime of 
torture and outrages upon personal dignity with rape, the Pre-Trial Chamber considered the 
same evidence in satisfying the elements of each crime.981 The Pre-Trial Chamber did not 
‘consider the legal elements of each offence’ but ‘the acts or omissions giving rise to the 
offence’.982 As pointed out by scholars, a review of the history of how the Rome Statute and of 
the Elements of Crimes were negotiated points to the intention that some crimes be charged 
cumulatively.983 Multiple charges based on the same conduct assist Trial Chambers ‘to enter 
multiple convictions based on that conduct, at least with respect to charges that contain 
materially distinct elements’.984 If the Pre-Trial Chamber had not dismissed the cumulative 
charges for torture and outrages upon personal dignity, the Trial Chamber might have felt 
empowered to hand down a sentence of 25 years as recommended by the prosecution.985  
The first sentence imposed by the ICC for SGBCs for a crime as serious as rape which 
causes lifelong harm to victims, should serve to deter perpetrators. The 18-year sentence handed 
down does not reflect the gravity of the crime, especially as the time already spent in custody is 
taken into account,986 and the sentence can be reviewed after two thirds of it has been served987 
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possibly entitling the convict may get an early release. Although the ad hoc tribunals such as the 
ICTR have handed down lower sentences for rape, as in the Akayesu case where the accused 
received 15 years imprisonment for rape, the Rome Statute allows judges to impose higher 
sentences, up to a maximum term of 30 years imprisonment or ‘a term of life imprisonment 
when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the 
convicted person’. 988 Scholars such as Whiting have drawn attention to the fact that sentences 
for direct participation in the crimes attract a higher sentence than those for command 
responsibility.989 Although the prosecution sought on appeal to have Bemba’s sentence increased 
to 25 years,990 the outcome of that endeavour will never be known as Bemba was acquitted of all 
charges brought against him when he appealed against his conviction and sentence.  
4.4.1.6   Short lived victory, the reversal of Bemba’s conviction 
Bemba’s conviction and sentence was short-lived as a majority of the Appeals Chamber on 
8 June 2018 reversed his conviction, and acquitted him of all the charges.991 The successful 
prosecution of Bemba by the Trial Chamber would have been the ICC’s first conviction for 
crimes of SGBV and also for rapes committed against men. It was hailed as a landmark 
conviction by many rights groups and feminists who fought to have these crimes recognised in 
their own right.992 Bemba’s conviction was also a first of an accused convicted by the ICC under 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
When the person has served two thirds of the sentence, or 25 years in the case of life imprisonment, the Court 
shall review the sentence to determine whether it should be reduced. Such a review shall not be conducted 
before that time. 
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Subject to article 110, the Court may impose one of the following penalties on a person convicted of a crime 
referred to in article 5 of this Statute:  
(a) Imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not exceed a maximum of 30 years; or  
(b) A term of life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual 
circumstances of the convicted person 
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990 ICC Bemba Appeal – Open Society Foundations available at https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/fact-
sheets/icc-bemba-appeal (accessed 29 August 2018). 
991 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gambo ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial 
Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”’ (8 June 2018) ICC-01/05-01/08 A. 
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article 28(a) of the Rome Statute for sexual offences. As stated by the Pre-Trial Chamber II 
during the confirmation of charges hearing, under this article: 
A superior may be held responsible for the prohibited conduct of his subordinates for failing to 
fulfil his duty to prevent or repress their unlawful conduct or submit the matter to the competent 
authorities. This sort of responsibility can be better understood “when seen against the principle 
that criminal responsibility for omissions is incurred only where there exists a legal obligation to 
act”.993 
The ICC prosecutor, in referring to the legal obligations of commanders, declared that 
commanders had ‘a legal obligation to exercise responsible command and control over their 
troops to provide sufficient training to ensure that their troops do not commit atrocities’.994 She 
added that the case was ‘noteworthy in that it has highlighted the critical need to eradicate sexual 
and gender-based crimes as weapons of war in conflict by holding accountable those who fail to 
exercise their duties and responsibilities that their status as commanders and leaders entail’.995 
The rest of this section considers the Appeals Chamber’s reversal of Bemba’s conviction. 
4.4.1.6 (i)  The Appeals Chamber reversal of Bemba’s conviction 
The Appeals Chamber’s decision to acquit Bemba of all charges is viewed by critics as a 
‘controversial reversal’ and reinterpretation of ‘key elements of the Rome Statute’.996 The 
Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber could not convict Bemba of the crimes brought 
against him as the crimes ‘were not within the facts and circumstances described in the charges’ 
and the prosecution had not established Bemba’s link to the crimes under article 28(a) of the 
Rome Statute.997 Judge Eboe-Osuji, who was one of the majority judges, initially favoured a 
retrial, but later decided concur with the majority judges, Judges van den Wyngaert and Morrison 
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that an acquittal was appropriate.998 Judge Eboe-Osuji gave a separate opinion from the other two 
majority judges. The two dissenting judges, Judges Manageng and Hofmański, upheld the Trial 
Chamber’s decision.999 Bemba’s appeal was based on six grounds: 
1. The trial was unfair. 
2. The conviction exceeded the charges. 
3. He was not liable as a superior. 
4. The contextual elements were not established. 
5. The Trial Chamber erred in its approach to identification evidence. 
6. Other procedural errors invalidated the conviction.1000  
The majority appeal judges considered grounds two and three whilst the dissenting judges 
considered all six grounds of appeal. Article 83(2) of the Rome Statute provides that an Appeals 
Chamber may intervene where it ‘finds that the proceedings appealed from were unfair in a way 
that affected the reliability of the decision or sentence, or that the decision or sentence appealed 
from was materially affected by error of fact or law or procedural error. The Appeals Chamber, 
however, deviated from its conventional standard of appellate review for factual errors, and that 
applied by ICTY and ICTR ad hoc tribunals and many domestic courts.1001 Under the 
conventional standard, the Appeals Chamber determines ‘whether a reasonable trial chamber 
could have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the finding in question, thereby applying 
a margin of deference to the factual findings of the trial chamber’.1002 In considering the margin 
of deference, the Appeals Chamber has in the past held that: 
It will not interfere with factual findings of the first-instance Chamber unless it is shown that the 
Chamber committed a clear error, namely, misappreciated the facts, took into account irrelevant 
facts, or failed to take into account relevant facts. 
As to the ‘misappreciation of facts’, the Appeals Chamber has also stated that:  
It will not disturb a Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber’s evaluation of the facts just because the Appeals 
Chamber might have come to a different conclusion. It will interfere only in the case where it 
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cannot discern how the Chamber’s conclusion could have reasonably been reached from the 
evidence before it.1003  
The Appeals Chamber, however, in Bemba’s case stated that the margin of deference ‘must be 
approached with extreme caution’.1004 Judge Eboe-Osuji’s view on the margin of deference, in 
his separate opinion, was ‘that the notion of appellate deference for the factual findings of the 
Trial Chamber is arguably something of a blind-spot in the ICC appellate jurisprudence, resulting 
directly from the undiscerning reception of the notion from the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals’.1005 In explaining the role of appellate deference to lower court findings was one of 
judicial policy rather than a legal matter, he stated that:  
It must be observed that the Rome Statute does not suggest—let alone require—appellate 
deference to the factual findings of the Trial Chamber. Indeed, there are specific provisions of the 
Rome Statute the terms of which obstruct, at least, a clear view of appellate deference as a 
standard norm in final, merits appeals in this Court. Article 83(1) is one of them. It provides as 
follows: ‘For the purposes of proceedings under article 81 and this article, the Appeals Chamber 
shall have all the powers of the Trial Chamber’ [emphasis added]. As there is no equivalent 
provision in their statutes, the case law of the ICTY and ICTR may have forged a mould of 
appellate deference that may not fit the specific circumstances of administration of justice at the 
ICC, as a direct product of construction of the Rome Statute, and especially in light of the further 
analysis made below.1006 
The Appeals Chamber was ‘of the opinion that it may interfere with the factual findings of the 
first-instance chamber whenever the failure to interfere may occasion a miscarriage of justice, 
and not “only in the case where [the Appeals Chamber] cannot discern how the Chamber’s 
conclusion could have reasonably been reached from the evidence before it”’.1007 It further stated 
the importance of the Appeals Chamber not tying its ‘hands against the interest of justice’, 
especially as the Rome Statute did not provide for the notion of appellate deference or require the 
Appeals Chamber to apply that particular notion.1008 It also stated that the Appeals Chamber ‘will 
not assess the evidence de novo with a view to determining whether it would have reached the 
same factual conclusion as the trial chamber’. Also ‘that it will determine whether a reasonable 
trial chamber properly directing itself could have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to 
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the finding in question, based on the evidence that was before it’.1009 In justifying its decision to 
deviate from its normal practice of appellate review, the Appeals Chamber stated: 
The Appeals Chamber must be satisfied that factual findings that are made beyond reasonable 
doubt are clear and unassailable, both in terms of evidence and rationale. Mere preferences or 
personal impressions of the appellate judges are insufficient to upset the findings of a trial 
chamber. However, when a reasonable and objective person can articulate serious doubts about 
the accuracy of a given finding, and is able to support this view with specific arguments, this is a 
strong indication that the trial chamber may not have respected the standard of proof and, 
accordingly, that an error of fact may have been made.  
When the Appeals Chamber is able to identify findings that can reasonably be called into doubt, it 
must overturn them. This is not a matter of the Appeals Chamber substituting its own factual 
findings for those of the trial chamber. It is merely an application of the standard of proof.1010  
With regard to the second ground of appeal, Bemba argued that he should not have been 
convicted of criminal acts which exceeded the ‘facts and circumstances described in the charges’ 
that had not been confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.1011 The provision which the Appeals 
Chamber took into consideration to base its findings, was article 74(2) of the Rome Statute, 
which provides: 
The Trial Chamber's decision shall be based on its evaluation of the evidence and the entire 
proceedings. The decision shall not exceed the facts and circumstances described in the charges 
and any amendments to the charges. The Court may base its decision only on evidence submitted 
and discussed before it at the trial. 
The Appeals Chamber held that the charges, confirmed against Bemba, were broadly formulated, 
as they were ‘confirmed in relation to categories of crimes, without any further qualification’. As 
a result, such charges were insufficient to bring Bemba to trial, as they did not come within the 
description of article 74(2)’s ‘facts and circumstances’.1012 The Appeals Chamber applied the 
same reasoning relating to crimes contained in the Amended Document Containing the Charges 
that were confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.1013 Apart from considering article 74(2) of the 
Rome Statute, it also took cognisance of regulation 52(b) of the Regulations of the Court, which 
states that documents containing the charges must set out a statement of the facts, including the 
time and place of the alleged crimes, which provides a sufficient legal and factual basis to bring 
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the person or persons to trial, including relevant facts for the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
Court’. In applying this regulation, the Appeals Chamber stated that: 
Simply listing the categories of crimes with which a person is to be charged or stating, in broad 
general terms, the temporal and geographical parameters of the charge is not sufficient to comply 
with the requirements of regulation 52 (b) of the Regulations of the Court and does not allow for 
a meaningful application of article 74 (2) of the Statute  
The Appeals Chamber also held that Bemba could not be convicted of criminal acts which had 
been added after the issuance of the Confirmation Decision, as they were not, ‘facts and 
circumstances described in the charges’.1014 It stated that from the way the prosecutor had 
pleaded the charges she should added the additional criminal acts by amending the document 
containing the charges.1015’As a result, the Appeals Chamber identified two murders, various 
pillagings and rapes of a man, women and unidentified girls as falling outside the ‘facts and 
circumstances described in the charges’, brought against Bemba.1016 Thus, although Bemba could 
not be convicted of these crimes, they were relevant to establish ‘the contextual element of 
crimes against humanity, which operates at a higher level of abstraction’.1017 In relation to these 
crimes, the Appeals Chamber reversed Bemba’s conviction and discontinued the proceedings 
relating to them.1018 The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber could only have 
convicted Bemba of one murder, the rape of 20 persons and five acts of pillaging, as they came 
within the scope of the charges.1019 
The Appeals Chamber considered the third ground of appeal, which related to Bemba’s 
liability as a superior under article 28(a) of the Rome Statute. In doing so, the Appeals Chamber 
limited its assessment of Bemba’s liability to whether he failed to take ‘all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his power to prevent or repress the commission of crimes by his 
subordinates during the 2002-2003 CAR Operation, or to submit the matter to the competent 
authorities’.1020 The Appeals Chamber stated that assessing all the necessary and reasonable 
measures taken by a commander requires ‘consideration of what measures were at his or her 
disposal in the circumstances at the time’ and that this, ‘must be based on considerations of what 
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crimes the commander knew or should have known about and at what point in time’.1021 It also 
stated that a commander need not ‘take each and every possible measure at his or her disposal’ as 
‘article 28 only requires commanders to do what is necessary and reasonable under the 
circumstances’ [Court’s emphasis].1022 Consequently, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial 
Chamber had made seven errors which ‘resulted in an unreasonable assessment of whether Mr 
Bemba failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures in the circumstances existing at the 
time’.1023 It therefore found that the Trial Chamber erred in respect of the following issues: 
(i) failing to properly appreciate the limitations that Mr Bemba would have faced in 
investigating and prosecuting crimes as a remote commander sending troops to a foreign 
country;  
(ii) failing to address Mr Bemba’s argument that he sent a letter to the CAR authorities before 
concluding that Mr Bemba had not referred allegations of crimes to the CAR authorities for 
investigation;  
(iii) in considering that the motivations that it attributed to Mr Bemba were indicative of a lack of 
genuineness in adopting measures to prevent and repress the commission of crimes; 
(iv) in attributing to Mr Bemba any limitations it found in the mandate, execution and/or results 
of the measures taken; 
(v) in finding that Mr Bemba failed to empower other MLC officials to fully and adequately 
investigate and prosecute crimes; 
(vi) in failing to give any indication of the approximate number of the crimes committed and to 
assess the impact of this on the determination of whether Mr Bemba took all necessary and 
reasonable measures; and  
(vii) by taking into account the redeployment of MLC troops, for example to avoid contact with 
the civilian population as a measure available to Mr Bemba 
On account of these errors, the Appeals Chamber reversed Bemba conviction, and acquitted him 
of the charges of one murder, the rape of 20 persons and five acts of pillaging.1024   
4.4.1.6 (2) How the Appeals Chamber’s decision will affect the prosecution of sexual 
and gender-based crimes. 
(i) The standard of review 
The dissenting judges and critics have discussed the effect which the reversal of the conventional 
application of appellate review for factual errors would have on future cases, particularly as the 
Appeals Chamber stated it ‘will not access the evidence de novo with a view to determining 
whether it would have reached the same factual conclusion as the trial chamber’.1025 The 
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dissenting judges viewed the majority’s decision to modify the standard of review as 
‘unwarranted and contrary to the corrective model of appellate review and, in some aspects, 
potentially inconsistent with the Statute’.1026 They also held that such modifications would ‘lead 
to inconsistencies, which will make it difficult for anyone to understand’.1027 Though they 
recognised that the Appeals Chamber was not obligated to follow its previous decisions, they 
recalled previous Chamber’s decisions, which held that they would not depart from previous 
decisions unless there were, convincing reasons to do so.1028 They warned that departing from 
previous jurisprudence could cause in lack of predictability of court decisions and consequent 
lack of public reliance on decisions in which there was no apparent fairness.1029 The Trial 
Chamber was in a better position ‘than the Appeals Chamber to assess the reliability and 
credibility of evidence’ because the Trial Chamber observes witnesses when testifying, hears the 
parties’ and participants’ submissions and is familiar with the case, having seen it unfold right 
from the start of the trial.1030 Although Appeal Chambers have ‘access to the trial record and can 
therefore consult the transcripts of the witnesses’ testimony and documentary evidence and study 
the parties’ and participants’ submissions before a trial chamber’,1031 its assessment of evidence 
from the record was not equivalent to that of the Trial Chamber, possibly resulting in the very 
miscarriage of justice which it purported to avoid. With regard to SGBCs it is essential that all 
the evidence is scrutinised, which includes observing the victims and other participants right 
from the commencement of the case. As stated by Sacouto, ‘[w]ithout a thorough review of all 
the evidence – including a contextual analysis of whether and how sexual violence that may at 
first appear unintended might actually be connected to the commission of other crimes and thus 
attributable to the individual(s) responsible for those crimes – sexual violence crimes may well 
go unpunished’.1032 
Although the Appeals Chamber declined to access all the evidence in the Bemba case de 
novo, it has left open the possibility of another Appeals Chamber doing so. The dissenting judges 
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warned that an Appeals Chamber accessing all the evidence de novo could turn into another trial, 
leading into inordinate delays in the case heard and the risk of inaccuracy in the evidence. In 
addition, it is not for the Appeals Chamber to apply a beyond reasonable doubt evidentiary 
standard directly, as its review is a corrective one, assessing the reasonableness of the impugned 
finding.1033 Hearing the evidence de novo for SGBCs years after the incident occurring might be 
hamstrung by the death or relocation of victims and witnesses, or inaccuracy of evidence on 
account of the passage of time, weakening the possibility of a conviction.1034 In addition, living 
witnesses might be disinclined to give evidence once again because they might lose their 
compensation in the event of a conviction being overturned. 
(ii)  Restricting the Pre-Trial Chamber’s role to confirming charges that are not broadly 
formulated 
The Appeals Chamber ruling that it is not sufficient for the Prosecutor to list ‘the categories of 
crimes with which a person is to be charged, or state in broad general terms the temporal and 
geographical parameters of the charge’, was because this did not ‘comply with the requirements 
of regulation 52(b) of the Regulations of the Court, did not allow for a meaningful application of 
article 74(2) of the Statute’1035 and was inconsistent with the Pre-Trial Chamber’s role in 
confirming charges. The purpose of the confirmation of charges hearing was to filter those 
charges and cases which should go to trial from those which should not.1036 In the Bemba case, 
for example, one of the reasons why the Pre-Trial Chamber declined to confirm the charges of 
torture and outrages upon personal dignity was because the prosecutor had ‘failed to properly 
notify the defence of the material facts underlying these charges in the amended DCC’.1037 The 
Pre-Trial Chamber declined the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal its decision, holding 
that the Pre-Trial Chamber had a duty to filter those cases which would go to trial and detect 
deficiencies which would affect the case.1038 Thus, the Pre-Trial Chamber cannot just accept 
whatever charges are presented before it. A literal reading of article 61(7) of the Rome Statute on 
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confirming or declining charges presented before the Pre-Trial Chambers would hinder its task 
of conducting fair and expeditious proceedings and protecting the rights of the defence.1039 It 
was the prosecutor’s duty to ensure the provision of all facts relevant to the charges, as the 
Chamber would not address any factual deficiencies.1040 
The evidentiary threshold which Pre-Trial Chambers have applied to confirm charges for 
trial is lower than that required by the Trial Chamber for a conviction. The threshold is that of 
‘substantial grounds to believe’, whilst that before the Trial Chamber is ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’.1041 The ‘substantial grounds to believe’ threshold accords with the gatekeeper function at 
the Pre-Trial stage as: 
(i) only those cases proceed to trial for which the Prosecutor has presented sufficiently 
compelling evidence going beyond mere theory or suspicion;  
(ii) the suspect is protected against wrongful prosecution; and 
(iii) judicial economy is ensured by distinguishing between cases that should go to trial and those 
that should not.1042 
The minority judges succinctly stated the normal practice of pre-trial judges in confirming 
charges, when they stated that: 
Where specific criminal acts are alleged to support a more broadly described charge, the pre-trial 
chamber must consider these acts in so far as it may serve its enquiry into whether there is 
sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed the 
crimes charged [Court’s emphasis]. In such a case, allegations of such criminal acts are primarily 
vehicles to prove a broader allegation and it may therefore not be necessary for the pre-trial 
chamber to assess all criminal acts put forward by the Prosecutor.1043  
Thus, the majority decision in the Bemba’s case, which required the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
confirm all individual criminal acts at the confirmation of charges hearing, creates a higher 
evidentiary threshold than the ‘substantial grounds to believe’ one as provided in article 61(7) of 
the Rome Statute.1044 The advantage of having charges which are broadly formulated and 
confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber is that the prosecutor can rely on those individual criminal 
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acts before the Trial Chamber which were not confirmed before the Pre-Trial Chamber, as long 
as they are within the scope of those charges which were confirmed. 1045 
Those who favour the majority decision argue that this would make the prosecution 
properly prepare the case when charging those suspected of a crime. Karnavas for example, is of 
the opinion that when the prosecution adds criminal charges during the trial or when the 
evidence is being summed up, it is because the prosecution has failed to formulate the charges 
properly, is not prepared for trial or has not got the required evidence to establish the necessary 
burden of proof.1046 Such instances, Karnavas claims, throw the defence off guard and do not 
safeguard the rights of the defence.1047 Although Bemba did not argue on appeal that he had not 
received sufficient notice of the charges against him,1048 it is not surprising that the majority 
appeal judges felt they had to set the record straight concerning the prosecution’s presentation of 
evidence at the pre-trial stage. ICC judges have criticised prosecutions for, inter alia, the ‘timing 
and length of investigations’, and ‘the quality of the evidence collected during the investigation’ 
and presentation in court.1049 Judge Hans-Peter Kaul and the Appeals Chamber in the 
Mbarushimana case have advised the prosecution to complete its investigation by the time of the 
confirmation hearing,1050 as this allows for ‘continuity in the presentation of the case and 
safeguards the rights of the Defence’.1051 It also ‘ensures that the commencement of the trial is 
not unduly delayed and upholds the right of the Defence to be tried without undue delay’.1052  
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The Appeals Chamber decision means that it would be difficult for the prosecution to add 
charges not confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber at the trial stage, or obtain a modification of 
charges as sought by the lawyers in the Lubanga case, when they applied to have crimes of 
sexual slavery and inhuman or cruel treatment added to the charges against the accused. The 
prosecutor’s appeal against the majority Trial Chamber’s decision to modify the legal 
characterisation of the facts1053 was met with the ruling that ‘the Decision would have required 
the parties to investigate, prepare and address incidents and events that were not pleaded’.1054 
This would have resulted in a delay in the conclusion of proceedings.1055  
The Laurent Gbagbo case is illustrative of the Pre-Trial Chamber falling in line with the 
Appeals Chamber decision against broadly pleaded charges, when it adjourned the confirmation 
of charges hearing to allow the prosecution to conduct further investigations. Obtaining reliable 
evidence at this stage of proceedings is crucial, as it lays the foundation of the prosecution’s 
case. The next part of this section discusses the Gbagbo case.  
(iii)   Adjourning the confirmation hearing for in-depth investigations  
Laurent Gbagbo was the former president of Côte d’Ivoire. He was charged with four counts of 
crimes against humanity for murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, other inhumane 
acts and persecution committed during the 2010-2011 post-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire. He 
was also charged with attempted murder. These charges were brought under articles 25(3)(a) 
(indirect co-perpetrator), 25(3)(b) (orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime), 
25(3)(d) (contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime) and 28(a) and 
(b) (command responsibility).1056 At the confirmation of charges hearing, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
deviated from its normal practice of either confirming the charges before it or declining to 
confirm them by applying article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute which provides that it may 
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‘adjourn the hearing and request the Prosecutor to consider [p]roviding further evidence or 
conducting further investigation with respect to a particular charge’.1057 The majority Pre-Trial 
Chamber found that the prosecutor had relied heavily on anonymous hearsay evidence from non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) together with press reports, regarding the ‘key elements of 
the case, including contextual elements of crimes against humanity’.1058 It stated that reliance on 
such evidence placed the accused in a difficult position, as his rights were limited since he would 
not be able to ‘investigate and challenge the trustworthiness of the source of the information’. In 
addition, such evidence made it difficult to determine the probative value to attach to it.1059 The 
Chamber also referred to the documentary or summary evidence relied on by the prosecution, 
rather than witness testimony, stating that this would limit it from evaluating the credibility of 
the witness’.1060 It stated that although ‘NGO reports and press articles may be a useful 
introduction to the historical context of a conflict situation, they do not usually constitute a valid 
substitute for the type of evidence that is required to meet the evidentiary threshold for the 
confirmation of charges’.1061 Though recognising that ‘article 61(5) of the Statute only requires 
the Prosecutor to support each charge with “sufficient” evidence at the confirmation hearing’, the 
majority of the Chamber assumed that the prosecutor had ‘presented her strongest possible case 
based on a largely completed investigation’.1062 The Chamber pointed out the need for the 
prosecution to conduct further investigations, as it was unlikely its evidence would be useful at 
trial.1063 The Chamber adjourned the hearing to give the prosecution the opportunity to obtain 
further evidence. It stated that that:  
The Prosecutor’s evidence, viewed as a whole, although apparently insufficient, does not appear 
to be so lacking in relevance and probative value that it leaves the Chamber with no choice but to 
decline to confirm the charges under article 61(7)(b) of the Statute. Rather than making a final 
determination on the merits at this time, the Chamber considers it appropriate in this case to 
adjourn the Hearing pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Statute.1064 
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In allowing the prosecution to provide further evidence or conduct further investigations, the 
Chamber provided it with a list of issues to address.1065  
The majority Appeals Chamber decision on the confirmation of all criminal acts raises 
both the positive and negative factors for the prosecution of SGBCs. Ngudjolo and Callixte (who 
were acquitted) might have been convicted of all the crimes charged if the prosecution had 
properly investigated their cases and produced the requisite evidence. The Katanga case 
illustrates the lack of preparation by the prosecution in proving SGBCs compared to the other 
crimes for which he was convicted. Proper preparation informs the prosecution of the strength of 
its case and assures victims and participants of the likelihood of a conviction once an action is 
commenced. A deficit of evidence at the pre-trial stage alerts the prosecution to the fact that 
there is no case to answer. Obtaining evidence and linking the accused to the crimes for SGBCs 
is more difficult than for other crimes, perhaps because the prosecution of these crimes is a 
relatively new legal institution. Time and money would therefore be wasted by conducting a trial 
that still needed extensive prosecutorial investigations. 
On the negative side, after commencing a sexual and gender-based case, the prosecution 
may find that victims and witnesses, who initially were reluctant to come forward, may decide to 
do so as the case progresses. As Groome puts it ‘[c]hanges in security, disposition towards the 
court, and reaction to court proceedings can all prompt new witnesses to come forward. Over the 
course of a case, there may be better access to witnesses, crime scenes, and archives’.1066 In 
addition, the majority Appeals Chamber decision could mean that confirmation hearings are now 
mini-trials, because the judges would pay more focused attention to the crimes presented at this 
stage of proceedings, and this could also have an adverse effect on the successful prosecution of 
SGBCs. Consequently, the confirmation hearing could take a longer time before charges are 
confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. In the Gbagbo case for example, the confirmation of 
charges hearing was held from 19 to 28 February 2013, a decision adjourning the hearing was 
made on 3 June 2013, and more than a year elapsed before the charges were confirmed on 
12 June 2014. 
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(iv) Restrictive application to modes of liability relating to sexual and gender-based crimes. 
ICC prosecutions in ‘command and control’ type prosecutions for SGBCs have not been able to 
prove how the accused was linked to the crimes charged. In the Bemba case for example, just 
establishing there was a superior-subordinate relationship was insufficient. Proving effective 
command and control was necessary, as was ‘an awareness of crimes being committed (or 
sufficient information that would have put the superior on notice that crimes were being 
committed) and in all circumstances a failure to prevent and punish’.1067 As put by the majority 
Appeals Chamber: 
Simply juxtaposing the fact that certain crimes were committed by the subordinates of a 
commander with a list of measures which the commander could hypothetically have taken does 
not, in and of itself, show that the commander acted unreasonably at the time. The trial chamber 
must specifically identify what a commander should have done in concreto. Abstract findings 
about what a commander might theoretically have done are unhelpful and problematic, not least 
because they are very difficult to disprove. Indeed, it is for the trial chamber to demonstrate in its 
reasoning that the commander did not take specific and concrete measures that were available to 
him or her and which a reasonably diligent commander in comparable circumstances would have 
taken 1068 
Sacouto and other critics argue that the Appeals Chamber had applied an unduly restrictive 
interpretation to different modes of liability, such as in article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. In 
doing so, she states that it sets ‘a particularly high bar for cases involving sexual violence 
charges’ thereby increasing the risk of impunity for these crimes.1069 The Bemba case and others 
show how difficult it is to link the accused to the crimes charged, especially for SGBCs, and thus 
the necessity of obtaining evidence which cannot be disputed. 
4.5 CONCLUSION.  
This chapter examined cases relating to SGBV committed in armed conflict situations, which 
came before the ICC. The analysis points to the fact that there are still teething problems the 
prosecution and judges of the ICC need to overcome to obtain successful convictions of SGBV 
crimes and restore its credibility. Although, the inclusion of SGBCs in the Rome Statute is one 
step closer to getting crimes of SGBV recognised in their own right, the law will not serve as a 
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meaningful deterrent to those bent on committing such crimes until the ICC starts getting 
convictions for these crimes.  
Apart from the Lubanga case where the prosecutor was reluctant to bring charges for an 
unfamiliar crime, other cases relating to SGBCs committed in armed conflict show that 
convicting an accused for these types of crimes is more challenging than for other crimes, in 
which international prosecutors have had the benefit of more years of experience. Prosecutors 
have been particularly unsuccessful in linking the accused to the mode of liability charged, 
especially when the accused is not a direct perpetrator of the crime. This buttresses Askin’s point 
that judges would prefer to convict an accused for such crimes as killing, pillaging and torture, 
even when the accused was not near the scene of the crime.1070 She criticises ICC judges for their 
reluctance ‘to hold individuals accountable for sex crimes unless they are the physical 
perpetrators, they were present when crimes were committed, or they can be linked to evidence 
encouraging the crimes’.1071  
The current prosecutor should ensure the execution of OTP Strategic Plan, 2016 to 2018 
to deal with the issue of lack of evidence and improper charges. There is also need for higher jail 
sentences for SGBC convictions; in particular, ICC judges should consider revising upward the 
prison terms, especially given the likelihood of an accused’s early release. Taking the gravity of 
SGBV into consideration and the lasting harm caused to victims both physically and 
psychologically, sentences should be for a longer term. Victims may feel that justice has not 
been done when the prison time spent by perpetrators of such crimes is minimal compared to the 
lasting harm caused to victims.  
There is a necessity for fair representation of female and male judges at the ICC to ensure 
sensitivity to gender issues and the application of the law thereto. In the Lubanga case, for 
example, where Judge Benito dissented from the majority of the Chamber, which consisted of 
two male judges, she was of the opinion that the victims had been discriminated against when the 
court failed to include SGBV crimes within the legal concept of the term ‘use to participate 
actively in the hostilities’, thus making such crimes, invisible.  
                                                            





This chapter also argues that there needs to be consistency from the ICC judges as to how 
they apply the law in handing down decisions. The recent Appeals Chamber decision in the 
Bemba case as to their interpretation of the Rome Statute has made it difficult for one to predict 
how other Chambers may lay down the law.  
In has been suggested that a treaty which contains stronger language and guidelines and which 
prohibits, punishes and prevents gender-based violence crimes may help combat impunity for 
these crimes, similar to the ‘current project on crimes against humanity treaty’.1072 As pointed out 
by Margot Wallstrom, a former UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, it is 
not the inadequacy of the laws but inadequate enforcement that is the reason for failure to 
prosecute these crimes.1073 Apart from the Rome Statute, there is abundant legislation in ad hoc 
tribunals, various human right instruments1074 and United Nations resolutions1075 relating to 
SGBV. The pertinent and necessary factor required is conviction for these crimes. It is a 
welcome development that the prosecutor now seems bolder in prosecuting SGBV crimes, with 
two such cases currently before the ICC. 
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THE AFRICAN UNION’S RESPONSE IN THE PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL 
AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN ARMED CONFLICT SITUATIONS AT 
THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The African continent has been no stranger to armed conflicts; in the 1970s alone the continent 
recorded more than 30 wars fought mainly intra-state.1076 By 1996, 14 African states were 
engaged in armed conflicts.1077 The 100-day genocide in Rwanda in 1994, and the armed 
conflicts which took place in Sierra Leone and Liberia all testified to the prevalence of armed 
conflicts in which sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) was committed. Currently, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is experiencing armed conflict in which SGBV is 
prevalent. 
This chapter assesses the response of the African Union (AU) in prosecuting SGBV at 
regional level. Burke-White argues for prosecuting international crimes at the regional level, in 
that such prosecution of international crimes could help balance the benefits and pitfalls of trials 
at international and domestic levels.1078 Burke-White further argues that prosecution of 
international crimes at regional level may be a better means of taking legal action against 
perpetrators when considering issues such as costs, political independence, legitimacy and 
judicial reconstruction.1079 The AU Assembly has attempted to meet most of the goals for 
prosecution of international crimes at the regional level by adopting the Protocol on 
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 
also referred to as the Malabo Protocol,1080 at its 23rd ordinary session on  
June 27 2014.1081 Although the adoption of the Malabo Protocol has received much criticism 
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from scholars,1082 the Protocol provides for the prosecution of SGBCs in armed conflict 
situations at the state level, through its General Affairs Section and at the individual level 
through its International Criminal Law Section.1083 
The assessment of the AU’s response to prosecuting SGBCs in armed conflict situations 
at the regional level is to determine whether the proposed African Court of Justice and Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACJHPR) will be a useful means of bridging the impunity gap for SGBV 
committed on the continent in armed conflict situations. When inundated with cases, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) will be forced by financial constraints to be selective as to 
cases chosen for trial. The yearly forecast of activities of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of 
the ICC is proof that not every situation of SGBV would necessarily be selected for trial at the 
ICC.1084 Thus, it would be necessary to fill the impunity gap at the regional level, where hearing 
cases of SGBV committed in armed conflict situations is difficult to prosecute at either the 
international or the domestic level. Moreover, if other AU states follow the lead of those states 
which have already expressed their intention to leave the ICC,1085 and carry out their threat, an 
                                                            
1082 Abass for example, is of the opinion that the creation of the ACJHPR does not add any value to the international 
prosecution of crimes. Ademola Abass ‘Prosecuting international crimes in Africa: Rationale, prospects and 
challenges’ (2013) 24 The European Journal of International Law 934 at 936. See also Coalition for an effective 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights et al ‘Implications of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
being empowered to try international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes’ at 14 
available at 
http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/images/docs/submissions/opinion_african_court_extension_jurisdiction.pdf  
(accessed on 16 February 2017) (stating that ‘conferring criminal jurisdiction on the African court will require the 
re-design of the institutions and instruments of the African regional human rights system as well as the 
establishment and funding of a complementary regional regime of cooperation in criminal matters.’).  
1083 See 5.3 below regarding these Sections. 
1084 Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC strategic plan for 2016-2018, the OTP forecast nine preliminary 
examinations, one new situation under investigation, six active investigations, nine hibernated investigations, five 
pre-trial phase, five-trial phase and two final appeals. ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan| 2016-2018, 6 July 2015at 24 
available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/.../070715-OTP_Strategic_Plan_2016-2018.pdf  (accessed 11 November 2016). 
1085 In October 2016, Burundi’s Parliament voted in favour of leaving the ICC. On 27 October 2016, Burundi 
officially informed the UN of its intention to withdraw from the ICC. Burundi stated that its reason for withdrawing 
from the ICC was that the preliminary investigations into Burundi’s pre-election violence by the ICC in April 2016 
violated the complementary principle in the Rome Statute. Burundi officially informs UN of intent to leave ICC 
available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/27/burundi-icc-withdrawal-major-loss-victims (accessed 10 
February 2017). United Nations Reference: ‘C.N.805.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Depositary Notification)’ 
available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2016/CN.805.2016-Eng.pdf (accessed 10 February 2017). 
South Africa and The Gambia had also announced their intention to withdraw from the ICC in October 2016. South 
Africa’s instrument of withdrawal which was signed by its Minister of International Relations and Cooperation on 
19 October 2016, stated that South Africa ‘found that its obligations with respect to the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts at times are incompatible with the interpretation given by the ICC of obligations contained in the Rome 
Statute of the ICC.’ However, in March 2017 South Africa officially withdrew its notice from the ICC, after a High 





impunity gap will be created at the international level in the prosecution of SGBCs which occur 
in armed conflict situations. This would mean resorting to prosecuting SGBCs where possible at 
the regional level if prosecution is not possible at the domestic level.  
This chapter commences by reviewing the Constitutive Act (CA) of the African Union, 
the legal basis for the creation of the ACJHPR. It is also significant as the AU relies on the CA 
as justification for it ruling that member states comply with its decision not cooperate with the 
ICC’s request for the arrest and surrender of President Al-Bashir, Sudan’s incumbent head of 
state.1086 The chapter argues that AU’s concern, right from its establishment, in handling human 
right matters, which include SGBCs, is to establish peace and security at the expense of justice in 
Africa. The AU would rather deal with human rights crimes, which include SGBCs, through 
peace talks than seek justice through the courts. The chapter also considers the prosecution of 
SGBV in armed conflict at both the state and individual levels. At the state level, this involves 
consideration of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa (also known as the Maputo Protocol or the African Women’s Protocol). At 
the individual level, this will involve considering the Malabo Protocol. In considering both 
protocols, attention is drawn to the challenges likely to result in applying them to the prosecution 
of SGBCs committed in armed conflict at the regional level. This would enable the drafters of 
the Malabo Protocol to consider amendments to the protocol in order to facilitate the prosecution 
of these crimes at the regional level.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
International-Criminal-Court.jpg (accessed 10 March 2017). Daily Maverick ‘Top SA jurists make the case for the 
ICC as SA withdraws its original notice of withdrawal’ available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/.../2017-03-08-
top-sa-jurists-make-the-case-for-the-i (accessed on 10 March 2017). On 25 October 2016, Gambia declared its 
intention to withdraw from the ICC. Gambia’s information minister stated that the ICC is an ‘International 
Caucasian Court for the persecution and humiliation of people of colour, especially Africans.’ In February 2017, 
Gambia withdrew its notice from the ICC, after there was a change of government in January 2017. Why African 
states are leaving the ICC available at www.iol.co.za/news/africa/why-african-states-are-leaving-the-icc-2084346 
(accessed 27 November 2016). Newsweek ‘Why an African mass withdrawal from the ICC is possible’ available at 
www.newsweek.com/icc-international-criminal-court-africa-gambia-south-africa-buru (accessed 10 March 2017). 
Jollofnews ‘Gambia cancels withdrawal from the ICC available at https://jollofnews.com/2017/02/13/gambia-
cancels-withdrawal-from-the-international-criminal-court/ (accessed 10 March 2017).   
1086 See for example, African Union Press Release Nº 002/2012, On the decision of Pre-trial Chamber 1 of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the alleged failure by the 
Republic of Chad and the Republic of Malawi to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with 





5.2 REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE AFRICAN UNION RELATING TO 
SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED CRIMES COMMITTED IN ARMED 
CONFLICTS 
5.2.1 The Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
The CA of the African Union is an important regional instrument as it is the legal foundation for 
the AU, which replaced the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).1087 Its importance is 
underlined by the fact that scholars such as Murungu1088 regard articles 4(h), 4(m) and 4(o) of 
the CA as forming the legal basis for the creation of the ACJHPR.1089 The CA gives recognition 
to human rights in armed conflict situations, stating in its preamble and declaration of objectives 
the need for the AU to ‘promote peace, security and stability on the continent’.1090 This is the 
genesis of the AU sequencing peace before justice, illustrated by the resistance to the ICC’s 
proceeding against Al-Bashir.1091 Initially the CA provided for 
the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in 
respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.1092 
The CA’s amendment was by the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union,1093 which included after the words ‘war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
                                                            
1087 Constitutive Act of the African Union, art 2 which provides that ‘[t]he African Union is hereby established in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act. ’Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/23.15, 
adopted 11 July2000 (entered into force May 26, 2001). 
1088 Chacha B Murungu ‘Towards a criminal chamber in the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (2011) 9 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 1067 at 1080-1081. 
1089 Article 4(m) provides that the ‘Union shall function in accordance with … respect for democratic principles, 
human rights, the rule of law and good governance’. Article 4(o) provides that the “Union shall function in 
accordance with ... respect for sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political 
assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities.’ 
1090 Constitutive Act of the African Union, preamble and article 3(f). 
1091 Al-Bashir is wanted before the ICC for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. The ICC issued a 
warrant of arrest for his arrest on 4 March 2009, for five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war 
crimes, which includes torture and rape as crimes against humanity. The second warrant of arrest issued on 12 July 
2010 for his arrest and surrender contained three counts of genocide, which includes rape as a type of genocide. 
Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir ‘First warrant of arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir’ ICC-
02/05-01/09-1 (4 March 2009). Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir ‘Second warrant of arrest for Omar 
Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir’ ICC-02/05-01/09-95 (12 July 2010). Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir 
‘Second decision on the Prosecution’s application for a warrant of arrest’ ICC-02/05-01/09 (12 July 2010). The Pre-
Trial Chamber had originally refused to grant the genocide counts. The Prosecutor had to appeal against the Pre-
Trial Chamber’s decision. The Appeals Chamber on 3 February 2010 reversed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision. 
1092 Constitutive Act of the African Union, art 4(h). 
1093 Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted on 11 July 2003. The Protocol 
was adopted by the First Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 
3 February 2003 and by the Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union in Maputo, Mozambique on 
11 July 2003. See Refworld/Protocol on Amendment to the Constitutive Act … available at 




humanity’, the words ‘as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability 
to the member state of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security 
Council’.1094 This additional clause was included to enable the AU to be flexible in deciding 
when to intervene.1095 Notably, the CA does not define war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity, but the Rome Statute provides guidance to the definition of these crimes. The 34 
African states parties to the ICC probably intended that the Rome Statute’s definition of these 
crimes, would also apply to those listed in the CA.1096 Also, these crimes are similarly defined in 
the Malabo Protocol in line with the definition given to them in the Rome Statute.1097 The AU’s 
office of legal counsel has noted that article 4(h) of the CA ‘provides the basis of the practice of 
the African Union on universal jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity’.1098 
5.2.2 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa. 
The Maputo Protocol complements the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
International Human Rights conventions as it ‘focuses on concrete actions and goals to grant 
women rights’.1099 The Maputo Protocol came into force on 25 November 2005 after 15 of its 53 
member states ratified the Protocol.1100 The protection of women’s rights and supplementing the 
                                                            
1094 Idem art 4(h). 
1095 Ben Kioko ‘The right of intervention under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: From non-interference to non-
intervention’ (2003) 85 Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge/International Review of the Red Cross 807 at 812. 
1096 For the list of African states which have ratified the Rome Statute see African group of States – ICC available at 
https://www.icc.cpi.int/.../states%20parties/african%20states/.../african%2... (accessed 20 January 2015). Though the 
CA came into force on 26 May 2001, it can be assumed that when the Rome Statute was adopted on 17 July 1998, 
the African member states, which agreed to its adoption, would agree to the contents of the Rome Statute, which 
include the definition of the crimes contained in the Rome Statute. Kindiki is of the opinion that as the Rome Statute 
has already defined war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, it would be difficult for the AU to develop 
other definitions. Kithure Kindiki ‘The normative and institutional framework of the African Union relating to the 
protection of human rights and the maintenance of international peace and security: A critical appraisal’ (2003) 3 
African Human Rights Law Journal 97 at 108. 
1097 The Malabo Protocol is not yet in force. See section 5.3.2 with regard to these crimes. 
1098International criminal justice and Africa, the state of play, Chapter 4 at 26 available at 
www.ictj.org/international-crimes (accessed on 18 April 2016).   
1099 Mary Wandia ‘Rights of women in Africa: Launch of petition to the African Union’ (3 June 2004) available at 
http://www.pambazuka.org/gender-minorities/rights-women-africa-launch-petition-african-union (accessed 6 
December 2016). 
1100 At present 36 member states have signed and ratified the Protocol and 15 member states have signed but not 
ratified the Protocol. These states are Algeria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Sudan and Sudan. Botswana, Egypt and Tunisia have not signed or ratified the Protocol. Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, available at 




African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Banjul Charter, ACHPR) informed the 
implementation of the protocol.1101  
In contrast to the Banjul Charter, the Maputo Protocol explicitly recognises gender-based 
violence committed against women in armed conflict situations.28 The definition ‘violence 
against women’ in article 1(J) of the Maputo Protocol, for instance, includes violence committed 
in ‘situations of armed conflicts or of war’. The stated definition of ‘violence against women’ is: 
All acts perpetrated against women which cause or could cause them physical, sexual, 
psychological, and economic harm, including the threat to take such acts; or to undertake the 
imposition of arbitrary restrictions on or deprivation of fundamental freedoms in private or public 
life in peace time and during situations of armed conflicts or of war.1102 
The Maputo Protocol also dedicates a whole article to the ‘protection of women in armed 
conflicts’,1103 thus incorporating international humanitarian law provisions in the article along 
with the jurisprudence of international tribunals.1104 Under article 11(1) of the Maputo Protocol, 
state parties ‘undertake to respect and ensure respect for the rules of international humanitarian 
law applicable in armed conflict situations, which affect the population, particularly women’. In 
an armed conflict, state parties are enjoined to protect civilians ‘irrespective of the population to 
which they belong’.1105 This duty arises from international humanitarian law. The protocol 
specifically mentions that the protection given to civilians extends to women.1106 Article 11(3) 
provides for protection from ‘all forms of violence, rape and sexual exploitation’ of ‘asylum-
seeking women, refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons’ by state parties.1107 These 
categories of people often come into being as the after-effect of an armed conflict. The article 
also provides for finding the perpetrators who shall be liable for the atrocities committed against 
their victims, which are considered ‘war crimes, genocide and/or crimes against humanity’.1108 
Although it prima facie appears that these acts can only be committed against the groups of 
                                                            
1101 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, available at University of Minnesota Human Rights 
Library, ‘African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights …’ available at 
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z1afchar.htm (accessed 12 April 2016). 
1102 The Maputo Protocol also defines ‘discrimination against women’ under article 1(f). 
1103 Maputo Protocol, art 11. 
1104 Fareda Banda (2008) Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa in Rachael Murray and 
Malcolm D Evans (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice 1986-2006 at 
455 (Cambridge University Press). 
1105 Maputo Protocol, art 11(2). 
1106 Ibid. 





people mentioned in the subsection, the contention is that these acts could also be committed 
against women in armed conflict situations who fall outside these groups. This is by virtue of the 
interpretation given to article 11(2), by which states parties have an obligation under 
international humanitarian law to protect women ‘irrespective of the population to which they 
belong’.1109 The last sub-paragraph of article 11 provides that state parties should ensure that 
children, especially the girl child under 18, do not engage in hostilities and are forcibly recruited 
as soldiers.1110 
When the ACJHPR comes into force, the General Affairs Section of the court will be 
competent to hear cases relating to the Maputo Protocol, which include cases under its article 11 
relating to SGBCs in armed conflict situations.1111 An individual or non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) with observer status before the AU or its organs or institutions, can bring 
cases relating to the Maputo Protocol before the General Affairs Section of the ACJHPR.1112 The 
Statute of the ACJHPR categorically states that the individual or NGO must be African.1113 They 
would only have a right to bring such cases if the member state concerned ‘has made a 
Declaration accepting the competence of the court to receive cases or applications submitted to it 
directly’.1114 In the event of a member state not making a Declaration, according to article 9(3) of 
the protocol the court will not receive the case or application.1115 It would be difficult for an 
individual or NGO in most cases to bring a case or application under the Maputo Protocol 
challenging a state for SGBCs, as most member states are reluctant to make such a Declaration. 
With the present African Court, that is the ACHPR; to be taken over by the ACJHPR when it 
                                                            
1109 Susana SaCouto and Katherine Cleary ‘The Women’s Protocol to the African Charter and sexual violence in the 
context of armed conflict or other mass atrocity’ (2009) 16 Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice 173 at 188. Ntombizozuko Dyani ‘Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa: Protection of women from 
sexual violence during armed conflict” (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal 166 at 181.  
1110 Maputo Protocol, art 11(4). 
1111 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, article 7 replaces article 17, Statute of 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. Article 7 states that article 17 shall read that ‘[t]he General Affairs 
Section shall be competent to hear all cases submitted under Article 28 of the Statute except those assigned by the 
Human and Peoples’ Rights Section and the International Criminal Law Section as specified in this Article.’ Under 
article 28(c) the ACJHPR will have jurisdiction over:  
‘The interpretation and the application of the African Charter, the Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa, or any other legal instrument relating to human rights, ratified by the States Parties concerned;’ 
1112 Idem at art 16. Article 16 is titled ‘Other entities eligible to submit cases to the court.’ 
1113  Ibid. 
1114 Ibid. 




comes into force, the protocol to ACHPR also specifies that a declaration must be made by 
member states granting NGOs or individuals access to the court.1116 Since the ACHPR’s coming 
into force on 25 January 2004, only eight member states have made an article 34(6) Declaration, 
with the Republic of Benin being the most recent member state to lodge its Declaration with the 
AU’s Commission.1117 At the same time, states tend to withdraw their declarations to limit those 
who may bring an application or case against them.1118  
Although the ACJHPR is not yet in force, an international court for the first time has 
made a pronouncement on the provisions of the Maputo Protocol.1119 The ECOWAS Community 
Court of Justice found the Federal Republic of Nigeria had violated articles 2, 3, 4(1), 5, 8 and 25 
of the Maputo Protocol,1120 and other conventions and human rights instruments. Article 2 of the 
Maputo Protocol provides for the ‘elimination of discrimination against women’ while article 3 
for their ‘right to dignity’, whilst article 4 provides for one’s ‘right to life, integrity and security’, 
article 4(1) states that ‘[e]very woman shall be entitled to respect for her life and the integrity 
and security of her person. All forms of exploitation, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment 
and treatment shall be prohibited’. Article 5 provides for the ‘elimination of harmful practices’ 
and article 8 for ‘access to justice and equal protection before the law’. Lastly, article 25 
provides for remedies, as reflected in the following case. The plaintiffs were wrongfully arrested 
                                                            
1116 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 9, 1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III), entered into force Jan. 
25, 2004. University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, ‘Protocol to the African charter on human and peoples’ 
right ….’ available at www.peacewomen.org/.../hr_protocoltotheafricancharteronhumanandpe... (accessed 12 April 
2016). Article 34(6) provides that:  
‘At the time of the ratification of this Protocol or any time thereafter, the State shall make a declaration 
accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases under article 5(3) of this Protocol. The Court shall not 
receive any petition under article 5 (3) involving a State Party which has not made such a declaration. 
Article 5(3) states that:  
‘The Court may entitle relevant non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with observer status before the 
Commission, and individuals to institute cases directly before it, in accordance with article 34 (6) of this 
Protocol.’ 
1117 The other states are Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda and Tanzania. Benin deposits 
article 34(6). Declaration available at www.africancourtcoalition.org › In the News (accessed 14 February 2017).  
1118 In 2016, Rwanda withdrew its declaration with the ACHPR claiming that it was to prevent individuals from 
exploiting its use and [to] avoid the declaration from being used contrary to the intention for why it was made (sic). 
International Justice Resource Centre ‘Rwanda withdraws access to the African Court for individuals and NGOs 
available at www.ijrcenter.org/.../rwanda-withdraws-access-to-african-court-for-individuals-and-n (accessed 14 
February 2017).  
1119 Dorothy Chioma Njemanze & 3 Others v The Federal Republic of Nigeria, ECOWAS Community Court of 
Justice, ECW/CCJ/APP/17/14/ECN/CCJ/JUD/08/17, 12 October 2017.  




by the defendant’s agents on the pretext that they were prostituting themselves on the streets at 
night, in Abuja, Nigeria. They were detained under inhuman conditions and subjected to sexual, 
physical and verbal abuse. They were neither charged nor offered apologies by the defendant’s 
agents when they were released. The court awarded the first, third and fourth plaintiffs’ damages 
in the sum of 6 million naira each. The court however, dismissed the second plaintiff’s claim as 
statute barred. Although this case did not occur in an armed conflict situation, it is positive news 
for female victims of SGBV committed in armed conflict, as these victims may also bring their 
case before the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice against ECOWAS member states, since 
the court cannot prosecute individuals.  
5.3 THE AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
The Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights,1121 adopted by the AU Assembly on June 27, 2014,1122 amended the Protocol on 
the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Protocol on ACJHR) at its 11th 
summit in 2008.1123 The Protocol on ACJHR provided for the merging of the African Court of 
Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR)1124 and the Court of Justice of the AU1125 into a single 
court known as the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR).1126 The merging of 
these two courts was intended to reduce costs.1127 The ACJHR consists of a General Affairs 
                                                            
1121 The Protocol on amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Malabo Protocol), establishes the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights. Protocol on 
amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art 1. Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, art 1(3). 
1122 Decision on the Draft Legal Instruments, Dec Assembly/AU/8(XXIII), Decision no Assembly/AU/Dec 
529(XXIII), (26-27 June 2014), para 2(e). 
1123 The AU Assembly adopted the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights on July 
1, 2008 in Sharm-El-Sheikh, Egypt.  
1124 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights relating to the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights established the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. 
1125 The CA established the Court of Justice as the principal judicial organ of the African Union. Constitutive Act of 
the African Union, art 18(1). Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, art 2(2). 
1126 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art 2. 
1127 Fidh International Federation for Human Rights, ‘Practical guide, The African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights toward the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,’ at 31 and 51 available at 
https://www.fidh.org?img?pdf/african_court_guide.pdf (accessed 15 April 2016). The decision to merge these two 
courts was made pursuant to two decisions of the AU. See Assembly of the African Union, Third Ordinary Session, 
6-8 July 2004, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Decision on the seats of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec. 45(III) Rev. 
1 at para 3 (The Assembly further decides that the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Court of 




Section and a Human Rights Section.1128 The ACJHR is not yet in operation as the  number of 
ratifications required to bring the Protocol on ACJHR and the Statute annexed to it, into force, 
have not been deposited.1129 With the amendment of the Protocol on ACJHR by the Malabo 
Protocol, the name ACJHR changed to the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACJHPR).1130 This new court will consist of three sections: General Affairs, Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and an International Criminal Law Section.1131 The International Criminal Law 
Section of the ACJHPR will consist of a Pre-Trial Chamber, a Trial Chamber and an Appellate 
Chamber.1132 As with the Protocol on ACJHR and its statute, the Malabo Protocol’s coming into 
force also depends on 15 member states ratifying it and the statute annexed to it.1133 So far, only 
nine member states have signed but not ratified the Malabo Protocol,1134 thus making the 
ACHPR the only regional court presently operating in Africa.  
This section of this chapter commenced by briefly assessing the genesis of the AU 
amending the Protocol on ACJHR to include international crimes, which include SGBCs 
committed in armed conflicts. The argument was that it was not the intention of the AU to 
prosecute international crimes at the regional level, especially considering that this idea was 
considered untimely when first broached in the 1980s. Moreover, with the creation of the 
ACJHR, there was no International Criminal Law Section but a General Affairs and Human 
Rights Section. Secondly, despite the AU having repeatedly stated its commitment to fighting 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
July 2005, Sirte, Libya, Decision on the merger of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Court 
of Justice of the African Union – Assembly/AU/6(v) (The Assembly decides that a draft legal instrument relating to 
the establishment of the merged court comprising the Human Rights Court and the Court of Justice should be 
completed for consideration by the next ordinary sessions of the Executive Council).  
1128 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art 28(c). 
1129Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art 9. Fifteen ratifications are required. 
As of 2014 Libya, Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Congo, Rwanda and Cote d’Ivoire have ratified the Protocol on 
ACJHR. SALC Handbook series ‘Justice for all: Realising the promise of the Protocol establishing the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights available at www.southernafriclitigationcentre,org/.../Justice-for-all-Realising-
the-Pr...  (accessed 2 May 2016).  
1130 Protocol on amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art 1. 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights at art 1(3). 
1131 Idem at art 16(1). 
1132 Idem at art 16(2). 
1133 Idem at art 9. 
1134 As of January 2017, these member states are Benin, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, 
Guinea, Sierra Leone and Sao Tome and Principe. Chad was the last member state to sign the Malabo Protocol in 
February 24, 2016. African Union, Draft 2 Withdrawal strategy document at 12 available at 





impunity, it more particularly seeks to promote peace and security rather than justice.1135 
Sequencing peace and security over justice contradicts articles 4(h) and 4(o) of the CA of the 
AU, condemning and rejecting impunity, and asserting the duty to intervene in situations of 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, regardless of the perpetrators’ status.1136 For 
instance, Thabo Mbeki, as former president of South Africa, in referring to the case against Al-
Bashir, stated that Africa’s ‘first task is in stop[ping] the killings of Africans’. But a challenge 
arises when the argument is made that the issue of justice is trumped by the issue of peace.’1137 
Salva Kiir, South Sudan’s leader said that ‘he needs Bashir not in a court room or in jail, but at 
the negotiating talk in order to reach peace in Sudan’.1138 In the process, no peace deals were 
reached and there were continued reports of women and girls raped by rebels, government-
supported militia and the Sudanese forces.1139  
In its instrument of withdrawal lodged at the UN in October 2016, South Africa stated 
that it ‘found that its obligations with respect to the peaceful resolution of conflicts at times are 
incompatible with the interpretation given by the International Criminal Court of obligations 
contained in the Rome Statute’.1140 Apart from the different instruments stating the AU’s 
emphasis on promoting peace and security, the AU’s reluctance to prosecute international crimes 
                                                            
1135 Constitutive Act, Preamble (Determined to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights, consolidate 
democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law). African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, Preamble (Firmly convinced of their duty to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights 
and freedoms and taking into account the importance traditionally attached to these rights and freedoms in Africa). 
Protocol on ACJHR, Preamble (Bearing in mind their commitment to promote peace, security and stability on the 
continent and to protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights and other relevant instruments relating to human rights). Malabo Protocol, Preamble (Bearing in mind their 
commitment to promote peace, security and stability on the continent, and to protect human and peoples’ rights in 
accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant instruments). An exception 
where the AU did not prefer peace and security over justice is in the armed conflict in South Sudan. The Peace and 
Security Council of the AU in 2013 ordered a Commission of Inquiry to be established to investigate into and make 
recommendations on the human right abuses, which included raping of civilians, caused by the power struggle 
between soldiers loyal to President Salva Kiir and those loyal to the former Vice-President, Dr Rick Machar. This 
investigation was ordered even though the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was involved in 
peace talks with both sides. Human Rights Watch ‘South Sudan events of 2015’ available at 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/south-sudan (accessed 20 February 2017). The final report 
of the African Commission of inquiry on South Sudan (15 October 2014) is available at 
https://paanluelwel2011.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/final-report-full-report.pdf  (accessed 20 February 2017).     
1136 See footnote 13 above for the text of article 4(0) of the CA of the AU. 
1137 Al Jazeera ‘Thabo Mbeki: Justice cannot trump peace’ available at www.aljazeera.com/.../thabo-mbeki-justice-
cannot-trump-peace-2013112210658783... (accessed 18 February 2017). 
1138 Ibid. 
1139International Bar Association ‘Sexual violence in Darfur’ (2015) available at 
www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=8be55dc6-54c1-47ed-a7d8 (accessed 18 February 2017). 
1140 The Citizen ‘SA pulling out of the International Criminal Court’ available at http://citizen.co.za/news/news-




is apparent as gleaned from the difficulty individuals and NGOs experience on prosecuting 
SGBCs − as with other cases provided for by the Maputo Protocol before the ACHPR, which is 
still in force, and the ACJHPR, if it should start operating. Most African states participated in the 
drafting of the Rome Statute in 1998 at the Rome Conference1141 and 34 out of the 47 African 
states represented1142 ratified the Rome Statute under which they expected the ICC to prosecute 
crimes of most serious concern to the international community, and which included SGBCs in 
armed conflicts.1143 In any event, as the prosecution of SGBCs in armed conflicts was the 
primary duty of states, and the ICC would only prosecute these crimes as a last resort, there was 
no need to establish an international criminal court at the regional level.1144 The next section 
reviews the Malabo Protocol with regard to SGBCs in armed conflict situations. 
5.3.1 The genesis leading to the prosecution of international crimes by the African Court 
of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Scholars such as Murungu have mistakenly claimed that the quest for a human rights and an 
international criminal court at the regional level in Africa was due to the indictment and 
prosecution of senior African state officials by certain European domestic courts, and/or by the 
ICC,1145 pushing the AU to act in establishing an international criminal court. Apparently, 
discussions within the AU to have a court in Africa to try international law crimes first occurred 
in the 1980s1146 during the drafting of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
Although Guinea then initiated this proposal, discussions on establishing an African Court to try 
international crimes on the continent arose again in January 2006 when the AU Assembly set up 
a committee to advise on issues relating to the case against Chad’s former President, Hissene 
                                                            
1141 Hassan Jallow and Fatou Bensouda International Criminal Law in an African Context in Max du Plessis (ed) 
African Guide to International Criminal Justice 15 at 41 (Institute for Security Studies). 
1142States parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at https://asp-icc-
cp.int/.../states%20parties/.../the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20...(accessed 20 January 2015).Coalition for 
the International Criminal Court ‘Africa and the International Criminal Court’, available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Africa_and_the_icc.pdf (accessed on 29 June 2016). 
1143 See Press conference by the President of the Assembly of States Parties, H. E. Mr Sidiki Kaba on the withdrawal 
from the Rome Statute at 9 (24 October 2016) available at https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/.../PASP-Press Conference 
(24Oct2016)-ENG-transcript.p (accessed 14 February 2017) (stating that the reason why African states decided to 
join the ICC is because ‘justice can play a role in the  resolution of the crisis  situations which prevail in almost all 
African regions. The International Criminal Court gives hope that those responsible for these crises will be 
prosecuted’). 
1144 Rome Statute, art 17. 
1145 Murungu ‘Towards a Criminal Chamber’ at 1068 and 1077-8.  
1146 Abass ‘Prosecuting International crimes in Africa’ at 936. Max du Plessis, Tiyanjana Maluwa and Annie 
O’Reilly ‘Africa and the International Criminal Court’ (2013) available at 




Habre. In its report, the Committee of Eminent African Jurists recommended ‘the possibility of 
conferring criminal jurisdiction on the African Court of Justice . . . to make the respect for 
human rights at national, regional and continental levels a fundamental tenet for African 
governance’.1147 In February 2009, whilst expressing its regret at the warrant of arrest issued 
against the Chief of Protocol for Rwanda, Mrs Rose Kabuyethe, the AU Assembly sought the 
establishment of the AU Commission:  
 . . . in consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, to examine the implications of the Court being empowered 
to try international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and report 
thereon to the Assembly in 2010.1148 
In that same year, the AU Assembly, in expressing its concern about the effect the indictment 
issued against Al-Bashir would have on the peace processes being carried out, requested the 
Commission to:  
[E]nsure the early implementation of Decision Assembly/Dec. 213(XII), adopted in February 
2009 mandating the Commission, in consultation with the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to examine the 
implications of the Court being empowered to try serious crimes of international concern such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, which would be complementary to national 
jurisdiction and processes for fighting impunity.1149 
Another decision, taken by the AU Assembly in July 2010, requested that the AU Commission 
‘finalise its study on the implications of empowering the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights to try international crimes’. It also requested the commission to submit a ‘report to the 
next Ordinary Session of the Assembly through the Executive Council in January/February 
2011’.1150 The AU Commission employed a team of experts to draft a Protocol, which would 
expand the ACJHR’s jurisdiction to include international crimes. The AU government, experts, 
and ministers of justice and lawyers adopted the draft Protocol in May 2012 after experts had 
                                                            
1147 Idem at 8. Murungu ‘Towards a Criminal Chamber’ at 1075. Abass ‘Prosecuting International crimes in Africa’ 
at 919.  
1148Assembly/AU/DEC. 213(XII), Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the implementation of the Assembly 
decision on the abuse of the principle of Universal jurisdiction, Doc Assembly/AU/3(XII), Twelfth Ordinary 
Session, 1-3 February 2009, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
1149 Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev 1, Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the meeting of African States 
Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII), Thirteenth Ordinary Session, 1-3 July 2009, 
Sirte, Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 
1150 Assembly/AU/Dec.292 (XV), Decision of the abuse of the principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Doc. 




considered the various revisions of the draft at different workshops.1151 In June 2014, the African 
Union Assembly adopted the final version of the Malabo Protocol. 
5.3.2 Crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Law Section of The 
African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
Article 28A of the statute of the ACJHPR lists 14 international and transnational crimes, which 
the ACJHPR would have power to prosecute1152 once its Protocol and annexed Statute came into 
force. These crimes include genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. There should be 
coordinated arrangements for SGBCs to be prosecuted as genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.1153 Genocide was defined largely in the same way as in the Rome Statute except for 
the addition of a subsection ‘[a]cts of rape or any other form of sexual violence’ not included 
under the genocide article in the Rome Statute.1154 The addition of the words ‘[a]cts of rape or 
any other form of sexual violence’ indicates that the AU appreciated the decision in the case of 
Prosecutor v Akayesu, relating to rape and sexual violence. The ICTR stated that rape could 
constitute genocide when it was ‘committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a particular group, targeted as such’.1155 Ambos is of the opinion that the additional 
subparagraph does not add value to the traditional scope of genocide crimes. She argues that 
‘rape or any other form of sexual violence’ are already covered under subparagraph (b), that is, 
‘causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group’, and under subparagraph (d), 
that is, ‘imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group’.1156 Although Ambos 
draws one’s attention to this fact, this additional subparagraph not only explicitly refers to rape 
and sexual violence, but also takes into account the argument of feminist scholars for the 
recognition of these crimes as distinct crimes on their own right.1157 Ambos is also of the 
opinion, that the drafters of the Malabo Protocol should have added the term ‘political groups’ in 
                                                            
1151 Meeting of Government Experts and Ministers of Justice/Attorneys, General on Legal Matters 7 to 11 and 14 to 
15 May 2012, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, ‘Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights,’ Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7. Article 28E which relates to the crime of unconstitutional 
change of government was not adopted. 
1152 Malabo Protocol, art 28A(1). 
1153 Idem at arts 28B (Genocide), 28C (Crimes against Humanity), and 28D (War Crimes) 
1154 Idem at arts 28B and 28B(f). 
1155 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial Judgment) Case No ICTR-96-4, Sept 2, 1998, paras 731 and 734.  
1156 Kai Ambos (2017) Genocide (Article 28B), Crimes against Humanity (article 28C), War Crimes (Article 28D) 
and the Crime of Aggression (Article 28M), in Werle G., Vormbaum M. (eds) The African Criminal Court. 
International Criminal Justice Series, vol 10. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 31 at 39. 
1157 See for example chapter 2 regarding the argument made by feminist scholars such as Kathleen M Pratt and 
Laurel E Fletcher ‘Time for justice: The case for the international prosecutions of rape and gender-based violence in 




the genocide section, as this would have addressed the demands of human rights advocates to 
have this group included. Adding ‘political groups’ to the genocide aegis would have aligned the 
protocol with domestic legislation, such as in Columbia,1158 Côte d’Ivoire and Ethiopia.1159 It 
would be appropriate to include ‘political groups’ in the Malabo Protocol as ‘political groups’ in 
Africa have historically been targets of genocidal attacks through widespread rape. The 2002 
attacks perpetrated in the Ituri region of the DRC against the Lendu ethnic tribe and other 
political opponents by rape and other inhumane acts by armed groups is an example of this.1160    
The definition of crimes against humanity is also very similar to that of the Rome Statute, 
except for the word ‘enterprise’, included in its descriptive paragraph.1161 The article does not 
define what would constitute an enterprise. Under its list of what acts could constitute crimes 
against humanity, the article not only lists ‘[t]orture’ in article 28C(1)(f) but also adds the words 
‘cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment’. Though torture is defined in article 
28C(2)(e), no definition is given for these additional crimes. ‘Cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment’ are additional to the acts provided for in article 7(f) of the Rome 
Statute, which only mentions ‘torture’. Additionally, the ICC’s ‘Elements of Crime’ provides the 
elements for the war crimes of inhuman treatment, cruel treatment and outrages upon personal 
dignity.1162  
The definition of war crimes under article 28D in the Malabo Protocol is largely similar 
to the definition of war crimes in the Rome Statute. In the Malabo Protocol war crimes refers to 
‘any of the offences listed, in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a 
large scale commission of such crimes’.1163 The phrase ‘in particular when committed as part of 
a plan or policy or as part of a large scale commission of such crimes’ was included in the Rome 
Statute’s definition of war crimes as a compromise after heated debate by delegates at the Rome 
                                                            
1158 See article 101 of the Criminal Code of Columbia. Kai Ambos ‘Genocide (Article 28B), Crimes against 
Humanity (Article 28C), War Crimes (Article 28D) and the Crime of Aggression (Article 28M)’ at 40. 
1159 Although Côte d'Ivoire includes ‘political groups’ in its domestic legislation, ‘racial groups’ is omitted. See 
article 137 of the Code Penal. With regard to Ethiopia, see article 269 of the Criminal Code.    
1160 Democratic Republic of Congo – Page 1    
1161 Article 28(C)(1) provides that ‘[f]or the purposes of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the 
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack or enterprise directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack or enterprise: (emphasis added).  
1162 ICC Elements of Crime, war crime of inhuman treatment art 8(2)(a)(ii) – 2, war crime of cruel treatment art 
8(2)(c)(i) – 3, war crime of outrages upon personal dignity art 8(2)(c)(ii). 




Conference.1164 It was agreed that the ‘plan, policy and scale are not elements or jurisdictional 
pre-requisites for war crimes’.1165 Instead ‘they are factors which may be taken into account by 
the Prosecutor in determining whether or not to begin investigations concerning an alleged war 
criminal.1166 Nothing suggests that the drafters of the Malabo Protocol intended that this phrase 
should bear the same interpretation as that of the Rome Statutes. Ambos points out that the 
drafters of the Malabo Protocol should have seized the opportunity to exclude this controversial 
phrase from the Malabo Protocol, as it was an ‘unnecessary limitation of the war crimes 
provision, and one not required by international (humanitarian) law’.1167 The drafters of the 
Malabo Protocol would not have been expected to have made the distinction between 
international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict in article 28D of the Malabo 
Protocol, especially as African delegates at the Rome Conference were in favour of having it 
removed.1168 Scholars such as Jalloh view this distinction as an archaic legal one which gives 
importance to the nature of the conflict rather than the gravity of the crime.1169 As pointed out by 
Ambos, most of the crimes listed in article 28D are defined as crimes occurring both in the 
context of an international and non-international armed conflict, thus making the distinction 
irrelevant.1170 As a result there is a ‘common category of armed conflict crimes’.1171 Although 
one may assume that article 28D provides for a ‘common category of armed conflict crimes’ – 
those crimes which are common to both types of armed conflict – it would avoid confusion if the 
Malabo Protocol is amended to reflect this. 
                                                            
1164 Krut Dormann ‘War crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court with special focus on the 
negotiations on the elements of crimes’ (2003) 7 Max Planck Yearbook of the United Nations Law 341 at 349. 
1165 Ibid. 
1166 Ibid.  
1167 Kai Ambos ‘Genocide (Article 28B), Crimes against Humanity (Article 28C), War Crimes (Article 28D) and the 
Crime of Aggression (Article 28M)’ at 42. 
1168 Charles Jalloh ‘Regionalizing International Criminal Law?’ (2009) 9 International Criminal Law Review 445 at 
475.  
1169 Ibid. See also Deidre Willmott ‘Removing the distinction between international and non-international armed 
conflict in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (2004) 5 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1 
at 3. 
1170 Kai Ambos ‘Genocide (Article 28B), Crimes against Humanity (Article 28C), War Crimes (Article 28D) and the 
Crime of Aggression (Article 28M)’ at 48. In referring to the Rome Statute, Jalloh also pointed out that it was 
unnecessary for the Statute to distinguish between international and non-international armed conflicts. He went on to 
state that the ‘codification of the relevant war crimes in a single place, effectively renders the distinction nugatory in 
the legal regime applicable before the International Criminal Court. Charles Jalloh ‘Regionalizing International 
Criminal Law?’ at 475. 




Apart from the new category of armed conflict titled ‘nuclear weapons or weapons of 
mass destruction’, there are four different categories of war crimes in the Malabo Protocol, 
which are similar to those in the Rome Statutes. These categories are: 
• Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 19491172; 
 
• Grave breaches of the First Additional Protocol to the Conventions of 8 June 1977 and 
other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed 
conflict1173; 
 
• Serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, which applies in a non-international armed conflict situation;1174 and  
 
• Other serious violations of the laws of customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an 
international character.1175   
Article 28(D)(b), that is, the ‘[g]rave breaches of the First Additional Protocol to the 
Conventions of 8 June 1977 category’, contains an additional list of seven war crimes, not 
contained in the Rome Statute, which apply in an international armed conflict context.1176 They 
derive their legal basis from the 1907 Hague Conventions, the Four Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocol I. 
These crimes are: 
o Intentionally launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous 
forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to 
civilians or damage to civilian objects which will be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct overall military advantage anticipated;1177 
 
• Unjustifiably delaying the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians;1178 
• Wilfully committing practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices 
involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination;1179  
• Making non-defended localities and demilitarised zones the object attack;1180 
                                                            
1172 This applies to grave breaches committed in the context of an international armed conflict. Article 28D(a) 
Malabo Protocol. The corresponding article in the Rome Statute is article 8(2)(a). 
1173 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(b). The corresponding article in the Rome Statute is article 8(2)(b). Though the 
phrase, ‘grave breaches of the First Additional Protocol to the Conventions of 8 June 1977’ is not mentioned in 
article 8(2)(b) Rome Statute the crimes under this article are a reproduction from this and other Conventions. Krut 
Dormann ‘War crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ at 344.   
1174 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(c). The corresponding article in the Rome Statute is article 8(2)(c). 
1175 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(e). The corresponding article in the Rome Statute is article 8(2)(e). 
1176 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(b). 
1177 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(b)(v). 
1178 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(b) (xxviii). 




• Slavery and deportation to slave labour;1181 
• Collective punishments;1182 
• Despoliation of the wounded, sick, shipwrecked or dead.1183 
 
Of these seven crimes1184‘[s]lavery and deportation to slave labour’ is especially relevant to the 
prosecution of SGBCs as it is based on article 13 of the third Geneva Convention, which 
provides for the ‘humane treatment of prisoners’; as is article 62 of the same Convention, which 
provides that ‘[p]risoners of war shall be paid a fair working rate of pay by the detaining 
authorities direct’,1185 based on article 6 of the annex to IV Hague Convention regarding 
excessive tasks imposed on prisoners of war.1186 Article 28D(b)(xxvii) of the Malabo Protocol 
which refers to ‘[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of 18 years into the national 
armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities’ in an international armed conflict 
is also relevant to SGBCs. It differs from article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Rome Statute, which 
provides for ‘[c]onscripting or enlisting children’ in an international armed conflict situation, as 
the age specified in the Malabo Protocol for the conscription or enlisting children is higher than 
that specified in the Rome Statute. Under the Malabo Protocol it is an offence to conscript or 
enlist children under the age of 18 years, whilst the Rome Statute specifies ‘under the age of 15 
years’.1187 However, as with the Rome Statute, which makes ‘conscription or enlisting of 
children . . . into the national armed forces an offence, the drafters of the Malabo Protocol ought 
to have seized the opportunity to include non-state actors such as militia groups as potential 
perpetrators of this crime.1188 Article 28D(b)(xxvii) of the Malabo Protocol differs from its 
article 28D(e)(vii), which also refers to ‘[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of 
eighteen years’ but ‘into armed forces or groups . . .’  applicable to non-international armed 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
1180 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(b) (xxx). 
1181 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(b) (xxxi). 
1182 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(b) (xxxii).   
1183 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(b) (xxxiii). 
1184 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(b) (xxxi). 
1185 Geneva Convention III relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949. See also Kai Ambos 
Genocide (Article 28B), Crimes against Humanity (Article 28C), War Crimes (Article 28D) and the Crime of 
Aggression (Article 28M)’ at 46. 
1186 Article 6 annex to the Hague Convention IV, Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land. Kai 
Ambos ‘Genocide (Article 28B), Crimes against Humanity (Article 28C), War Crimes (Article 28D) and the Crime 
of Aggression (Article 28M)’ at 44. 
1187 Rome Statute, art 8(2)(b)(xxvi). 
1188 Kai Ambos ‘Genocide (Article 28B), Crimes against Humanity (Article 28C), War Crimes (Article 28D) and the 




conflict. Thus, under the Malabo Protocol, the prosecutor can only prosecute non-state actors 
who conscript or enlist children in a non-international armed conflict situation, as the reference 
to ‘groups’ in article 28D(e)(vii) is to non-state actors. 
Article 28D(e) also provides seven additional crimes to those provided in the Rome 
Statute, but applicable in a non-international armed conflict context. They derive their legal base 
from the Geneva Conventions, Hague Convention and the Additional Protocol II. These crimes 
are: 
• Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving 
them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief 
supplies;1189 
• Utilising the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain 
points, areas or military forces immune from military operations;1190 
• Launching an indiscriminate attack resulting in death or injury to incidental 
civilian loss, injury or damage; or an attack in the knowledge that it will cause 
excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects;1191 
• Making non-defended localities and demilitarised zones the object of attack;1192 
• Slavery;1193 
• Collective punishments;1194 
• Despoliation of the wounded, sick, shipwrecked or dead.1195 
Of relevance to the prosecution of SGBCs is the crime of slavery. Its legal basis is derived from 
articles 13 and 62 of the Geneva Convention III,1196 and from article 4(2)(f) of the Additional 
Protocol II.1197 However, slavery would be of a sexual nature where the perpetrator has caused a 
person to engage in such acts.1198 To assist the ACJHPR with interpreting and applying crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in SGBV cases committed in armed conflict 
                                                            
1189 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(e)(xvi). 
1190 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(e)(xvii).   
1191 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(e)(xviii).   
1192 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(e)(xix).   
1193 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(e)(xx). 
1194 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(e)(xxi).   
1195 Malabo Protocol, art 28D(e)(xxii).   
1196 See footnote 112 above. 
1197 Article 4(2)(f) of the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II) (prohibits at any time and at any place 
whatsoever slavery and the slave trade in all their forms). Kai Ambos ‘Genocide (Article 28B), Crimes against 
Humanity (Article 28C), War Crimes (Article 28D) and the Crime of Aggression (Article 28M)’ at 47. 
1198 Though the elements of crimes for sexual slavery have not been defined in the Malabo Protocol it would more 




situations, the ACJHPR will need to rely on an Elements of Crimes document, just as the ICC 
has done.1199  
The other crimes that the ACJHPR will have jurisdiction to prosecute are crimes of 
unconstitutional change of government, piracy, terrorism, mercenarism, corruption, money 
laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes, illicit 
exploitation of natural resources and the crime of aggression.1200 Abass, points out that although 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are serious crimes, they are not committed on 
a frequent enough basis to be compared to other ‘ubiquitous and ongoing crimes’ such as piracy, 
internet frauds and trafficking of children and women, which affect many states in Africa and are 
in urgent need of consideration by the international criminal jurisdictions.1201 Although Abass’s 
view may be correct, if these crimes are given more consideration than those of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, there is the danger that SGBCs will be considered to be crimes 
of secondary importance and become marginalised.1202 This will be a regression to the days 
when SGBCs were not recognised in their own right. Article 46C of the statute of the ACJHPR 
also provides for corporate criminal liability.1203 In the prosecution of SGBCs, invoking this 
article is imperative where armed groups are funded by corporations involved in illegal 
exploitation of conflict minerals such as gold, tantalum, tin and tungsten.1204 
                                                            
1199 See Rome Statute art 9(1). In addition, article 21(1) of the Rome Statute also provides in relation to the 
documents the ICC relies on that, the Court should ‘apply in the first place, the Rome Statute [sic], Elements of 
Crimes and its rules of Procedure and Evidence.’ This order of relying on which documents or law to be first applied 
could also be applicable for the international criminal court section of the ACJHPR once it drafts an Elements of 
Crimes and rules of Procedure and Evidence documents. 
1200 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, arts 28A(1)(4)-(14). Though the Statute 
of the ACJHPR define these transnational crimes, some of them such as the unconstitutional change of government 
and the illicit exploitation of natural resources are not defined under international law.  
1201 Ademola Abass ‘The proposed international criminal jurisdiction for the African Court: some problematical 
aspects’ (2013) 60 Netherlands International Law Review 27 at 36-37. 
1202 Sirleaf is of the opinion that there could be a division of labour between the ICC and the ACJHPR. Sirleaf 
suggests that the ICC should focus on ‘crisis crimes’ that is those crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, whilst the 
ACJHPR focuses on the more ‘quotidian crimes.’ Her reasoning for this is to allow the ICC to concentrate on the 
crimes within its jurisdiction, thus allowing the ICC to ‘dedicate its limited resources more effectively.’ Following 
Sirleaf’s suggestion will still marginalise SGBCs at the regional level, which means that the reason for considering 
closing the impunity gap for SGBCs at the regional level would be defeated. Matiangai V S Sirleaf ‘Regionalism, 
regime complexes and the crisis in international criminal justice’ (2016) 54 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
699 at 760. Matiangai V S Sirleaf ‘The African Justice Cascade and the Malabo Protocol’ (2017) 11 International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 1 at 29. 
1203 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, art 46C. 
1204 Idem art 28L bis could also be used to prosecute individuals where SGBCs in-armed conflict arises because of 
illicit exploitation of natural resources. Conflict minerals in eastern DRC, helped sustain armed groups and 




Apart from the fact that the ACJHPR will have jurisdiction to try a wide range of crimes, 
its statute provides for the incorporation of ‘additional crimes to reflect developments in 
international law’.1205 Prosecuting a wide range of crimes and adding more crimes to the 
jurisdiction of the ACJHPR will result in strain on its human resources but also constraints on the 
number of cases it can prosecute, as prosecutions are costly in terms of time and time and 
resources. This would mean that the OTP of the ACJHPR would have to prioritise prosecutions, 
which in turn would limit the number of SGBCs that it investigates and takes to trial. In addition 
to this, the judges assigned to each chamber will be overburdened, as there would be not enough 
judges to handle the volume of cases assigned to each chamber. For instance, the ACJHPR’s 
International Criminal Law Section will only have nine judges assigned to it. One judge will sit 
in the Pre-Trial Chamber, three judges in the Trial Chamber and five judges in the Appellate 
Chamber.1206 Experience has also shown the necessity of having competent and experienced 
investigative teams to handle SGBCs. Cases such as Prosecutor v Akayesu tried by the 
International Criminal Court for Rwanda (ICTR) and Prosecutor v Mathieu Chui tried by the 
ICC illustrate of this proposition.1207  
Prosecuting SGBCs is time-consuming, as they are amongst the most difficult crimes to 
prosecute, presenting ‘many challenges and obstacles in the way of the effective investigation 
and prosecution’1208. The ICC, for instance, which has jurisdiction to try a smaller range of 
international crimes on a wider geographical reach than that of the ACJHPR’s international 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Enough Project ‘Progress and challenges on conflict minerals: facts on Dodd-Frank 1502’ available at 
www.enoughproject.org/files/Progress%20and%20Challenges.pdf (accessed 14 February 2017).  
1205 Idem art 28(A)(2) provides that ‘[t]he Assembly may extend upon the consensus of State Parties the jurisdiction 
of the court to incorporate additional crimes to reflect developments in international law.’ 
1206 Malabo Protocol, article 10.  
1207 In the former case, Judge Navanethem Pillay’s questioning of a witness revealed that rapes had taken place in 
the Taba commune of which the accused was the bourgmestre. Judge Pillay adjourned the trial to allow the 
prosecution to investigate the allegations of rape, which arose from the questioning of the witness. Prosecutor v 
Mathieu Chui case was one of the many cases before the ICC, where the judges went into depth pointing out the 
flaws in the Prosecutor’s investigations, which should not have occurred, thus resulting in the acquittal of the 
accused from all charges, brought against him.   
1208 Some of these challenges and obstacles ‘include the under or non-reporting owing to societal, cultural, or 
religious factors, stigma for victims; limited domestic investigations, and the associated lack of forensic or other 
documentary evidence owing inter alia to the passage of time, and inadequate or limited support services at national 
level.’ ICC, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, June 2014, para 3 and Executive Summary para 4 




criminal law section, spent over US$ 1 billion on its first two successful convictions,1209 and this 
after 12 years of the ICC being in force.1210 The ICC is funded by the Assembly of State Parties, 
individuals, and international corporations and organisations.1211 It is possible that some states, 
which ratify the Malabo Protocol and are already ICC member states, would find it difficult to 
meet their financial contributions, as this is already occurring with member states’ financial 
commitments to the African Union. By the end of 2015, for instance, only 19 African Union 
member states ‘had fully met their obligations to the Union, while 35 member states were in 
arrears with 14 member states having already been in arrears as at 31 December 2014.’1212 The 
ICC, which has a smaller range of crimes to try compared with the ACJHPR, is burdened with 
outstanding contributions from certain state members to the court’s regular budget and 
contingency fund.1213 Of concern is that the ACJHR, like the ICC would face similar financial 
challenges, but on a larger scale. In addition, the ACJHR may not be able to obtain as much 
finance as the ICC has been able to raise from other entities. One of the ways, which the OTP of 
the ACJHPR could reduce its financial cost would be by investigating SGBCs concurrently with 
other crimes within its jurisdiction, just as the OTP of the ICC has undertaken to do. This method 
not only ensures that resources are efficiently utilised, but also enables sufficient time to be given 
to collecting and analysing evidence, planning of cases and decision-making, as well as 
identifying and selecting witnesses.1214 
The OTP of the ACJHPR should take its cue from the ICC’s OTP 2016-2018 strategy in 
prosecuting cases to forestall the marginalisation of the prosecution of SGBCs at the regional 
                                                            
1209 These cases were Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Prosecutor v Germain Katanga. Lubanga was found 
guilty on 14 March 2012 and Katanga on 7 March 2014. Their convictions did not relate to sexual and gender-based 
crimes.  
1210 David Davenport ‘International Criminal Court: 12 years, $1 billion, 2 convictions’ (2014) available at 
www.forbes.com/.../12/international-criminal-court-12-years-1-billion-2-convictions (accessed 10 February 2017). 
The ICC’s budgetary request for 2016 to run the Office of the Prosecutor was 6.47 million euros, an increase of 16.4 
per cent from the previous year, whilst its request for the judiciary was 6.70 million euros an increase of 5.6 per cent 
from the previous year. The Committee on Budget and Finance recommended a 3,839,400-euro increase for the 
Office of the Prosecutor and a 429,900 increase for the judiciary.Global Justice ‘ASP 14: Negotiating the 2016 
International Criminal Court budget’, available at 
https://iciccglobaljustice.wordpress.com/.../asp14_the_courts_budget_for_2... (accessed 14 May 2016). 
1211 African Business Magazine ‘Who pays for the ICC?’ (2011) available at 
www.africanbusinessmagazine.com/uncategorised/who-pays-for-the-icc/  (accessed 11 November 2016).  
1212 2017 Budget Overview Paper – Pan African Parliament available at 
www.panafricanparliament.org/.../documents...au-2017-budget-overview-paper.../file (accessed 14 May 2018). 
1213 ICC Assembly of State Parties, Report of the Committee on Budget and Finance on the work of its Twenty-
seventh Session, ICC-ASP 15/15 (28 October 2016) paras 16 -22. 




level. The first strategic plan of relevance to SGBCs relating to armed conflicts is a prosecutorial 
policy involving the OTP of the ACJHPR taking an in-depth, open-ended approach to 
investigations, while maintaining its focus. As described by the ICC’s OTP, this means 
identifying  
 [a]lleged crimes (or incidents) to be investigated within a wide range of incidents. Following this 
meticulous process, alleged perpetrators are identified based on the evidence collected, This 
approach implies the need to consider multiple alternative case hypotheses and to consistently 
and objectively test case theories against the evidence – incriminating and exonerating – and to 
support decision-making in relation to investigations and prosecutions.1215 
The second prosecutorial policy strategy would be for the OTP of the ACJHPR to be ‘as trial-
ready as possible from the earliest phases of proceedings, such as when seeking an arrest warrant 
and no later than the confirmation-of-charges hearing.’1216 Thus, the OTP would only issue an 
arrest warrant or summons to appear ‘if there are sufficient prospects to further collect evidence 
to be trial-ready within a reasonable timeframe’.1217 The third prosecutorial policy which the 
OTP of the ACJHPR could consider would be prosecuting perpetrators starting from the mid to 
high-level to enable it convict those most responsible for the crime.1218  
Another strategic plan, which the OTP of the ACJHPR might adopt for the investigation 
and prosecution of SGBCs would be to ‘integrate a gender perspective in all areas of the office’s 
work to implement the policies in relation to sexual and gender-based crimes’.1219 This is the 
second strategic goal of the ICC OTP’s 2016-2018 strategic plan. The only reference in the 
Malabo Protocol to gender issues is in the statute of the ACJHPR which states that ‘the 
Assembly shall ensure that there is equitable gender representation in the court’,1220 which could 
be read as referring to the staff and judges employed at the ACJHPR. By integrating a gender 
perspective, the OTP would be:  
. . . committed to integrating a gender perspective and analysis into all of its work, being 
innovative in the investigation and prosecution of these crimes, providing adequate training for 
                                                            
1215 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan| 2016-2018 at 15. 
1216 Ibid. 
1217 Idem at 15 and 16. 
1218 Idem at 16. 
1219 Idem at 6 and 19. 




staff, adopting a victim-responsive approach in its work, and paying special attention to staff 
interaction with victims and witnesses, and their families and communities.1221 
The OTP of the ACJHPR will also have ‘to ensure that its activities do not cause harm to victims 
and witnesses.1222 It would need to  
pay particular attention to SGBC from the earliest stages to address specific challenges posed to 
the investigation and prosecution of these crimes, including under or non-reporting owing to 
societal, cultural or religious factors.1223 
Within its mandate, the OTP of the ACJHPR will need to ‘apply a gender analysis to all crimes 
within its jurisdiction’,1224 and must also ‘bring charges for SGBCs wherever there is sufficient 
evidence to support such charges’,1225 thus avoiding the mistake made by the Prosecutor of the 
ICC by not bringing charges for SGBCs in the Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo case. 
The ICC’s OTP adopted as its strategic goal 5 ‘a basic size which can respond to the 
demands placed upon the office so that it may perform its functions with the required quality, 
effectiveness and efficiency’.1226 It would be necessary for the OTP of the ACJHPR to consider a 
similar plan so as to fairly present cases of SGBV before the court. This form of strategic goal 
would assist the OTP of the ACJHPR to respond quickly to cases in which it should intervene. It 
would be an advantage for the OTP of the ACJHPR to ‘counter irregular growth and so provide 
financial predictability’1227 in the light of the inevitable financial constraints it would face. The 
basic-size strategy would also provide the OTP of the ACJHPR with ‘stability in its resources 
and related planning’ and equip it ‘with an ability to respond more adequately and with the 
needed quality without having to over-prioritise or constantly overstretch existing resources’.1228 
5.3.3 Jurisdiction of International Criminal Law Section of the African Court of Justice 
and Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Article 3 of the Malabo Protocol vests the ACJHPR ‘with an original and appellate jurisdiction, 
including international criminal jurisdiction, which it shall exercise in accordance with the 
                                                            
1221 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan| 2016-2018 at 19. ICC, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes at 4 and 
Executive Summary para 2. 
1222 Ibid. 
1223 Ibid. ICC, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes at Executive Summary para 4. 
1224 Ibid. Ibid. 
1225 Ibid. Ibid. 






provisions of the Statute annexed hereto’.1229 The International Criminal Law Section of the 
ACJHPR would only have jurisdiction over crimes committed after its Protocol and Statute came 
into force;1230 no prosecution of crimes committed before its Protocol and Statute came into 
force could be effected, thus creating an impunity gap in the prosecution of SGBCs, unless the 
ICC, which has been in force since 2002, or individual states at domestic level, try these 
cases1231. The AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted the Malabo Protocol in 
June 2014, but since then no African state has ratified the Protocol. Reports from the AU 
Commission and AU Executive Council suggest the unlikelihood of the Malabo Protocol 
attaining the required ratifications in the near future, as ratification of treaties in Africa is 
historically a lengthy process. The AU Commission and AU Executive Council have repeatedly 
voiced their concern about the slow rate of ratification of OAU/AU treaties and the failure by 
member states to take the necessary steps to adopt them as part of their domestic law.1232 The 
AU Executive Council has even gone as far as appealing to ‘member states to ensure that 
they. . . initiate the process of ratification of new treaties within a period of one year after their 
adoption.’1233 At its 30th Ordinary Session in January 2018, the Assembly of the African Union 
expressed its ‘concern at the slow pace of ratification’ of the Malabo Protocol, and endorsed the 
action plan for the Protocol’s ratification.1234 The Assembly in particular urged member states to 
ratify the Malabo Protocol. For their part legislators are reluctant to endorse the Malabo Protocol 
as it is ‘unpalatable to nation states’1235 in that the legislative power given by the Malabo 
Protocol to the Pan African Parliament, a consultative and advisory organ, to make laws for 
                                                            
1229 Protocol on amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art 
3(1). 
1230 Idem at art 11. Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, art 46E(1). In addition to 
this where a state became a party to the Protocol and Statute after its entry into force article 46E(2) of the Statute 
provides that ‘the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force 
of this Protocol and Statue for that State.’ Fifteen member states need to ratify the Malabo Protocol for it to enter 
into force.  
1231 The exact date when the ICC entered into force was 1 July 2002, when its Statute entered into force. See Rome 
Statute, art 11. 
1232 Tiyanjana Maluwa ‘Ratification of African Union treaties by member states: Law, policy and practice’ (2012) 
13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1 at 4-5. 
1233 Decision on the Status of Signatures and Ratification of OAU/AU Treaties EX.CL/605(XVII), 
Ex.CL/Doc.571(XVII), adopted by the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Executive Council in Kampala, Uganda, 
on 25 July 2010. 
1234 African Union, Assembly, Thirtieth Ordinary Session, ‘Decision on the International Criminal Court, Doc. 
EX.CL/1068 (XXXII)’, 28-29 January 2018, Assembly/AU/Dec. 672(XXX), para 3(ii). 
1235 Pan African Parliament wants Malabo Protocol reviewed: available at https://www.independent.co.ug › AFRICA 




Africa, is unacceptable to states.1236 This reluctance places in jeopardy the prosecution of SGBCs 
in African armed conflicts, as states such as Burundi are in the process of leaving the ICC, and 
more African states may likely follow suit.1237 Ideally the ACJHPR should be fully functional 
before these states pull out so that the ACJHPR is able to seamlessly take over the prosecution of 
SGBCs.1238 However, the experience of the ICC shows it would take years before the ACJHPR 
would learn from mistakes made before it can secure successful prosecutions of SGBCs.  
As with the ICC,1239 the ACJHPR can exercise its jurisdiction based on territory or 
nationality. Thus, ACJHPR exercises jurisdiction where: 
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was 
committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft. 
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.1240 
 
The statute of the ACJHPR goes further to state that the International Criminal Law Section of 
the ACJHPR can also exercise jurisdiction: 
(c) When the victim of the crime is a national of that State. 
(d) Extraterritorial acts by non-nationals, which threaten a vital interest of that State.1241 
The ACJHPR can exercise its jurisdiction over crimes specified in Malabo Protocol when the 
prosecutorial powers are exercised proprio motu in cases when a state party refers a situation to 
the Prosecutor or the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU or the Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union refers a situation to the Prosecutor.1242 The drafters of the 
statute for the ACJHPR were careful not to include an organisation with powers similar to that of 
the Security Council that could refer situations to the OTP of the ACJHPR. Under the Rome 
                                                            
1236 Ibid. 
1237 States such as Botswana, Senegal, Nigeria and Ivory Coast are not in favour of withdrawing from the ICC. 
Yahoo News ‘Sudan’s al-Bashir, attending Rwanda summit, defies the ICC’, available at 
https://news.yahoo.com/sudans-al-bashir-attending-rwanda-summit-defies-icc-183019 (accessed 18 July 2016).  At 
the AU’s 28th summit, which took place in Addis Ababa, a resolution was passed for states to collectively 
withdrawal from the ICC. As the resolution is non-binding on African states each state would individually decide if 
it wants to withdraw from the ICC. Human Rights Watch ‘AU's 'ICC Withdrawal Strategy' Less than Meets the Eye’ 
available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/01/aus-icc-withdrawal-strategy-less-meets-eye (accessed 20 
February 2017). 
1238 Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute provides that before a state party can withdraw from the Statute it must have 
given a written notification of its withdrawal addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. ‘The 
withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a 
later date.’ Article 127(2) of the Rome Statute provides that states have a duty to cooperate with the ICC, until they 
are no longer a state party with the ICC. 
1239 Rome Statute, arts 12(2) and (3). 
1240 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, arts 46(2)(a)E bis and (b)E bis. 
1241 Idem art 46(2)(c)E bis and (d)E bis. 




Statute, ‘the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter of the 
United Nations’ may refer a situation to the ICC.1243 The Security Council exercised its powers 
to refer the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC, by adopting Resolution 1593(2005).1244 The 
Security Council’s referral of Darfur, a non-state party to the ICC, was based on the International 
Commission of Inquiries report ‘on the violations of international humanitarian and human rights 
violations in Darfur’.1245 The enforcement of Resolution 1593(2005) by the ICC has been a 
cause of disagreement between the ICC and the AU, which has hindered the prosecution of 
SGBCs in Darfur. Although two African states, Benin and the United Republic of Tanzania, 
were in favour of the resolution’s adoption, the AU and scholars consider a Security Council’s 
referral of Darfur to the ICC as political.1246 Three of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council are not parties to the ICC.1247 Consequently, when the ICC initiates situations 
in this manner, it does not act judicially or as independently upon judicial interpretation of the 
law.1248 In the referral of situations by the AU Assembly of the Heads of States and 
Governments, the 54 heads of state and governments will each have equal voting rights. In the 
case of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union referring a situation to the 
                                                            
1243 Under article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction where ‘(a) situation in which one 
or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.’ The other two methods by which the ICC may have 
jurisdiction over an individual who belongs to a non-member state are contained in article 12(3). 
1244 Resolution 1593(2005), adopted by the Security Council at its 5 158th meeting, on 31 March 2005. This 
resolution was adopted by a vote of 11 in favour, to none against, with four abstentions from Algeria, Brazil, China 
and the United States. United Nations ‘Security Council refers situation in Darfur, Sudan to Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court’, available at www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8351.doc.htm (accessed 25 May 2016). The 
United Nations and most countries in Europe and Human Rights Watch were in favour of a referral. The US initially 
objected to the referral as it did not recognise the ICC, and was afraid that it would put its citizens at risk of being 
prosecuted for international crimes committed at Darfur. It was in favour of the creation of a special court for 
Darfur. BBC ‘UN urges Darfur war crimes trials’, available at www.democraticunderground.com > Discuss > 
TopicForums > NationalSecurity (accessed 25 May 2016).   
1245 Resolution 1593(2005). 
1246 Paola Gaeta ‘Guest Post: The ICC changes its mind on the immunity from arrest of President Al Bashir, but it is 
wrong again’ available at https://opiniojuris.org/2014/04/23/guest-post-icc-changes-mind-immunity-arrest-
president-al-bashir-w (accessed 12 July 2016). Nsongurua J Udombana ‘Can these dry bones live? In search of a 
lasting therapy for AU and ICC toxic relationship’ (2014) African Journal of International Criminal Justice 57 at 
74. Kaba, the President of the Assembly of State Parties to the ICC suggests that the right to veto by the five 
permanent members of the SC should not be absolute. With regard to mass crimes, this right should have no 
standing; otherwise, it would create ‘a sense of injustice, a sense of a two-tier justice system to the benefit of big 
countries or selective justice to the detriment of small countries.’ Press conference by the President of the Assembly 
of States Parties, H. E. Mr Sidiki Kaba on the withdrawal from the Rome Statute at 9 (24 October 2016) available at 
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/.../PASP-PressConference(24Oct2016)-ENG-transcript.p (accessed 14 February 2017)  
1247 The three non-ICC state members are the United States of America, China and Russia. 




Prosecutor, the 15 members reflect a regional balance, with each region’s vote being equal.1249 In 
addition to this, none of the members sits permanently, but is subject to re-election.1250  
5.3.4 The controversial immunity clause  
5.3.4(i)   Article 46A bis and immunity 
The provision for the immunity of heads of states and other senior state officials in article 46A 
bis in the Malabo Protocol has been described as ‘the most controversial aspect of the Malabo 
Protocol’,1251 ‘short-sighted and shameful and probably serving as little more than a symbolic 
fist shake in the face of the ICC’.1252 Article 46A bis provides that: 
No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against any serving AU 
Head of State or Government, anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or any 
other senior state officials based on their functions during the tenure of office. 
This granted blanket immunity to certain officials. The AU views this article as consistent with 
and reflective of customary international law.1253 To buttress this point, Tladi refers to a press 
release in which the AU Commission stated that ‘the immunities provided for by international 
law apply not only to proceedings in foreign domestic courts but also to international 
tribunals’.1254 The commission went on to state that states could not, therefore, ‘contract out of 
their international legal obligations vis-à-vis third states by establishing an international 
tribunal’.1255 Tladi notes that the text of article 46A bis, is ambiguous and poorly drafted. His 
first comment on the text, relates to the phrase ‘or anybody. . . entitled to act in such capacity’, 
which he states is unclear and capable of a broad interpretation.1256 For example, it could include 
all ministers and also all members of parliament of certain states.1257 In addition to Tladi’s 
                                                            
1249Peace and Security Council – Wikipedia available at 
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_and_Security_Council (accessed 16 February 2017). 
1250 Five of these members are elected to a three-year term, whilst 10 of them are elected to a two-year term. 
1251 Amnesty International ‘Malabo Protocol’ at 16. 
1252 Max du Plessis, ‘Shambolic, shameful and symbolic: Implications of the African Unions immunity for African 
leaders’ (2014) 278 Institute for Security Studies 1 at 2. 
1253 Dire Tladi ‘The immunity provision in the AU amendment protocol and the entrenchment of the hero-villain 
trend’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1, 9, available at SSRN 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2628137 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2628137 (accessed 14 April 2018).  
1254 Idem at 8. See AU Commission Press Release 002/2012 on the Decisions of Pre-Trial Chamber of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the alleged failure by the 
Republic of Chad and the Republic of Malawi to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with 
respect to the arrest and surrender of President Al-Bashir of the Republic of the Sudan, 9 January 2012, p 2. 
1255 Ibid. Ibid.  





comment, article 46A bis does not specify which senior state officials, are entitled to immunity. 
The deliberations on the amendments finalising the draft Malabo Protocol concluded that senior 
state officials ‘would be determined by the court, on a case–by-case basis taking their functions 
into account in accordance with international law’.1258 The law demands clarity on the important 
issue of which officers are entitled to immunity under customary international law. Tladi’s 
second criticism relates to whether article 46A bis creates two regimes of immunity or just 
one.1259 International customary law differentiates between two types of immunity − immunity 
ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae. Distinguishing between the two is relevant as 
they apply to different state officials and have different legal implications. With regard to 
immunity ratione personae (personal immunity), ‘holders of high-ranking office in a state, such 
as heads of state, heads of government, and ministers of foreign affairs enjoy immunity from the 
jurisdiction in other states’.1260 This type of immunity is inviolable. Diplomats and officials sent 
on special missions abroad also enjoy immunity ratione personae1261 to protect them against any 
act of national authorities before national courts which would hinder them from engaging in their 
international duties.1262 As states are equal and sovereign, there is a horizontal interstate 
relationship between them.1263 Immunity ratione personae protects these officials in respect of 
official and private acts carried out by them prior to taking office or while in office.1264 The 
                                                            
1258 Executive Council Twenty-Fifty Ordinary Session, 20 -24 June 2014, Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, 
EX.CL/846(XXV), The Report, The Draft Legal Instruments and Recommendations of the Specialized Technical 
Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Consideration of the Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, para 26. 
1259 Dire Tladi ‘The immunity provision in the AU amendment protocol’ at 3 
1260 ICJ ‘Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium)’, Merits 
Judgment of 14 February 2002, [2002] ICJ Reports 3, para 51. (Arrest Warrant). Most scholars refer to the Arrest 
Warrant case when referring to which government officials are entitled to claim this type of immunity. In the Arrest 
Warrant case heads of government are mentioned as persons covered by immunity ratione personae, yet in the 
Pinochet case Lord Millett stated that this type of immunity ‘was not available to serving heads of government who 
are not also Heads of State …’. Thus, as the Arrest Warrant case specifies, heads of state and heads of government, 
a head of government does not necessarily have to be a head of state. House of Lords, Bartle and the Commissioner 
of Police for the metropolis and others, ex parte Pinochet; R v Evans and another the Commissioner of Police for 
the metropolis and others, ex parte Pinochet, R v [1999] UKHL 17 (24 March 1999).  
1261 Ibid.  
1262 Idem para 54. Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome 
Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with 
Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir’ ICC-02/05-01/09-139 (12 December 2011) 
para 34.  
1263 Dapo Akande ‘International law immunities and the International Criminal Court’ (2004) 98 The American 
Journal of International Law 407 at 415. 
1264 Antonio Cassese ‘When may senior state officials be tried for international crimes? Some comments on the 
Congo v Belgium case’ (2002) 13 EJIL 853 at 864. Dapo Akande ‘International law immunities and the 




immunity however, ceases to exist when they leave office, thus leaving them open to prosecution 
for acts which they committed in their private capacity.1265 Immunity ratione materiae 
(functional immunity) on the other hand, relates to official acts carried out by an individual 
acting on behalf of the state.1266 It protects a wider category of state officials who can claim this 
type of immunity compared to those protected under immunity ratione personae. Immunity 
ratione materiae protects previous and current state officials, officials who are no longer state 
officials but have previously represented the state, and non-state organisations which have acted 
on the state’s behalf.1267 This immunity is a substantive defence compared to immunity ratione 
personae, which is a procedural defence.1268 In this regard, state officials claim immunity ratione 
materiae on the basis that other states should not prosecute them, for official acts carried out on 
behalf of their state, as these are acts of the state.1269 Thus, state officials continue to enjoy this 
immunity even when they no longer carry out their official function.1270 However, state officials 
cannot plead immunity ratione materiae when charged with an international crime.1271 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Arrest Warrant case concluded, after 
examining state practice, national legislation and national higher courts decisions that no 
exception to immunity ratione personae existed before national courts of a foreign state, where 
an incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs is accused of committing international crimes.1272 
Although the ICJ case concerned an incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs, scholars and judges 
recognise the ratio as applying also to heads of states and government, and state officials who are 
entitled to immunity.1273 The ICJ also considered immunity provisions of international criminal 
                                                            
1265 Ibid. Ibid.  
1266 Idem at 862. Idem at 412. 
1267 Dapo Akande ‘International law immunities and the International Criminal Court’ at 413. 
1268 Antonio Cassese ‘When may senior state officials be tried for international crimes?’ at 863. 
1269 Idem at 863. Dapo Akande ‘International law immunities and the International Criminal Court’ at 413. 
1270 Ibid. 
1271 Dapo Akande ‘International law immunities and the International Criminal Court’ at 413. 
1272 ICJ ‘Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000’ para 58. 
1273 See for example ICJ, Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), 4 June 
2008, para. 170 (where the ICJ affirmed its findings) See also PTC II, ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, In the case of 
the Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir ‘Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-
compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir’ (6 July 
2017) para 68 (where the Chamber deduced that it could not identify a rule in customary international law that 
would exclude immunity for Heads of State when their arrest is sought for international crimes by another state, 
even when the arrest is sought on behalf of an international court.’ National courts have applied this principle, for 
example, with regard to Zimbabwe’s former president Robert Mugabe and Margaret Thatcher when she was 
Britain’s prime minister. See Dapo Akande ‘International law immunities and the International Criminal Court’ at 




tribunals and held that none of these provisions enabled ‘it to conclude that any such an 
exception exists in customary international law in regard to national courts’.1274 The ICJ, 
however, stated that there are certain circumstances when immunities enjoyed by state officials 
under international criminal law would not represent a bar to criminal prosecution.1275 One of 
such circumstances mentioned by the ICJ is when the state official (in this case an incumbent or 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs) ‘may be subject to criminal proceedings before certain 
international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction’.1276 The Malabo Protocol provides 
that ACJHPR does not have jurisdiction over these officials. Futhermore, there is no provision in 
the Malabo Protocol removing the customary international law immunity of these officials 
belonging to state parties to the Malabo Protocol. Consequently, a state party to the Malabo 
Protocol will be in breach of its obligations under international law for arresting and surrendering 
(under an ACJHPR-issued arrest warrant) such officials who are on their territory and who 
belong to state parties to the Malabo Protocol, or non-state parties, which accept the court’s 
jurisdiction,. This is likely to hinder the prosecution of SGBCs committed in armed conflicts, 
and other crimes committed within the jurisdiction of the ACJHPR when these are perpetrated by 
individuals who enjoy immunity.1277 This is of particular concern, given the trend for African 
heads of states to remain in power for years and show a reluctance to step down,1278 coupled with 
tendency of African states to shield their senior state officials from prosecution.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
sitting heads of state). Paola Gaeta ‘Does President Al-Bashir enjoy immunity from arrest?’ (2009) 7 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice at 315 at 320. 
1274 ICJ ‘Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000’ para 58. 
1275 Idem para 61. 
1276 Ibid.  
1277 In Sirleaf’s view the inclusion of the immunity clause in the Statute of the ACJHPR may be of an advantage as it 
could work to ‘encourage state cooperation with the regional criminal court, because leaders will not have to fear 
that the court will be used as a tool by more powerful states for regime change.’ Matiangai V S Sirleaf 
‘Regionalism, regime complexes and the crisis in international criminal justice’ (2016) 54 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 699 at 756. 
1278 An example was the case of Chad’s former head of state, Hissene Habre, convicted of crimes against humanity 
of rape, sexual slavery and ordering the killing of 40,000 people, which were committed from 1982 to 1990 when he 
was head of state. Bringing Habre to trial was a long process. Though Habre was overthrown in 1990, he was tried 
on 20 July 2015. His trial ended on 11 February 2016. An Extraordinary African Chamber in Senegal, which 
Senegal and the AU inaugurated in February 2013, convicted him on 30 May 2016. Human Rights Watch ‘Q&A: 
The case of Hissene Habre before the Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal’ available at 
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Al-Bashir, is a case in point, having ruled Sudan since 1989.1279 Even as the ICC seeks his arrest 
and surrender for crimes which include rape and torture, Al-Bashir is unlikely to give up power. 
Some international criminal courts, which the ICJ mentioned as having jurisdiction over 
incumbent or former state officials, included the ICTY, ICTR, and the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).1280 To qualify as an international criminal court, Gaeta argues that under 
international law the court ought to possess a personality, which is distinct from a state or group 
of states.1281 Akande also argues that the inherent features of the tribunal are important, that is, 
how the tribunal was established and if the constitutive instrument binds the state of the official 
whom the court wishes to try.1282 In this regard, the constitutive instrument, which establishes 
the international tribunal or court, must provide for the exclusion of immunity.1283 The Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal for Nuremberg, for instance, and the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East provided for the criminal prosecution of 
individuals for international crimes regardless of their official status.1284 Whilst the tribunal at 
Nuremberg was established to try major war criminals of the European Axis, the Far East 
tribunal was established to try Japanese top military, political and diplomatic leaders.1285 Article 
7 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) provides that: 
The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of States or responsible officials in 
Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or 
mitigating punishment.1286 
                                                            
1279 Examples of other presidents who have held on to power for a long time are, Teodoro Obiang Nguema of 
Equatorial Guinea who has been president since 1982. Jose Edwardo dos Santo of Anglo who was been President 
1979-1918. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe who had been President since 1987. He finally gave up power in 2017. 
Yoweri Museveni of Uganda who has been President since 1986. Daily Monitor ‘Africa’s longest serving leaders’, 
available at www.monitor.co.ug > Home > News > World (accessed 18 July 2016). 
1280 ICJ ‘Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000’ para 61. 
1281 Paola Gaeta ‘Does President Al-Bashir enjoy immunity from arrest?’ at 322. 
1282 Dapo Akande ‘International law immunities and the International Criminal Court’ at 417. 
1283 Ibid.  
1284 Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis, (“London 
Agreement”), (8 August 1945) 82 UNTS 280. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Dated 
at Tokyo January 19, 1946, amended April 26, 1946, TIAS 1589: 4 Bevans 20, art 6. Reference should be made to 
Chapter 2 for a more detailed explanation of these tribunals in relation to SGBCs. 
1285 See Chapter 2 on the IMT at Nuremberg and the IMT for the Far East. See Paola Gaeta ‘Does President Al-
Bashir enjoy immunity from arrest?’ at 322 (where Gaeta questions whether the IMT at Nuremberg is an 
international criminal court.) 
1286 Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis, (“London 
Agreement”), (8 August 1945) 82 UNTS 280, art 7. (This rule was later endorsed in the Judgment of the Tribunal in 
October 1946, by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 95(1) in 1950 and also by the International 
Law Commission as Principle III in the Principles of International Law Recognised in the Charter of the Nuremberg 




Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East states that: 
Neither the official position, at any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted 
pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to free such 
accused from responsibility for any crime with which he is charged, but such circumstances may 
be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.1287 
The two ad hoc Tribunals which were established pursuant to UNSC resolutions under powers 
exercised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, contained similar provisions in their Statutes. 
Members of the UN are taken to have agreed to waive their immunity before these two ad hoc 
Tribunals as they are bound by decisions of the Security Council by virtue of article 25 of the 
UN Charter.1288 Article 7(2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) provides that: 
The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a 
responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor 
mitigate punishment.1289 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) contains a similar provision in article 
6(2) of its Statute.1290 The Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone also 
recognised this principle, after concluding that the Special Court for Sierra Leone was an 
international court.1291 Article 6(2) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which 
provides a similar provision to that of the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR states that: 
The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a 
responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor 
mitigate punishment.1292 
                                                            
1287 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Dated at Tokyo January 19, 1946, amended April 
26, 1946, TIAS 1589: 4 Bevans 20, art 6. 
1288 See article 25, United Nations Charter which provides that [t]he Member of the United Nations have agreed to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter. Dapo Akande 
‘International law immunities and the International Criminal Court’ at 417. Paola Gaeta ‘Does President Al-Bashir 
enjoy immunity from arrest?’ at 330 (stating that both ad hoc tribunals ‘are subsidiary organs of the Security 
Council and constitute in and of themselves a measure to restore peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN 
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1289 Statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, SC res 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217thmtg., 
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1290 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, SC res 995, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453 mtg., U.N. Doc 
S/RES/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994), art 6(2). See Chapter 2 which discusses the ICTR in relation to SGBCs). 
1291 Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor ‘Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction’ SCSL-
2003-01-I (31 May 2004) paras 37 -42. 
1292 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art 6(2), 2178 UNTS 138, 145; 97 AJIL 295; UN Doc. 




In applying article 6(2) of the Statute, the Appeals Chamber held that ‘the principle seems now 
established that the sovereign equality of states does not prevent a Head of State from being 
prosecuted before an international criminal tribunal or court. . . .  [It] finds that Article 6(2) of the 
Statute is not in conflict with any peremptory norm of general international law and its 
provisions must be given effect by this court’.1293 Thus whilst previous international tribunals 
provided for the prosecution of incumbent heads of state and their officials, the Malabo Protocol 
grants them immunity. It is thus pertinent to consider the prosecution of such persons for SGBCs 
before the ICC.  
5.3.4 (ii)  The ICC as an alternative court from the ACJHPR to prosecute those entitled to 
immunity under customary international law 
The Malabo Protocol permits the prosecution of persons who are not immune to prosecution 
under customary international law.1294 Thus, the ACJHPR will have jurisdiction to prosecute 
such persons as rebel fighters, persons in opposition to the government, and individuals who are 
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Section 308 of the Nigerian Constitution, for example, provides that: 
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, but subject to subsection (2) of 
this section 
(a) no civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against a person to whom this 
section applies during his period of office; 
(b) a person to whom this section applies shall not be arrested or imprisoned during that period 
either in pursuance of the process of any court or otherwise; and 
(c) no process of any court requiring or compelling the appearance of a person to whom this section 
applies, shall be issued 
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to civil proceedings against a 
person to whom this section applies in his official capacity or to civil or criminal proceedings in 
which such a person is only a nominal party 
(3) This section applies to a person holding the office of President or Vice-President, Governor or 
Deputy; and the reference in this section to “period of office” is reference to the period during which 
the person holding such office is required to perform the functions of the office. 
However, the Bill implementing the Rome Statute in Nigeria grants the President, Vice-President, Governor or 
Deputy Immunity, and thus contravenes article 27 of the Rome Statute. Section 20(1) of the Bill provides that: 
Subject to the provisions of section 308 of the Constitution, a state or diplomatic immunity attaching to a person or 
premises by reason of a connection with a state party of the Rome Statute shall not prevent proceedings under this 
Act, in relation to that person or premises. See Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended, 
section 308. Crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and related offences Bill, 2012 available at 





not state officials at the time. The head of state, government officials or state officers, who enjoy 
immunity while in office could face prosecution when their immunity lapses. It is thus worth 
considering the ICC as an alternative court to prosecute these officials whilst they are still in 
office. This, however, would only be possible in the event of a state being unwilling or unable to 
try crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, as the ICC is a court of last resort.1295 The issue of 
immunity before the ICC has been a hurdle for the prosecution of perpetrators of SGBCs before 
the court as the ICC relies on member states’ cooperation to arrest and surrender perpetrators of 
SGBCs, and without which it cannot fulfil its mandate.1296 The failure of the ICC to prosecute 
these crimes is plain to see where states such as Malawi, Chad, the DRC, South Africa, the 
Hastiemite Kingdom of Jordan and Kenya have refused to cooperate with its request for the 
arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir when he visited their states. The question whether such states 
have an obligation to arrest and surrender a person entitled to customary international law 
immunity, has hinged on the interpretation of article 27(2) of the Rome Statute, and its 
relationship to article 98(1) of the Rome Statute. This has proved particularly contentions when 
non-states parties to the Rome Statute, which have not accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction, have been 
petitioned to hand over an individual who enjoys immunity for prosecution. This has led to 
considerable debate amongst scholars,1297 in the AU and the ICC. The AU’s position is that 
‘states cannot contract out of their international legal obligations vis-à-vis third states by 
establishing an international tribunal’.1298 The AU maintains that ‘a treaty only binds parties to 
                                                            
1295 Rome Statute, art 17. See Chapter 3. 
1296 Part 9 of the Rome Statute titled ‘International cooperation and judicial assistance,’ contains 16 articles which 
address various issues relating to cooperation. Article 86, for example, provides that ‘States Parties shall, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.’ Article 87 provides for the general provisions relating to requests for 
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1297 For discussions on whether non-state parties are stripped of their international customary law immunity under 
articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute, when the UNSC makes an article 13(b) referral to the ICC, see articles by 
Paola Gaeta and Dapo Akande, two of the leading authorities on this topic. Paola Gaeta ‘Does President Al-Bashir 
enjoy immunity from arrest?’ at 315- 332. Dapo Akande ‘International law immunities and the International 
Criminal Court’ at 407-433. Dapo Akande ‘The legal nature of Security Council referrals to the ICC and its impact 
on Al Bashir’s immunities’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice at 333-352. Dapo Akande ‘The 
Bashir indictment: Are serving heads of state immune from ICC prosecution’ (2008) available at 
http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/akande1.pdf (accessed 25 May 2016). Dov Jacobs ‘The ICC and 
immunities, Round 326: ICC finds that South Africa had an obligation to arrest Bashir but no referral to the UNSC’ 
available at https://dovjacobs.com/2017/07/06/the-icc-and-immunities-round-326-icc-finds-that-south-africa-had-an-
obligation-to-arrest-bashir-but-no-referral-to-the-unsc/ (accessed 10 May 2018). 
1298 See AU Commission Press Release 002/2012 on the Decisions of Pre-Trial Chamber of the International 




the treaty’.1299 Moreover, ‘a treaty may not deprive non-party states of rights which they 
ordinarily possess’.1300 AU member states, both non-states parties and states parties to the ICC, 
have preferred to ‘comply with the decisions and policies of the Union’1301 according to its 
Constitutive Act. They have done this by aligning with the AU’s directive not to cooperate with 
the ICC, ‘pursuant to the provisions of article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to 
immunity for the arrest and surrender of President Omar El Bashir of The Sudan’.1302 
The ICC’s decision on South Africa’s failure to cooperate with it in the arrest and 
surrender of Al-Bashir gives it latest exposition of the application of articles 27(2) and 98(1) of 
the Rome Statue, 1303 which its prior decisions in relation to Malawi and Chad failed to address. 
The ICC’s decisions on Malawi and Chad’s failure to cooperate with the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
request for the arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir reflected the tension which exists between 
articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome Statute.1304 In these decisions, the court, however, 
concluded that both states had ‘failed to comply with the cooperation requests contrary to the 
provisions of the Statute’ and thus ‘prevented the Court from exercising its functions and powers 
under the Statute.’1305 The ICC found in the Malawi decision that: 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and the Republic of Malawi to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest 
and surrender of President Al Bashir of the Republic of the Sudan, 9 January 2012, p 2. 
1299 Ibid. 
1300 Ibid.  
1301 Idem at p 1. Article 23 (2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
1302 African Union, Assembly, ‘Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal (ICC) Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII)’, 3 July 2009, para 10. African 
Union, Assembly, Assembly, ‘Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly Decisions on the International 
Criminal Court - Doc. EX.CL/670(XIX)’, 30 June-1 July 2011, Assembly/AU/Dec.366(XVII), para 6. 
1303  Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ‘Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-
compliance by South Africa’  African Union, Assembly, Thirtieth Ordinary Session, ‘Decision on the International 
Criminal Court, Doc. EX.CL/1068 (XXXII)’, 28-29 January 2018, Assembly/AU/Dec.672(XXX), para 2(iii). 
1304 In the Malawi decision, which the PTC also referred to in the Chad decision, the ICC stated that it noted ‘that 
there is an inherent tension between articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Statute and the role immunity plays when the 
Court seeks cooperation regarding the arrest of a Head of State. The Chamber considers that Malawi, and by 
extension the AU, are not entitled to rely on article 98(1) of the Statute to justify refusing to comply with the 
Cooperation Requests.’ Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ‘Corrigendum to the Decision pursuant to 
Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the failure by the Republic of Malawi to comply with the cooperation requests 
issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir’ ICC-02/05-01/09 (13 
December 2011) para 37. Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ‘Decision pursuant to Article 87(7) of the 
Rome Statute on the refusal of the Republic of Chad to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court 
with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir’ ICC-02/05-01/09 (13 December 2011) 
para 13.      
1305 Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ‘Corrigendum to the Decision pursuant to Article 87(7) of the 
Rome Statute’ Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ‘Decision pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute 




Customary international law creates an exception to Head of State immunity when international 
courts seek a Head of States arrest for the commission of international crimes. There is no 
conflict between Malawi’s obligations towards the Court and its obligations under customary 
international law; therefore, article 98(1) of the Statute does not apply.1306    
The Pre-Trial Chamber reached a similar decision in the case against Chad.1307 
The ICC’s decision relating to the DRC’s failure to cooperate with the Court for the arrest and 
surrender of Al-Bashir, gave its own interpretation on articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome 
Statute in regard to the immunity of a non-state party, (in this case Sudan), which has not 
accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction. The ICC interpreted article 27(2) of the Rome Statute, which 
provides that ‘[i]mmunities or special procedural rules, which may attach to the official capacity 
of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising 
its jurisdiction over such a person’ as an ‘exception to the Court's jurisdiction’ and stated that it 
‘should in principle, be confined to those State Parties who have accepted it.’1308 The ICC held 
that article 98(1), which provides that 
[t]he court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the 
requested state to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the 
state or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third state, unless the Court can first 
obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity, 
referred to the ‘cooperation of the third [party] state for the waiver or lifting the immunity of its 
Head of State’.1309 Consequently, unless the non-state party waives the immunity of its persons, 
the ICC cannot request the surrender or assistance from a state of such persons. It also stated that 
the article aimed ‘at preventing the requested State from acting inconsistently with its 
international obligations towards the non-State Party with respect to the immunities attached to 
the latter’s Head of State’.1310 The ICC, however, concluded that article 98(1) did not apply in 
this case to a non-State party to the Rome Statute, that is, Sudan. It based its decision on 
paragraph 2 of Resolution 1593(2005), which the ICC stated ‘implicitly waived the immunities 
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granted to Omar Al Bashir under international law and attached to his position as a Head of 
State’, 1311 thus reversing its earlier decisions in the Malawi and Chad cases.   
The ICC’s recent decision on South Africa’s non-cooperation, found that South Africa’ 
failed to cooperate with the court by not arresting and surrendering Al-Bashir when he visited 
South Africa.1312 Although the Pre-Trial judges agreed on this point, Judge Marc Perrin de 
Brichambant disagreed with the majority’s decision regarding the legal basis upon which Al-
Bashir could not claim customary international law immunity.1313 The majority judges 
considered whether any derogation from immunity under customary international law existed 
when the ICC sought the arrest and surrender of a head of state who was entitled to immunity in 
the context of the relationship between articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome Statute. The 
Chamber held that article 27(2) excluded heads of state claiming immunity from arrest1314 and 
referred to the existence of a vertical and horizontal relationship under article 27(2). Since a 
vertical relationship existed between the ICC and a state party; a person belonging to that state 
party could not claim immunity, including a head of state from that state party. As a result, a 
state party cannot refuse the court’s request for the arrest and surrender of that concerned person. 
Ratifying the Rome Statute, in their view, meant that state parties ‘accepted the irrelevance of 
immunities based on official capacity, including those that they may otherwise possess under 
international law’.1315 The same applied at the horizontal level where an inter-state relationship 
existed between states parties to the Rome Statute. Thus, a states party had a duty, to comply 
with a request from the ICC for the arrest and surrender of a head of state from another state 
party. The rationale behind this was that states parties had waived their right to claim immunity 
by voluntarily ratifying the Rome Statute.1316 As a result, the ICC held that article 98(1) of the 
Rome Statute did not apply to states parties to the Rome Statue and states that had accepted the 
                                                            
1311 Idem para 29. 
1312 Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ‘Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-
compliance by South Africa’.  Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision under Article 87(7) of the 
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court’s jurisdiction under article 12(3) of the Rome Statute.1317 The ICC also recognised that in 
principle, non-state parties to the Rome Statute did not have an obligation to cooperate with the 
ICC; neither, were their immunity rights under international law affected by article 27(2) of the 
Rome Statute.1318 With regard to article 98(1) of the Rome Statute, the ICC held that it could not 
request a state party to arrest and surrender a head of state or state official who belonged to a 
non-state party, unless it had obtained a waiver of immunity from the relevant non-state 
party.1319 The ICC pointed out that ‘article 98 of the Statute addresses the Court, and is not a 
source of substantive rights (or additional duties) to state parties’.1320 Thus, article 98 does not 
provide state parties the right to refuse to comply with the ICC’s requests for cooperation or 
postpone carrying out its arrest and surrender request.1321 This applies even when the request for 
arrest and surrender applies to a person who enjoys diplomatic immunity or customary 
international law immunity.1322  
The ICC also held that when the Security Council refers a situation to the ICC in terms of 
article 13(b) of the Rome Statute under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, a state that has not 
accepted the Rome Statute may be bound by the obligations defined in it.1323 In considering such 
a situation, the ICC considered SC Resolution 1593 (2005), where the SC, in acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, referred the Darfur situation to the ICC. In line with its previous 
decisions, the ICC held that the effect of such a referral in triggering the court’s jurisdiction 
meant that the entire Rome Statute’s legal framework applied.1324 Apart from this, Resolution 
1593 (2005) also placed an obligation on Sudan to cooperate fully with the ICC and provide the 
ICC with the required assistance.1325 Thus, Sudan’s rights and obligations in this situation 
became analogous with those states that had ratified the Rome Statute.1326 As a result, article 
27(2) of the Statute applied in the same way to Sudan as it did to states parties to the Rome 
Statute, which meant that Al-Bashir could not claim customary international law immunity based 
on his official capacity as head of state. Sudan, therefore, had the obligation to arrest and 
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surrender Al-Bashir to the ICC as he was not immune from the ICC’s jurisdiction.1327 
Furthermore, as article 98(1) did not apply in this situation, it was not necessary to obtain a 
waiver of Al-Bashir’s immunity, as ‘a waiver can be conceived of only where immunity 
applies’.1328 Thus, state parties would not violate their obligation under international law 
regarding immunity by arresting Al-Bashir and surrendering him to the ICC.1329 
Although the AU had boldly included article 46 bis in the statute of the ACJHPR, the 
ICC indirectly granted heads of state and senior official’s immunity when it accepted referrals of 
situations from the presidents of the DRC and Uganda.1330 In deciding to accept these referrals to 
prosecute SGBCs, it was clear that the governments of the DRC and Uganda had no intention to 
prosecute those who also committed these crimes, especially if the ICC needed those 
governments’ cooperation to investigate such crimes in their country.1331 
Rather than having a blanket provision granting immunity to African heads of states and 
their senior state officials, the AU should consider adding a proviso that in the event of peace 
talks failing or are being unlikely to succeed, heads of states and their senior state officials could 
be prosecuted when in power. In addition, a proviso should be considered that in the event of any 
successful peace talks, the OTP of the ACJHPR, would not be prevented from prosecuting heads 
of states or their senior state officials when they cease to hold such positions. Alternatively states 
could enter a reservation, that this article would not be applicable to them. This at least would 
give hope to victims of SGBV rather than having to run up against a blanket immunity in the 
Malabo Protocol. Alternatively, the AU could have a provision similar to that of article 16 of the 
Rome Statute, where situations deferred for a certain number of months in the interest of peace 
and security1332 could carry a proviso that this would not prevent the prosecution of heads of 
states or their senior officials.  
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The controversy regarding article 46A bis is reminiscent of the bilateral immunity 
agreements (BIAs) signed between the United States and other states. The United States has 
signed BIAs with states which provide ‘that current or former US government officials, military 
and other personnel regardless of whether or not they are nationals of the state concerned, that is, 
foreign sub-contractors working for the US and US nationals, would not be transferred to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.’1333 Such BIAs defy state parties’ obligation towards the ICC as they 
grant immunity from crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction to officials of the United States. This 
in effect means that where a government official from the United States, for example, commits 
SGBCs during an armed conflict situation in a foreign state, that official will be immune from 
the jurisdiction of the ICC. By December 2006, of the 46 state parties which had signed BIAs 
with the United States, 24 were African states1334 – in many cases to avoid the United States 
from imposing economic penalties or withdrawing military aid.1335  
5.3.5 Cooperation and judicial assistance of the state parties to the ACJHPR 
The drafters to the Malabo Protocol, mindful that non-cooperation as in the case of  
Al-Bashir, could occur with its state members, included a provision in the statute annexed to the 
Malabo Protocol which is similar to that contained in the Rome Statute of the ICC.1336 The 
statute of the ACJHPR provides for ‘state parties to cooperate with the Court in the investigation 
and prosecution of persons accused of committing the crimes defined’.1337 It would be helpful 
for the OTP of the ACJHPR to follow the lead of the ICC by putting in place provisions to 
enhance cooperation with its state members, thereby enhancing investigation and prosecution of 
SGBCs. Like the OTP of the ICC, the OTP of the ACJHPR will need to develop its own 
‘strategy and action plan to support arrests’1338 and surrender of perpetrators of SGBC. This 
would be ‘with a view to increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of cooperation and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
renewed by the Council under the same conditions.’ 
1333 Coalition for the International Criminal Court ‘Status of United States bilateral immunity agreement’ available 
at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCFS_BIAstatus_current.pdf (accessed on 14 March 2017). 
1334 Ibid. 
1335 Ibid. Fohrid Human Rights and Democratic Forum ‘International Criminal Court, article 98(2) and bilateral 
immunity agreement’ (2011) p 8 www.fohrid.org.np/.../2-international-criminal-court-article-98-2-and-bilateral-
immu (accessed 14 March 2017). 
1336 See section 5.3.4(ii) above. 
1337 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, art 46L(1). 
1338 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan| 2016-2018 at 13. Strategic goal 6 deals with the ICC’s goal to ‘strengthening 




impact’1339 of its operations in prosecuting SGBCs. Given that sufficient resources need to be 
ploughed into this plan to be effective,1340 the OTP of the ACJHPR may face struggle to obtain 
full financial cooperation from state parties. Lack of a strategy and action plan could present a 
good excuse for state parties not to cooperate with the OTP of the ACJHPR. This would 
undermine the credibility of the ACJHPR as it needs state cooperation with the enforcement of 
warrants, the investigations of situations and compliance with requests. 
With regard to facilitating cooperation in preliminary examinations, investigations and 
trials, the OTP of the ACJHPR, like the OTP of the ICC could: 
Ensure that there is strategic and operational advice and cooperation support available to the 
integrated teams. This includes effectively making and following-up on requests for assistance, 
galvanizing efforts in cooperation with other actors for the arrest and surrender of individuals 
sought by the ICC, and maintaining general cooperation; and consolidating and further expanding 
the Office’s network of general and operational focal points and judicial actors, and streamlining 
and standardising processes and interactions with partners (States, international and regional 
organisations, NGOs).1341 
The OTP of the ACJHPR will also need to engage continually with its stakeholders so that they 
may understand its work and mandate relating to bringing crimes of SGBV to trial.1342  
State parties to the ICC, which decide to remain in the ICC and ratify the Malabo 
Protocol, may find that their obligations to cooperate with the ICC and the ACJHPR conflict on 
account of the overlapping jurisdiction of the courts. It is therefore necessary for the ICC and the 
ACJHPR prevent such conflicting obligations, since both have the goal of ending impunity for 
SGBCs. The OTP of the ICC’s states as a strategic goal the need not only to address ‘situation-
related cooperation in support of investigations and prosecutions, but also general diplomatic and 
political support towards the Office and its mandate’. To enable it to do so, the OTP of the ICC 
states that it  
. . .  will engage in coordination with other court organs as appropriate, with states, regional and 
international organisations, NGOs and (other) networks to further increase understanding of the 
Office’s work and mandate, and to ensure continued general and diplomatic support for the 
mandate, activities and resource requirements of the Office from relevant stakeholders.1343 
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1340 Ibid (stating that ‘[t]he office must continue to dedicate sufficient resources to facilitate cooperation, and to 
continue its strategic review of how to address the key obstacles impacting cooperation’.) 






Reference to the OTP of the ICC’s willingness to ‘engage in coordination with other court 
organs’ and with regional organisations is an indication that this could include the ACJHPR. 
Under article 46L of the statute to the ACJHPR:  
The Court shall be entitled to seek the cooperation or assistance of regional or international 
courts, non-State Parties or cooperating partners of the African Union and may conclude 
Agreements for that purpose.1344 
Reference to the ACJHPR seeking cooperation or assistance from international courts is an 
indication of its willingness to work with the ICC, in terms of which both courts may conclude 
agreements. 
5.3.6 The complementary principle in the Malabo Protocol 
Article 46H of the statute annexed to the Malabo Protocol provides for complementary 
jurisdiction at the ACJHPR. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of article 46H (except for the omission of the 
word ‘genuine’ relating to prosecution of cases), is worded similarly to article 17 of the Rome 
Statute,1345 which provides for the steps which the ICC should take to have a case admitted 
before it. However, paragraph 1 of article 46H contains a provision which is not found in article 
17 of the Rome Statute, namely: ‘The jurisdiction of the Court shall be complementary to that of 
the National Courts, and to the Courts of the Regional Economic Communities where 
specifically provided for by the Communities.’ Under the Rome Statute, the ICC acts as a court 
of last resort when national courts fail to prosecute, according to the principles set out in article 
17 of the Rome Statute.1346 In the case of the ACJHPR, the court will only act where national 
courts and courts of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have failed to prosecute one of 
the crimes within its jurisdiction. Out of the eight RECs, which the AU recognises, only four of 
them, namely the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), EAC (East African Community) and Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) are operational, although the SADC tribunal is 
presently suspended.1347 Given that none of these courts have jurisdiction to try international 
                                                            
1344 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, art 46L(3). 
1345 Rome Statute, art 17 deals with the issue of admissibility of cases before the ICC. 
1346The preamble to the Rome Statute emphasises that the ICC shall be complementary to national courts 
jurisdictions. Article 1 of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC shall be complementary to national court’s 
jurisdiction.  
1347 The other four REC courts recognised by the AU are the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of 
Sahei-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and 




crimes, complementarity in relation to SGBCs and other crimes within the ACJHPR’s 
jurisdiction can only operate between the ACJHPR and national courts.1348 This would entail all 
REC courts changing their constitutions to accommodate this provision in paragraph 1 of article 
46H, for the reason that it would be cumbersome for the REC courts to have jurisdiction to try 
international crimes. Considering complementarity not just from a national aspect, but also from 
the REC aspect, would not help reduce the OTP of the ACJHPR’s financial costs. Abass, points 
out further problems that would be encountered in bringing a case before a national court and 
then the courts of the REC, before bringing it to the ACJHPR. First, which REC should hear the 
case, as most African states belong to two or more RECs1349 and, in any event, have overlapping 
memberships, as in COMESA and SADC.1350 Secondly, individuals do not have an automatic 
right to bring a matter before REC courts.1351 For these reasons, it is necessary for the drafters of 
the Malabo Protocol to amend the Protocol for the complementarity principle to exclude these 
courts.  
One of the ways in which the OTP of the ACJHPR could reduce the cost of prosecuting 
SGBCs at the regional level whilst making sure that the impunity gap for these crimes is closed, 
is by adopting a positive complementarity approach just as adopted by the OTP of the ICC in its 
2009-2012 prosecutorial strategy.1352 This approach would involve the OTP of the ACJHPR 
encouraging ‘genuine national proceedings where possible (situation countries included), relying 
on its various networks of cooperation, but without involving the office directly in capacity 
building or financial or technical assistance’.1353 By engaging with and supporting African states 
in their national proceedings, it would enable states to carry out their duty to investigate and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Criminal Court, Africa and the African Union: what way forward?’ (2016) available at www.ecdpm.org/wp-
content/.../DP201-ICC-Africa-AU-Apiko-Aggad-November-2016.pd (accessed  23 February 2017).   
1348 Ibid.  
1349 Abass ‘Prosecuting international crimes in Africa’ at 945. Abass gives as example the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) and the Community of Sahei-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). 
1350 Ibid.  
1351 Ibid.  
1352Prosecutorial Strategy, 2009-2012, 1 February 2010 at 5 available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-rep-strategy-2010 (accessed 1 November 2016). Burke-White prefers to adopt 
the term proactive complementarity as it ‘better reflects the nature of the policy and better highlights its distinction 
from the court’s present approach’, which he says may be termed ‘passive complementarity.’ William W Burke-
White ‘Proactive complementarity: The International Criminal Court and national courts in the Rome System of 
international justice’ (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal 48 at 49. 
1353 Ibid. In comparison, applying Burke-White’s ‘proactive complementarity’ suggestion ‘recognises that the ICC 
can and should encourage, and perhaps even assist, national governments to prosecute, international crimes’. 
Proactive complementarity recognises that some outside assistance may allow states to undertake prosecutions when 




prosecute SGBCs. In a draft withdrawal strategy document, the AU suggests that states should 
strengthen their ‘legal regulatory frameworks and judicial mechanisms’ so as to try international 
crimes, in order to limit the ICC’s intervention in such crimes1354 by ‘developing continental, 
regional and national strategies such as model national laws and capacity building programmes 
(that is training, experience, exchange programmes etc).1355 The draft paper also urges states to 
ratify and domesticate the Malabo Protocol, as this would enhance the complementarity principle 
‘in order to reduce the deference to the ICC and further the mantra of an African solution to 
African problems’.1356 The AU needs to include the ICC in the notion of complementarity if all 
institutions are to help close the gap of impunity relating to SGBCs on the continent. For the 
positive complementarity approach to work effectively, it should operate directly between the 
ACJHPR and national courts without having situations considered by RECs. This would enable 
the OTP of the ACJHPR to directly assist states in investigating and prosecuting SGBCs, and 
would eliminate delays by states unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute SGBCs. 
Once the Malabo Protocol comes into force, the ACJHPR and the ICC will have 
overlapping jurisdictions regarding SGBCs. Article 46H of the Malabo Protocol does not specify 
how the complementarity principle would work between the ACJHPR and the ICC. The 
ACJHPR provides for regional criminal jurisdictions while the Rome Statute provides that the 
ICC ‘shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions’.1357 The ICC has established that 
a case under article 17(1) (a) of the Rome Statute would be admissible before it where national 
investigations did not include the same individual and conduct as those in the ICC 
proceedings.1358 Overlapping jurisdiction of the ICC and the ACJHPR would vitiate 
complementarity where both courts investigate and prosecute the same perpetrator of SGBCs for 
                                                            
1354African Union, Draft 2 Withdrawal strategy document, p 12 available at 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf (accessed 16 
February 2017). 
1355 Ibid. 
1356 Ibid.  
1357 Rome Statute, Preamble at para 10. See also Rome Statute, article 1 that also provides that the ICC shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.  
1358 Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali ‘Judgment on the 
appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on 
the application by the Government of Kenya challenging the admissibility of the case pursuant to article 19(2)(b) of 
the Statute’ at para 36. Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang ‘Judgment 
on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled 
‘Decision on the application by the Government of Kenya challenging the admissibility of the case pursuant to 




the same crime at the same time.1359 This scenario is unlikely as each court would seek to 
maximise their costs.1360 It would be best for both courts to agree to their complementary 
jurisdiction and amend their statutes accordingly. Although Kenya proposed an amendment to 
the Rome Statute’s Preamble regarding the complementarity principle so as to include regional 
criminal jurisdictions, no such proposal has been made by any African state regarding article 
46H of the Malabo Protocol.1361 The proposed amendment to the Rome Statute’s preamble 
‘Emphasise[d] that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be 
complementary to national and regional criminal jurisdictions’.1362 
The 12th session of the Assembly of State Parties was not able to adopt Kenya’s proposed 
amendments, as Kenya had not given the proposed notification to state parties as required by the 
Rome Statute.1363 These proposed amendments and the other amendments are pending.1364 
5.3.7 Complementing or not complementing? 
Having considered the role which the AU has played in bridging the impunity gap for SGBCs 
committed in Africa at the regional level, it is necessary to consider whether prosecuting these 
crimes at the regional level complements and/or bridges the impunity gap of the ICC. Appraising 
                                                            
1359 Du Plessis argues that the ICC would not be barred from prosecuting the same case, which the ACJHR is 
prosecuting. His reasoning for this is that article 17 of the Rome Statute refers only to states. Max du Plessis 
‘Implications of the African Union decision to give the African Court jurisdiction over international crimes’ (2012) 
235 Institute for Security Studies Paper 1 at 11. 
1360 In Rau’s opinion lack of clarity as to a court’s jurisdiction in the case of overlapping jurisdictions could result in 
competition between them regarding their jurisdictional precedence in the case. For instance, courts could 
compromise their legitimacy by handing down lighter sentences, giving acquittals, which are unwarranted, or result 
in politicised benches. There could also be uncertainty between different groups such as defendants, victims and the 
prosecutor. Kristen Rau ‘Jurisprudential innovation or accountability avoidance? The International Criminal Court 
and proposed expansion of the African Court of Justice and Human Right’s’ (2012) 97 Minnesota Law Review 669 
at 695. 
1361 Other proposals made by Kenya included article 63 of the Rome Statute relating to trials in the presence of the 
accused, article 27 of the Rome Statute relating to irrelevance of official capacity, article 70 of the Rome Statute 
relating to offences against administration of justice and article 112(4) of the Rome Statute relating to establishing 
an Independent Oversight Mechanism. South Africa has also made a proposed amendment to article 16 of the Rome 
Statute. Proposed agenda items for the 12th session of the Assembly of state parties of the International Criminal 
Court regarding Kenya’s proposed amendments, available at http://scribd.com/doc/183221222/kenya-s-proposed-
agenda-items-for-the-12th-Session-of-the-Assembly-of-State-Parties  (accessed 28 May 2016). African Union, Draft 
2 Withdrawal strategy document at 12. 
1362 Ibid. 
1363 Coalition for the International Criminal Court ‘Report of the twelfth session of the Assembly of State Parties to 
the Rome Statute’ (2013) p 20 available at www.iccnow.org/documents/asp12_report.pdf (accessed 29 May 2016). 
Article 121(2) of the Rome Statute provides that three months notification should be given. The article provides that:  
No sooner than three months from the date of notification, the Assembly of States Parties, at its next meeting, 
shall, by a majority of those present and voting, decide whether to take up the proposal.  The Assembly may 
deal with the proposal directly or convene a Review Conference if the issue involved so warrants. 




the prosecution these crimes at the regional level did not entail instituting international tribunals 
such as, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra-
Leone (SCSL). Although the ICTR and SCSL played a part in prosecuting SGBCs committed in 
armed conflict in Africa, they were statutorily limited by time and territory.  
The ICC’s challenge to its credibility and effectiveness in bridging the impunity gap for 
crimes within its jurisdiction can be dealt with by obtaining cooperation from member states in 
arresting and surrendering alleged perpetrators of these crimes, establishing impartiality and 
overcoming financial constraints. The Rome Statute provides detailed provisions of the 
cooperation required from member states, though states such as Malawi, Chad, the DRC, South 
Africa, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Kenya, prefer to align with the AU’s stance of not 
cooperating with the ICC, and would rather ‘comply with the decisions and policies of the 
[African] Union’.1365 Although the AU has accused the ICC of bias against African states, the 
conflict of interest between the ICC and the AU concerns the immunity of incumbent state 
officials who are from non-ICC member states. Thus, the interplay between articles 27(2) and 
98(1) of the Rome Statute in cases where the Security Council refers a situation to the ICC (as in 
the SC’s resolution relating to Al-Bashir), is a matter of dispute between the AU and ICC. It has 
not helped that legal scholars disagree on the interpretation of these articles, nor that different 
Pre-Trial Chambers have given different interpretations on this matter. To avoid further disputes 
between the ICC and state members of the ICC, the Security Council when making referrals to 
the ICC, should ensure that their resolutions are clearly worded to avoid ambiguity. The AU has 
decided to seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ, through the United Nations General Assembly 
on the relationship between articles 27 and 98, and ‘other contested issues relating to the 
conflicting obligations of states parties to cooperation with the ICC’.1366 A better option would 
be for the AU to defer requesting the advisory opinion from the ICJ pending the outcome of the 
appeal by Jordan to the ICC’s Appeals Chamber (lodged on March 2018), against of the decision 
made against it by Pre-Trial Chamber II. The Pre-Trial Chamber held that Jordan failed to 
comply with the ICC’s request for the arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir when he was on 
Jordanian territory in March 2017, and referred the matter to the Assembly of State Parties and 
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the UNSC.1367 The Pre-Trial Chamber granted Jordan’s application to appeal against its decision 
on the following grounds:  
• That [t]he Chamber erred in its findings regarding the effects of the Rome Statute upon 
the immunity of President Al-Bashir.  
• That [t]he Chamber erred in concluding that Security Council resolution 1593 (2005) 
affected Jordan’s obligations under customary and conventional international law to 
accord immunity to President Al-Bashir.  
• That [e]ven if the Chamber's December 2017 decision with respect to non-compliance 
was correct (quod non), the Chamber abused its discretion in deciding to refer such non-
compliance to the Assembly of States Parties and to the Security Council.1368 
The issues appealed against by Jordan include those questions on which the AU seeks an 
advisory opinion. Since the interpretation of articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute, (when there 
is a referral by the Security Council regarding the immunity of an incumbent state official 
belonging to a non-state party) relates to articles in the Rome Statute, the ICC Appeals Chamber 
would be in a better position to decide on the matter. Du Plessis and Tladi point out that the 
advantage of an ICJ advisory opinion would be that it would take ‘a holistic view of all areas of 
international law’.1369 On the other hand they warn that resorting to the ICJ for an advisory 
opinion runs the risk of causing a friction between ‘two independent courts of international 
law’.1370   
With regard to the OTP being impartial as to whom it investigates and prosecutes, it 
would be difficult for the ICC to sever itself from political considerations. As mentioned 
earlier,1371 the DRC and Ugandan cases illustrate the difficulties the OTP faces in deciding 
whether to prosecute state officials accused of committing SGBCs. Although the ICC’s Policy 
Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation gives guidelines as to impartiality, the OTP still faces 
                                                            
1367 Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ‘The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's appeal against the "Decision 
under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest 
and surrender [of] Omar Al-Bashir."’ ICC-02/05-01/09 (12 March 2018). 
1368 Ibid.  
1369 Max du Plessis and Dire Tladi ‘The ICC’s immunity debate – the need for finality’ (11 August 2017) available 
at https://www.ejiltalk.org/author/dtladi/ (accessed 14 May 2018). 
1370 Max du Plessis and Dire Tladi ‘The ICC’s immunity debate – the need for finality’ (11 August 2017) available 
at https://www.ejiltalk.org/author/dtladi/ (accessed 14 May 2018). 




challenges regarding impartiality. In the recent ICC trial against Laurent Gbagbo, the former 
president of Cote d’Ivoire, it was alleged by the commissions of inquiry that both sides 
committed crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, yet none of Alassane Ouattara armed supporters 
faction was indicted.1372 With the Malabo Protocol in its current form, article 46A bis adopts the 
customary international law position on immunity, by granting blanket immunity to heads of 
state and state officials and so the OTP at the ACJHPR would not face the problem of 
impartiality directly, even though in reality there will be instances of impartiality. Indictments 
issued by the OTP will be one-sided prosecutions of rebels, militia groups and those who oppose 
the government, as the court cannot indict incumbent heads of state and state officials accused of 
committing SGBCs. This blanket provision is one of the disadvantages of prosecuting SGBCs 
before the ACJHPR. Although the ICC faces impartiality challenges, the Rome Statute does give 
the Prosecutor the discretion as to whom to prosecute. 
The failure of states to pay their contributions ‘in full or in a timely manner’ at the ICC 
jeopardises the daily operations of the court. In order to meet shortfalls in its member states’ 
financial contributions, the ICC resorts to using its Working Capital Fund at the end of that 
particular year.1373 The ACJHPR is likely to face greater financial challenges than the ICC, 
bearing in mind that it will also prosecute cases other than SGBCs. For example, the ACJHPR 
must be prepared to face such challenges in line with the ICC’s practice of diverting resources 
for unforeseeable events − such as Bosco Ntaganda’s surrender and new investigations not 
anticipated.1374 
Buttressed by a regional court to try crimes peculiar to Africa, including SGBCs 
committed in armed conflict, the ACJHPR should play a vital role in the prosecution of these 
crimes, thereby bridging the impunity gap. However, the same three constraints mentioned 
above, which limit the ICC’s effectiveness in prosecuting crimes within its jurisdiction, will also 
apply to the ACJHPR to an even greater extent, bearing in mind the human resources it will 
require compared to the ICC, and the types of crimes that it will investigate and prosecute. In 
addition, as suggested above, there is a need to redraft the Malabo Protocol by removing or 
                                                            
1372 See Sophie Rosenberg ‘The International Criminal Court in Cote d’Ivoire, Impartiality at Stake?’ (2017) 15 
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ICC’s alleged impartiality in the case against Laurent Gbagbo). 
1373 ICC Assembly of State Parties, Report of the Committee on Budget and Finance on the work of its 
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redrafting article 46A bis so that the OTP of the ACJHPR can make an informed decision on 
whom to prosecute. Also, a provision in the Malabo Protocol to increase its number of judges, 
where the need arises, is called for, as is the case with the Rome Statute.1375 Consideration 
should also be given to the amendments suggested in section 5.3.2 relating to the crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter, which examined the Malabo Protocol adopted by the AU to establish a regional 
court to try crimes peculiar to Africa, concentrated on crimes of SGBV committed in armed 
conflicts under the proposed ACJHPR jurisdiction. The examination was to assess whether the 
creation of the first permanent regional tribunal to try ‘international’ crimes would be effective in 
closing the impunity gap for SGBCs committed in armed conflicts at the regional level. Many 
criticisms about the Malabo Protocol have raised concern whether the Protocol adds value to the 
movement for the prosecution of international crimes. Whatever the case, the fact remains that 
Africa needs a regional court which can effectively investigate and prosecute SGBCs, especially 
as these crimes are prevalent on the continent. 
In examining, the Malabo Protocol in the context of the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, it was found that there is the need to redraft the Malabo Protocol for 
successful investigation and prosecution of SGBCs at the regional level. Such includes removing 
or redrafting article 46A bis, and amending the genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes articles. Although the case of Dorothy Chioma Njemanze & 3 Others v The Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, ECOWAS Community Court of Justice is welcomed, in that it establishes 
that victims of SGBCs can bring a case against a state in the ECOWAS Community Court of 
Justice, it is of concern that individuals and NGOs will face inordinate difficulties in bringing 
cases before the ACJHPR. Of concern also, is the threat of SGBV marginalisation, as it may be 
considered less important than the other crimes within the court’s jurisdiction for being not 
‘ubiquitous and ongoing crimes’. Before redrafting the Malabo Protocol, the AU should obtain 
advice from legal experts on gender issues, international organisations, civil societies and NGOs, 
as their suggestions would help in rectifying the weaknesses of the Malabo Protocol.  
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The chapter also noted that the AU is not alone in having used an immunity clause to 
avoid the prosecution of sitting heads of states and senior officials, with powerful states such as 
the United States finding means of immunising their citizens from the ICC’s jurisdiction. This 
has also resulted in the widening of the impunity gap for prosecuting perpetrators of SGBCs in 
the ICC. 
This chapter also contends that, however justified the AU’s claims against the ICC might 
be, the AU needs to put aside its political differences with the ICC and work closely with it in 
closing the impunity gap for SGBV. The AU should thus encourage African states to remain in 
the ICC, especially as it appears unlikely that the ACJHR will come into operation in the near 
future. In any event, it would take years for the AU to find its way to obtaining successful 
prosecutions for SGBCs, bearing in mind that these crimes are amongst the most difficult to 
prosecute. As a result, the AU will need the ICC’s assistance, drawing on its experience and 
learning from its mistakes if perpetrators of SGBV are to be accountable for these crimes. 
This chapter also found that funding the ACJHPR, and the fact that the AU prefers to enter into 
peace deals with perpetrators of human right crimes rather prosecute them, would present 
obstacles to investigating and prosecuting SGBCs. Although the AU claims in its CA its 
commitment ‘to combat impunity and promote democracy [and] the rule of law and good 
governance’,1376 this determination is directed at rebel fighters, those in opposition to the 
government in question and former heads of state − as with Hissene Habre, former president of 
Chad. In that case, the AU and Senegal inaugurated the Extraordinary African Chamber, in 
Senegal to try Hissene Habre.1377 As will be seen in the next chapter, entering into peace deals is 
not necessarily the best solution; although the government of the DRC entered into various peace 
deals with their opponents, this did not prevent perpetrators from committing SGBV on all sides. 
This chapter concludes that until the AU removes the loopholes in the Malabo Protocol, the 
ACJHPR will not be a reliable court for the successful prosecution of SGBCs committed in 
armed conflict situations. At this stage, although the ICC and the AU are not at best of terms, the 
ICC is the better of the two courts to prosecute SGBCs committed in armed conflict in Africa. 
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IMPLEMENTING THE ROME STATUTE IN THE DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO’s DOMESTIC LAW RELATING TO SEXUAL 
AND GENDER-BASED CRIMES COMMITTED IN ARMED CONFLICTS 
In 2002, she had been abducted with her uncle by the FDLR. They were 
each tied to a tree by their hands and feet, and she watched while he died 
after they cut off his genitals. She remained tied to the tree for two weeks, 
raped at will by her abductors repeatedly, and she became pregnant.1378 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The DRC signed the Rome Statute on 8 September 2000, and ratified it according to legislative 
decree No. 0013/2002 of 30 March 2002.1379 On 11 April 2002, the DRC deposited the 
instruments which ratified the Rome Statute.1380 On 31 December 2015, its President 
promulgated the adoption of the bill, implementing the International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) 
Rome Statute in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC’s) domestic laws upon approval by 
its National Assembly and Senate on 10 December 2015.1381 The long-awaited promulgation of 
Rome Statute into the DRC’s domestic laws demonstrated the government’s willingness to 
investigate and prosecute international crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, and end impunity for 
sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Although the DRC operates a monist legal system, 
the promulgation of the Rome Statute, published in the DRC’s Official Journal1382, will allow the 
DRC give full effect to the Rome Statute and have its domestic laws amended in line with the 
Rome Statute. This will strengthen the DRC’s legal framework in areas where its judicial system 
is weak, thereby making it possible to make perpetrators of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction 
                                                            
1378 A victim of rape in the Kivu Province of the DRC describing her ordeal to a United Nations Panel of Experts in 
2010. OHCHR ‘Report of the Panel on remedies and reparations for victims of sexual violence in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo to the High Commissioner for the Human Rights’ (3 March 2011) para 24. 
1379 Office Journal of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Office of the President of the Republic, 29 February 2016. 
1380 Avocats Sans Frontieres ‘Case study, The application of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by 
the courts of the Democratic Republic of Congo at 10 available at www.asf.be/wp-
content/.../ASF_CaseStudy_RomeStatute_Light_PagePerPage.pdf  (accessed 10 October 2016). 
1381 The documents implementing the Rome Statute into the DRC’s laws are dated 31 December 2015, whereas 
Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) state that the date on which the DRC’s President promulgated the Laws 
was 2 January 2015. PGA ‘PGA welcomes the enactment of the implementing legislation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court by the Democratic Republic of Congo’ available at http://www.pgaction.org/news/pga-
welcomes-enactment-drc-implementing.html (accessed 29 August 2016). 
1382 In an email to me, Marion Chahuneau, Programme Officer for PGA confirmed that they were published in the 




accountable. The DRC will also be able to fulfil its primary duty ‘to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’.1383 
Although the DRC is a party to other international treaties and instruments1384 which 
prohibit SGBV committed in armed conflict situations, the focus of this chapter will be to 
examine the Act which implements the Rome Statute into the DRC’s domestic laws, and its 
impact on the investigation and prosecution of SGBV committed in armed conflicts. This chapter 
considers the DRC, where SGBV committed in armed conflict is prevalent, as a case study to 
assess whether the application of the Rome Statute’s principles at the domestic level can bridge 
the impunity gap relating to SGBV committed in armed conflicts.  
This chapter comprises three sections. The first gives a brief historical account of SGBV 
in the DRC to provide a picture of the problem of SGBV committed in armed conflicts. The 
second dwells on the laws relating to SGBV in the DRC before the promulgation of the Rome 
Statute in its domestic laws. The DRC’s Constitution prohibits SGBV against women, the high 
rate of which, according to Yarkin Erturk, was due to discrimination against and oppression of 
women. In spite of the fact that the 2006 laws of the civil courts prohibited rape and other 
SGBCs, the prosecution of these crimes by the civil courts was rare. The military court’s laws on 
the other hand were not consonant with international war crimes. For example, the definition of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in the military court’s Penal Code differed 
from that of the Rome Statute. The last section considers the application of the Rome Statute in 
the DRC with regard to such issues as complementarity, head of state immunity and cooperation 
between the DRC and the ICC. It also considers what steps the DRC’s judiciary should take 
                                                            
1383 Rome Statute, Preamble. 
1384 IHL Conventions which the DRC has ratified are the Geneva Conventions (GC) of 1949 (ratified in 1961), the 
First Additional Protocol of 1977 to the GC (ratified in 1982), and the Second Additional Protocols of 1977 to the 
GC which (ratified in 2002). Also ratified by the DRC are the Hague Convention 1954 (ratified in 1961) and the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 (ratified in 1962). With regard to 
international human rights instruments relating to SGBV these are: the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and its Optional Protocol (both ratified in 1976), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ratified in 1976), the Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women 
(ratified in 1986),the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ratified in 1987), the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (ratified in 1990), the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of Children in armed Conflict (ratified in 2001), the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ratified in 1996), and the African Charter on Rights and Welfare 
of the Child (ratified in 2001). United Nations Human Rights ‘Report of the mapping exercise documenting the most 
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003’ (2010) at  339 – 343 available at: 




when applying the Rome Statute in the investigation and prosecution of SGBV, to avoid making 
the same mistakes made by the ICC. 
6.2 SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
The conflicts and wars in the DRC date back to colonial regimes, particularly that of King 
Leopard II, who colonised the DRC in 1885.1385 In recent years, the DRC has experienced two 
successive wars where crimes of SGBV have been widespread and prevalent, especially in the 
eastern Congo region.1386 An OHCHR report attributes the high number of rapes in the DRC to 
its wars.1387 On the other hand, the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, Yarkin 
Erturk, attributes the high number of rapes in the DRC’s armed conflict to ‘gender-based 
discrimination in the society at large – discrimination against women and their oppression in 
virtually every sphere of life’.1388 
In the DRC, SGBV in armed conflict was a weapon of war used to terrorise, punish and 
destroy communities and families for collaborating with opposing armed groups or the 
Congolese army, and to displace people from communities rich in resources.1389 Perpetrators 
have also exploited civilians’ vulnerability in armed conflict situations to commit SGBCs.1390 
Various forms of SGBV took place in the DRC, such as gang rape, sexual slavery, members of 
families being forced to rape each other and the dismembering of victims such as cutting off their 
                                                            
1385 International Legal Assistance Consortium ‘Rebuilding courts and trust: an assessment of the needs of the justice 
system in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (August 2009) at 12 available at: 
www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/.../conflits_in_drc_eng_25sept_rev1.pdf (accessed 30 August 2016).  Democratic 
Republic of the Congo: How did the colonialism affect the people in Congo? available at 
http://southwest.mpls.k12.mn.us/uploads/congocasestudy.pdf (accessed 30 August 2016) (stating that King Leopard 
II’s claim to the DRC was recognised by Europe at the Belgium Conference in 1885).   
1386 OHCHR ‘Progress and obstacles in the fight against impunity for sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo’ at para 7 (April 2014) available at: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/drc/Congo0602.pdf  (accessed 30 
August 2016). 
1387 Ibid. OHCHR ‘Report of the Panel on remedies and reparations for victims of sexual violence’ at para 142. 
1388 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Yakin Erturk, on violence against women, its causes and consequences, UN 
Human Rights Council, A/HRC/7/6/Add.4(28 February 2008) at 16 available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/7session/A.HRC.7.6.Add.4.doc (accessed on 30 August 
2016). 
1389 OHCHR ‘Progress and obstacles in the fight against impunity’ at para 7. Human Rights Watch ‘The war within 
the war, sexual violence against women and girls in eastern Congo’ (June 2002) at 1 and 23 available at: 





genitals.1391 In expressing her opinion of the SGBV committed in the DRC, Pritchett states it is 
indisputable that ‘the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo has a woman’s face’,1392 
attesting that civilian women and girls were the main victims of this conflict. Various non-state 
armed groups, foreign militia, state security forces such as the Forces Armees de la Republique 
Democratique du Congo (FARDC) and the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC), whose intended 
function was to protect civilians, were perpetrators of these crimes.1393 In 2013 for instance, of 
the 689 cases of SGBV which occurred in an armed conflict situation, government security 
forces committed 31%.1394 The apparent decline in conflict-related SGBCs in 2015 was 
attributed to underreporting of cases and limited access to conflict-affected areas.1395 Of the 637 
cases reported by the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), armed groups committed 74% of the sexual crimes, whilst 
government security forces committed the remaining 26%.1396 The rape of at least 40 women on 
a daily basis continued.1397 
6.2.1 The genesis of sexual and gender-based violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo   
The DRC has suffered from two recent wars: the first, the Congolese World War from 1996 to 
1997 and the second, from 1998 to 2003,1398 known as ‘Africa’s World War’.1399 Margot 
                                                            
1391 A. Peterman, T. Palermo and C. Bredenkamp ‘Estimates and determinants of sexual violence against women in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (2011) 101(6) American Journal of Public Health at 1060. United Nations 
Human Rights ‘Report of the mapping exercise’ at 318. 
1392 Susan Pritchett ‘Entrenched hegemony, efficient procedure or selective justice? An inquiry into charges for 
gender-based violence at the International Criminal Court’ (2008) 17 Transnational Law and Contemporary 
Problems 265 at 268. Though women and girls are the main targets of SGBV committed in armed conflict, men are 
also raped. Like women, these men are also stigmatised. OHCHR ‘Report of the Panel on remedies and reparations 
for victims of sexual violence’ at paras 31, 32 and 50. 
1393 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence’ S/2016/361 April 2016) paras 32 
and 33. Report of the Special Rapporteur, Yakin Erturk, on violence against women at 2 and 6. 
1394 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on conflict related sexual violence’ 5/2015/203 (23 March 2015) para 
23. 
1395 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on conflict related sexual violence’ S/2016/361(20 April 2016) para 34. 
1396 Ibid. 
1397 DRC: The forgotten rape capital of the world available at:  https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/drc-the-forgotten-
rape-capital-of-the-world (accessed 25 March 2016). This does not preclude the fact that men also experience 
gender-based violence as also seen in the Bemba case.  
1398World without genocide ‘Democratic Republic of Congo, 1996 to present’ available at: 
www.worldwithoutgenocide.org/.../Conflict-in-the-Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo-Wo...(accessed on 31 
August 2016). Vlassenroot points out that even though the signing of the Global and Inclusive Agreement on 
Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Pretoria Agreement) led to the official end of the DRC wars, there 
has been an increase in the number of armed groups. Koen Vlassenroot ‘South Kivu: identity, territory and power in 
the Eastern Congo’ (2010) Usalama Project Report: Understanding Congolese Armed Groups, Rift Valley Institute 




Wallstrom, a former UN special representative on sexual violence in conflict, has also referred to 
the DRC as ‘the rape capital of the world’.1400 The first Congolese World War is closely 
associated with the 1994 Rwandan genocide. When the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a Tutsi 
militia group defeated the Hutus during the Rwandan genocide, over one million Rwandan Hutus 
fled to eastern Congo in 1994.1401 These refugees robbed and terrorised the locals. In 1996, the 
Banyamulenge, an ethnic group having affiliation with the Rwandan Tutsis retaliated by trying to 
get the Rwandans out of the country.1402 This led to Congo’s first war. Laurent-Desire Kabila 
who was the leader of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL), 
with Uganda and Rwanda as his allies, invaded the Congo.1403 They had taken control of eastern 
Congo by December 1996, and by May 1997, when they had taken control of Kinshasa, they 
overthrew Mobutu SeseSeko who had ruled the country for 35 years.1404 Kabila declared himself 
President on 17 May 1997, and renamed the country, known as Zaire under Mobutu’s rule, as 
DRC.1405 During Mobutu’s reign and until he was overthrown, many civilians were raped and 
tortured by his security services.1406 The ADFL and their allied forces also raped and tortured 
civilians, and this continued even after Kabila became President.1407 
Rwanda and Uganda with the help of Burundi started the second Congo War in 1998, 
when Kabila turned his back on them. Kabila got support from Zimbabwe, Chad, Angola, Sudan 
and Namibia to fight against them.1408 Both sides, including the United Nations (UN) 
peacekeepers, raped women and children as young as six years old.1409 When the Rwandan and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 www.eprints.lse.ac.uk/.../Vlassenroot_South_Kivu_identity_territory_and_power_in_easter (accessed 2 September 
2016). The Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Pretoria 
Agreement) was signed in Pretoria on 16 December 2002 available at: www.peacemaker.un.org/drc-
agreementontransition2002  (accessed 2 September 2016).    
1399Ibid. Sara Meger ‘Rape of the Congo: Understanding sexual violence in the conflict in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo’ (2010) 28:2 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 119 at 124.    
1400 UN News Centre ‘Tackling sexual violence must include prevention, ending impunity – UN Official’ (April 
2010) available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34502 (accessed 20 April 2016). 
1401 World without Genocide ‘Democratic Republic of Congo, 1996 to present.’ 
1402The Christian Science Monitor ‘A brief history of Congo’s wars’ (29 November 2011) available at 




1406 United Nations Human Rights ‘Report of the mapping’ at 150. Gaelle Breton-Le Goff ‘Ending Sexual Violence 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2010) in Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 13 at 15. 
1407Idem at 150 -152. Ibid.  
1408 World without Genocide ‘Democratic Republic of Congo, 1996 to present.’      




Ugandan troops failed to oust Kabila from power, they took control of North and South Kivu,1410 
and aligned with rebel groups against Kabila’s government. The Ressemblement Congolais pour 
la Democratie (RCD), the Mai-Mai and the Movement for Liberation of Congo were some of the 
military groups, which came together.1411 In January 2001, Kabila was assassinated and his son 
Joseph Kabila became President.1412 
Despite agreements such as the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999,1413 the Pretoria 
Agreement of 2002,1414 Uganda Luanda Agreement of 2002,1415 Sun City Agreement of 
2003,1416 and Goma Peace Agreement of 2009,1417 which were signed to bring the conflicts in 
the DRC to an end, the DRC still experienced instability and SGBV.1418 There are more than 60 
                                                            
1410 United Nations Human Rights ‘Report of the mapping exercise’ at 153. 
1411 Stacy Branwell ‘Rape and sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo: a case study of gender-based 
violence’ (2010) Journal of Gender Studies 45 at 48. 
1412 The Christian Science Monitor ‘A brief history of Congo’s wars.’ 
1413 The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 10 July 1999 by Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda 
and Zimbabwe. Zambia, the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations, and the South African Development 
Community witnessed it. The parties to the agreement agreed to a ‘ceasefire among all their forces in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.’ Also ‘all foreign forces from the national territory of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo’ were to withdraw from the DRC. The Lusaka Ceasefire agreement also provided that the granting of 
amnesty did not apply in the case of the crime of genocide. United Nations Security Council, Lusaka Agreement, 
S/1999/815, 10 July 1999, pars 1, 12 and 22 available at: www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-
documents/document/rol-s1999-815.php (accessed 31 August 2016).    
1414 The Pretoria Agreement was signed between the President of the DRC and Rwanda in Pretoria, South Africa, on 
the 30 July 2002. The agreement was for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC and the ‘dismantling of 
the ex-FAR (Rwandan Armed Forces) and Interahamwe (Rwandan Hutu Militia) forces in the DRC’ available at: 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/33230/drc-rwanda-text-pretoria-memorandum-understanding (accessed 31 August 
2016).    
1415 The Luanda Agreement of 6 September 2002 was an agreement between the governments of the DRC and 
Uganda for the ‘withdrawal of Ugandan Troops from the DRC ‘Cooperation and normalisation of relations between’ 
both states’ available at: 
 www.beyondjuba.org/BJP1/.../Ug_gov_and_DRCongo_gov_security_agreement.pdf (accessed 31 August 2016). 
1416 This agreement, which was signed by the DRC government and the warring parties, such as the Congolese Rally 
for Democracy and Movement for the Liberation of Congo, in the second Congo war, was a culmination of the 
Inter-Congolese dialogue. It ‘set the process for the transformation of the political climate within the DRC.’ Inter-
Congolese Political Negotiations, The Final Act (Sun City Agreement) available at www.peacemaker.un.org/drc-
suncity-agreement2003 (accessed 31 August 2016). 
1417 This was an agreement where the CNDP confirmed ‘its decision to cease its existence as a politico-military 
movement’ and the DRC government undertook to respond ‘to the CNDP’s request for recognition as a political 
party.’ Peace agreement between the government and Le Congres National Pour La Defense du Peuple  (CNDP), 
Goma, DRC, art 1 (23 March 2009) available at www.friendsofthecongo.org/images/pdf/cndp_accord.pdf (accessed 
31 August 2016).  
1418 Institute for War and Peace Reporting ‘Sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo’(2008) at 4 
available at 
http://www.ceipaz.org/images/contenido/Sexual%20violence%20in%20the%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20
Congo.pdf (accessed 20 March 2017) (stating that instead of the Peace agreement of 2002 bringing an end to SGBV 




armed groups operating in the eastern Congo region, with North and South Kivu mostly 
affected.1419 
6.3  DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO’S DOMESTIC LEGISLATION 
PROHIBITING SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN ARMED 
CONFLICT SITUATIONS  
6.3.1 The Constitution’s Provisions Relevant to Sexual and Gender-based Crimes 
Committed in Armed Conflict 
The DRC Constitution prohibits sexual violence committed against women and promotes the 
elimination of such violence. Under article 14 of its Constitution, the government of the DRC 
commends ‘the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women’ and undertakes to 
‘take measures to combat all forms of violence against women in public and private life’.1420 
Article 15 specifically mentions that the ‘government shall ensure the elimination of sexual 
violence’. The article further states that: 
Without prejudice to international treaties and agreements, any sexual violence against any 
person with the intent to destabilise, dislocate a family and eliminate an entire people is a crime 
against humanity punishable by law.1421 
Thus, under article 15 of the Constitution there is the classification of sexual violence as a crime 
against humanity when committed ‘against any person with the intent to destabilise, dislocate a 
family and eliminate an entire people’. Article 16 of the Constitution recognises the human rights 
of a person, stating that: 
The State has an obligation to respect and protect one. Everyone has the right to life, physical 
integrity and the free development of his personality in accordance with the law, public order, the 
rights of others and morals. No one shall be held in slavery or in any similar condition. No one 
shall be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. No one shall be subjected to forced or 
compulsory labour.1422 
6.3.2 The DRC courts and sexual and gender-based laws applicable before them 
6.3.2.1 Sexual offences within the civil and military courts jurisdiction of the DRC 
                                                            
1419 Jeffrey Gettleman ‘In Congo, wars are small and chaos is endless’ The New York Times (30 April 2016) 
available at: www.nytimes.com/2016/05/.../africa/in-congo-wars-are-small-and-chaos-is-endless.html (accessed 31 
August 2016).  
1420 Constitution of the Republic of the Democratic Republic of Congo amended by Law No 11/002 of 20 January 
2011 revising certain articles of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo of 18 February 2006, art 14.  
1421 Idem at 15.  




The civil and the military courts in the DRC have jurisdiction over criminal matters. With regard 
to the adoption of sexual offences in the DRC’s civil jurisdiction, NGOs representing women in 
the DRC pushed for the adoption of these crimes in the national laws.1423 In 2006 the NGOs 
were successful in getting the Congolese Parliament to adopt stringent laws relating to 
SGBCs.1424 In this regard, amendments to the DRC’s 1940 Penal Code and its 1959 Penal 
Procedure Code, drafted by a group of local NGOs,1425 came into force in July 2006.1426 Law 
06/018 of July 2006, which amended the 1940 Penal Code, recognises in its preamble the fact 
that the DRC’s wars of 1996 and 1998 exposed victims to a wide range of crimes including 
sexual violence.1427 The preamble further states the necessity to revisit certain provisions of its 
Criminal Code to ‘prevent and severely punish offences relating to sexual violence and ensure 
the systematic treatment of victims of these offences’.1428 By modifying and supplementing the 
1940 Penal Code, the new law integrated international humanitarian law rules relating to sexual 
violence offences to protect victims of such offences.1429 Under the provisions of Law 06/018 of 
July 2006, rape is committed 
. . . either by means of violent or serious threats, or by coercion against a person, directly or 
through a third party, or by surprise, through psychological pressure, or in a coercive 
environment, or “by abusing a person who by reason of illness, impairment of his faculties or any 
other accidental cause” would have lost the use of his senses or would have been deprived of it by 
some artifices: 
(a) every man, whatever his age, who has introduced his sexual organ, even superficially into that 
of a woman, or any woman, whatever her age, who will have compelled a man to introduce even 
superficially his sexual organ in his;  
                                                            
1423 Breton-Le Goff ‘Ending sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ at 22. 
1424 Ibid. 
1425 Ibid. 
1426 Loi n° 06/018 du 20 juillet 2006 modifiant et complétant le Décret du 30 janvier 1940 portant Code penal 
congolais available at  www.leganet.cd/Legislation/DroitPenal/Loi.06.018.20.07.3006.htm(accessed 16 March 
2017). Loi n° 06/019 du 20 juillet 2006 modifiant et complétant le Décret du 06 août 1959 portant Code de 
Procédure Pénale Congolais available at www.leganet.cd/Legislation/DroitPenal/L.06.019.20.07.2006.htm (accessed 
16 March 2017). 
1427 The French version reads ‘Les guerres de 1996 et 1998 dans notre pays n’ont fait qu’empirer la situation 
économique déjà déplorable et provoquer des millions de victimes dont les plus exposées et visées sont cruellement 
frappées par les crimes de toutes catégories. Ces victimes ont été atteintes dans leur dignité, dans leur intégrité 
physique et morale, mais aussi, dans leur vie. Ainsi, de tels actes ne peuvent rester impunis à l’avenir.’  
1428 The French version reads ‘Face à la nécessité de prévenir et de réprimer sévèrement les infractions se rapportant 
aux violences sexuelles et d’assurer une prise en charge systématique des victimes de ces infractions, il s’est avéré 
impérieux de revisiter certaines dispositions du Code pénal.’ 
1429 The French version reads ‘Ainsi, la présente loi modifie et complète le Code pénal congolais par l’intégration 
des règles du droit international humanitaire relatives aux infractions de violences sexuelles. De ce fait, elle prend 
largement en compte la protection des personnes les plus vulnérables notamment les femmes, les enfants et les 




(b) any man who has penetrated, even superficially, the anus, mouth, or other orifice of the body 
of a woman, or of a man by a sexual organ, by any other part of the body, or by an object 
anywhere; 
(c) any person who has introduced, even superficially, any other part of the body or any object 
into the vagina;  
(d) any person who has compelled a man or woman to penetrate his anus, his mouth, or any 
orifice of his body, by any sexual organ, for any part of the body or by any object whatsoever.1430 
The actus reus of rape under the 2006 Law, is similar to that of rape as provided for in the Rome 
Statute’s Elements of Crime, bringing rape under the 2006 Law in line with that of international 
criminal law.1431 Recognising the fact that a man or woman can commit rape, the 2006 Law 
provides that perpetrators of rape, regardless of their sex, will be committed to imprisonment of 
five to 20 years and a fine. If the victim died because of the rape, life imprisonment would be the 
penalty for the perpetrator(s).1432  
Other SGBCs similar to those provided for under the Rome Statute which were 
introduced into the DRC’s national laws for the first time included sexual slavery, forced 
marriage, forced pregnancy, sexual mutilation, zoophile conduct and forced sterilisation.1433 
(Law No 06/019 of July 2006 amended and supplemented the 1959 Penal Procedure Code.1434) 
Law No 06/019 intended to ensure the prompt trial of cases relating to SGBV by providing for 
the preliminary examinations into these crimes to be undertaken within a month of the referral of 
the crime to its judicial authority and for the judicial proceedings relating to these cases to take 
place within three months.1435 Both Law No 06/018 and Law No 06/019 apply to crimes 
committed after August 2006. Thus, there could be no trial of any gender-based crimes provided 
for under Law No 06/018 that occurred before August 2006.1436 This created an impunity gap in 
the prosecution of these crimes, as the existing 1940 Penal Code only provided for the 
prosecution of crimes of rape, indecent assault and outrage to public morality.1437 The definition 
                                                            
1430 Loi n° 06/018 du 20 juillet 2006, art 170(2) under art 2. 
1431 Rome Statute Elements of Crime art 7(1)(g)-1 and 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1. 
1432 Loi n° 06/018 du 20 juillet 2006, arts 170(2) and 171 under article 2. 
1433 Idem at art 3. Zoophile is a sexual disorder where a person is attracted to animals or has sexual intercourse with 
animals. Medical Definition of Zoophilia – Medicine Net available at 
www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=11824 (accessed 10 May 2017). 
1434 Loi n° 06/019 du 20 juillet 2006. 
1435 The French version reads ‘Sans préjudice des dispositions légales relatives à la procédure de flagrance, l’enquête 
préliminaire en matière de violence sexuelle se fait dans un délai d’un mois maximum à partir de la saisine de 
l’autorité judiciaire. L’instruction et le prononcé du jugement se font dans un délai de trois mois maximum à partir 
de la saisine de l’autorité judiciaire.’ 





of rape in the 1940 Penal Code did not conform to the definition of rape under international 
criminal law, as is the case with Law 06/018. But although the 2006 laws ended impunity for 
SGBCs, the imposition of harsh sentences was rare, and most perpetrators escaped imprisonment 
with resultant injustice to their victims.1438 
With regard to military justice, the military police tribunals, garrison military tribunals, 
military courts and operational military courts, and the Military High Court can deliver justice in 
the DRC military.1439 Military courts and tribunals have jurisdiction over members of the DRC’s 
armed forces and its national police force, rebels and civilians who commit crimes under the 
rules of the DRC’s army.1440 These military courts and tribunals also have jurisdiction to hear 
crimes specified in the Military Penal Code, but this is subject to the provisions of articles 117 
and 119 of the Military Judicial Code.1441 The crimes specified in the 2002 Military Penal Code 
over which the military courts and tribunals have exclusive jurisdiction are the crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.1442 In including these crimes into the 
Military Penal Code, the DRC partially adopted the Rome Statute’s complementary 
provisions.1443 The Military Penal Code specifically lists ‘rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilisation and other forms of sexual violence of 
                                                            
1438 Institute for War and Peace Reporting ‘Sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ at 4. 
Erturk states that ‘the law enforcement and justice authorities have been unable and in many instances are apparently 
also unwilling, to implement the law’ Report of the Special Rapporteur, Yakin Erturk, on violence against women at 
16. 
1439Loi n° 023/2002 du 18 Novembre 2002 Portant Code Judiciaire Militaire, art 1 available at 
http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit Judiciaire/Loi.023.2002.18.11.2002.pdf  (accessed 16 March 2017). 
1440 Under article 156 of the DRC Constitution, military courts have jurisdiction over members of the armed forces 
and national police. However, article 115 of the Military Justice Code 2002 extends the military courts’ jurisdiction 
to include civilians who are involved in fighting during armed conflicts. Also article 112(7) of the Military Justice 
Code 2002 extends the military courts’ jurisdiction during peacetime to any civilian ‘who, even if not part of the 
army commit an infractions against the army, national police or the national service’ and ‘who without being 
soldiers commit crimes using weapons of war’. International Center for Transitional Justice ‘The accountability 
landscape in eastern DRC: Analysis of the national legislative and judicial response to international crimes’ (2009 – 
2014) at 9 available at https://www.ictj.org/publication/accountability-landscape-eastern-drc-analysis-national-
legislative-and-judicial-response (accessed 16 March 2017). 
1441 Loi n° 024/2002 du 18 novembre 2002 art 207 which provides that ‘subject to the provisions of articles 117 and 
119 of the Military Judicial Code, only the military courts and tribunals have jurisdiction over offences under this 
Code.’  
1442 Idem art 161, which provides military courts with exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes. The French version reads ‘en cas d’indivisibilité ou de connexité d’infractions 
avec des crimes de génocide, des crimes de guerre ou des crimes contre l’humanité, les juridictions militaires sont 
seules compétentes’. The provisions relating to the crime of genocide is contained in article 164, crimes against 
humanity in articles 165 to 172 and war crimes in articles 173 to 175.     
1443Michael P Broache ‘Bringing home Rome: Explaining the domestication of the Rome Statute in the International 




comparable gravity’ as crimes against humanity.1444 However, the Military Penal Code has been 
criticised by scholars as being deficient, for example, in that the definitions of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes were not fully in line with the Rome Statute’s definition; it 
conflated the crimes against humanity and war crimes definitions and no provision was made for 
the criminal liability based on command responsibility.1445 Crimes against humanity are defined 
under the Military Penal Code as ‘grave violations of international humanitarian law committed 
against civilian populations before or during war’ and ‘are not necessarily related to a state of 
war’.1446 It then provides a different definition of crimes against humanity in the subsequent 
article as ‘grave breaches against persons and objects protected by the Geneva Conventions and 
the additional Protocols, when the conventions only address situations of international and non-
international armed conflict’.1447 In April 2013, the Law on the Organisation, Functioning and 
Jurisdiction of the Courts was adopted to curb these deficiencies,1448 taking away the exclusive 
right of the military courts to try crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity by 
giving civilian courts, through the Court of Appeal, the right to try these crimes.1449 So far, these 
courts have tried only one case, in which the Appellate Court of Lubumbashi convicted four 
defendants for genocide in September 2016.1450 
6.3.3 Mobile Courts 
States in Africa such as the DRC, Somalia and Sierra Leone have resorted to using mobile courts 
to improve ‘justice service delivery in remote, conflict-affected areas’,1451 thus making justice 
accessible primarily to victims of SGBCs. The military courts in the eastern DRC, for instance, 
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1445 Broache ‘Bringing home Rome’ at 21 and 24. International Center for Transitional Justice ‘The accountability 
landscape in eastern DRC’ at 6 and 7.  
1446 Loi N° 024/2002 du 18 novembre 2002, art 165. ICTJ ‘The accountability landscape in eastern DRC’. 
1447 Ibid. Ibid. 
1448 Loi  organique n°13/011-B du 11 avril 2013 portant organisation, fonctionnement et compétences des 
juridictions de l'ordre judiciaire available at  
http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/LOI.13.011.11.04.2013.htm (accessed 16 March 2017). 
1449 Loi organique n°13/011-B du 11 avril 2013, art 91. The French version reads ‘les Cours d'appel connaissent de 
l'appel des jugements rendus en premier ressort par les tribunaux de grande instance et les tribunaux de commerce. 
Elles connaissent également, au premier degré : 
1) du crime de génocide, des crimes de guerre et des crimes contre l'humanité commis par les personnes relevant de 
leur compétence et de celle des tribunaux de grande 'instance ;’ 
1450 Human Rights Watch ‘Justice on trial: Lessons from the Minova rape case in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(October 2015) at 71 available at www.refworld.org/docid/560d06c34.html (accessed 12 April 2017). 
1451 Evaluation of UNDP’s support to mobile courts in Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia at 





cannot cover the vast expanse of that area as most courts are situated in towns and cities.1452 In 
South Kiva, only four military courts are competent to try rape cases.1453 This means that victims 
in rural areas have to travel long distances on unsafe roads to reach a military court, which could 
result in them not attending a hearing, not contributing to investigations and not participating in 
trials.1454 Furthermore the cost of having to travel to and attend these courts is mostly 
prohibitive. Thus, victims in rural areas are usually forced to resort to traditional justice 
mechanisms or local custom, conducted in their local dialect rather than in French which is the 
language used by the military courts. A disadvantage of this form of justice is that the fine or 
reparation demanded of the perpetrator is usually paid in the form of a cow, or goat, often to the 
family of the victim.1455 In other instances, the victim is forced to marry the perpetrator, which is 
a further form of punishment for the victim who has already been raped by the perpetrator, and 
sometimes may be forced to live a life of abuse at the hand of the perpetrator.1456 This form of 
justice also undermines the rule of law, as it does not recognise the gravity of the criminal 
offence committed by the perpetrator.1457 It also fosters corruption among police officers’, who 
would rather receive money for helping to facilitate negotiations than encourage a victim to 
proceed with a court trial.  
Since 2008, the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI) together 
with organisations, such as, MONUSCO and Avocats sans Frontières, have organised rape trials 
in remote areas of South Kivu, North Kivu and Maniema provinces in eastern DRC.1458 In 
particular, the ‘Task Force International Justice’, a network of various organisations which have 
recently instituted mobile military courts and the Haute Cour Militaire to sit in remote areas. 
Congolese lawyers have also benefited from the legal training, received, on the implemented 
                                                            
1452 FIDH ‘Victims of sexual violence rarely obtain justice and never receive reparation’ at 47 available at available 
at https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_rdc_.pdf  (accessed 19 September 2018).  
1453 Trial International ‘Sexual violence in the DRC: Why is impunity so persistent? (12 October 2017) available at 
https://trialinternational.org/.../sexual-violence-in-the-drc-why-is-impunity-so-persista.. (accessed 19 September 
2018). 
1454 FIDH ‘Victims of sexual violence rarely obtain justice and never receive reparation’ at 47. 
1455 PHR ‘Barriers to justice: Implementing reparations for sexual violence in the DRC’ (2013) at 20 available at 
http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/blog/barriers-to-justice-for-barriers-to-justice-for-survivors-of-sexual-violence-
in-the-drc.html (accessed 19 September 2018). 
1456 Ibid. 
1457 Ibid. 
1458 Michael Maye ‘Mobile courts in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Complementarity in action?’ available at 





Rome Statute in the DRC’s domestic law.1459 Although these mobile courts have been successful 
in getting convictions for rape, operating these mobile courts is difficult and costly, and 
dependent on international funding.1460   
6.3.4 Military courts applying the Rome Statute’s provisions before the implementation 
of the Rome Statute in its domestic law. 
As the DRC operates a monist legal system, international treaties and agreements which have 
been duly ratified do not have to be passed into law in order to be applied at the national level, as 
the DRC’s Constitution provides for the supremacy of these ‘international treaties and 
agreements over its national laws’.1461 Taking advantage of these constitutional provisions, the 
military courts in 2006 started applying the provisions of the Rome Statue to certain cases in 
order to fill the inconsistencies and/or gaps in the DRC’s domestic law,1462 such as in the war 
crimes and crimes against humanity definition in the Military Penal Code, which differed from 
the Rome Statute’s.1463 The military courts applied the Rome Statute’s provisions to rape cases, 
such as in the Sango Mboyo case in December 2003, in Fizi on New Year’s Day in 2011 and in 
Minova in 2012.1464 In the Sango Mboyo case, for example, by applying the provisions of the 
Rome Statute, the military judges applied ‘a broader interpretation to the definition of rape than 
that provided for under Congolese law’.1465 Although these cases recorded convictions, the 
                                                            
1459 Kavumu Case: Appeal opens near crimes venue available at https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/kavumu-
case-appeal-close-to-crimes-venue/ (accessed 19 October 2018). 
1460 Trial International ‘Sexual violence in the DRC: Why is impunity so persistent? 
1461 Ibid, Constitution of the Republic of the Democratic Republic of Congo amended by Law No 11/002, arts 153 
and 215. Complementarity in the Congo: The direct application of the Rome Statute in the military courts of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo available at www.domac.is/media/domac-skjol/Domac-12-Trapani.pdf  (accessed 10 
October 2016).  Article 153 provides that ‘the courts and tribunals, both civil and military, shall apply duly ratified 
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applied by the other party.’ (‘Les traités et accords internationaux régulièrement conclus ont, dès leur publication, 
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1462 Idem at 5 and 17. 
1463 Article 166 of the Congolese Military Penal Codes definition of crimes against humanity includes quite a 
number of offences, which are classified as war crimes in the Rome Statute. For a fully explanation of these 
differences see Idem at 17, 18 and 21 – 33. 
1464 Idem at 106 and 110-112 giving a detailed summary of how the military courts applied the Rome Statutes 
provisions to these cases from those of the Military Penal Code. 
1465 Idem at 39. The Kolonga case is an example, where the military judges did not apply the Rome Statutes 




application of the Rome Statute’s provisions by the military judges has been criticised for not 
providing ‘clear criteria to explain their decision to use domestic law over international law, and 
vice versa’.1466 The deficit in applying appropriate criteria was probably due to the judges’ 
inexperience in applying treaty law such as the Rome Statute.1467 In any event there is an 
inherent conflict between the application of international criminal law and the DRC’s national 
laws.1468 
6.4 THE ROME STATUTE IMPLEMENTED IN THE DOMESTIC LAWS OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
The DRC President’s promulgation of Law No. 15/022 of 31 December 2015, Law No. 15/023 
of 31 December 2015 and Law No. 15/024 of 31 December 2015, which had the effect of 
implementing the Rome Statute into the DRC’s domestic law, modified and completed the 
Congolese Penal Code, Military Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure.1469 These laws 
recognised that the Rome Statute ‘embodies the repression of crimes that deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity and affect the entire international community as a whole, given their 
gravity’.1470 The first relates to modifications of the Congolese Criminal Code;1471 the second 
modifies the Military Penal Code, whilst the third law modifies the Code of Criminal 
Procedure.1472 These laws, which were published in the Official Journal of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo on 29 February 2016, came into force 30 days after their publication. This 
meant that SGBCs which occurred before the date when these Acts came into force would not be 
prosecuted under these Acts, unless the prosecution was by the ICC. This created an impunity 
gap in prosecuting these crimes under to the Rome Statute. Laws No. 15/022 of 31 December 
2015 and 15/024 of 31 December 2015 refer to the complementary principle under the Rome 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
when sentencing to death a Mai-Mai combatant who ordered and participated in 10 women being abducted and 
raped. 
1466 International Center for Transitional Justice ‘The accountability landscape in eastern DRC’ at 7.  
1467 Open Society Foundations ‘Putting complementary into practice: Domestic justice for international crimes in 
DRC, Uganda and Kenya at 20 (2011) available at https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/.../putting-
complementarity-into-practice-20 (accessed on 7 April 2017).  
1468 Dunia P Zongwe ‘Taking leaves out of the International Criminal Court Statute: The direct application of 
international criminal law by military courts in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2013) 46 Israel Law Review 
249 at 250. 
1469 PGA ‘PGA welcomes the enactment of the implementing legislation of the Rome Statute.’ 
1470 Office Journal of the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
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Statute, that is the obligation of state parties to try crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, with the 
ICC being a court of last resort. Law No. 15/024 of 31 December 2015 provides that: 
National courts have primacy of the crimes under Title IX of the Criminal Code 
concerning crimes against the peace and security of humanity. The International Criminal 
Court only intervenes in the alternative.1473 
In its ‘explanatory memorandum’ Law No. 15/022 of 31 December 2015 provides that: 
Since the jurisdiction of the Court is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions, 
state parties, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, have undertaken the following 
two obligations: 
 
First to fully cooperate with the Court in its investigation and prosecution for crimes 
within its jurisdiction and 
Secondly to ensure the harmonisation of its criminal law with the provisions of the 
Statute.1474 
To harmonise its criminal law with that of the Rome Statutes, Law No. 15/022 of 31 December 
2015 states that ‘there is a necessity to introduce genocide crimes, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes into its Criminal Code Decree of 30 January 1940’.1475 A flaw with the laws 
promulgated by the DRC’s President lies in the poor drafting, as they do not specify whether 
types of jurisdiction other than territorial jurisdiction will apply before the DRC’s domestic 
courts. What Law No. 15/024 of 31 December 2015 provides is that the Act ‘implies a duty to 
submit to its criminal jurisdiction those responsible for the international crimes defined in the 
Rome Statute. . .’1476 The interpretation embraced all other types of jurisdiction, that is, active, 
personal, passive and universal jurisdiction when an accused, regardless of where s/he committed 
the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, is present in the DRC. If this is the case, a distinction 
can be made with the DRC’s jurisdiction from other African states such as Burkina Faso and 
South Africa, which have implemented the Rome Statute in their domestic laws.1477 Burkina 
Faso for instance, applies the universal jurisdiction principle by stating that ‘its jurisdictions are 
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1475 Ibid.  
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competent to deal with crimes covered by this Act, regardless of where they were committed, the 
nationality of their perpetrator or that of the victim, when the accused is present in the national 
territory.’1478  
South African courts have jurisdiction over non-nationals who committed crimes within the 
ICC’s jurisdiction outside their state boundaries, but where the perpetrator is present in their 
territory.1479 
6.4.1 The sexual and gender-based crimes implemented in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo’s domestic law 
Law No. 15/022 of 31 December 2015, which modifies and supplements Decree of 30 January 
1940 of the Penal Code, defines the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
in terms similar to that of the Rome Statute,1480 thus updating its domestic law to include 
international crimes as defined in the Rome Statue. As previously mentioned, these crimes were 
solely within the military courts’ jurisdiction and were not defined as in the Rome Statute. Law 
No. 15/024 of 31 December 2015 repeals the provisions on genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes contained in Title V of the Military Penal Code 2002.1481 Law No. 15/024 also 
repeals article 207 of the Military Penal Code 2002 which provided military courts with 
exclusive jurisdiction over these crimes.1482 Only natural persons are criminally liable for these 
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act, 2002, art 4(3). 
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crimes, thus excluding companies and/or cooperatives from criminal liability.1483 In addition, an 
accused must be 18 years of age when s/he committed the crime with which s/he is accused.1484 
As with other crimes, SGBCs ‘committed with the intention to destroy in whole or in part 
a national, racial, religious or ethnic group’ would be considered a crime of genocide. As 
genocidal crimes, the SGBCs were classified as follows:  
• The members of the group were murdered. 
• There had been a serious injury to the physical or mental integrity of members of 
the group; 
• Deliberate infliction on the group’s conditions of life calculated to bring about 
physical destruction; 
• Measures to prevent births within the group; and 
• Forcible transfer of children of the group to another group.1485 
The definition of crimes against humanity is in line with that of the Rome Statute, in that such 
crimes must have been committed ‘as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any 
civilian population and with knowledge of the attack’,1486 thus avoiding the confusion in its 
application, which was the case under the Military Penal Code. Under the Military Penal Code, 
the commission of grievous crimes was taken to be ‘serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed against any civilian population before or during war’.1487 The 
Military Penal Code further stated that ‘crimes against humanity were not necessarily related to 
the state of war’.1488 This definition made crimes against humanity by the military courts 
difficult to apply, as international humanitarian law applies during an armed conflict whereas 
crimes against humanity may not necessarily occur during an armed conflict.1489 The crimes of 
‘rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced sterilisation’, enslavement, imprisonment, 
torture and forced pregnancy are crimes of SGBV included in the list of crimes which constituted 
crimes against humanity.1490 
Law No. 15/022 of 31 December 2015 also recognises war crimes committed in an 
international armed conflict or non-international armed conflict situation. Whilst article 8(1) of 
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the Rome Statue provides for the ICC to have jurisdiction over war crimes committed ‘as part of 
a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission’, such provision is not required under Law 
No. 15/022. Since this is not a requirement for war crimes before the DRC courts, it may be 
easier to convict a perpetrator for SGBCs before these courts, than before the ICC. 
Certain acts of SGBCs classified as war crimes are: 
• Torture or inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment, including biological 
experiments; 
• Wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body integrity, mental or 
general well-being; 
• Subjecting persons of fallen enemies in its power to physical mutilation or to 
medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the 
medical, dental treatment or hospitalisation, nor carried out in interest of these 
people, and which cause death to or seriously endanger their health; 
• Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as provided in 
article 222, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 7 of this Penal Code on crimes against 
humanity;  
• Enforced sterilisation, or any other form of injury or sexual violence constituting a 
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.1491 
Under article 224 of Law No. 15/022 of 31 December 2015: 
The articles of Title IX of this Code shall be interpreted and applied in accordance with the 
Elements of the Crimes provided for in article 9 of the Rome Statute and adopted by the 
Assembly of state parties on 9 September 2002.1492 
Thus, since the ICC relies on its Elements of Crimes for the interpretation and application of the 
law relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, Law No. 15/022 of 31 
December 2015 also directs that the DRC’s national courts to refer to the ICC’s Elements of 
Crimes to interpret or apply the law relating to these crimes. In the Kavumu case, mentioned 
below, the military court applied the ICC’s Elements of Crimes when considering the elements 
for rape. 
Article 21 bis, like article 25 of the Rome Statute, provides for individual criminal 
responsibility. Under article 21(1) bis for example, a person is criminally liable where that 
person commits genocide, crimes against humanity and/or war crimes ‘individually, jointly with 
another person or through another individual irrespective of whether the individual is criminally 
                                                            
1491 Loi n° 15/022 du 31 décembre 2015, art 223. 




responsible or not’.1493 Law No. 15/022 of 31 December 2015 does not provide the same 
penalties as the Rome Statute for these crimes; whilst the Rome Statute provides for 
imprisonment and a fine, as well as forfeiture of a convicted person’s proceeds, property and 
assets, Law No. 15/022 of 31 December 2015 provides that the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes are punishable by death.1494 The reason these crimes attract a death 
sentence may be because the DRC considers them to be as serious as certain other crimes in its 
domestic law, such as treason and espionage, attacks and plots against the head of state as well as 
participation in armed gangs, which also carry a death sentence.1495 
Law No. 15/022 of 31 December 2015 also provides that the crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, which it refers to as ‘crimes against the peace and security of 
humanity’, are not subject to statutory limitations, amnesty or pardon.1496 Political considerations 
around the granting of statutory limitations, amnesty or pardon to members of armed groups who 
committed SGBCs in armed conflict situations and other serious crimes, were among the reasons 
for the low number of investigations and judicial proceedings relating to SGBV crimes against 
them at the ICC and before the DRC’s military courts.1497 During the period January 2014 to 
March 2016, for example, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) 
documented only 28 convictions of rape and other offences committed by armed combatant 
groups.1498 These armed combatant groups, allegedly responsible for a number of the SGBCs 
committed against civilians, were often beneficiaries of amnesty or integrated into the Forces 
Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC).1499 Knowing that they would not 
be prosecuted but would be granted amnesty or integrated by the DRC government into the 
DRC’s national armed forces (FARDC), the perpetrators of crimes relating to SGBV were not 
deterred from committing these crimes. Also at the international level, the DRC government was 
reluctant to assist the ICC with the arrest of members of armed combatant groups once it thought 
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witnesses. OHCHR ‘Accountability for human rights violations and abuses in the DRC: Achievements, challenges 
and way forward’ (January 2014 - March 2016) para 52.  
1498Idem para 9. 




that it could enter into peace deals with these groups, although the government did self-refer 
certain cases to the ICC. The case brought against Bosco Ntaganda by the ICC is an example of 
such a situation, where the DRC government initially refused to assist in Ntaganda’s arrest, 
stating that his arrest ‘would further exacerbate tensions in the east and constitute an obstacle to 
any peace deal’.1500 
6.4.2 Immunity based on official capacity 
Article 20 quater of Law No. 15/022 of 31 December 2015 removes immunity of certain classes 
of people to which the DRC Constitution grants immunity. It provides that: 
Regarding the prosecution for the crimes referred to in Title IX on crimes against the 
peace and security of humanity, the law applies to everyone equally without any 
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as Head of State or 
Government, a member of the Government, a member of Parliament or elected 
representative or public official of the state, does not exonerate that person from criminal 
responsibility, neither does it constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.1501 
The article is similar to article 27 of the Rome Statute which provides that officials such as a 
head of state or government and members of government are not be immune from the 
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.  
In its explanatory memorandum, Law No. 15/022 of 31 December 2015 also states that 
statutory limitations will not apply to crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes ‘irrespective of the official capacity, under which certain categories of people are 
beneficiaries of immunities under domestic law’.1502 Articles 153 and 163 of the DRC’s 
Constitution specify those classes of people who would benefit from immunity under the DRC’s 
domestic law. Under article 153, the prosecution of certain public officers should be before the 
Court of Cassation ‘in the first and last resort on the infractions’ committed by them. These 
public officers are the: 
1. Members of the National Assembly and the Senate; 
2. Members of the Government other than the Prime Minister; 
3. Members of the Constitutional Court; 
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4. Magistrates of the Court of Cassation and the members of the prosecutorial office before 
that Court; 
5. Members of the Council of State and the members of the prosecutorial office before that 
Council; 
6. Members of the Court of Accounts and the members of the prosecutorial office before 
that Office; 
7. First Presidents of the Courts of Appeal as well as the Attorneys General at these courts; 
8. First Presidents of the Administrative Courts of Appeal and the Attorneys General at 
these courts; 
9. Governors, and Vice Governors of the Province and the Provincial Ministers. 
10. Presidents of the Provincial Assemblies.1503 
The DRC’s Constitution also provides that the Constitutional Court is the only court before 
which the President, the Prime Minister, their ‘co-authors’ and accomplices can be tried for 
certain criminal offences.1504 The listed offences are in article 164 of the DRC Constitution as 
‘political infractions of high treason, of contempt of Parliament, infringements of honour or of 
probity as well as crimes of privilege and for the other infractions of common law committed in 
the exercise or on the occasion of the exercise of their functions”.1505 Crimes of SGBV can be 
classified as offences relating to ‘infringements of honour or of probity’. Article 20 quater of 
Law No. 15/022 of 31 December 2015 thus removes the immunity granted to these classes of 
people relating to the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In addition, 
article 20 quater provides that one’s status does not constitute a ground for a reduction in 
sentence. 
The DRC’s Military Judicial Code provides for the prosecution of army generals before 
the High Military Court for crimes committed by them.1506 However, the military judicial system 
has been reluctant to prosecute most high-ranking officials due to pressure from the DRC 
government and other top military officials. As a result, most of these high-ranking officials who 
were directly or indirectly responsible for SGBCs escaped investigation and prosecution for 
these crimes, especially as their juniors could not prosecute them before lower military 
courts.1507 Since the promulgation of these laws, the military courts with the assistance of Trial 
International and other members of Task Force International Justice have successfully 
prosecuted Fredric Batumik, who was a Member of Parliament in South Kiv. He was convicted 
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with 10 others for the rape of 40 young girls in the village of Kavumu.1508 His lawyers claimed 
that the proceedings against him were unconstitutional, as the Congolese Constitution granted 
him immunity as a Member of Parliament.1509 The military court in a preliminary decision held 
that article 27 of the Rome Statute, which dealt with the ‘irrelevance of official capacity’, 
prevailed over the domestic immunities granted under the Congolese Constitution.1510 It is 
necessary that the military courts and the Courts of Appeal be independent of the government 
and top military officers if these courts are to be effective in prosecuting SGBCs committed in 
armed conflicts as with other crimes. The UNSC has repeatedly emphasised the importance of 
fighting impunity for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the various ranking 
officers of FARDC and the PNC. It has also emphasised the need for the DRC government ‘to 
continue to ensure the increased professionalism of its security forces’.1511 The military courts 
and the courts of appeal need to work together, by sharing experiences in challenging impunity, 
so that they overcome the political, institutional and legislative challenges faced by those 
branches of the judiciary.1512 
6.4.3 Amending the Military Penal Code to conform to the Rome Statute 
6.4.3.1 Law no. 15/023 of 31 December 2015 explanatory memorandum 
Law no. 15/023 of 31 December 2015 amends the Military Penal Code of Law No. 024/202 of 
18 November 2002. Its explanatory memorandum states that:  
The ratification by the Democratic Republic of Congo of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and its entry into force justified, at the time, the amendment of Act No. 024/2002 
of 18 November 2002 on the Military Penal Code by provisions defining and punishing the crime 
of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crime.1513 
                                                            
1508 See section below on ‘The application of the Rome Statute by the military courts after its implementation in the 
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1509 The Kavumu trial: Complementarity in action in the Democratic Republic of Congo available at 
https://www.ijmonitor.org/2018/02/the-kavumu-trial-complementarity-in-action-in-the-democratic-republic-of-
congo/ (accessed 20 September 2018). He claimed immunity under article 107 of the Congolese Constitution. 
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1511 UNSC, Resolution 2277 (2016), 30 March 2016. 
1512 ICTJ ‘Magistrates discuss dual jurisdiction of military and civilian courts over international crimes in DRC’ 
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The explanatory memorandum then goes on to state that crimes relating to peace and security of 
humanity are no longer within the exclusive jurisdiction of the military courts, thus giving 
ordinary courts jurisdiction over these crimes. The explanatory memorandum thus provides that: 
Organic Law no. 13/011-B of 11 April 2013 on the Organisation, Functioning and Competence of 
judicial authorities, recognises the competence of the ordinary courts to deal with crimes affecting 
the peace and security of humanity. Having lost the character of an exclusively military offence, 
these international crimes are now counted among the ordinary offences. 
The main innovations made to the current text are: 
The abolition of Law no. 024/2002 of 18 November 2002 of the Military Penal Code of 
provisions relating to crimes affecting the peace and security of mankind; 
The repeal of article 207 of the same law which recognised only military competence to deal with 
offences under the Military Penal Code.1514 
This provision is reinforced by the repeal of article 207 of the Military Penal Code, meaning that 
the definition of the crime of genocide, crimes against the peace and war crimes as provided for 
in Law no. 024/2002 of 18 November 2002 of the Military Penal Code (which did not conform 
with that of the Rome Statute) no longer applied and that the military courts no longer had 
exclusive jurisdiction to try the crime of genocide, crimes against the peace and war crimes.  
6.4.3.2 Command responsibility of military commanders and non-military superiors 
Article 1 of Law no.15/023 of 31 December 2015 provides for the command responsibility of 
‘military commanders or a person in effective function of a military commander’, by adopting 
the language of article 28(a) of the Rome Statute, relating to these persons’ liability for crimes 
within the court’s jurisdiction committed by their subordinates. Article 1 provides that: 
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under the Decree of 30 January 1940 on the 
Penal Code and this Act for the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, a 
military commander or a person in effective function of a military commander is criminally 
responsible for such crimes committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, 
or effective authority and control, as the case may be when he or she has not exercised 
appropriate control over such forces where: 
(a) That military commander or person knew or ought by reason of circumstances to have known 
that the forces were committing or were about to commit these crimes; and 
(b) This military commander or such person has failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures within his power to prevent or punish the execution thereof or to refer the matter to 
the competent authorities for the purposes of investigation and prosecution. 





In the case against Bemba Gambo, heard before the ICC, Trial Chamber III listed six 
requirements a court must fulfil to find a military commander liable for acts of his 
subordinate.1515 These requirements are: 
1. Crimes within the jurisdiction of the court must have been committed by forces; 
2. The accused must have been either a military commander or a person effectively acting as a 
military commander; 
3. The accused must have had effective command and control, or effective authority and control, 
over the forces that committed the crimes; 
4. The accused knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time should have known that the 
forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; 
5. The accused must have failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his power 
to prevent or repress the commission of such crimes or to submit the matter to the competent 
authorities for investigation and prosecution; and 
6. The crimes committed by the forces must have been a result of the failure of the accused to 
exercise control properly over them.1516 
The adoption by the DRC government of command responsibility of its military commanders is a 
move forward in the prosecution of these officials relating to SGBCs committed by them where 
they incite or order such crimes to be committed or fail to prevent or repress these crimes from 
happening. The prosecution of military commanders is a means for victims to obtain justice, 
especially when they cannot identify those who raped them, but can identify the armed group to 
which the perpetrator(s) belonged. 
Before the enactment of article 1 in Law no. 15/023 of 31 December 2015, Congolese 
law did not provide for liability based on command responsibility. Although the DRC military 
courts have used the command responsibility principle to prosecute a few high ranking military 
officers, there is a general reluctance by the military courts to prosecute such officers.1517 As 
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mentioned above, this is due to the interference of the powerful figures in the military and 
government establishments.1518 The reluctance to prosecute these high-level military officers is 
evidenced in such cases as the Minova Rape Case where soldiers of the Congolese army raped at 
least 76 women and girls in November 2012. An international outcry put pressure on the DRC 
government to prosecute those responsible and the military initiated a trial in Goma. Most of the 
victims could not identify those who had raped them. Although the military court applied the 
principles of command responsibility as provided for under the Rome Statute, only two soldiers 
of the Congolese army of the 39 accused were convicted of rape.1519 As stated by Human Rights 
Watch ‘[t]he high-level commanders with overall responsibility for the troops in Minova were 
never charged; those lower-ranking officers who were charged were all acquitted. A number of 
soldiers were convicted of the war crime of pillage, despite an obvious lack of evidence against 
them’.1520 However, the conviction of a FARDC commander in South Kivu in the Musenyi case, 
indicates greater zeal on the part of military courts in prosecuting perpetrators in commanding 
positions.1521  
Military commanders of FARDC also signed a declaration in March 2015 to combat rape 
committed in armed conflicts. The signed declaration by the military commanders relates to their 
command responsibility, and includes: 
[R]especting human rights and international humanitarian law in relation to sexual violence in 
conflict; taking action against sexual violence committed by soldiers under their command; 
ensuring prosecution of alleged perpetrators of sexual violence under their command; facilitating 
access to areas under their command to military prosecutors and handing over perpetrators within 
their command that are under investigation, have been indicted or convicted; undertaking 
disciplinary measures against soldiers suspected of involvement in sexual violence in line with 
the FARDC military code; reporting to the FARDC leadership any incidents or allegations 
committed within their area of responsibility; sensitizing soldiers under their command about the 
zero tolerance policy on sexual violence in conflict; and taking specific measures to ensure 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Kiva province. He was convicted to a term of 10 years imprisonment and life imprisonment by a military court of 
South Kivu in December 2014 for crimes against humanity, which included rape and sexual slavery. OHCHR 
‘Accountability for Human Rights Violations and Abuses in the DRC’ at paras 81 and 82. Human Rights Watch 
‘Justice on trial’ at 75 and 89. 
1518 Human Rights Watch ‘Justice on trial’ at 48 and 75. 
1519 Idem at 3. 
1520Even a military police battalion officer who was charged was acquitted, as the prosecution did not present 
evidence that those soldiers who were under his command committed the crimes, which occurred in Minova. Idem at 
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protection of victims, witnesses, judicial actors and other stakeholders involved in addressing 
sexual violence.1522 
As of late 2016, only 35 commanders of FARDCs military units had signed this declaration.1523 
Just as military superiors are not exempt from command responsibility, civilian superiors 
are not exempt from superior responsibility relating to crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed by their subordinates. In line with article 28(b) of the Rome 
Statute, article 22 bis of Law no. 15/022 of 31 December 2015 provides that: 
1. Regarding the relationship between non-military superiors and their subordinates, the 
superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes under articles 221 to 223 of this Penal 
Code for crimes committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, 
when he did not exercise control properly over such subordinates, in situations where: 
- the superior knew that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes; or 
- has deliberately disregarded information which clearly indicated the plan to commit such 
crimes or the commission of the crime. 
 
2. These crimes were related to activities under the superior’s responsibility and effective 
control. 
 
3. The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his power to prevent 
or repress the commission of the crime or to refer the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution.  
The liability of these civilian superiors is the same as that of military commanders.  
6.4.4 Cooperation and judicial assistance of the Democratic Republic of Congo with the 
International Criminal Court 
Law no. 15/024 of 31 December 2015 amended and supplemented the Decree of 06 August 1959 
on the Code of Criminal Procedure. It provides for cooperation with and judicial assistance for 
the ICC by the DRC, as provided by Part 9 of the ICC’s Rome Statute. The explanatory 
memorandum of Law no. 15/024 of 31 December 2015 provides that: 
This Act implies a duty to submit to its criminal jurisdiction those responsible for the 
international crimes defined in the Rome Statute and, on the other hand, the obligation to 
cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court.1524 
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Law no. 15/024 of 31 December 2015, which includes a section III bis to the amended Code of 
Criminal Procedure, states ‘the terms and conditions for cooperation between the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and the International Criminal Court’.1525 This section titled 
‘[c]ooperation with the International Criminal Court’, provides for the DRC’s full cooperation 
with the ICC ‘in the investigation and prosecution of crimes under its [ICC’s] jurisdiction under 
the conditions and according to the procedure laid down in this chapter and by other national 
provisions and by the Statute of the Court’.1526 Cooperation with and assistance for the ICC by 
the DRC, or any state member of the ICC, is essential as the ICC does not have its own 
international police force, and thereby needs to rely on state parties to assist it. The two South 
African judgments relating to President Al-Bashir of Sudan are instructive in holding that a state 
party should be judicially independent in making decisions relating to requests from the ICC 
where political issues are involved and to protect the rule of law.1527 Both the North Gauteng 
High Court, in Pretoria, South Africa and the Supreme Court of Appeal gave sound judgments, 
which were not influenced by the political issues surrounding the case. The South African 
Litigation Centre brought the action before the High Court against the government of South 
Africa for an order for the arrest and surrender of  
Al-Bashir to the ICC, when he entered South Africa for an African Union summit in June 2015. 
The government argued that it was not obliged to arrest Al-Bashir as he enjoyed immunity from 
such arrest. As dealt with in chapter 5, the ICC issued two arrest warrants for Al-Bashir’s arrest 
which were forwarded to all state parties to the Rome Statute, including South Africa. The 
arrests have still to be executed. The High Court was not aware that  
Al-Bashir had already left South Africa when it held that the South African government’s action 
in not arresting Al-Bashir was inconsistent with the Constitution and ordered it to arrest Al-
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Bashir and detain him, pending a formal request from the ICC for his surrender.1528 The 
government, however, successfully appealed against the High Court’s decision.1529  
The procedure for the ICC requesting the arrest and surrender of persons is provided for 
in article 21-14e of Law no. 15/024 of 31 December 2015. Requests issued by the ICC for the 
arrest and surrender of persons should be to the Attorney General concerned.  
Article 21-16e of Law no. 15/024 of 31 December 2015 sets forth the procedure that the Attorney 
General must follow in responding to a request for an arrest and surrender. The Attorney General 
must respond promptly to the request made by the ICC and, where he approves the request, s/he 
‘shall issue a warrant for arrest, investigate and order the arrest and detention of the person 
sought’. The article then provides that ‘the person arrested by the Attorney-General at the Court 
of Appeal shall be brought before the Attorney-General at the Court of Cassation, within a 
maximum transfer period of thirty days’.1530 
Law no. 15/024 of 31 December 2015 also provides the ICC and the ICC’s staff with 
privileges and immunities when in the DRC, ‘necessary for the performance of their duties 
within the limits and conditions laid down in article 48 of its Statute’.1531 ICC staff entitled to 
privileges and immunities include ICC judges, the prosecutor and deputy prosecutor, the 
registrar, counsel, experts and witnesses.1532 In its attempt to conform to article 88 of the Rome 
Statute, Law no. 15/024 of 31 December 2015 provides procedures for the different forms of 
cooperation specified under Part 9 of the Rome Statute.1533 The Attorney General at the Court of 
Cassation is responsible for facilitating cooperation requests received from the ICC.1534 In the 
case of the President, the Prime Minister, their co-authors and accomplices, the Prosecutor 
General is responsible for facilitating cooperation requests received from the ICC, relating to 
these persons.1535  
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6.4.5 Competing requests 
Law no. 15/024 of 31 December 2015 provides for competing requests between the ICC and 
other states at the regional level, not provided for by the Malabo Protocol. Law no. 15/024 of 31 
December 2015 provides that ‘in the case of competing requests, the competent Attorney 
General shall comply with the provisions of Article 90 of the Rome Statute’.1536 The article 
provides for two situations: competing requests between the ICC and state parties, and between 
the ICC and non-state parties. With regard to competing requests between the ICC and a state 
party for the surrender to the ICC of ‘a person for the same conduct which forms the basis of the 
crime’, the ICC shall have priority over that state party’s request for the extradition of that 
person if:  
a) The Court has, pursuant to article 18 or 19, made a determination that the case in respect of 
which surrender is sought is admissible and that determination takes into account the 
investigation or prosecution conducted by the requesting state in respect of its request for 
extradition; or  
b) The Court makes the determination described in subparagraph (a) pursuant  
to the requested state's notification . . . 1537 
However where there is no determination made by the ICC, article 90 provides that: 
The requested state may, at its discretion, pending the determination of the Court . . .  proceed to 
deal with the request for extradition from the requesting state but shall not extradite the person 
until the Court has determined that the case is inadmissible. The Court's determination shall be 
made on an expedited basis.1538 
Article 90 repeats the same principle with regard to non-state parties to the ICC. Article 90(4) 
states that where the non-state party ‘is not under an international obligation to extradite the 
person to the requesting state’, that non-state party ‘shall give priority to the request for surrender 
from the Court, if the Court has determined that the case is admissible’.1539 Where the above 
situation ‘has not been determined to be admissible by the Court, the requested state may, at its 
discretion, proceed to deal with the request for extradition from the requesting state’.1540 
However, where an international obligation is in existence, ‘the requested state shall determine 
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whether to surrender the person to the Court or extradite the person to the requesting state’.1541 In 
making its choice, the state is guided by the criteria listed in article 90(6) of the Rome Statute. 
6.4.6 The Democratic Republic of Congo applying the complementarity principle 
Article 21 octies of Law no. 15/024 of 31 December 2015 provides that the DRC’s national 
courts shall have primacy over the ICC regarding crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. This 
conforms with the ICC’s Rome Statute which states in its preamble and article 1 that the ICC 
‘shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions’.1542 Article 21 octies of Law no. 
15/024 of 31 December 2015 also gives cognisance to the complementarity principle under 
article 17 of the Rome Statute by providing that the ‘International Criminal Court only intervenes 
in the alternative’.1543 Article 21 octies of Law no. 15/024 of 31 December 2015 further provides 
that ‘when the International Criminal Court is seized, the Attorney General concerned may assert 
the jurisdiction of the national courts or, where appropriate, challenge the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court.’ Where the DRC challenges the ICC’s jurisdiction, ‘the competent 
Attorney General shall adjourn the execution of the application until the final decision by the 
Court is taken’.1544 
Although there has been progress in the number of convictions of perpetrators of SGBV 
in the DRC, the number of convictions of state agents and members of armed groups who 
committed SGBV remains low.1545 Even with the recent promulgation of the Rome Statute, the 
DRC faces challenges in its crucial fight to prevail over impunity. These challenges include the 
government’s lack of political will to try senior officers as well as difficulties in ordering and 
empowering the DRC’s army to reach volatile areas occupied by armed groups. Other problems 
include the vetting of the DRC’s security forces, training investigators to obtain evidence relating 
to SGBV and interview victims of SGBV, training more lawyers and judges in prosecuting 
SGBCs and securing its penitentiary system to prevent the escape of prisoners.1546 Although the 
Task Force for International Justice has assisted with these challenges, by training lawyers in 
prosecuting SGBCs, getting experts in child trauma to sit in on interviews of child victims and 
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successfully petitioning for the change of an official who refused to initiate an investigation, the 
government still needs to work more effectively in other areas.1547 This can be done, for 
example, by creating safer roads to reach rural areas and creating more permanent courts, as 
mobile courts are expensive to organise.1548 With the DRC’s Courts of Appeal now having 
jurisdiction to try civilians rather than the military courts, both courts need to work together in 
the investigation and prosecution of SGBCs, especially as the ICC is unlikely to prosecute many 
situations from the DRC as its caseload increases. The ICC’s OTP can also assist by encouraging 
the DRC to bring prosecutions of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction before its domestic courts. 
This can be done through its positive complementarity principle which it defines as: 
All activities/actions whereby national jurisdictions are strengthened and enabled to conduct 
genuine national investigations and trials of crimes included in the Rome Statute, without 
involving the Court in capacity building, financial support and technical assistance, but instead 
leaving these actions and activities for States, to assist each other on a voluntary basis.1549 
Three categories of assistance that the OTP offers states under the positive complementarity 
principle are legislative assistance, technical assistance and capacity-building and improving 
physical infrastructure.1550 Examples of useful technical assistance to the DRC’s military and 
civil courts are ‘training of police, investigators and prosecutors, capacity building with regard to 
protection of witnesses and victims, forensic expertise, training of judges and training of defence 
counsel, [and] security for and independence of officials’.1551 Building capacity would include 
‘mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, to underpin cooperation in actual prosecutions’,1552 
and assistance with physical infrastructure would include construction of ‘court houses and 
prison facilities, and the sustainable operation of such institutions’. The ICC would also need to 
assist the DRC’s civil and military courts in complying with internationally accepted standards in 
investigating and prosecuting cases relating to SGBV, as well as in the training required for the 
of the application of these standards.1553 In its 2016-2018 Strategic Plan, the OTP has undertaken 
to encourage states in the investigation and prosecution of potential cases that fall within its 
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jurisdiction and are genuine.1554 In 2014, when the ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda visited the 
DRC, she recognised the need to strengthen cooperation between the ICC and the DRC, as the 
ICC could not prosecute all the DRC’s cases.1555 She also stated that the ICC was willing to 
work with the DRC to end impunity in the DRC, and help in strengthening the DRC’s judicial 
system.1556 The OTP has stated that assisting states in the investigation and prosecution of cases 
will have no financial implications for the ICC, as the ICC was not a development agency.1557 As 
pointed out by the OTP, there is the need for a collective effort to prevent crimes within its 
jurisdiction.1558 Organisations such as the UN together with partners like the American Bar 
Association Rule of Law Initiative have a role to play in the prosecution of crimes through 
mobile gender courts.1559  
Law no. 15/024 of 31 December 2015 also provides for self-referrals of situations to the 
ICC by the DRC’s President, by a decision of the Council of Ministers.1560 
6.4.7  Enhancing the investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes in 
the DRC 
The military courts applied the Rome Statute’s provisions to certain cases to fill the 
inconsistencies and/or gaps in the DRC’s domestic laws relating to international law. In spite of 
this, it is still necessary for courts to take cognisance of what the OTP has done to improve its 
investigation and prosecution of cases relating to SGBCs, and to learn from its mistakes made in 
cases such as the Minova rape case.  
6.4.7.1 The rights and protection of the accused, victims, witnesses and intermediaries  
The rights and protection of the accused, victims, witnesses and intermediaries are provided for 
under section VI of Law no. 15/024 of 31 December 2015. Article 26 bis provides for the right of 
an accused to a fair, impartial and public hearing. Article 26 ter provides for the protection of 
victims, witnesses and intermediaries. Before the implementation of article 26 ter of Law no. 
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15/024 of 31 December 2015 in the DRC’s Criminal Procedure Code, no provision was made for 
the protection of victims, witnesses and intermediaries who testified, and the rights of the 
accused were not protected. Article 26 ter of Law no. 15/024 of 31 December 2015 states that: 
In the context of the punishment of crimes under Title IX of the Criminal Code, the court seized 
shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, 
dignity and respect for the privacy of victims, witnesses and of intermediaries.1561 
Article 26 ter, in part is similarly worded to article 68(1) of the Rome Statute, although it does 
not provide for the mechanisms to carry out these protective measures. The assumption is that, as 
the Rome Statute is part of the DRC’s domestic laws that it would rely on the other provisions of 
article 68 of the Rome Statute, and the ICC’s Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-based Crimes 
for guidance. The latter, for instance provides that: 
61. Potential victim-witnesses with respect to sexual and gender-based crimes shall be subject to 
preliminary psychosocial and security assessments and screenings. The psychosocial assessment 
is mandatory for all witnesses of sexual and gender-based crimes. It will be conducted by a 
psychosocial expert, who will consider the welfare of the witnesses, and their ability both to 
undergo an interview process and testify without undue personal or psychological harm. The 
expert may be present during the interview itself in order to monitor the interview and advise the 
interviewer. The expert or an accompanying person may also provide support to the witness, as 
requested. 
62. The screening will focus on assessing the individual’s personal circumstances, willingness to 
assist the investigation, evidentiary value, and working towards establishing a relationship of trust 
and respect.1562 
Thus, before an investigation relating to SGBCs is admitted for trial, the potential victim or 
witness must be interviewed to assess his or her vulnerability, whether he/she will be able to take 
the pressure of testifying in court and also to build a relationship with the prosecution team.1563 
The investigation and prosecution team must therefore adopt ‘a victim responsive approach in all 
its activities’ just as espoused in the policy of the ICC’s OTP.1564 The team needs training in 
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eliciting information relating to SGBV from victims and witnesses.1565 They must also be 
familiar with euphemisms used by victims and witnesses, and be sensitive to their feelings, so 
that they do not feel that they are being victimised.1566 
NGO’s such as the TRIAL International, which is a member of the Task Force 
International Justice network, took an active part in ensuring victims and witnesses were 
protected in the Kuvumu and Musenyi cases.1567 In the Kuvumu case, for instance, codes were 
used to identify victims and witnesses, rather than their names throughout the court proceedings. 
Also when the victims or witnesses testified they were covered from head to foot and their voices 
altered by voice-altering equipment.    
6.4.8 The application of the Rome Statute by the military courts after its implementation 
in the law of the DRC   
Two cases are significant in showing how the military courts applied the Rome Statute after its 
implementation in the DRC’s domestic law. These military courts were used as mobile courts in 
consequence of the encouragement of international and Congolese civil society.1568 These two 
cases are discussed below. 
6.4.8.1 The Kavumu Case 
The Kavumu case is significant as it was the first time that a sitting DRC Member of Parliament 
was convicted of crimes under international law. The military court sat in the village of Kavumu, 
which is 32km from Bakavu, the capital city of the South Kivu province. The trial of the accused 
commenced in November 2017 and in December of that year the court gave judgment. Eleven 
men, including Frederic Batumike, a sitting Member of the South Kiva provincial parliament, 
were found guilty of the crimes against humanity of rape and murder, and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. The militia group known as ‘Jesus Army’, which was led by Batumike, were 
found guilty of abducting and raping 40 girls between the age of 18 months and 10 years 
between 2013 and June 2016. The victims were abducted unwitnessed as they slept in the 
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Kavumu village. After they were raped, the victims were returned to or near their homes. These 
girls were raped in the belief of the fetish that the hymeneal blood from these girls gave them 
supernatural protection from enemy bullets.1569 In considering rape as a crime against humanity, 
the military court considered the elements of rape in the ICC’s Elements of Crime of rape. It 
concluded that all these elements were proved.1570 In considering the mens rea of the accused, 
the military court held that the accused were aware that the rapes were committed to obtain 
hymenal blood from the victims for protection against their enemy.1571 The military court also 
acknowledged the difficulty the victims would have in identifying their attackers on account of 
their tender age and the fact the crimes occurred at night. The court thus admitted evidence of 
parents, which was corroborated by expert medico-legal evidence.1572 Video-recorded interviews 
with the victims, conducted in the presence of international and national experts on child trauma 
were also admitted.1573 This was in line with the ICC’s 2016 Policy on Children, which provides 
that:  
. . . direct contact, confrontation or interaction between a child victim or witness and the alleged 
perpetrator should be avoided, unless the child requests otherwise. Accordingly, the Office will 
consider whether there is a need to request that the Trial Chamber allows the child witness to 
testify via video link or from behind a screen, or that the accused be absent from the courtroom 
for the duration of the child’s testimony. The Office may also request that video or audio 
recordings of interviews with children be introduced pursuant to rule 68.1574 
The military court recognised that whilst the criminal liability of an accused was determined by 
articles 25 and 28 of the Rome Statute, their criminal responsibility fell under article 25 of the 
Rome Statute as they were natural persons. The crime, in which Batumike participated, fell 
within its jurisdiction.1575 This case went on appeal to the Haute Cour Militaire, which confirmed 
the military court’s decision in July 2018.1576 
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6.4.8.2   The Muyseni Case 
The Muyseni Case is significant as Colonel Julius Becker, the leader of FARDC soldiers of the 
33071st Battalion, was convicted by the mobile military court in Muyseni, in the province of 
South Kivu, for the war crimes of rape and looting committed by his troops.  These crimes were 
committed between 20 and 22 September 2015, by FARDC soldiers against 150 civilians in the 
village of Muyseni, during an anti-militia operation.1577 Becker’s responsibility as a superior was 
considered under article 28(a) of the Rome Statute. The military court held that Becker had 
effective authority and control over his troops, as he had the power to issue or give orders, the 
ability to ensure that orders issued were executed and the ability to issue combat orders.1578 
However, concern persists that cases under article 28(a) in future might follow the approach of 
the Bemba Appeals Court regarding the requirement of necessary and reasonable measures taken 
by a commander ‘to prevent or repress the commission of crimes by his subordinates’.1579 The 
military court sentenced Becker to 10 years imprisonment, which was reduced to two years by 
the Haute Cour Militaire.1580  
6.5 Military courts a better choice to the ICC in prosecuting SGBCs 
Military courts have shown in recent prosecutions a proficiency in applying the Rome Statute to 
SGBCs, albeit with the help of NGOs such as TRIAL International and Physicians for Human 
Rights from the first investigation stage to the conclusion of the case. Prosecuting cases in the 
locations where the crimes occurred and conducting trials in the villages where the victims reside 
has been more beneficial to the victims, than taking the case to the seat of the ICC at The Hague. 
Victims are more comfortable with proceedings in their home areas that they are less formal and 
not as complex as ICC cases. The duration of cases in the DRC, once the prosecution is ready for 
trial, is short compared to the ICC. The Kavumu case for example, was heard in 23 days. Cases 
tried by the ICC are prolonged by complex logistical problems. However, cases brought before 
the military courts have their own challenges. For example, the successful prosecutions of a 
commanding officer and a Member of Parliament in the Musenyi and Kavumu cases were only 
possible without outside interference with the judicial function; it is hoped that these cases were 
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not exceptional in that regard and that the government will not interfere if similar perpetrators 
are prosecuted in future. Also, the ICC prosecutor has learnt from previous experiences, based on 
criticisms for not prosecuting Ugandan and the DRC government forces, to be more cautious as 
to the choice of cases.1581     
ICC prosecutions are hindered by its lack of a police force and having to rely on host 
states for the arrest and surrender of alleged perpetrators. As a result of South Africa’s refusal to 
arrest Al-Bashir, the ICC found it was pointless to refer the matter to the United Nations Security 
Council or Assembly of State Parties, as previous such referrals had failed. However it is worth 
noting that in the Kavumu case, when the prosecutor refused to commence proceedings despite 
substantial evidence, a successful application was made to change the prosecutor. Prosecuting 
SGBCs in the DRC for the moment seems to be the best option, although the bringing of 
prosecutions is reliant on the initiatives of international and civil actors. However, many more 
prosecutions are needed to bring justice to victims and curb impunity.   
6.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter analysed the Act which implements the Rome Statute in the DRC’s domestic laws. 
Since ratifying the Rome Statute in 2002, it has taken the DRC 14 years to promulgate the Rome 
Statute in its domestic laws. The delay has hindered the proper prosecution of SGBCs committed 
in armed conflicts. Analyses in this chapter established that the implementation of the Rome 
Statute in the DRC’s domestic laws has addressed many defects in its criminal laws with regard 
to the prosecution of SGBCs at the international level. It has for example, included command 
responsibility in the DRC’s domestic laws, which is important to bring military commanders and 
non-military superiors within the reach of the law. In addition to this, perpetrators of SGBCs no 
longer qualify for amnesty, and peace deals with the DRC can no longer subvert prosecutions. 
The Act also clarifies certain issues relating to the DRC’s relationship with the ICC in the 
investigation and prosecution of SGBV at the international level – for example, states 
cooperating with the ICC in the arrest and surrender of those wanted by the ICC. The Act 
however differs from the Rome Statute by maintaining the death penalty as a possible sentence 
for convicted perpetrators. The assumption is that the DRC contends that the death penalty is 
                                                            




warranted on the assumption that ‘international’ crimes are as serious as other crimes under its 
domestic laws which carry the death penalty. Although the military courts have not yet 
pronounced a death sentence, the Act should be amended by removing the death sentence to 
bring its sentencing in line with that of the Rome Statute.  
It was observed that the help of international actors has made the successful prosecution 
of SGBCs possible. However, the government also needs to play its part in investigating and 
prosecuting these crimes by funding for example the building of more courts which are easily 
accessible to those living in rural communities. This is essential as it would encourage victims to 
contribute to investigations and take part in trials. It is also important that more lawyers are 
trained in the prosecution of SGBV cases, taking into consideration the number of rapes which 
occur in provinces such as South Kivu. 
The chapter concludes that, with the implementation of the Rome Statute in the DRC’s 
domestic laws, the effective investigation and prosecution of these crimes at the domestic level 
could close the impunity gap for SGBCs. However, the DRC still needs the help and experience 





CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The international, regional and domestic prosecutions of sexual and gender-based crimes 
(SGBCs) committed in armed conflict situations are important to close the impunity gap which 
has historically accompanied these crimes. Prosecuting these crimes not only brings justice for 
victims, but it also reduces the stigmatisation experienced by the victims, by transferring the 
blame to the perpetrators. 
This thesis assumes that African states which ratify the Rome Statute at the international 
level, the proposed Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court 
of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights (Malabo Protocol) at the regional level and 
incorporate the Rome Statute into their domestic laws, are committing themselves to ending the 
incidence of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) committed in armed conflict situations. 
This thesis is premised on the belief that when SGBV is prosecuted at these three levels 
the historic impunity enjoyed by perpetrators is removed. Active prosecution at all three levels 
not only restores the victims’ rights and dignity but also serves as an effective deterrent to future 
perpetrators of these crimes. It is also contended that in order to close the impunity gap for 
SGBV crimes, all three levels at which prosecutions may be possible must be coordinated in 
order to effectively prevent perpetrators of SGBV from escaping prosecution. 
This thesis provided an original contribution to the legal knowledge in this area through 
researching, comparing and analysing how investigations and prosecutions of SGBV committed 
in armed conflict situations occur in practice at these three levels. The analysis illustrated that 
prosecutions for SGBV crimes are as important as those for genocide or murder. This thesis 
argues that the impunity gap can and needs to be closed at the international, regional and 
domestic prosecutorial levels. This task is not achieved with the same level of ease at every 
level; nonetheless, this thesis has identified a number of factors which need to be addressed 





7.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
This chapter provided the summary of the findings and conclusions on the research question 
posited in chapter one of this thesis. Recommendations on modalities for more effective 
approaches were made on how to bridge the impunity gap of SGBV committed in armed conflict 
situations, at the three prosecutorial levels. 
The research questions raised in chapter one were addressed in the various chapters of this thesis 
as follows:1582 
1. What is the historical framework relating to criminalisation and prosecution of SGBV 
in armed conflict situations under international law? 
2. Have the conflicting views of the definition of rape at the ICTY and ICTR helped 
strengthen the prosecution of SGBV in armed conflict situations before the ICC?  
3. In what ways has the ICC failed in bringing perpetrators of SGBV in armed conflict 
situations to justice? 
4. Will the proposed implementation of international law crimes in the African Court of 
Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACJHPR) be a viable alternative in 
prosecuting SGBV in armed conflict situations at the regional level?  
5. Can the promulgation of the Rome Statute in the DRC’s domestic laws help bridge the 
impunity gap in the fight against SGBV committed in armed conflicts in Africa? 
The following conclusions were made regarding each question. 
7.2.1 What is the historical framework relating to the criminalisation and prosecution of 
SGBV in armed conflict situations in international law? 
This question, addressed in chapter two, concluded that SGBV in armed conflict situations was 
previously considered as an inevitable consequence of war or collateral damage to be tolerated. 
Women and girls were considered men’s property, which impacted negatively on how SGBV 
was viewed.1583 This pervasive mindset affected the manner in which such crimes were tried in 
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tribunals like the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg and the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). Gender-specific crimes, such as rape against women 
and children, were marginalised before these tribunals. They were either not prosecuted or not 
adequately prosecuted. This omission lent credence to the notion that rape and sexual assaults 
committed in times of armed conflicts were not as serious as grave crimes like genocide 
traditionally committed during armed conflicts. Scholars have argued that the marginalisation of 
these crimes was because the tribunals were more comfortable in prosecuting crimes against 
peace rather than gender-specific crimes. This lack of understanding of the gravity of sexual 
violence has prevented its inclusion as criminal in international treaties and has inhibited the 
prosecution of these crimes,1584 reducing gender-specific crimes to being insignificant and 
seemingly invisible. 1585 
Given the blindness of the international community and tribunals to SGBCs, feminist 
scholars and activists, and various non-governmental organisations (NGOs), actively sought to 
have gender-specific crimes, such as rape and forced marriage perpetrated against civilian 
women and girls in armed conflict situations, recognised in international instruments and 
prosecuted in their own right. The genocide and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in 
1993 and in Rwanda in 1994, gave feminist scholars and NGOs an opportunity to employ the 
development of international humanitarian laws to address crimes of SGBV and cause laws 
relating to these crimes to be implemented. The statutes for the International Criminal Tribunal 
for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) explicitly listed rape and enslavement as 
crimes against humanity and prosecutable as such.1586 The case-law arising from both tribunals 
provides evidence of recognition of gender-based violence as war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide in international criminal law, thus ending the pattern of reluctance by the 
international community to prosecute SGBV crimes.1587 Though these two tribunals were limited 
to specific regions and conflicts, the inclusion of the crimes of rape and enslavement helped pave 
the way for gender-specific crimes to be included in the International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) 
Rome Statute. Gender-specific crimes such as rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and 
forced pregnancy are prosecutable crimes in their own right in the Rome Statute, and as crimes 
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against humanity and war crimes.1588 Nonetheless, these crimes can only be prosecuted if 
perpetrated after July 1, 2002, the date on which the Rome Statute came into force after 
obtaining the required 60 ratifications.  
The inclusion of SGBCs in international treaties is to be welcomed. This chapter, however, 
argues that though inclusion of these crimes in international treaties is necessary, there is also the 
need for their effective investigation and prosecution.  
7.2.2 Have the conflicting views of the definition of rape at the ICTY and ICTR helped 
strengthen the prosecution of SGBV in armed conflict situations before the ICC? 
The laws of war, codified in conventions such as The Hague Conventions and Regulations, the 
Fourth Geneva Convention 1949 and the 1977 Additional Protocols, implicitly or explicitly 
prohibited rape. The prohibition of rape in these conventions, was framed in a manner which 
implied that rape was a violation against a woman’s honour or dignity, rather than as an offence 
against her person.1589 The jurisprudence flowing from the two ad hoc tribunals of the ICTY and 
ICTR made a remarkable contribution to the development of the concept of rape and other 
SGBCs committed in armed conflicts as crimes in their own right at the international level.1590 
Both tribunals had to develop their definition of rape, as there was no commonly accepted 
definition of rape in international law.1591 The ICTR in Prosecutor v Akayesu made the first 
finding of rape as a crime against humanity in the context of sexual violence under international 
law.1592 The tribunal’s definition of rape is gender-neutral so as to include the rape of men and 
children and broad enough to include objects used in physically invading any part of the victim’s 
body. The tribunal also held that sexual violence included rape and was ‘not limited to a physical 
invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even 
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physical contact’,1593 such as forced nudity. Rape was also recognised as a form of torture.1594 In 
addition to a conviction for rape, Akayesu was convicted of genocide as the tribunal held that 
rape could constitute genocide.1595 
The ICTY did not follow the ICTR’s definition of rape; the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v 
Furundzija adopted a narrower definition of rape, and developed a mechanical approach in its 
definition.1596 However, the judgment in Furundzija did develop the law by recognising sexually 
violent crime as torture. The accused was found guilty of torture as a war crime under article 3 of 
its statue, as rape was held to constitute torture.1597 The accused was also convicted of outrages 
upon personal dignity, including rape as a war crime under article 3 of its statue.1598 On the other 
hand, in Prosecutor v Kunarac et al, the Trial Chamber adopted what Sellers refers to as ‘a two-
pronged lack-of-consent requirement’.1599 For the first time, an international Trial Chamber 
directly examined consent in rape, without inferring there was lack of consent from the coercive 
circumstances in which the rape was committed.1600 The Trial Chamber, thus, developed its own 
definition of rape, retaining the mechanical element of rape in the Furundzija judgment, but 
removing the requirement of coercion, force or threat of force. Furundzija is the first case in 
which a tribunal has convicted an accused for rape as a crime against humanity and for 
enslavement together with rape. Other crimes which were gender-related included torture, and 
outrages upon personal dignity. 
In Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi, the ICTR Appeals Chamber clarified the issue of consent 
relating to rape given in the Kunarac case in response to the conflicting judgments given in the 
Akayesu and Kunarac cases. The Appeals Chamber reaffirmed the interpretation of rape given in 
the Kunarac appeal judgment, by stating that the required elements of the crime of rape, as a 
crime against humanity were proof beyond a reasonable doubt of non-consent of the victim and 
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that the accused was aware of such non-consent.1601 It also ruled that non-consent may be 
inferred from existing coercive circumstances, without having to prove that the victim did not 
actually consent.1602 
The ICTY and ICTR helped pave the way for the inclusion in an international treaty of 
SGBCs committed in armed conflicts. However feminist scholars and NGOs had no easy task to 
ensure that crimes of gender-based violence were included in the Rome Statute as crimes in their 
own right.1603 The Rome Statute includes a broader range of SGBCs than those in the ICTY and 
ICTR statutes which cited rape only as a war crime and crime against humanity1604. The ICC’s 
Elements of Crimes assists the court ‘in the interpretation and application’ of crimes within its 
jurisdiction. Thus, the ICC would not need to refer to various states’ legal definition of rape to 
assist it with a legal definition of rape, as was the case in the ICTY and ICTR. 
7.2.3 In what ways has the ICC failed in bringing perpetrators of SGBV in armed conflict 
situations to justice?  
In answering this research question, chapter three considered the mistakes the ICC’s Prosecutor 
made in exercising his discretion in investigating and prosecuting crimes of SGBV committed in 
armed conflict. Chapter four examined the prosecution of these crimes before the ICC. The 
contention was that the unsuccessful prosecution of perpetrators (when successful prosecutions 
could have been obtained) resulted in victims of SGBCs not obtaining justice. The ICC lost the 
opportunity to prove to the international community that rape and other SGBCs committed in 
armed conflicts were on the same footing as other grave crimes, such as murder and genocide. 
Continuous unsuccessful prosecutions of SGBCs could result in deterring victims from giving 
evidence before the ICC, as they might feel that the ICC was not the court where justice could be 
obtained. Victims would also have not received reparations with which they could have rebuilt 
their lives. This thesis concludes that there are three prominent factors which have made it 
difficult to secure convictions for SGBV before the ICC.  
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7.2.3.1 Non-investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes committed in 
armed conflict. 
Whilst the Rome Statute directs how the Prosecutor should exercise his/her discretion, in the 
investigation of situations and prosecution of cases the final decision is left to the Prosecutor. In 
the first case before the ICC, Prosecutor v Lubanga, although the Prosecutor initially stated that 
he was willing to investigate crimes other those charged; such crimes did not include SGBCs 
committed in armed conflicts. These crimes were ‘allegations related to the intentional direction 
of attacks against the civilian population, murders committed during and after these attacks, the 
pillaging of towns and places, and ordering the displacement of the civilian population’.1605 The 
Prosecutor declined to pursue charges for SGBCs, despite the fact that mass rapes committed by 
armed militia groups and government forces earned the DRC special notoriety1606 as the ‘rape 
capital of the world’.1607 Rather than amending the charges to include SGBCs, the Prosecutor 
preferred to make submissions regarding sexual violence in his opening and closing speeches at 
the trial, and asked the Trial Chamber to take into account sexual violence as an aggravating 
factor in sentencing.1608 
The Prosecutor’s refusal to include SGBCs in the charges against Lubanga, even though 
there was evidence that such crimes had occurred, can be differentiated from cases such 
Prosecutor v Akayesu, heard before the ICTR, where the trial was adjourned to allow the 
Prosecutor to amend the charges to include sexual violence charges, after further investigations 
had been made.1609 
In sentencing Lubanga, the majority Chamber, who were males, found that the evidence 
before them was not sufficient to include sexual violence and rape as aggravating factors in 
determining sentence, holding that the Prosecutor had failed to establish beyond reasonable 
doubt the link between the accused and sexual violence. However, Judge Odio Benito, in her 
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dissenting opinion on sentence, disagreed with the majority Chamber for not finding the 
evidence of sexual violence relevant in considering the damage caused to the victims and their 
families in accordance with Rule 145(1)(c) of the Rules. She was of the opinion that there was 
sufficient evidence of sexual violence, as the victims had suffered this harm because of their 
recruitment into the militia. She was also of the opinion that taking these factors into 
consideration in the determination of sentence would not be prejudicial to Lubanga, as he would 
have had sufficient notice, time and facilities to prepare his defence during the hearing. Judge 
Benito’s dissenting judgment confirms the argument put forward by feminists for the need to 
have a fair representation of female judges who are sensitive to gender issues.1610 
7.2.3.2 Lack of proper investigation of sexual and gender-based crimes by the Office of the 
Prosecutor and proving elements of SGBCs. 
Two of the most notable cases relating to the prosecution’s failure to investigate SGBCs 
committed in armed conflicts were the cases against Katanga and Chui. The cases against the 
accused were joined in March 2008, but later severed in November 2012, when the Trial 
Chamber decided to recharacterise the mode of liability relating to Katanga’s case, pursuant to 
regulation 55 of the regulations of the court. Chui was acquitted of all charges, which included 
sexual slavery as a war crime and crime against humanity. The Trial Chamber reprimanded the 
OTP for the weaknesses in its investigation. The evidence in Katanga’s case basically the same 
as in Chui’s case. Although the Trial Chamber re-characterised the mode of liability against 
Katanga, a different mode of participation was substituted instead.1611 Katanga was found guilty 
of all the charges brought against him, which included murder as a war crime and crimes against 
humanity, but not for the crimes of rape and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity and war 
crimes under article 25(3) (d) of the Rome Statute, and also of using child soldiers as a war crime 
under article 25(3) (a) of the same statute. The Trial Chamber held that the prosecution had 
established a ‘common purpose’ for the crimes Katanga was convicted of, but had not 
established a ‘common purpose’ for the crimes of rape and sexual slavery. This case 
demonstrated that trial chambers find it easier to convict an accused for crimes such as murder 
rather than SGBCs. As stated by Askin, ICC judges were reluctant ‘to hold individuals 
                                                            
1610 Cherie Booth and Max Du Plessis ‘The International Criminal Court and victims of sexual violence’ (2005) 18 
South African Journal of Criminal Justice 241 at 248. Askin ‘Sexual violence in decisions and indictments of the 
Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals’ at 98. 
1611 Kevin Jon Heller ‘Another Terrible Day for the OTP’ available at opiniojuris.org/2014/03/08/another-terrible-




accountable for sex crimes unless they are the physical perpetrators, they were present when 
crimes were committed, or they can be linked to evidence encouraging the crimes’.1612 Apart 
from this, judges have required a high evidential burden of proof from prosecutors when 
prosecuting SGBCs. 
The OTP’s presentation of weak evidence before the Trial Chamber was as a result of its 
focused approach to ‘carry out short investigations and propose expeditious trials, while aiming 
to represent the entire range of criminality’.1613 Given that SGBCs are difficult to prove, the OTP 
needed more time to prepare its cases for trial, with staff who were experienced in sexual and 
gender-based criminal matters. 
7.2.3.3  Non-cumulative charging and the Bemba Appeals Chamber decision 
This thesis argues that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision not to charge the crimes of torture as a 
crime against humanity and outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime cumulatively with the 
charge of rape, again ranked crimes of SGBV as crimes less serious than other grave crimes such 
as murder and genocide. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber in the Bemba case held that torture and outrages upon personal 
dignity were subsumed under the category of rape. Their reasoning was that because these 
crimes were not ‘distinct crimes’ to the crime of rape; they did not have an additional material 
element which was not contained in the rape charge. It is submitted that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
erred in its judgment as the ICC’s Elements of Crimes provide different elements which must be 
proved for each of these crimes. In addition to this, a review of the negotiating history of the 
Rome Statute and of the Elements of Crimes suggests that these crimes can be charged 
cumulatively. The Pre-Trial Chamber also held that charging these crimes cumulatively at this 
stage was not critical as regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court allowed trial chambers to 
re-characterise crimes. A differently constituted Pre-Trial Chamber at the confirmation of 
charges hearing in the case against Dominic Ongwen however, held that decisions relating to 
‘concurrence of offences’ were best left to Trial Chambers to decide. Powers of the Pre-Trial 
                                                            
1612 Askin ‘Katanga judgment underlines need for stronger ICC focus on sexual violence’ (10 March 2014) available 
at: www.ijmonitor.org/.../katanga-judgment-underlines-need-for-stronger-icc-focus-on-s... (last accessed 25 July 
2016). 
1613Prosecutorial Strategy, 2009-2012, 1 February 2010, p 6 available at https://www.icc-




Chamber to refuse to confirm charges have been debated with reference to article 61(7) of the 
Rome. At Ongwen’s confirmation of charges hearing, the Pre-Trial Chamber differed from the 
Pre-Trial Chamber in the Bemba case; by holding that article 61(7) allows the Chamber to 
confirm charges where the prosecutor has achieved the requisite burden of proof. If future cases 
before the ICC follow the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in the Ongwen’s case relating to 
cumulative charging, trial chambers could convict perpetrators of SGBCs cumulatively. This 
would also reflect the true nature of the crimes committed by perpetrators of SGBV committed 
in armed conflicts. 
Also, the Appeals Chamber decision in the Bemba case has created confusion as to the 
procedure for bringing cases before the ICC and interpretation of the Rome Statute. This will 
affect future cases on SGBCs if further Appeals Chambers follow the method which the Bemba 
Appeals in Chamber took arriving at its decision.  
7.2.4 Will the proposed implementation of international law crimes in the African Court 
of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACJHPR) be a viable alternative in 
prosecuting SGBV in armed conflict situations at the regional level? 
This question was addressed in chapter five of this thesis. This thesis argues that prosecuting 
SGBCs committed in armed conflicts at the regional level will be necessary to bridge impunity 
gaps which cannot be dealt with at the international or domestic level. It also argues that the 
proposed African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACJHPR) will not be able to 
achieve this goal until the Malabo Protocol is redrafted to accommodate certain provisions; it is 
not viable in its present state, in particular with reference to the immunity clause article. In 
redrafting the Malabo Protocol, the AU needs to consult with various international bodies and 
NGOs to create a workable treaty. 
Once the proposed ACJHPR starts operating, it is suggested that its staff work in tandem 
with the ICC so that the impunity gap can be bridged at both levels of prosecution. The thesis 
concludes that in its present form, the proposed ACJHPR would not be able to meet the demands 
of investigating and prosecuting SGBCs committed in armed conflicts. It could take years before 
the Malabo Protocol is properly drafted if the AU does not show political will in prosecuting 
these crimes, and years before the required number of signatories are obtained to bring the 




prosecutorial level achieved by ICC. Also the fact that the AU favours entering into peace 
negotiations with perpetrators of SGBCs does not help solve bridging the immunity gap.   
7.2.5 Can the promulgation of the Rome Statute after enactment in the DRC’s domestic 
laws help bridge the impunity gap in the fight against SGBV committed in armed 
conflicts, in Africa?  
Chapter six began by giving a summary history of the occurrence of SGBV in armed conflict in 
the DRC. It also gave an account of the DRC’s domestic laws relevant to SGBV committed in 
armed conflict before the Rome Statute was passed as part of the DRC’s domestic law. The 
provisions of the Rome Statute came into force in the DRC 30 days after they were published in 
the DRC’s Official Journal on 29 February 2016,1614 demonstrating a commitment by the DRC 
to prosecute SGBV committed in armed conflicts according to international law. The Act 
amends and completes the rationalisation of the Congolese Penal Code, Military Penal Code and 
Penal Procedure Code, thus bringing these laws in line with that of the Rome Statute. 
The Act not only spells out the relationship between the ICC and the DRC courts relating 
to the prosecution crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, but also the 
DRC’s courts’ obligations in prosecuting these crimes. Issues such as cooperation with the ICC 
in the investigation and prosecution of SGBCs, arrest and surrender of perpetrators of SGBCs 
and competing applications between the ICC and other states were addressed. The Act contains a 
provision for the prosecution of military commanders and civilian superiors, which was never 
provided for in its domestic laws. Prosecuting these classes of people bridges the impunity gap 
for SGBCs committed by state agents. The Act deviates from the Rome Statute by providing for 
the death penalty, and not imprisonment, where an accused is found guilty of these crimes. The 
thesis argues that in imposing the death penalty the DRC has brought SGBV committed in armed 
conflicts to the same level as other grave crimes in its domestic laws for which the sentence of 
death is competent.  
This thesis also contends that although mobile courts are presently best placed to 
prosecute SGBCs, they may not be the best mode of prosecution in the long run, on account of 
the cost of organising and running such courts. The thesis makes recommendations for the 
effective investigation and prosecution of SGBCs, concluding that military courts, with the help 
                                                            




of international actors, appear to be the best forum at present for bringing perpetrators to justice. 
Furthermore, an increase in the number of permanent courts in more remote areas of the DRC 
will help facilitate access to justice for victims and witnesses. Other steps necessary for an 
effective investigation and prosecution of SGBCs are also mentioned below as 
recommendations.  
 
7.3 Impediments to the investigation and prosecution of SGBV committed in armed 
conflicts common at all three levels. 
There are two key impediments which this thesis has identified that will affect bridging the 
impunity gap for SGBV committed in armed conflicts at the international, regional and domestic 
levels. The first is insufficient resources for the investigation and prosecution of these cases, and 
the second the prosecution of heads of state and senior officials who are still in power. 
7.3.1 Resources 
Having sufficient resources to mount the fight against SGBV committed in armed conflict is 
paramount. Insufficient resources handicapped the ICC in thoroughly investigating and 
prosecuting it first few cases, which forced it to adopt a sequential approach in its investigations, 
which led to the acquittal of those charged with SGBV. African states which are parties to the 
Rome Statute, which become parties to the Malabo Protocol and also prosecute SGBV at the 
domestic level, will find it difficult to meet their financial obligations at all these levels. As 
SGBV cases are complex and time-consuming, a great amount of funding needs to be ploughed 
into the investigation and prosecution of these cases. 
Some African states are yet to meet their financial obligations at the international level. 
With regard to the regional level, the proposed ACJHPR will be overwhelmed by the volume of 
crimes to be prosecuted, considering the number of crimes over which the court has jurisdiction. 
Even with a restructuring of the court, it will still face a problem with funding. This thesis 
suggests that the proposed ACJHPR, once it starts operating, should consider following the lead 
of the ICC in adopting a concurrent approach to its investigations, which would help it to 
effectively utilise its resources, dedicate sufficient time in the collection and analysis of 




as certain states may fail to meet their financial obligation to the proposed ACJHPR.1615 Even in 
the event of the DRC having resources to investigate and prosecute SGBCs, the DRC would 
need to continue relying on international help, as is the case with the ICC.  
7.3.2 Prosecuting Heads of States and top government officials 
Prosecuting heads of state and top government officials is going to be a major problem at all 
levels of prosecution, as observed in Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir, unless states 
are willing to cooperate in the arrest and surrender of such persons wanted by the court making 
the request.1616 Without such cooperation, an immunity gap is created in the investigation and 
prosecution of these persons. In addition to this, at the international level, if a state is not willing 
to allow the ICC to investigate the situation in that state, the evidence needed to prosecute the 
case would be lacking. With the ICC’s caseload increasing, it would prefer to prosecute those 
persons in respect of whom it could easily obtain cooperation from a state to investigate and 
prosecute. Also, the ICC is unlikely to invest in cases where cooperation is not forthcoming, as 
finances could better be diverted to investigate and prosecute other cases. 
At the regional level, article 46A bis of the Malabo Protocol provides for the non- 
prosecution of sitting heads of states and senior government officials. The problem with this 
provision is that a number of African heads of states do not relinquish power when they have 
served their term in office. By the time they do relinquish power; victims might have already lost 
hope of obtaining justice, as they would have had to wait years before the accused is prosecuted, 
some victims would have died and victims’ memory of recounting the exact event may have 
faded. Also, this would not have a deterrent effect in preventing perpetrators from committing 
SGBCs, as they would hope that they would never have to face trial. 
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations were made to the ICC, the AU and the DRC for the effective 
investigation and prosecution of SGBV committed in armed conflict: 
7.4.1 ICC policy 
                                                            
1615 ICC, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, June 2014, para 49 available at 
www.icc.cpi.int/.../OTP-Policy-Paper-on-Sexual-and-Gender-Based-Cri... (accessed on 25 October 2016). 




The ICC’s policy paper on sexual and gender-based crimes, its strategic plan for 2016 to 2018, 
and its 2016 policy paper on case selection are to be welcomed.1617 The policies reveal that the 
ICC still needs to work hard to bring SGBCs to the forefront. 
The following recommendations are made for bridging the impunity gap at the international level 
with regard to SGBCs committed in armed conflict:  
1. The OTP should rebuild its relationship with member states, as their assistance in the 
arrest and surrender of perpetrators of SGBCs is vital. This could be done by 
engaging those African states which have a strong influence on other African states to 
conduct dialogue on its behalf.  
2. The OTP should periodically review its Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-based 
Crimes, considering the complexity involved in investigating and prosecuting these 
crimes.1618 
3. The OTP must ensure that charges are properly drafted and that the evidence relates 
to the elements of the crimes charged.1619 
4. ICC judges need to be sensitive to sexual and gender-based issues and consider them 
on the same level of importance as other serious crimes. They must correctly interpret 
the law, for example, with regard to the elements of crimes required for crimes 
relating to SGBV.1620 
7.4.2 At the regional level the following recommendations were made to the AU and the 
proposed ACJHPR in bridging the impunity gap for SGBCs committed in armed 
conflict: 
To the AU: 
1. Amend the following articles in the Malabo Protocol:1621 
- Article 46A bis on immunity. Alternatively have a provision similar to article 16 
of the Rome Statute or enter reservations to article 46A bis; 
                                                            
1617 See chapters 3, 5 and 6. 
1618 The ICC for example has a Strategic Plan for June 2012-2015 and 2016 -2018. The Policy Paper on Sexual and 
Gender-Based Crimes was published in June 2014. 
1619 See chapter 3 under 3.3.3. Also chapter 4 under 4.4.1.2.  
1620 See for example chapter 4, regarding the ICC judges’ refusal to cumulatively charge the crimes of torture and 
outrages upon personal dignity. 4.4.1.2 (The confirmation of charges hearing), and 4.5.4 (non-confirmation of 
cumulative charges).  




- Article 28B, under the genocide chapeau to include the term ‘political groups’; 
- Article 28C relating to crimes against humanity, by defining the term ‘enterprise’; 
- Define the term ‘cruel inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment’ under 
article 28C(f); 
- Amend article 28D(b)(xxvii) to include the term militia groups as they are also 
conscript or enlist children. 
- Amend article 34(b) which limits NGOs’ and individuals’ ability to institute 
proceedings where a state has not made a declaration. 
To the proposed ACJHPR: 
1.  Employ a special adviser on gender issues.  
2. A policy document on sexual and gender-based crimes must be drafted and also a 
document defining the proposed court’s strategic plans in the investigation and 
prosecution of SGBV committed in armed conflicts. 
3. It is essential that the staff and judges appointed to the proposed court are adequately 
trained to identify and be sensitive to gender issues before the court. They should also 
be trained to identify gender aspects in crimes such as trafficking, which are non-
sexual violent crimes.1622 
7.4.3 At the domestic level, using the DRC as a case study, the following 
recommendations were made: 
To the DRC Government: 
1. Take an active part, with international and civil actors, in the prosecution of SGBCs.  
2. Invest in building more courts to make it easier for victims and witnesses of SGBV to 
have access to justice and give evidence in court. Also facilitate their access to legal 
assistance. With regard to existing courts, invest in equipping them and their 
personnel to investigate and prosecute SGBCs. 
                                                            
1622See Special adviser on gender completes her mandate (August 2016) available at  
www.4genderjustice.org/pub/Special-Adviser-on-Gender-completes-her-mandate.pdf (accessed on 19 May 2016). 
Ms Inder, on leaving office as the special adviser to the OTP, suggested that the OTP should ‘identify gender aspects 
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also be useful at the regional level as the proposed ACJHPR would have jurisdiction over crimes which are non-




3. Continually engage with international donors to provide financial and technical 
support for mobile military and civil courts to facilitate effective investigation and 
prosecution of SGBV crimes.1623 
4. Intensively sensitise society to SGBV, so that victims will not be stigmatised by their 
community. At the same time, have campaigns which will let perpetrators of this 
crime know that their actions will not be tolerated.  
5. Periodically train military commanders and civilian superiors on the Rome Statue, 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law so that they are 
aware that if they fail to control their troops that they would be prosecuted for failing 
to effectively do so.1624 
6. Allow courts to have a free hand in bringing prosecutions against perpetrators of 
SGBCs, irrespective of their rank. 
7. Amend the provision for the death penalty in the law implementing the Rome Statute 
to bring it in line with international law, which does not provide for the death 
sentence.  
To the DRC courts and police: 
1. Increase the capacity of the specialised national police unit which receives and 
responds to SGBCs. Also sensitise the police and prosecutors to bring cases of 
SGBCs before the courts.1625 Do not depend on local NGOs to refer cases which 
have been classified as priority to the court. 
2. Integrate a gender perspective and analysis at all stages of its work.1626 
                                                            
1623 This is the fourth strategic goal which the ICC had adopted, to enable it to monitor, prove and present crimes 
due to the growth in various forms of technology. Strategic Plan| 2016-2018, 6 July 2015 at 23 available at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/.../070715-OTP_Strategic_Plan_2016-2018.pdf  (accessed 11 November 2016). As the DRC 
is unlikely to raise such funds on its own, it is suggested that they liaise with international donors to raise these 
funds. 
1624 Chapter 6 under 6.2 stating that government forces such as the Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique 
du Congo (FARDC) and the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC) also rape civilians. 
1625 See chapter 6 relating to the Kavumu case where a successful application was made to change the initial 
prosecutor who did not want to prosecute the case.   
1626 The ICC has adopted this method. See ICC, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, June 2014, paras 





3. Train court staff and judges to identify and be sensitive to gender issues before the 
court. Conduct periodical training on the application of the Rome Statute, 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law. 
4. Draft a policy document on SGBCs and also a document defining the courts strategic 
plans in investigating and prosecuting SGBCs committed in armed conflicts. 
5. Work closely with the ICC and international and national actors in the prosecution of 
SGBCs committed in armed conflicts at the international and domestic stages.1627 
6. Ensure the protection of victims and witnesses. 
7. Be judicially independent in making decisions, especially from those involving 
political decisions.  
8.  
7.3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This thesis considered the prosecution of perpetrators of SGBCs committed in armed conflict at 
the international, regional and domestic levels, giving consideration to whether each level of 
authority involved in prosecuting these crimes was equipped to do so; and by so doing to able 
bridge the impunity gaps in the system.  
With the ICC’s continuing prosecution of these crimes, and in the light of its policy paper on 
SGBCs, its strategic plan for 2016 to 2018, and its 2016 policy paper on case selection, it is 
likely that the impunity gap for these crimes will eventually be bridged at the international level. 
Given that the ICC is a court of last resort, states should assume responsibility in pursuing these 
offences. This thesis contends that although the Act implementing the Rome Statute into the 
DRC’s domestic laws was passed in 2016, the impunity gap could be bridged at this level, if the 
recommendations given above are adhered to − although it may take a few years for significant 
convictions to be obtained. In the interim, assistance given by international actors to the mobile 
military courts has helped in starting to bridge this gap. At the regional level, with the adoption 
of Malabo Protocol in its present form, it is unlikely that these crimes involving heads of state 
and top governmental officials will be successfully prosecuted until the Protocol is redrafted to 
rectify this problem. Thus, further research is recommended for prosecuting heads of state and 
senior government officials for SGBCs committed in armed conflicts. Although the Rome 
Statute provides for their prosecution it is unlikely that they will be brought to justice whilst in 
                                                            




power, unless states are willing to cooperate with the ICC for their arrest and surrender. Thus, 
research as to how this impunity gap can be addressed would be valuable.  
This thesis concludes by reiterating the importance of victims of SGBV committed during armed 
conflicts obtaining justice at the international, regional and domestic levels. As stated by the 
Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2011, when referring to the plight of victims in 
the DRC: ‘We have heard so much about the mass rapes in the Congo but what has been missing 
is the voice of the victims . . .  . The international community and concerned people go and listen 
to the victims’ horrendous stories but then what? What has become of their lives since?’1628 
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